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
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
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






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PRESENT RELIGION.



# PRESENT RELIGION:

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A FAITH OWNING FELLOWSHIP WITH  
THOUGHT.

BY  
*Alma*  
SARA S. HENNELL,

AUTHOR OF "THOUGHTS IN AID OF FAITH."

PART II.—FIRST DIVISION :  
INTELLECTUAL EFFECT.

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## PART II.

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PRESENT RELIGION, CONSIDERED AS TO ITS  
BEARING UPON THE EXISTING SPHERES OF  
INTELLECT AND PRACTICAL FEELING.

*This Volume comprises the four Treatises that have been already published separately under the following titles:—*

COMPARATIVISM: EXPLAINING THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH RELIGION APPEARS STILL TO BE SET IN NECESSARY ANTAGONISM TO POSITIVISM. pp. 1—160.

*published January 1869.*

COMPARATIVE METAPHYSICS I.—METHOD THE REVERSE OF THAT OF SCIENCE, ARGUED TO BE THE MEANS, IN REALITY, TO THE DEEPEST KIND OF HARMONY WITH SCIENCE.

*published October 18 69.*

pp. 161—264.

COMPARATIVE METAPHYSICS II.—ON SYMBOLISM. MENTAL "SEX" TREATED AS ISSUE OF A GENERAL ANALOGY BETWEEN FORMS OF THOUGHT AND FORMS OF BEING. pp. 265—432.

*published October 1871.*

COMPARATIVE METAPHYSICS III.—SYMBOLIC METHOD ARGUED FOR, AS WHAT IS RIGHTFULLY IN DEMAND, OF AN ONTOLOGICAL RESPONDENT TO SCIENTIFIC METHOD.

*published November 1873.*

pp. 433—602.

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## ERRATA.

Page 289, line 1, for "for" read "as."

" 490, lines 20, 21, for "was still what was nothing more than Form-less," read "was even more than as to Orb-Forms without Form,"

" 434—448, correct the numbering,

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## **INTRODUCTORY EXPLANATION.**

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# INTRODUCTORY EXPLANATION

RESPECTING

INDIVIDUALISTIC POSITION.

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SECTION I.—THE MANNER IN WHICH ALL IMPROVEMENT IN RELIGION IS HELD TO BE ATTENDED BY AN INCREASED PERSONALITY IN OUR REALIZATION OF IT; AND NOT ONLY IN OUR IMPRESSION, BUT ALSO IN OUR EXPRESSION, OF RELIGION.

I AM now come to the point in my projected exposition where Personal Experience in Religion must be treated *directly*. I have approached to such treatment at the end of my last volume, and have all along cast occasional glances towards it; but henceforth it must occupy me entirely. Accordingly, I have described the past work of Investigation, virtually, in the title which I have appended to it, as merely the seeking out of the ancestral derivation for that matter of living consciousness to myself, of which I am offering the autobiography. In order to legitimize to myself the personal instincts upon which my actual Religion depends, I have acknowledged it incumbent upon me to find a source for them in the continuously-developing instincts of common humanity; and this demand I have met by tracing them back in reality, as I believe, to their very earliest provocation in human nature. But still this

has been only preparatory to the task that is eminently my principal one.

Nor is it easy to take account of the *difference* between the two kinds of mental effort, which makes itself felt the moment that one is exchanged for the other. So long as the work of Investigation was that which engaged attention, there was no warning of the peculiarity in the transition. But the very instant this has been effected,—just by the over-passing of the finishing stage of preparation into the culminating station prepared for,—the emerging of attention thus at once upon its full object calls for an utterly-varied frame of disposition. And the nature of the case is, moreover, that to estimate this change aright, both as to the character of it, and its magnitude, forms the foundation to every other sort of judgment now requisite. Here, therefore, is the need that I feel to supply this present Introduction, as an addendum to the one which I originally expected to serve for my entire work. I find that the very elements of consideration are by this juncture so shifted in their character, that to proceed to the new treatment I desire is impossible, except through a corresponding modification of my basis.

And yet this new occasion *was*, in a manner, anticipated in my beginning statement of principle. In filiating my own personal feeling, as I did, upon a common stock of human feeling,—the attestation of whose genuineness as Religion was the Progress in Beneficialness to human beings, which was of the supernal kind to individuals that arises out of its being procurable by no one person for himself,—I stated also at length the condition laid by nature for this Progress. And that was the reception, on the part of the common stock, of continuous accessions of nutriment to its substance, gained out of an alien sphere.

to Religion :—gained, namely, by efforts which, in being intellectual, are therein specifically non-religious. Such concession, then, surely gives reason for the present effect. If intellectual strivings to understand Religion, however ministrant to its proper appreciation, be yet of this alien nature to the latter, it is the true course of experience that the contrast should be felt as such. And to be added to this is the fact that the difference—explained as I am about to explain it,—falls precisely upon the circumstance requisite to exhibit the effect of the ministration.

I mean, upon the sense of Personality, as attached to the appreciation. While mere Investigation is in question, the self-consciousness of the investigator is best in abeyance. It would indeed be desirable that it should be altogether lost sight of, if it were not for the latent requirement, indispensable to the case, of preserving connection with the End to which Investigation is subsidiary, all such reference involving a degree of constraint laid upon what, on its own account, should be a thoroughly abstract operation. And accordingly I endeavoured, in my first working out of my plan, to subdue all obtrusion of my individuality, to the utmost that my object permitted. But when it now happens that this object, in being directly faced, is forced to be recognized as a deepened self-consciousness, how can it be otherwise than that the display of my Religion must be identified with the display of my Selfism? I feel, for my own part, that there is no means of avoiding the dilemma. I see that I am compelled, upon my own terms, to recognize that whatever I desire to show as improvement in my Religion, must be shown by so reversing the proportions of importance between my different objects, that now I must specifically aim to draw attention to my Selfism.

And this appears to me the farthest from a mere matter

of personal shrinking, which ought to be settled alone privately with myself. To accept the dilemma fully and openly *as* a dilemma, seems to me the root-element towards all true understanding of Religion. How *can* we understand it, I ask myself, except by doing right to every instinct connected with it? And from all that I have been hitherto gathering, the nature of Religion is indeed universally fraught with self-contradictions, making this new one little surprising.—My first object, therefore, in this Introduction, is to concentrate all my hitherto purpose on this point: to examine why, and in what manner, Religious Observation must be Self-Observation. But it happens, moreover, that a notable circumstance in the state of things bears upon the very same exigency.

This is the specially-opposite to my own intended dealing with the dilemma which I see adopted in the system of Positivism. With an object such as mine is, precisely of estimating the circumstances that *are* extant, it would be fatal to the integrity of my position not to adjust it fairly towards that system. And this involves a new diffusion of principle, much more extensive than the concentration of it will be narrowing. I require, namely, to justify my perceived contradiction to Positivism by a sufficient examination of *its* basis, to show that *my* basis respecting the nature of Religious Development is not really invalidated by the opposition. Such, accordingly, will be the mould into which, in fact, the whole of this introductory matter will be thrown: since my aim now to establish a true acceptance of religious condition,—this being the destined purpose of the present section,—will be seen to form my only ground for afterwards dealing with Positivism.—And I may indeed say that the case is scarcely different between this entire Introduction and the matter to follow it: in so very slight a degree is all

this really a divergence from the treatment that would have accompanied an entering at once on the direct process intended.

For I must state it as my own immediate pre-judgment, that the reason for Positivism's erring as I believe it to do, is deeply connected with the natural repugnance in question, especially strong in minds that are especially intellectual. If, to such minds, intellectual strivings *are* aberrant from Self-religiousness, the first impulse with them can only be to take the aberration for desirable. But then, to oppose this, I offer to show how the Religion that I have in view forms a Selfism quite different from such as former religionists have contemplated; even while my view is built upon theirs.

The one qualification upon which I desire to rest my consecutiveness, and which moreover I am convinced that not the most specially intellectual minds ought to deny as desirable, is my assent that the characteristic frame of mind for Religion is a comparatively *passive* one. According to my understanding of it, a religious disposition means that which binds the human consciousness, by a specially-centred kind of consciousness, in relationship with the sort of facts in the universe of which this central faculty alone can take cognizance: that is, with *general* facts.—And all that I have to say hereafter will be only what tends to demonstrate the proposition!—But I consider that *general* facts, in the nature of things, never can be estimated rightly, except precisely while thought, of the properly active sort, is at rest.

And hence follows the danger, to be felt as such, in too-long-maintained aberration, when the purpose is a religious one. For, at the same time that the intellectual

strain in such case is immeasurably heightened by the *indirect* posture of thought, the loss of power in the mind to right itself from the strain, always incident to extreme tension, is fatal to the quality of Sensitiveness in the mind, which alone enables it to receive general impressions. For this, nothing else will serve but the rest, which is really rest:—that is, the quietude which is known as such by coming after exertion, such as is not a too-much forced exertion.

In being at rest, when the mind is so, religious influences may come to it. They can never do so otherwise! This is the condition which has belonged to religious experience all its whole life hitherto, and which I am determined, for my own part, to abide by. The mind must not actively seek them, but only lie still, and wait till they sink into it.—But always comparatively speaking. There are degrees of rest, as of activity. And I have no intention of saying that where the rest is an intellectual rest, such as is now supposed to be in question, there is not still in requisition the alternating strain, which is softened into a direct one.

In this way, I preserve the self-consistency for Religion, which imports that no intellectualizing of it whatever needs to interfere with the prime condition of its being matter of personal impression: recognized, upon lower grounds, by universal religionists. Nor, so far as personal *im*-pression alone is concerned, would any one at all, I suppose, contest the conclusion. But the state of the case is, that intellectualization of religion, just as of every other matter of consideration, demands that *im*-pression shall be followed up by *ex*-pression. And here arises the struggle of contrary proprieties which makes up the dilemma in question. When thought requires to operate upon self-impression in the proper manner of intellect,

distinctively such, it must necessarily convert the at-first passive consciousness of selfism, into a directly active and ostensible self-consciousness, so far as the part of self is concerned which was the recipient of the impression. And an ostensible self-consciousness, even when thus limited, is, by the nature of it, that which jars against the intellectual habitude.

Here seems the true reason why religious utterance is held back, in literary practice, as it notoriously is, from following the rule gaining ground as to all other sorts of expression of "opinion," that it needs imperatively to be accompanied by a clear acknowledgment of responsibility. For the mere fact of the contrary sorts of conscience engaged,—conscience religious and conscience secular, and each equally genuine of its own sort, however they conflict with one another,—shows the actual depth of the inducement present to avoid here such responsibility, of a nature quite beyond the superficial respects which at first seem principally concerned in anonymous writing. A different reason, indeed, is wont to be alleged by the authors who adopt this practice. They are accustomed to sum up their balance of opposing considerations, by resting in the principle, that to make religious "opinion" take rank with other sorts of "opinion" is a desecration to the nature of religion. But this, to me, seems an argument fit only for orthodox decriers of intellect, and by no means adapted to the class of thinkers amongst whom anonymous writers upon religion ordinarily fall. At all events, it is one that tells, for myself, on the contrary side to that for which they use it. Believing, as I do, that unless religious investigation is mixed up with the personal considerations which *they* desire to abstract it from, it is rendered null and void of religious effect, the prohibition upon non-responsibility for expression is rendered emi-

nently more indispensable here than in any other possible case. Unless the writer's personality goes fully and openly in company with his expressions, his testimony towards the nature of religion seems to me to be really arrested upon a class of considerations which altogether falsify the result. I mean, by showing his results in the manner of a veiled hypothesis, instead of in the manner of directness which the form of the writing pretends to.—If, indeed, the writing be of the nature of acknowledged fiction, the fact of the acknowledgment sufficiently obviates this objection: seeing that it *is* a legitimate and highly serviceable purpose to present hypothetical specimens of what religion in thought and action may be, and especially when thought and action are in mingled representation. But this is not the understood case with graver works. Here there is expected, and certainly ought to be expected, that whatever hypotheses are presented are such as stand, in the writer's belief, on proof of experience.

Thus, to try to master the difficulties in the way of personal treatment, by forcing the subject into the aspect of abstractness, seems to me an evasion of them, in the place of a real surmounting. The only resource I can see, is, to fairly take up a stand on one side or the other of the opposite grounds of obligation; so that whatever wrong is done,—and I believe, for my own part, that the very emergency is, that wrong *must* be done in one way or the other,—it may be done with the least possible of wrongfulness. And this is the kind of advantage that I claim for my own position, compared with that of the orthodox. Though my case is incomparably more complicated than theirs, owing to my recognition of a secular conscience at all to compete with the religious, yet I am enabled so to assort the departments, that I can add this of strength to my religious assertion, beyond theirs, that, in not ignoring



the matter of social obligation, I can yet impugn it. Taking up the religious party-station, I can openly make it my choice that whatever infringement of obligation is necessary, shall fall outside this, and not inside.—And now I will show my actual manner of effecting this arrangement:—the so doing being in fact, as will be seen, equivalent to stating in essence my entire change from orthodoxy.

The desecration of Religion, really such, which needs to be shunned in the discussion of its topics, I can necessarily only admit to be that frame given to the discussion, which causes the intellectual instrumentation for religion to appear more important than religion itself:—or, in other words, that which strikes the balance between legitimate matter of *ex*-pression, and matter desirably reserved for sole *im*-pression, injudiciously. Nay, I must even say that, according to my view of it, religion precisely consists in—has no other existence except in—the realization of such balance between these as *shall* be a just one. And to see this, together with the fundamental obstacles in the way of success, we have only, as I believe, to recur to that deepest part of religion which indeed underlies all ground whatever of controversy, and pertains to universal experience.

No one will question that the deepest and truest part of religion is that which is wont to express itself in a quite different manner from what is ordinarily meant when we speak of “expression.” It is that which is precisely incapable of such means of uttering itself. It is a latent force in human nature which, because it is latent, acts of right only in the manner of a pervading impulse for conduct-direction. It is that which speaks never in words, but only in the mute language of deeds. Word-tampering with it, if such be ventured upon, destroys it,—in so far,

namely, as this best character is concerned. Here is what the instinct planted in the bosoms of every one of us tells us assuredly and unmistakeably. The prime condition of all in the matter, is therefore that a sufficient store of such internalized energy shall be reserved by every human being sacred from such tampering.

But the counter-fact in the case is this, that we have likewise instincts, of another sort, which constantly impel us to break through the primitive religious instinct; and which, moreover,—paradoxical as the assertion sounds,—have the effect of in this manner heightening the religious store, and in the only possible manner in which it can be heightened, so long as the expenditure implied in the conflict is not carried beyond its due limits. Unless the internalized store risks something, it gains nothing; while, in gaining nothing, it is in the way of utter loss. For this is the law of our relation, as human beings, with one another, that we *must* intercommunicate, to a certain extent, even as to our *almost*-deepest of life-endowments. In supposing ourselves to own a strength which others want, enabling us to meet life's trials as they seem not enabled, how can we do otherwise than unfold our store, even though it *be* at the risk of diminishing it;—and though, moreover, the risk is of a kind, as experience has taught us, that implies the keenest of self-injury? Whatever we do thus communicate, if not successfully,—if not received with the sympathy that alone can make it successful,—entails the penalty of a misunderstanding that includes contempt: carrying a destructive re-action within which is of the sort most exquisitely difficult of all others to be combated. For, whatever be the cause of failure otherwise, this at all events is certain in the case: that the speaker, with whatever good intention he may have spoken, has not spoken with the delicacy of method, and the de-

gree of restriction, with which he needed to have spoken, in order to success. And thus his conscience is forced to join in crying him down ;—while, moreover, the painfulness of self-condemnation is increased by the knowledge that the injury occasioned must spread, more or less, and in different ways, upon all persons within reach of the effect. Here then arises, from all these complicated feelings in combination, what I account as the true source of the dilemma that is never thereafter to cease from belonging to religion, but only to go on spreading and deepening in proportion as religion itself spreads and deepens :—the natural occasion for *reticence* in regard to what, nevertheless, at proper times and in proper manner, requires to be openly divulged.

But now let me compare my position towards this dilemma with that of orthodoxy,—so that I may show, according to my just-stated proposition, how the encreasing peril in the case, is yet not such as affects the specially-important part of religion, but only that which is justly amenable to social inflictions.

The difference lies altogether in the fact that what I have come to esteem as the mere liability to a false balance of judgment, derogatory to myself in the presence of fellow beings, is backed to the orthodox by the danger of incurring a false relation towards Deity. For the abstraction, in my own case, of the latter consideration, as not only injurious from its crudity, but positively irrelevant to the point, involves the essential practical variation, that an altered set of motives comes into question as likely to induce expression of religion. To orthodox professors the whole nature of their faith is that which in their own eyes must necessarily justify their making *boast* of it. The latent strength which they seek to maintain is known to them as “the love of God” ; to make assertion of which,

therefore, it would be a direct insult to Deity to regard as calling forth the shame-facedness towards men, which the *reticence* here taken as natural proves to be appropriate. Hence the only motive that remains with them, to guard them from the over-talking about religion, is the danger of wearing off the edge of their own piety. But in the nature of things this can only be a very feeble restraint, while the supposition is that the profession contains an act of homage towards God. And the nature of this profession, again, is such as can only, in the existing state of cultivation, redound (in so far as it is genuine,—this being of course understood,—) to the honour of the professor. But the case is quite the reverse with myself. That which backs the entire subject of religion to me is what does not in the least, in ordinary estimation, redound to the honour of the person who has the keenest sense of it. It does not in the least afford the special temptation to make boast of profession, to which the Christian supposition induces such easy proclivity. For who could possibly be led to talk over-much, at all events in the method of boasting of it, of the circumstance in our nature to which I have assigned the origin of all religion:—namely, to the fact of our self-conscious shrinking from Death! This is a fact, surely, respecting which there is no possible occasion of enforcing reticence upon us by any extrinsic motive. The instinct of hiding it to the utmost from fellow-creatures, is only so much beyond the need of any safe-guard being put on its expression, that desirableness falls altogether the other way!—As to the Christian basis of the “love of God”, whatever may be said and believed as to its capability of rising entirely above the quality of personal fear, there is assuredly attached to it, in any case but that of extremest fanatics, an open possibility, openly allowed for as such, of the Divine communion implied by

it suffering interruption: this liability giving rise in effect, as I conceive, to the very urgency of over-expression indulged in, and which is so with a view to satisfy self, if not to convince others, of the interruption's not having occurred. But there is *no* possibility that by much talking about dying, or our fear of dying, we should thereby remove Death, or even our own fear of it! This is *what* we can never talk away! And therefore I argue that the now-asserted mode of religion has a robustness about it that enables it to throw aside all adventitious restrictions. Partaking of the nature of its basis, no more is there fear of *this*, any more than of *that*, being dispersed away into words—so long, always, as the words are judiciously directed: that is, in the due prosecution of intellectual nutriment to the natural feeling of religion.

Our consciousness of this inevitable frailty—this necessary dread of dying, which we could not be sentient creatures without being subject to,—forms, in truth, an effective parallel in our case to the Christian's shame for his "state of nature." Fear of Death is only the representative manifestation of that general clinging to our Selfism, which is precisely *the* Original Sin of all human beings. Nay, this one idea, if it be only worked out through the mass of facts in the case, gives clue to the whole range of mental phenomena now claimed to occur in legitimate sequence to the human "state of nature";—including especially the reversion in such phenomena which attends the abandonment of the Christian view.

Grant that our Selfism *is* this Original Sin within us, and there is true ground for all the contradictions that a moral interpretation of Religion has ever found to exist there. Certainly, it is a Sin. It is that which moral judgment cannot do otherwise than condemn. And yet it is that which moral reprehension can do nothing towards

absolutely removing, though it may do something towards ameliorating it: herein precisely possessing the qualification which makes Sin to be what it is, as distinct from Crime. It is that which nature justifies us in, seeing that she has made it impossible for us to break away from it; but for which she does so justify us, only in so far as we meet it with the grace of mingled submission, and widened human affections,—the which when we do attain to exhibit, we are in truth redeemed from the aspect of sinfulness, into one of a contrary nobleness such as by no other possible means could we have attained to. We are made to know that it is incomparably better to have lain under the state of “sin,” and so to have escaped the evil of it, than never to have known the humiliation of it. And this is the entire essence of Religion. “Faith in God,” according to my understanding of it, means the general belief in *that*, whatever it be, in nature, which experientially does enable us so to master our inherent Fear of Death as that it *may* yield us this noble quality. But experience also has shown us that it is only possible to realize this sort of faith, by consciously admitting to ourselves our “need of Christ”: this standing, by present interpretation, solely for the acknowledgment of dependence upon the body of human relationships, just referred to as the ennobling agency that is called for. More than all, however, is it necessary that each individual being should undergo the converting process out of the originally unconscious sinfulness, which consists in his personal appropriation of the redemption from it, obtainable first through convincing himself of the sin. Until any soul knows the sin to be such, the grace awaiting it cannot be made to appear. And here therefore lies the crisis of our dilemma. Selfism of every sort, even when it is raised, through grace of a spiritualized nature, above the

grosser kinds of selfishness, remains always a thing that in the face of fellow creatures we are bound to be reticent in displaying; however, before God, we are lifted above the need of being ashamed of it. And, yet farther, the same equivocalness is proved to require passing into our actual Religion. Since Religion is based upon selfishness, and all along remains identified with a certain relation to selfishness,—so that to deny *that* is in effect to deny *it*,—there is a certain species of shame attached rightfully to our profession of Religion. I mean, to our profession *as* profession. In so far as Religion is true Religion, and our profession of it is a genuine one, so, I urge, is there the necessity existent—based upon whatever forms the true dignity and modesty of our nature,—that we should speak with the certain shame-facedness on our own part which makes virtual acknowledgment of the inner frailty: this being shewn by the constant habit of restriction laid upon such profession, only removed upon adequate occasion. And, on the other hand, to find what constitutes such adequate occasion, is the problem to be solved, which again is so far from escaping the condition of dilemma, that it only encounters this in a peculiarly-heightened fashion: since, not to make profession of Religion, when this *is* rightfully called for, is to betray that shame *on account of Religion* which is of all impediments the most intrinsically fatal to a genuine feeling of Religion. And, once more, the fact of the heightened difficulty in itself explains the reversed course of duty that arises to myself, compared with the case of the orthodox. The robustness gained to my innermost core of principle being what I have shown it to be, as that which frees me from all concern upon account of due maintenance for *it*; the highest desiderandum remaining to me *must* be to follow out, as best I may, the intellectual or overt expression of

my faith, which, under whatever risk attendant upon failure, still affords me the only means, not only of spreading, but also of realizing that faith.

And let there be considered the actual history of creed-usage amongst Christians, thus interpreted. It was the very instinct towards obtaining intellectual realization for the object of these hidden needs that gave original birth to the formulas. For the earliest glance towards the use that might be made of them was sufficient to establish them. The human mind felt at once that here was the means, so called for, of at once communicating, and yet concealing, what nature makes every one wish to conceal. And accordingly they became established in the function by the general consent of believers: decent symbols, which were universally felt to cover self-exposure with a recognized propriety.—But this means that the emotions subtended by them were also assumed to be common to all men. And that they were so, accounts, farther, for the fact of priesthood-institutions having sufficed, as they did, for the occasions of Church-members, during the earlier life of the Church. So long as the creed did represent only *common* human feelings,—that is, did represent these sufficiently, and made no pretence of going beyond these,—it was indeed a fitting practice that one selected man, speaking for all the rest, should alone go through the formalities attached to creed-utterance, while upon their part a matter-of-course “amen” should suffice to express whatever of consent was needed. But as culture advances, it is the necessity of things that shades of feeling should arise, the niceties of which are incapable of common expression, and require on the contrary a particular one. And this, whenever it occurs, betokens that the season for priesthood is over. It did occur, notoriously, in the Church, when protestants broke away from the



priesthood. And the farther we attend, moreover, to the progress of the secession, the more shall we see how it turns constantly upon only this one point—the conscious need of drawing away responsibility in belief from the priest, and the personal undertaking of it. Even while he remains as yet content to merely take up his creed, just as it falls from the lips of his representer, the advancing believer, really such,—namely, he who is advancing in earnestness,—feels himself bound to head it, to himself, with a first-pronoun the most emphatic:—*Ego, non alter, credo.*—Having gone thus far, however, experience has shown that he is close upon the need of altogether re-fashioning his religious garb.

But here is the occasion where development-principle affords a reading of the mental facts of the case, such as proves to me its efficiency above all other kinds of principle. It shows that the wordy veil of belief needs *only* to be re-fashioned, and by no means cast off as a superfluity. Even as a texture of mere words, to have served human purposes so long as it has done, is, by this principle, a sign that the requisite proportion between expression and the integral continuity of religion has been preserved; and this ensures a relative continuity for the expression. The very circumstance of taking the creed-alterations as “mental facts” implies this.

For let it be remembered what the course of modification in the creed has actually been, to the mass of the rationalists who have worked their way through it. One by one the minor articles have dropped away, generally beginning with those of least importance, until at last nothing at all has been left except the central belief in Deity: with, however, no reason apparent why this also should not follow the example of the rest. But to me, on the contrary, has become clear this unanswerable

reason. The belief in Deity has no need to disappear with the rest, because, precisely in *being* central, it has had the advantage over peripheral beliefs. It has, in fact, *absorbed into itself* all of them, and thus in their very destruction substantiated itself. And hence, in my own way of asserting that the prime article of the "*credo in unum Deum*" has become the solitary one to me, I am so far, in my own consciousness, from really annulling any of the other doctrines, that I am only selecting this as the one phrase that says for me every thing whatever that it is possible for a creed to say.\* In their being, all of them, representers of mental realities, and such as hang indissolubly together, I consider that the whole of creed-life in the world has consisted only in the bringing of religious necessities to bear upon this one sufficient focus. Dimly surmized at the beginning, in the end it is clearly realized.

And does not this conclusion respecting general progress in religion, answer perfectly to what I have just stated as to my particular experience? I have said that before I go on to the new details become requisite to be considered, I find it necessary to concentrate my recognition of my own selfism, as in relation to these: concentration meaning, inevitably, enhancement. And precisely this appears to me the true way also of dealing with the whole past of world-religion, which I regard as the supernal response gained out of nature to meet the cry of human selfism: meaning by human "selfism" the very depth of conscious human frailty. Man's acknowledgment of this response obtained lies wholly in the just-quoted phrase! Here therefore have I done with expression as to what concerns the laying out of the two

\* It may be remembered how, in one of Mozart's exquisite masses, the instinct of the great composer has cast him upon a similar track; shown by his emphatic return, at the close of the creed, to its first article.

departments severally appropriate to discussion and non-discussion. The main one of these which is the latter,—the department of practical life-action,—needs nothing but this single recognition. I cannot even enlarge it, as many of my fellow-emergers from Christianity have done, into Kant's formula of belief in "God, virtue and immortality":—so to do would effectually disguise my real aim. "God" alone must include every thing. And now let me explain the amazing difference of result—little to be imagined beforehand,—which springs from the attainment of this simplicity. It yields, as I believe, precisely the ability to settle the due balance between reticence and open expression, without injury to religion, which I am seeking in order to control my own matter of discussion, now about to be entered upon,—and to be also enlarged upon, with the detail which shall answer to the now-effected concentration.

The better secured be the common ground, which is that of latent influence, the larger surely may be, and must be, the occasion for individualistic expression. And thus let me show first how the simplicity of symbolic profession does actually aid in securing to us participation in the fundamental provision.

Nay, rather than *securing* this result, it is truer to say that it *vitalizes* it—in a way that religion could no otherwise be vitalized. For the instant that creed-simplification has proceeded to this extent, the very indefiniteness that follows is in itself the source of a consequence that sounds at first a self-contradiction. The reduction of the belief-symbol, namely, into this utter absence of any of the assorted meaning that should any longer yield occasion for verbal discussion upon it, gives rise upon the spot to the specific *diffuseness* which, again, in the very per-

fectness of such character, acts as a specialized *intensity*. That is, the belief in Deity falls into the nature of an atmosphere. It becomes the mind-environment so unspeakably subtle—and, I may add, for that reason so conceivably inalienable,—that the mind knows it only for that which is as boundless as the total thought-expanse is boundless. And eminently does the physical parallel show farther the division of compartments, mutually balanced, which I am seeking to assign to religion—with also the identical relation of values between them. What is there in the worth of the whole firmament-full of atmosphere to us, that we can for a moment compare with that of the mouth-full that goes to expand our own little several sacks within us! As atmosphere is capable of becoming *breath* is it alone of real importance; and just so, is it alone the true importance of religion that we should breathe it, as it has been figuratively said that it requires to breathe in *us*, through every action of our lives. But there is a farther usefulness in the parallel, much less obvious, which signally bears upon my immediate occasion. It will enable me at once to explain in what way I believe that verbally-expressed thought, employed in the service of religion, may indeed obtain the harmony of character with religiously-directed conduct, which will religiously justify the employment.

It is, by our always bearing in mind that our subject-matter is like atmosphere:—atmospheric environment, one and the same with the breath of life within us. Only in this way can we at all understand the difficulties of our subject in the way that prepares us to deal with them. First and chiefly, we need to remember that our religion, like air, needs rightfully to be *felt* (emotively), instead of being *seen* (intellectually); but secondarily, and for immediate purpose, we must be conscious that whatever

measure upon an individualistic footing: this bringing about the very incongruity now encountered between social and religious proprieties. If any of us who have presumed to criticize the thoughts of Jesus and Paul could encounter these personages *socially*, no kind of homage that could be paid them would be felt to be great enough for them; but this does not prevent the *religious* necessity that makes it to us a positive merit in their followers to ignore, so far as religion is concerned, their superiority.

This same kind of consideration, however, if it be only extended to meet the circumstances, does in truth afford a vindication that is applicable to myself; and that is so, also, in being equally available to the above arguers. The principle that I am actually relying on is fundamentally none other than that which the utterers of religious experience of all classes, and in every case, both do and must rely upon: the dictum of universal religion that "before God, all human beings are on one level." For the doctrine of Evolution, which stands to myself as religion, displays in fact only the true correspondent to this idea, though in a more definite form, when it teaches, as it does, how any degree of mental advantage in one person over another, falls nevertheless into manifest insignificance, when compared with advantage counted "in general":—whatever, namely, of mental greatness any individual mind possesses, being shown by the very idea of Evolution to be owed incomparably more to the effect of Evolution, and to the mind's position in world-history, than to any culture personally its own. Such state of the case then, I submit, gives a real right to the religious side of Evolutionism to treat the latter kind of effect with a certain comparative slightingness,—so long, that is, as it happens, though no longer than it does happen, that the occasion present to it lies with the former.

SECTION II.—THE NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION, ALREADY ASSERTED  
AS SUCH, IN WHICH MY OWN ACCEPTED BELIEF STANDS TOWARDS  
POSITIVISM.

AND now I must show how the foregoing conception of Religion bears upon the particular circumstances which make up my actual mental position :—these, as I have already said, being such as center round the necessity of taking a due account of Positivism.

And indeed there is one particular part of these circumstances which, as it acts with peculiarly personal force upon myself, will likewise force me to carry my present matter into a closer degree of detail than otherwise would have been necessary, and which therefore must at once be referred to. I have already had occasion, in different places of my former writings, to speak of this eminent mode of thought; and in having done so, as the case obviously stands, previously to taking what I admit to be alone a “due account” of it, I have fallen thence under the embarrassment which was so evidently likely to follow. That is, partly in failing to make my own real meaning understood; but chiefly, in seeming to convey an injurious misrepresentation of Positivism. To set myself right therefore as to this accusation—or, rather to remedy the extreme imperfectness of my heretofore expression of my meaning,—I shall need to go back once more to the ground of my earliest acquaintance with the subject.

When I shall have thus made out the explanation which in fact I can only give in this way, I hope it will appear that whatever misrepresentation I seem to have committed myself to in regard to Positivism is really cancelled by the misunderstanding I have occasioned with regard to

myself, so far as any particular statements are concerned. For if this were not the case, I should feel little right to proceed now any farther. But as to the general matter of misrepresentation, I must urge a difference of circumstance, which in truth it belongs to the very character of my principle that I should demand to have allowed for. If religious perception be really the matter of purely "general impression" that I believe it to be, and that hence requires the delineation of itself to be only in the manner of successive shadings that I have described; there is even a necessity of a degree of imperfectness at the first, such as can only disguise its real purport. And moreover, it is just as inevitable, that although such disguise may be eminently more injurious when opinions held in opposition are in question, yet that the disguise should here be itself also enhanced: this being the result of the partialness of aspect, which however I assert to be the condition above all essential to the case. For at the same time I have also shown, how the dereliction of social respects which lies in the acting upon the party-position is actually justified by the nature of the religious standpoint: namely, by the express partiality, and express personality, which in themselves furnish admission, by tacit understanding, of incapability to render full justice to what is opposed. I am convinced, for my own part, that there is an incomparably greater likelihood in the end of wearing away prejudices of the really obstructive sort, by precisely this fair acknowledgment of antagonism; and that, in my own case, the very fact of my thus speaking as a religionist,\* under confessed bias against Positivism,

\* I feel that this word, so awkward and likely to be so repugnant, requires for itself a special apology, or explanation. But here is all I can say for it:—Needing, as I do, a class-epithet which shall separate the sort of persons thus referred to from "men of science", I can find no other description than this, unless I were to follow the example of French usage, in a way that

is the most hopeful of means to me, if I may suppose that there is any, of finally influencing towards a true understanding of Positivism any of those who are likeliest to need such influence, and upon whom assuredly I should be heartily glad to exercise it: my fellow religionists, also under party character.—And even as to the case of individual authors, supposing such to be in question, it seems to me that the same justification of misrepresentation thus made would to a certain extent also apply. For when once it has been fairly stated, as I do here on my own account, that the object is *only* to tell what has been gathered from them,—only what the speaker is able to make out of them, and not what is asserted to be in them,\*—surely, whatever wrong could thus be supposed possible to reach the authors must indeed be reduced to its minimum.

But much more probably to be raised than this kind of objection, against the meddling with topics such as this on such considered-insufficient footing, is the following:—“Why, after all,” it may naturally be thought, “should there *be* any actual necessity of giving this particular attention to a mode of conception that is an opposite mode: and where attention can therefore be only controversial? Why not simply speak out one’s own ideas, if they seem worthy the utterance, and leave those of other persons, that disagree with them, alone?”—To this, however, my answer is of the most assured sort. It is:

seems to me much *more* offensive. If I were to say, “persons of religion,” or “religious persons,” in the technical sense that the French use their word “*religieux*”, I should be degrading the word that of all others I wish to keep in honour. I would much rather raise the meaning of “religionist,” than I would lower that of “religious.”

\* I should not wish this to be understood, however, except exclusively with regard to the present work. In the *Thoughts in aid of Faith* it was an express and leading object with me to give as faithful a report as I was able of the opinions I referred to.



“Because only through this appliance of contrast can I in fact make my own ideas clear to myself, by bringing *these* out of their initiatory vagueness. Here I find what I am compelled to own as the very condition of the case, as I have myself learned to understand it. Just as all intelligence means power of discerning distinctions, so does intellectualized religion mean to me the taking account of *all* distinctive opinions, in that manner of *weighing* them in relation to itself, which the conclusions of my foregoing volume, as to the centre of thought-gravitation seated in religion, inevitably induce me now to try and carry out. And Positivism, as I have already said, is eminently the fact in the modern thought-atmosphere which demands to be reduced to this relation.”

And this points out sufficiently the difficulty, requiring all along to be contended with, which again has lain in the very nature of my design. In the same way that the comprehension of adverse opinion is the necessary step to the effective showing of my own, has there been required a gradually-advancing process to capacitate me for that comprehension, with means of expressing it. My entire work is an endeavour towards definition; with, as must be remembered, a specific aim to show the steps of the process. When I shall have defined what I mean by my “Present Religion,” my work will be finished. And so, in a lesser degree, is it with Positivism. When I shall have defined what Positivism is, to my mental perception, I shall have done with *it*. But I have had no means of doing so before this actual stage of my demonstration. I have only now the terms prepared which I require to make use of for the purpose. This, accordingly, must serve as the reason which I have now to give,—though at the time I had no thought of any being required to be given,—why I did not, before I began to speak about Positivism, and

especially to speak against it, explain what I meant by it. For this is what I have been chiefly accused of folly in, and with this of sufficient-seeming reason: namely, that in the absence of definition whatever I have said against Positivism has necessarily appeared to rest, with whatever defiance of the apparent fact of the case, manifestly such to genuine students, on the person who is generally understood to be the representer of Positivism. And that is, of course, Auguste Comte.

I have then to begin my explanation here, by showing what were the circumstances, personal to myself, why I could not at starting do even thus much:—not even say whether by Positivism I did or did not mean the doctrines of Comte.

Certainly, it would have served at once to facilitate my own design if I *had* been able, upon first entering my present course of thought, to assume Comte as the adequate representer of the counterbalancing thought which I needed to my own of this kind; in the correspondent manner to my acceptance of an orthodox representative in Bishop Butler. The generalistic nature of my object makes it imperative that I should deal only with average opinions: namely, with such as relate exclusively to essential points, and to such as are so accounted by the mass of persons professing to adopt them. And in Bishop Butler I found precisely such representer:—not in the least likely to be objected to, as a standard believer, by any one likely to become my own reader. But, in fact, the state of the case as to the present requirement, has been altogether different from this. On the one hand, the fact of my own aimed-at principle being that of “Comparativism” has involved the necessity, in the natural course of thought, of its opposite counting

as "Positivism": this being, moreover, an extant reality;—on the other hand, there has been extant none of that unanimity respecting the characterization of what is essential to Positivism, which in itself, if extant, would have forbidden the uncertainty in which I needed to hold my own determination, while yet wanting my own means of decision. Indeed, when I consider the events of recent controversy upon this point, I cannot help even congratulating myself that my *not* having been tempted then to try any decision, as to what hangs so closely on this as the question of Comte's representation of Positivism, was the really most favourable of conditions to me:—especially, as I must insist, when the difficulty of assorting judgment upon the point is so much more complicated as it is with regard to my own desired arrangement, than it is with regard to any ordinary arrangement. For it is not by any means only because the subject of Positivism has not yet had the time to become so maturely appreciated, and thence averaged in general estimation, as orthodox Christianity has been, that difficulty has lain with the assorting it. It is also the fact, according to my own belief,—or, at all events, it is the fact of my own experience,—that the selection of a representative of Positivism needs an incomparably closer balancing of considerations than was experientially needful in the case of Christianity.

And in what the extra-difficulty of this to myself consists, I can now fairly begin, for the first time, to explain: by pointing to the matter which I have indeed shown throughout to be all-in-all with me, and the fundamental occasion for my requiring the designation of "Comparativism" for my belief, when controversially treated. This is, the demand which I believe to find in the actual state of mental condition—though not existent there, except in a nascent form, previously,—of a perma-

nently-established dualism in mind-characteristics : the two departments of which, as soon as rightfully and completely assorted, shall need to be known as severally Science and Religion—entirely opposite to one another, and yet entirely harmonious *with* one another. In thus resting my conviction, then, the question was, how was I to comport myself towards the existent form of thought, which to my own instinctive judgment was neither of these, and yet which stood to ordinary impression—and indeed so far admissibly by myself,—in a recognized condition of contrast to my own then-present topic of Orthodoxy? My inevitable first decision was, that Positivism should, unquestioningly, be adopted by me as standing in that relation to Christianity. And, in being so placed, it was doubtless helpful to me, accordingly, in my desire to understand the latter. But I hoped from the juxtaposition also this, that it might further my more particular end of showing how Positivism, in order justly to fulfil itself, and vindicate its being taken for a world-fact, required just as much to ripen thenceforward into an effective Science, as Christianity into a purer Religion. I held that the very defectiveness, hitherto found historically exhibited in one and both of them, accounted rationally for the defect in the mutual opposites to either. But this involved that, for my own personal occasion, I should hold a double oppositeness to Positivism : one, an historical or ancestral opposition, implying that I myself had been carried beyond it, and therefore throwing *blame* upon it ; the other merely an instinctive requisition to find in it the sort of opposition that I should welcome, and that I should feel myself paying *honour* to it, in the recognizing. Herein, then, do I assert the actual increase of complication, which made it not desirable to add at that time the farther problem, of settling how far Comte's personality affected the relation.

I have already urged how the most baffling circumstance in moral classification, lies in the fact that originally the destined characteristics appear in a false light. Thus, with regard to Science and Religion, needs it now only to adduce it in present point. The very sign that neither Science nor Religion has till now been pure of its sort, has been showed by men of Science moulding their efforts upon a religious plan; and by men of Religion showing, at all events, a negation of any thing like real religiousness in their plan. But judged by this test, Comtism has appeared to me so eminent a defaulter, that this, if nothing else, sufficed with me in the first instance to induce my ignoring the claim of Comte to form the representer of Positivism:—I mean, of the kind of Positivism that I wished to consider as destined for the harmonious opposite to my own view. To fulfil such purpose, the typical exponent upon whom I believe my instinctive choice would have rested, if choice had been necessary, would have been Mr. Mill, much rather than Comte:—little as I confess that my degree of acquaintance with the opinions of either would have justified any such forming of judgment. But this leads to the signal point recently shown as lying between these standard leaders of opinion, in the manner of finally dividing them from one another as to any possibility of competition, which consists in the fact of the later character of Comte's works having altogether transgressed that character of his earlier ones, in which Mr. Mill's Positivism mainly agreed with Comte's. And so indeed has this matter of division in Comtism proved itself the source at foundation of the general amount of fluctuating judgment abroad respecting Comte: while to myself it brings precisely—and just through the watching of the fluctuation,—the perception requisite to me at all events *now*, that after all it is

Comte whom I now require as my exponent of oppositeness, and not Mr. Mill, though in quite a different mode of oppositeness to what the latter might have held. For the part of Comtism which I need to deal with, as its characteristic part, is precisely that which Mr. Mill, and similar thinkers, adjudge to be its worst: its tendency to over-systematization. It is this, namely, which seems to me to show a bearing in Comtism towards the very result which I am myself contemplating; though still it shows it in a manner that so expressly thwarts my own idea, that I feel myself more than ever forced into antagonism to Comtism.

And this is the clue that I have to use in my self-explanation. For although in both of the passages which alone I need particularly refer to, the actual point bears solely on positivistic treatment of History, yet this to my mind is precisely identified with that which concerns the making out truly of the two thought-methods, held as indispensable. And thus, so far from my expressions in question having been really the mere careless aspersions that they appear to be, they represent to myself the incipient pointings to what has since become of such central importance, that it stands as the one element that a final scheme cannot escape comprising, if ever it is to rise up truly to answer as a general scheme! A division between Religion and Science that shall save Religion from becoming the mere subordinate to Science that Comte's method of division seems to me to make it, must necessarily, to my instinct, carry with it a treatment of History on a quite different principle from what Positivism, such as is true to itself, can supply: by which I mean, a principle of Developmentalism that shall go altogether beyond the idea of Development which under Positivism is possible. And I can truly say that this instinct was present to me

already when I wrote the book I have now to turn to : namely, my *Thoughts in aid of Faith*, which was published now eight years ago.

The plan of that book was to describe the dawning ideas I speak of, in specifically the mode of their actual derivation, from different literary sources. And that was, as successive layers of thought, which however had this of special relation to myself, that they were only selected as having been experienced by me to be harmoniously combinable with one another ; the combination, as it was strictly my own, being thus in itself the proper object to which the work really pointed, though it did not, in the nature of it, do more than point :—its faint presage as to scheme-conditions lying in it, merely hovering over and about the autobiographical statements. But in fact the three first of the layers presented gave the whole of what was essential to the combination. First, the principle of direct attention to outwardly-manifested facts, taken as a *course* of facts ;—Secondly, that of direct attention to the mental process in the estimating of that course ;—Thirdly, of attention to our internal capability, both outwardly and inwardly directed, of combining the results, in the same way that nature herself combined the events that constituted the course :—these three principles, taken in unison, were in themselves all that gave what served as actual basis to my then-anticipatory re-moulding of Religion. Nevertheless, as subsequently to the assimilating of these it had happened to me to receive, notably to myself, a large super-addition of principle of two farther kinds, I joined my results of these supplementarily to the others. And this it was, in fact, which for the first time brought me into collision with Positivism. For thus certainly must be classed to rank, not only Mr. Lewes's *Biographical History of Philosophy*, but also the

*History of Civilization* of the late Mr. Buckle, notwithstanding the different kinds of Positivism held by their respective authors, and especially their different thought-relations towards the kind which was Comte's.

Of Comte's own writings, however, I must state that at this time I knew nothing. I had indeed read much of the account of them first given by Mr. Lewes in the *Leader* newspaper, in 1852, and had afterwards, besides occasional review articles, attempted to read the condensed translation made of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* by Miss Martineau. But I own that I advanced very little way in the latter; and that my doing so was caused by my repugnance to the system. Or, rather I should say, my repugnance to whatever seemed new to me in the system. For as to the great doctrine attached to it, which forms indeed its inspiration in general,—namely, that all we have to do in questioning Nature, is simply to discover what *is* there, without throwing disguise upon this from our desire of what *should* be,—this was what I had by no means here first to learn. This had been, I am thankful to say, the very atmosphere of all the intellectual life that I had ever lived in; so that I was conscious, as far as this went, that both all my best teachers hitherto, and I myself, had been, so to speak, born Positivists. But in regard to Comte's structure raised upon the principle, so far from *this* according with my innate sense of truth and naturalness, nothing at all struck me in it but its peculiar un-naturalness. And in saying this, I include particularly its arrangement of "the three stages" of human culture. Thus, after gathering this preliminary impression, the very remembrance of Comtism subsided for me, with, it seems to me on looking back, the least possible of mental result obtained from it: except indeed that I did afterwards, in compiling a con-



troversial essay, not fail to recur to the opinions of Comte for illustration, in common with those of others; though still without finding reason thence to vary my original judgment. And accordingly when I met with Comtism anew, as well as with that which was akin to Comtism, in the form in which it *did* awaken in me genuine sympathy, as presented in the two works just mentioned, I had no thought beyond the immediate authors before me: not being well-informed enough to know then, as I have learnt since, how the quality which here seized hold of me, as the splendid breadth of historic design in the objects pursued in both cases, was that which Comte himself had actually exhibited to an incomparably greater degree. But then not even did Mr. Lewes's Positivism lead me to Comte's Positivism. The effect to me was rather that of a confusion respecting Positivism in general, which cast even additional discredit for me upon Comte individually. For still did even what I admired raise demur in me, and with peculiar pointedness, from the very interest that was engaged;—so that I may say it was precisely this admiration that now drew forth my intuitive antagonism to Positivism into a distinct shape.—And hence my strangely-sounding assertion, based on the impression Mr. Lewes had given me, that “the principle of Positivism had not yet admitted the essential element of History into its consideration”\*:—manifest nonsense, if

\* See *Thoughts in aid of Faith*, p. 275. The context to this passage is as follows. Speaking of the inconsistency with its own design which Mr. Lewes's work seems to exhibit, through its contempt of metaphysics, in common with works of a similar class of thought, I say that it appears to show its need of “a scientific principle adequate to the subject; an historical Psychology, competent to explain the psychological History. It appears to expose, in fact, the want that is inherent in the principle of Positivism, as being, after all, hitherto only a partial, and therefore apt to be a *party* way of viewing things, owing to its not having yet admitted the essential element of History into its consideration, and consequently not having yet enabled itself to compass the grasp of

I had been referring, as I have been supposed to refer, to the attention given to History by positivistic writers; but which in reality had no such intention.—And indeed how could it, when a positivistic history was precisely before me!—The fact was, that the meaning which I was thus struggling to get into words, through the exaggerated figure of making a “principle” take “consideration,” was this: my intuitive conviction, namely, that Positivism had not yet advanced to the depth of its own development which should reveal to it the necessity of a means for the philosophizing of History which should go altogether beyond its own means,—that is, which should go so far beyond its actual idea of Development, as to force itself to cease, in fact, to *be* Positivism, and to become, instead, Developmentalism. And as to the latter, I had sufficiently stated in the volume previously, to what particular form of this principle I alluded. I mean, to the system of Mr. Herbert Spencer. If this had been taken, in the place of Comtism, to supply the basis of mental science that was needful to a Philosophy of History, I believed, upon instinctive trust, that an incomparably better thing might be made of it, even than the acknowledged partially-good thing which positivists had actually made of it. And that was, as to immediate indication, by the ability which I was assured Mr. Spencer’s principle would afford, not to treat metaphysics, when the subject of General Philosophy was under consideration, with the degree of depreciation with which Mr. Lewes treated it: this, in Mr. Lewes’s work, appearing to me precisely *not* the “implicit” quest for History, for its power of combining with which Mr. Spencer’s principle had approved itself so satisfying to me, as I stated it to be.

a true Psychology. Immediately that the ‘whole’ of the historic substance is regarded as vital organism, the progress in the mode of the mind’s action becomes at once true and essential growth of constitution.”

And indeed when Comte's own handling of History is added into question, so far is this matter of offence from diminished, that no one will dispute its being aggravated. But here falls the need of allowing for Comte's transition-period in philosophy: since, as to History, it was this which acted in changing his previous attention to History simple, into first the organized sort of regard which gave to it, properly, its Philosophy. But neither of the works I have spoken of had any relation to this later method of Comte's. Mr. Buckle makes no reference except to the *Cours de Philosophie*; and Mr. Lewes's book, at its original appearance, was anterior even in date to Comte's later works: so that both of their productions stand as virtual forestalments of whatever Comte did himself of similar kind in his own comprehensive Philosophy of History. They appear in the light of contributory chapters towards a general scheme of this sort, such as may be conceived of as possible to be in future accomplished, upon a plan either the same as, or parallel to, Comte's own original plan, though *without* the systematic change of method being carried out in it, which Comte himself ended by carrying out. That is, they exhibit efforts to set forth in each case a true individualized thread of quasi-concrete history, for respectively "Philosophy" *per se*, and "Civilization" *per se*, running in abstract fashion through the more ordinary course of more-properly concrete history, which efforts precisely make history philosophy, but without the degree of compulsion towards a fore-gone conclusion at the end which characterizes Comte's dealing with history.—This, however, is the matter, now in question as to its desirableness, as to which indeed I can only decide for myself in the negative. For, not to go now beyond the sort of judgment which is merely intuitive, here is what I have just been referring to as such, in comparing

the positive idea of Evolution with Mr. Spencer's. To obtain an idea of mental advance such as should effectually consort with that of historic advance, it seems at once indispensable that the effect of progress should be seen just as much upon mind-*constitution* as upon mind-*action*. And yet, under Comte's method of treatment, just as he has actually not attempted the former exhibition, does the very fact of his contempt for metaphysics seem to cut off from his method the power of doing so. It renders, as I conceive, the very idea of mental advance at all, constitutionally-supported, a one-sided impossibility.

And now let me come to the second expression of my own, requiring explanation,—where the case is, that in passing from the subject of metaphysics proper to that of Christianity, the spirit of this exclusiveness has naturally touched me only the more strongly. If in treating of general history, the class-notion of Positivists has been thus undeniably to count *those* as merely “futile speculation”, so it is no less notorious that they call *this*, habitually, a “barren superstition.” I mean, in respect of its specific dogmatization. And I myself, in what I have been writing subsequently to the book just referred to, have expressly been intent upon showing, how all that is proper to Christian dogma is precisely and abundantly *fruitful*, if only it be philosophically estimated!—In this latter requisition, indeed, lies all the point. If Comte, or any other positivist, owned that they were speaking *here*,—or Mr. Lewes *there*,—only by the impulse of personal judgment, expressing itself in the strong language which personal feeling in a sort justifies; or else in the temper of bitterness, however keen, which is permitted as legitimate to the vein of manifest satire:—in neither of these cases would there have been anything of which most persons would care to complain,—or, at all events, against

which they would feel prompted to argue,—however they might find the language displeasing. Indeed, for myself, seeing that this personality of impulse implies necessarily a judgment exclusively adapted to existent conditions, I confess that I should, to a large extent, sympathize with such heated expression:—since, as to my own personal occasion, neither *would* metaphysics, nor theological dogmas, be otherwise than futile and barren. But when Positivists have used the expressions, they have precisely *not* owned themselves personal. They have claimed to be philosophic; and eminently they have claimed to be judging historically, though holding by a standard that is stationary—or, if not entirely so, yet, as I allege, very far from possessing the flexibility requisite. Here, therefore, occurred to me again the want of an adequate development-recognition, as what alone could explain, and what truly did explain, the philosophic anomaly that this appeared to me. Accordingly, in trying to enter into the view of Christianity which could afford to them such an aspect, I imagined that they must hold it—not indeed as *apart* from the true stock of development, since their principle forbade them to suppose any thing to be so; but—as an out-lying excrescence, separated *thus* from being a supporter of its legitimate continuity. And, with this idea, I said that I supposed they classed it with the sort of productions that we account of as “weeds, erratic comets, aimless thoughts.” (*Present Religion*, vol. i., p. 69.) Nor, considering that my object in the context was specially concerned with the “outer form”, or dogmatic character, of Christianity, can I indeed see that I was here by any means surpassing the degree of depreciation which one and all of them habitually commit themselves to.

For the honour that Comte pays, amply, to the moral precepts of Christ, and followers of Christ, has nothing

to do with this sort of estimation. Isolated sayings, grown to a certain perfectness of meaning, may be passed from hand to hand, and system to system, as current coin, which have no longer any necessary relation to the mint they sprang from. The question here alone at issue, is whether dogmatic forms of thought do not constitute that mint. If "barren" as Comte calls them, certainly they have no such efficiency. But, for myself, I urgently oppose the assertion.

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And now, having said what I am able to say about my past ideas of Positivism, held while the subject was only an incidental one to me, I may return to the present ground, where my concern in it is of the direct and special sort that I have alleged.

Since the completion of my last volume, I need to state, I have turned to the study of Comte's views, in so far as these bear relation to my own object, with my utmost carefulness. Nor do I mean only by this that I have studied the particular parts of his works which bear immediately upon religion, taken as religion is commonly understood. My own idea of religion is that which makes me feel, on the contrary, how rightful is the demand, urged so peculiarly in the case of Comte by his disciples, that no separate consideration is here of any real value. I see that if the whole effect of his scheme, as such, is not allowed for, no real understanding can attach to any part of it. And indeed it has been my having tried to gain this sense of the scheme that has actually brought the "over-systematization" of it, so accounted by Mr. Mill, into the standard position as to my own occasion, of which I must now show what I feel to be the benefit to me.

Such position arises thus, that precisely by Comte's determination to make his system include *everything*, (whether by main force or not,) he has truly brought it into the character where it stands, as no completed scheme ever before was brought to stand, in full competition with the Christian scheme,—now admitted by myself, as fully as by him, to be a thing that is by-gone. Butler has sufficiently taught me to know, by his own treatment of the latter, that no treatment can be religiously-adapted, except that which does take its matter in the light of "a scheme";—while I see perfectly also, both that the very meaning of a scheme is that it includes reference to whatever is placed under it, and that the very fact of "everything" being placed under it brings the moral character into the bearing of it, which hence causes the scheme to become "a religious scheme." Thus what otherwise appears an injurious excess in Comte's systematization, here brings it simply up to the condition required. It effects the full "scheme of things in general, upon the plan of Science," where consequently is fairly matched, and for the first time, the heretofore scheme of Supernaturalism. That is to say, the principle of Science is here accepted, professedly, with the acknowledgment of its *sovereignty* which first produces in the acceptance the nature of religion. And this gives me true ground for judging whether or not I can take it for a true religion; and also, upon Development-principle, for a true maintainer of continuity with the past of religion. But there needs to be instantly remembered that such understanding of the case by no means belongs to Comte's own idea of religion. And here is the immediate sign of the oppositeness through which I have anticipated that benefit from the standard can *alone* reach me.

I have no need to go at all *beyond* this matter of the

"sovereignty" of principle, in comparing grounds with Comte:—this makes the clear openness of the comparison to me. For this limitation of the subject is the consequence involved within my own changed mode of religion, to show forth which, expressly on its own account, will be my sole object when I shall have done with this controversy. Whatever has hitherto lain of argument between Positivists and Christians, has necessarily turned mainly upon the specific sum and substance of religion, which to all religionists is comprised within the "belief in Deity", charged by Christians to be at least ignored by their opponents. But to myself, through my having dropped the whole of the concreteness hitherto attached to the belief, neither express controversy on the topic, nor express ignoring of it, is any longer in question. "Belief in Deity" remains simply the crowning point of "metaphysics." I am hoping to show hereafter how, purely as matter of natural "sovereignty" over other metaphysical conceptions, the impression of universal orderliness in nature, *when this is considered as affecting peculiarly our moral and personal instincts*, really contains the precise sequent to the Christian belief which upon any terms of natural reason can alone be rightfully looked for. And if Comte's scheme of Science, therefore, availed to set forth this, I should have no religious objection to make against it. But, as I have just implied, Comte's whole method of working the subject, shows an altogether different feeling from this of the very nature of religion.

It seems to me indeed a pure matter of instinct, arising at the first glance at the subject, that the very fact of his system's aiming to over-master religion, suffices to prevent it from being itself a religion. And the whole of my preceding section has gone to show reason for this instinct;—since precisely is it the mode of treatment



which Comte's idea supposes, and which Comte's working of the idea carries out, that forms actually the *direct* mode which I have there accounted to nullify the whole character of religion. The true "religion of Positivism," as I conceive the meaning of the term, would mean the *influence* from the scientifically-systematized view of things propounded by Comte, which should morally display itself upon the minds of its accepters, within a sufficient time after their having duly assimilated it. I take it to be the only test of a scheme's being at once universal and genuine that it should afford this influence. But then must this also be considered, as again upon instinct:—by no possibility could Comte, *if* he had understood religion in this way, have conceived *himself* the institutor of that religion. A human being may indeed institute a *form* of religion;—or he may prophecy that a religion will grow out of the truth he utters;—or he may even anticipatively exult, when he finds some few disciples already acting upon his principles, that already is the harvest white upon the fields. But in the nature of things the same mind that gives out the basis cannot also realize the issue. And thus the very fact of Comte's claiming a contrary event, seems to testify a want of harmony with that "nature of things", in itself condemnatory of his idea of religion.—Mahomet, truly, announced himself as a world-prophet; but this was under connection with the military propagandism which showed that the religion thus far concerned was an outside affair. I do not believe that Christ spoke of himself as the "light of the world" that his followers called him; but that he also had a concrete purpose before him, as to the world-restitution then expected, which accordingly preserved to his fanaticism, if it be counted as such, the naïve and ingenuous character, as Comte might

describe it, which altogether saved it from being what a conscious selfism would have made it. And as for Paul, instead of seeing it in him as a consciously-judicious restraint upon himself that he did not set himself up as the founder of the religion that he preferred to attribute to Jesus, I feel it clear to me that the inspiration which guided him was only capable of founding a religion because any such obtrusion of himself was out of question to it. If in proclaiming "Christ" he had not been proclaiming "a truth", quite in contradiction to the proclaiming "a person", whether himself or another, I see no means at all of explaining to ourselves, on natural terms, how his doctrine should have actually become the religion that it did.

Yet it was a grand sort of impatience in Comte which compelled him, after he had fully given forth his systematization of science, not to stop here, but also to embody the mode in which his schemed nature of things must necessarily exhibit itself in concrete and consciously-human action. And this devotion to his own belief, and his own magnificent ideal, must, at all events, count as genuine religion:—or, rather I should say, *would* have done so, if it had appeared in the personalness of guise, not of his own sort, but precisely contrary to his own, which I believe to be really indispensable to religion. Just by Comte's *not* putting forth the whole of his later expositions, where religion comes into question, as the simple matter of his own personal impression, and mere opinion, does he appear, in fact, to have been cutting off any actual possibility from himself of ever becoming really the founder of religion that he aspired to be.

But he could not have done this. His system stood by its compactness; and the nature of its compactness lay in its bearing consentaneously upon the single point at its

termination which is certainly *not* a personal object; nor, any more, the sort of object which ordinary instinct can accept as a religious object. For instinct *will* place the two kinds of object together! Its teleology condemns it as religion;—all the while that its possession at all of a teleology is the one true evidence to it of religious method being at all events rightfully aimed at by it. In Comte's idea, the matter in which all action of nature terminates, and in which consequently it must be the rational end and aim of all human existence, and its true "final purpose", that this should also abut, is the production of a sound regulation for Society. And truly is this an abutment which, to one side of our consciousness, approves itself instantly rightful and noble. But because, not content with this, it claims *also* to be religious, when to the other side of consciousness, as commonly entertained, nothing whatever of religion is in question, it seems to me that the natural force in the appeal is destroyed.

And thus, even in this surface-view of Comtism, taken as a whole, do I gain this impression of large confirmation to my own object. If Comte's Sociologically-directed hypothesis could be made to divest itself of all that relates naturally to the opposite side of consciousness, there would be probable means gained for the shifting of Comte's division of thought-methods into the very kind of division that I am looking to. For this, it is true, Positivism itself must disappear—yielding to Developmentalism:—but there would fall an association between Developmental Science and the pursuit of Social good, which might be a true and effective one, on the one hand; and, on the other, an historically-assisted pursuit of Developmental Philosophy, naturally assorting with Religious objects; by which both would be supported, and neither in the least interfered with. And accordingly,

thus stands my own teleology. I may indeed refer to what is to follow in this volume to show that a teleological bearing even closer than this lies in the Religiously-directed hypothesis I have been making out for myself, expressly of the kind to at-once oppose and supplement the Social, though elaborated *to* myself hitherto without the slightest thought of Sociology.——And already in this introduction, I hope in fact to make way towards this end ; by showing, in my concluding section, how I conceive that a scientific plan of systematization *may* clear the road for the integrated division. Meantime, however, I must finish showing, how whatever relates immediately, in Comte's later works, to Religion, is on its own grounds unacceptable to me.

And first, as to what concerns the Philosophy of Christian History given in the third volume of his *Politique*, and making part of that general historic survey, and scheme of general progress, which was actually struck off by him in so wonderful a heat of constructive genius, —a heat that might well carry away the “implicitness” of attention necessary to allow for *two* aspects in History, every where present. I hope I may say that I have at all events learned from this to understand what was indeed the force of the systematic current, which in Comte's case over-bore every thing meeting it to his own purpose ; and which accordingly shows me, in a manner, how it might appear justifiable to him to render to Christianity the scant measure of honour that he has seemed to have paid it. But none the less for this degree of sympathy with him do I continue to feel, both that the measure is scant, and that his satisfying himself with it, is, in so far, unphilosophical.

I cannot help feeling, all the *more* strongly for it, that the method of quest I have myself been following, just

through being stretched into depths which Comte's method utterly condemns, opens out means for results which, as on the one hand they touch incomparably closer interests than Comte's touches, so on the other fill up precisely the interstices that here and there betray themselves within his results. Comte's entire historic thread is secured by winding itself round the assumption that, in social regulation being the one final purpose of life, all procedure of human action throughout history, Christian action included with the rest, must have sprung from an instinctive aspiration on the part of mankind to realize it:—to realize, namely, what still lies in futurity, even to ourselves. But surely safer than this is my own kind of basis, which rests upon an unquestionable state of things, belonging to the primordial condition of human beings. And, as the touchstone evidence of the sort of conception I have thus gained,—evidence such as necessarily forces itself at times, by fitful manifestations, into crucial points of history, where particular *men* make history,—I ask earnestly that there may be compared what I have myself assigned as the acting motive to the originator of Christianity, taken accordantly with Comte as St. Paul, with that which Comte has suggested for such motive. I think no one who will do so will deny, that while my interpretation differs indeed from the ordinary conception of the Apostle's thought to the full as much as Comte's does, yet the mode of difference in my case is as certainly that which bears in the true direction for religious material, as his tends away from it:—mine varying altogether towards an enhanced inwardness of motive, just as his towards an increased outwardness.—Moreover, as to the possible complementariness, finally, of the opposite views, there is this singular support to the idea, *prima facie*, that in Comte's view the two nations who stand out in mine as

furnishing patently the true stock of religion, are represented as "*fatalement sacrifiées à l'évolution fondamentale de l'humanité.*" (See *Politique*, vol. iii., p. 408.)

So also have I just been explaining, though without any peculiar reference to Comte, how to me too does the whole of Christian dogma lapse actually, in my forced endeavour to understand it, into simple Monotheism;—but with what utter opposition of meaning from what Comte has in view by the lapse! And, as the sign of the contrast, again, *he* states the condition of Monotheism to be a merely necessary stage of bare transition; while to *me* it is the express condition of essential permanence!\*

But, once more,—as to the unpracticableness I find of making good the union of my own ideas with Comte's, which thus renders the evolutionary scheme of the latter only as a failure to me, as to my power of acquiescence in it,—the case is this, that just as much are my immediate instincts contradicted by Comte's Sociology, in so far as they are called forth in regard to it, as they are by his estimation of Christianity. If it seems to me, as assuredly it does, by no means an instance of due regulation on the part of Nature, that she should prove to have reduced all the intense heart-earnestness that we know to have gone to Christianity, into a merely subordinate supply of energy, first towards the building up of a church-polity, and now of a civic polity:—so does it also appear to me that such reckless expenditure, if it had been committed by her, must necessarily have defeated its own purpose. For, on the very face of the matter, political concerns show as

\* To the above, moreover, I must add the counter-experience with regard to Polytheism. While to Comte this stands as furnishing the constant type for active intellectualism, I have myself stated the imperative reason which compels me, from my own point of view, to treat this phase of faith as "a mere accident," or virtual "nullity," in respect of "intrinsic development." See pp. 250-1 of my preceding volume.

those from which every thing of the nature of feeling and passion—every thing at all connected with individualistic excitement—is most wisely excluded. I have therefore two distinct courses of argument against his Philosophy of Christianity; rising indeed from opposite sources, but still such as play into another to the most decisive strengthening of both of them.

For upon the secular and historical ground where my own instinct is so admittedly feeble in itself, I gain clear corroboration, also instinctively acceptable to me on its several grounds, partly from the body of philosophic politicians who side with Mr. Mill—the *true* positivist, as I esteem him,—partly, from the general feeling of Protestants as opposed to Roman Catholics. As to the latter, Comte's systematic enforcement of the thread of continuity in Christianity to lie through mediæval church-organization into the now ripely-prepared social organization, manifestly compelled him to treat Protestantism, in a secondary degree, with the same kind of "ignoring the better part of it" which I have accused him of towards the entire form of religion:—that is, as an heretical, or merely negative excrescence. It involved the need of Christianity's remaining to him, as it did, constantly identified with Roman Catholicism;—just as, on the other hand, politicians of the school of Mill must accuse him of constantly identifying the idea of all government with despotic government. And as to *this*, such politicians have satisfied me that if the despotic principle which rules of necessity in church organization, should actually prove capable of being transferred into civic institutions, the event would be fatal to all best issues from the latter: precisely because such application of ecclesiasticism would be injurious to the proper individualization of human beings; which, again, they argue to be of right the only

basis for a social inter-dependence amongst them of a beneficial sort. But this argument of theirs entirely coalesces with what I have been urging as to the true purpose of Christianity: namely, that this also abuts in a due ripening of individuality;—my own estimation of that purpose, moreover, claiming to be in true legitimate sequence to the Protestant idea of it. For as to what is really intrinsic to Christianity, as opposed to its outer shell of church-ism, I consider it, just as much as Protestants in general do, to subsist in the sole embodiment of the idea of “redemption”—whatever be the difference of my idea from theirs as to what the term represents. Although, namely, I have come to believe that the original conception of “redemption” related to an evil which, in so far as it admitted of men’s release from it, lay only in their own uncultured imaginations; still, I see in even this sort of release an event that may well be accounted an “atonement” effected for individual minds with the general rule to which each is accountable,—and which, consequently, proves to me that this part of Christianity, considered by Comte to be its specially *un-moral* part, is in reality the most eminently productive of moral results, rightly such:—moral results, necessarily, *being* specifically results to individuals. And, farther, I have traced this effect of the dogma precisely to its associated reference to that other dogma, of post-mundane retribution, which again appears to Positivists the specific nourisher of whatever the feeling of human Selfism has in it of unworthy:—to me, this very dogma appearing, on the contrary, the engenderer of specifically its highest imaginable attribute. I mean, the ability of possessing an abiding and directing Conscience. Conscience can never abide where there is *not* a robust Selfism! But then, together with the power of self-direction, and consequent self-indepen-



dence, bestowed by Conscience, do men obtain equally from the latter the counter-effect that by it their individualism, otherwise un-social, is rendered the best conductor to sociality. Hence, thus appears the actual meeting of the conclusions. It is the manner of treating the idea of the Future Life which at once gives the key to the whole course of the subject.\* If this be unduly slighted, or diverted from its natural concomitants, all Philosophy of Religion, and therein relatedly all generalism whatever, must fall into perversion. And thus it is only natural that while Comte has failed towards it as he has done,—as the instinct of ninety-nine out of every hundred of his

\* Let me trace the entire thread of continuity, as I understand it:—

First, the idea of primitive religion that retribution for sin was represented, characteristically, by the arbitrary infliction of Death:—it being assumed, as the intuitive hypothesis of savages, that whoever died entered a domain where he left behind him the sovereignty of God, and fell under that of the demon-opposite to God.

Secondly, the idea that some special favourites of God—heroes, amongst the Greeks; but, amongst the post-Maccabean Hebrews, the whole race of the chosen people, except such as forsook the election,—remained God-befriended, even more after they had been subjected to the temporary trial of Death, than before it. (To this stage even savages seem to have the power of attaining; but none of going beyond it.)

Thirdly, Paul's spiritualized conception, centered upon the believed fact of the bodily resurrection of Jesus, that other-world destination was proved by it to be the sphere of a retribution that had no respect whatever except to individualistic condition, shown by the individual's relation to Christ: thus preparing entire abolition of the idea of the Death-punishment (or, of Death as a punishment), and throwing open immediate connection between anticipated retribution and the personal consciousness.

Lastly, the continual ripening of this idea, through especially the handling of Protestants, and especially (as to intellect) by means of their controversies with Catholics and with one another, which consists in constantly drawing the moral effect of believed-in retribution more and more within the soul's own bounds—accompanied by the counter-effect of a correspondent dwindling in the moral need for any future retribution at all, of the kind originally imagined: that is, of the kind originally associated with the idea of the Death-punishment. As soon as Death is thoroughly seen to be a natural necessity, without any thing in the least of arbitrariness in its institution, so also is Conscience ripened to serve as the individual's true regulator.

readers will assuredly pronounce him to have done,—the failure, as such, should repeat itself, as I am arguing that it does, alike in his slender value for Protestantism, and in the peculiarities of his social politics.—While the Hebrews lacked the idea of super-mundane retribution, they also were satisfied—crudely, and in our estimation, semi-barbarously,—with the modified-patriarchal civicism which threw all moral government upon an Autocrat, who, though Divine, was still a concretely-conditioned existence. So, likewise, in another light, did it happen as to Protestantism, that the same matter of question formed the very focus of cause for Reform-separation from Catholicism. What but this was the point upon which the moral sense of Luther actually struck out its revolt:—namely, the claim of a concrete priesthood to control the judgments upon internal sin which he discerned to belong, by the very birth-right of conscience-gifted men, solely to each man's share in the world unseen? Roman Catholicism would have given to fellow-men the power to indulge, or non-indulge, sin. Luther claimed that nothing should come between his Maker and himself in such respect save only his own conscience: he must needs, as to this, be king and priest to himself. And this is the very bearing of the complaint of English reformers in politics against Comtism. The importance Comte attaches to civic organization, relatively to individualistic self-guidance, forms a true matter of continuity to all that we account destructive of conscience and spirituality in Papism; and thence indeed, backwards, to the very barbarism of Patriarch-hood. In whatever degree a concrete mortal like ourselves is made to fulfil what really rests with self to do, there is an actual severance of functions from our own personality, which is a cutting of the integrity of it right in two.—For my own part, however, I would still

retain the principle of division, which carries the benefit of Catholicism, so far as it goes, in this way: namely, by setting apart the priest-function for the one half of every man's own individual nature, and letting *this* officiate for the other half.

But there is a farther matter of result, gained from my own treatment of religion, on behalf of which if I may not appeal so specifically as here to the principles of enlightened politicians, yet I may in a manner do so to the feeling of our nation in general, contrasted particularly with Comte's nation. I mean, to our national instinct as to the benefit of keeping apart the idea of the "family" from that of governmental institutions. For this instinctive judgment, I conceive, is in fact maintained in us, precisely through the same instinctive reasoning by which the Protestant eschews the interposition of any sort of fatherhood between the natural father and God. Whether it be the so-called "spiritual Pope", or the would-be "paternal Despot", that is the thing proffered to us, our two attachments, of the family sort and of the religious sort, distinctly apart as they lie, unite in compelling us to reject it with a sort of indignation. *Both* the family-parent and the Father-Deity seem alike insulted by it. The only possible use which the pseudo-father and pseudo-Deity of Popedom can have for us, in the way of continuity, is just the furnishing us with a type of what expressly the concrete sort of government must abstain from aspiring to. And this is a matter of true serviceableness.—But, in truth, there seems to be an inevitableness of abuse to the idea of the family, contained in the very essence of Comte's Sociology. And that is, in the assumption that he makes of its being an "unit." This, accordingly, is the fundamental matter upon which I press for comparison with him.

In my own searching for the actual circumstances in nature which have given the existing mould to our religious feelings, I have myself, by my own instinctive guidance, recurred to the very idea of the family-relations forming such circumstance—and not for the religious alone, but all other kinds of organized feeling,—which is the essence of Comte's. And I may say, it has been with a kind of glad astonishment that, in my subsequent recurrence to Comte, I have thus found him upon the identical track. But still I must also say, that my own interpretation seems to me much deeper and truer than his. In the essential dividedness which I have myself found in the family-constitution,—instead of taking it for the homogeneous integer for which Comte takes it,—I see at once the separating mark of the human knot of connection from the merely animal kind of aggregation which *was* defective of the division, and a true source for the variation in present experience with regard to the religious and secular modes of feeling. But, moreover, in this constitution of divided elements in the family group, considered as incessantly warring with one another, I see a right cause, otherwise wanting, for whatever of vitality our relational life, both domestic and social and also abstractly-religious, in any way possesses. *Because* the filial-parental relation acts in one direction, and the fraternal in a precisely contrary direction, has the family knot, or focus of emotionalism, alone a rationale for its existence, as anything more than a brute connection. And if at the same time the contrariety so perpetuates itself, as I have schemed it to do, into the domain of mind, as that the first kind of relation presides constantly over all our conceptions, and also our organized institutions, that have regard to religion, and the second kind over inter-human ones, the duplicity in the type seems attested. But be-

yond this, and with a clenching significance, lies the matter of the third element of family-division, the making out of whose functional type is now become regnant with me. That is, the Sex-division, lying at once beneath and above the Parental and Fraternal distinctions—deeper in its origin than either of them, and yet incomparably later in power of duly asserting itself. It will be seen, in what I have yet to say, how especially different from Comtism is what my own conclusions show, as the part that Sex has really to perform in and by the so-called “social unit,” compared with my difference even as to the former elements. And therefore let me rest here, at once, the true basis of my Anti-Positivism. Nor can I help claiming it as a true sign of clear purpose already attached to my own view, that it does so admit of my presenting the point.

For thus, in fact, is sufficiently explained what I have referred to as yielding to my thinking its requisite teleology: namely, as I may now describe it, the discerned power in religiously-swayed systematization to trace out a course of human civilization, which shall exhibit progress as proceeding *backwards*, according to the social view of it; and that is, such as shall *end in*, instead of *beginning with*, the matter of family culture:—this view of progress in every way being held to answer to, in opposing, the political view. To make out this idea systematically, it is true, there is a world of thought to be dealt with!—and I am about to throw in my own poor contribution towards it!—But the very suggestion of such an idea, *as* a teleological one, gives a helpfulness to the whole subject that is incalculable.

And powerfully does it bear upon the remaining point of general objectionableness in Comte’s system, necessary to be now touched upon, which is so pregnant of import-

ance that it may be said to carry the full moral weight of Positivism. I mean, the peculiar character given by Comte to his general principles of morality, which is represented by his own invented word of *Altruism*. Used as this word is desired by Comte to be used, the very nature of it sets itself in full against my own conception: implying, as it does, that the correlative to Egoism, in a desirable or normal sense, shall be that which *destroys* Egoism; whereas, if my principle be true, the correlative ought to be that which especially enhances, in elevating, the latter. My principle supposes that the perfecting of family-relations, which is the final purpose, ostensibly such, of religiously-directed culture,—causing, while it tends constantly towards this, the leaving of social relations, contrarily, ever more and more in the background of relative importance,—constitutes in fact the finishing acquisition of attributes to every individual's individualism, through the centering of family-ties ever closer in conjunction with its Egoism: in consequence of which result, when accomplished, the feeling of Selfism may truly be accounted upon a level,—a virtual or balancing level,—with the Social instinct whose ripening occurs in a directly opposite fashion. And to meet this idea, my own suggested term of "Relationalism" seems indeed precisely to answer, as to expressing the true quality of modification which Egoism requires to undergo,—and especially, as to the main point of holding present to attention the true starting-point whence improving impulses, to be genuine, must necessarily flow. But this is what Comte's term slurs over, and hides from sight; and by so doing, appears to bring much more of risk to the moral purity of the conception involved, than even to its clearness to thought. If there be *not* held in view, systematically, that all outgoings of human sympathies, to be genuine, must have

their *point-de-départ* in human selfishness, it seems to me that a more perilous opening is made, in reality, towards all kinds of self-delusive moral hypocrisy, than any other which an unwitting systematization could possibly have fallen into! The only safety-valve from it is to throw the meaning of *Altruism*—accordantly, indeed, with the natural habit and genius of language,—into that of the correlative to Egoism in its bad sense; both of the terms thus being taken to represent simply the *abuse* of natural function. And the same character, with identical liability, appears to attach equally to the connected phrase, grown latterly so much into vogue,—and by no means in mere pleasantry, but in all seriousness of practical intention,—of the “Enthusiasm of Humanity.” So false, and therefore so dangerous to true morality, appears to me the idea that is here involved,—or rather aimed at,—that the best I can hope for in regard to it, seems to be that the term should speedily be turned into an acknowledged symbol of warning: namely, against the peculiar cant of which I am convinced that its use must in the end become the real engenderer.\* I say, that the idea of it is merely “aimed at”; because what real idea can there belong to the terms employed? If “humanity”, as a feeling, mean really the “feeling of humanity” which we ordinarily understand by it, impossibly can there be an “enthusiasm” of it, such as any thing like a genuine instinct can reply to! If “humanity” be thought of as a true and natural feeling, nothing of feeling that we know of could be freer from all character of passion; and to paint it as possessing such, is therefore the depriving

\* Or else, of a general scepticism as to the power of doing good. I mean, of course, that both of these liabilities are proportionate to the degree in which the idea implied by the phrase is held apart from that of particular modes of benevolence—which are the legitimate sphere of enthusiasm.

it of truth and nature, and the tricking up of it instead with the flare of theatrical tinsel.—Besides, whatever of perversion befalls any particular words out of the delicate group here called in question, vitiates the whole number. If “Humanity” can be passionate, what meaning at all has “*Love*”, by which it may henceforth be distinguished? And what is there that can in any way compete in importance, as to the furthering of vital well-being to mankind, with the preserving of a true meaning *here*? I hope to show hereafter, when I come to the moral aspect of my subject, that it is quite as much on account of the distinctiveness which my principle of thought-division affords to our practical ideals, as of that which it yields to our speculative ones, that such principle establishes itself to me:—how the making out, in fact, of the purely passionless Religion which this mode of thought institutes, is nothing else than identical with the obtaining of correspondent distinctiveness, and therein enhancement, to our ideal of true human Love;—while similar effect proportionately follows to the whole range of moral ideals that lie between these two extremes, of the most highly abstract, and the most relatively-concrete nature. To do full distinctive justice in our thinking to either side in this matter,—that is, to both sides,—seems to me of such indispensable requisition, in order equally to the future purifying of family happiness, based upon the present vivifying of our personal affections, and to the maintaining of our personal steadfastness in sense of Right and Duty, that I can scarcely say how strong is my conviction of the necessity, in our pending systems of principle, of forbearing all tampering with, and confounding together of, the signs that need to hold the respective departments asunder. It is in truth impossible to me to pass from the point without making



this protest, on my own account, as to what seems to me so plainly this sort of tampering, as does the style of language I am speaking of; tending to raise pretensions of emotion towards figments which have no natural association with emotion, of the sort intended. According to my own feeling, the "Love of Otherhood", such as Comtism enjoins it, is no whit less dangerous an intrusion amongst our moral ideals, as dispersive of all genuine images, than was the very injunction to "Otherworldliness" itself, which all Comtists have so vehemently repudiated. The whole meaning of Altruism, in fact, appears neither more nor less than a simple prosaic barbarism, made to overlay the corresponding precepts of Christ. What in the Gospel stands as an exaggeration that is felicitously explained as such by its position, Comte has expressly culled off, and would mould into a systematic basis!

Thus, from every one of these leading considerations as to the character of Comte's proffered religion, the result tends the same way: towards showing that while a change in method is required in passing from intellectual systematization to religious, his own kind of change is null as to the effect demanded—or, rather, is that which causes a condition that is worse than if none had been attempted. And let me here fall back for a moment upon comparison with Butler; the parallelism with whom, on the part of Comte, seems to me to become here of peculiar instructiveness. I mean, as to the one-sidedness, of reverse sorts, which each of them has manifested, in their respective attempts to mould religion into a "system." I wish to express how the one-sidedness of the secularist drives me anew towards that of the religionist, as proving after all the least at fault of the two—as ought naturally

to be expected, in the subject being that of religion.

When Butler endeavoured to blend the whole range of things contemplated under one scheme of Analogy, the two domains that presented themselves to him as requiring to be amalgamated, though heretofore held antagonistic, were known to him by the terms of Reason and Revelation. But let the present idea be admitted, and I think we have only to consider what was really understood by him as to these terms, to see that his endeavour to reduce these accounted domains under one common law of interpretation, so far as it went, was a true pre-figurement of the modern doctrine of Uniformity, subjected to the here-desired division. For by the domain of Reason, Butler certainly had in view that entire region of Nature as to which it is now allowed, on all hands, that the method which ought lawfully to reign supreme is that of observant investigation; and by the domain of Revelation, whatever else he meant, he must at all events have meant this, that it comprised whatever, out of the whole of things, stood as complimentary to the other class of thought-objects. If then we reflect both how the former sphere has come to count to ourselves as the whole mass of things material; and how it is the special point and glory of the modern principle of Unity to carry law-interpretation, as reason's true interpretation, through material nature into mental,—nothing truly appears wanting to a perfect sequence between Butler's idea and the modern one, except the very allotment of division now sought for. Namely, that to the field of Outward Observation should be added, in distinctive opposition, the field of Introspection. Let only the idea of Revelation be thoroughly freed from its obscuring phantasm of *miracle*, and the continuity between "matter revealed" and "matter gained by Introspection" seems to me of

the simplest. Nor is the continuity really impeded by Butler's arrangement being, as I have called it, merely a "negative preparation" for a true one :—this being the effect of that slight put upon a certain province of mind-operation, in which I conceive that Butler has been matched, and more than matched, by Comte. For the latter's insistency upon uniformity was carried out by means of an over-bearing of religion and metaphysics that was determinately and expressly such ; but Butler's neglect of the contrary or scientific action of thought,—which caused his "reasoning" to remain of the merely metaphysic kind, instead of rising to the inductive kind,—was a simple ignoring of Science : a simple leaving it un-meddled with, as regarded his subject. And this made room for the filling up now of his defective classification in the way that is impossible with Comte's. The very fact of Butler's reasoning, as *mere* reasoning, having worked up the mass of then-hypothesized conception into the consistency it did, furnished at all events the temporary somewhat that held open the space for an opposition to science that should be of the true sort. And here, therefore, do I feel right given to my own instinct respecting the two schemes : causing me to see *why* it is that my own thought may really be filiated upon Orthodoxy, while towards Positivism of any kind it can merely hold collateral relation. I cannot avoid, namely, the assurance that pristine Religion's contempt for Science, indulged in through mere ignorance, was a fault eminently more capable of being rectified, than is the contempt of Religion, on the part of Science, which in positivistic hands means the bodily crushing up of it.

All along throughout the course of world-experience, as Christian experience, the two partner-aspects of "the seen" and "the believed",—"the demonstrable" and

“the taken upon instinct”,—have stood side-by-side, as a junction to be expected, in a way that of itself goes far to prove the partnership matter of Nature’s intention :—so that Comte’s determination for science, that, purely man-like, it *shall* find it good to be alone, seems to me a manifest flying in the face of Nature!—Nay, for my own principle, I may go back to the Bible-idea of creation itself, for a basis to filiate itself upon, as well as to lessons of experience. If my teleology lies entirely in the showing that the human mind is “two” and not “one”, this is supposed, as I have continually hinted, to be solely in the same manner that human beings are thus divided, and consequently upon the same grand design betokened by that division. And thus, if I would prove how I really am only building up my scheme, after all, on and around the Bible-scheme, I have, for its exposition, but to enlarge on the words of Genesis this little: namely, to make them run—“In the beginning, God devised”—let me be suffered the anthropomorphism,—“a creative type; “by the not-sudden, but infinitely-gradual working-out of which, He has now finally compassed that highest thing to which creation has ever yet extended, the human mind: *so*, however, creating this, that only rightly adapted to His purpose has He found it, when at length, as at present, ‘male and female’ has He also created it.”

And to work out the evidence of this grand design, as to this culmination of it in Mind-Sexhood, will be the leading purport of my whole generalistic effort, to follow this introduction,—according to my own sense of its purport. So far is the idea, hitherto only allusively glanced at in my speculations, from being a matter of *mere* illustration to me! Whenever the whole of things comes to be looked at fairly from the point of view that is *not* the scientific, but the sheerly generalistic, this fact of Sexhood,

as universally either realized, or tending to be realized, in Nature, is the one, as I believe, that takes lead of every other. And its doing so, as I also believe, substantiates the right to this secondary mode of world-speculation being attempted—secondary, however, only as to conscious effort, since in regard to instinct it has long been recognized as primary.

If fellow-minds with my own will only similarly follow out their bent, in striving to gain a sense of general things that, under due respect to science, shall yet possess a true independency of the sort of scheming that bases itself upon solitary science;—if, as conscious religionists, they will lend themselves, each for himself or herself, (since, under religion, each separate soul forms the world-centre to itself,) to work out, still for common good, a view of Nature that shall as truly answer to the distinctively feminine need of religion, as the view of science answers to the distinctively masculine command of reason:—so that the respective views shall themselves grow to be as purely “distinct in their individualities” as it is the true sign of human culture that the human sexes should become more and more distinct:—if this be truly and faithfully done, with whatever degree of ability, little or much, such minds can bring to the task, incomparably great, I am assured, is the aid that must arise to human thinking. There must be induced, namely, a means of looking at Nature, as it were, stereoscopically: and what this signifies is, the power of finding in Nature a true *solidity* of meaning—a meaning such as the flat one-sidedness, whether of Science alone, or of Metaphysics alone, neither has ever yet afforded, nor in the nature of things ever can afford.

My desire then for this issue, this assuredly natural issue, to human thought-arrangement, is my clenching

reason for the abrogation of Comtism :—while its want of a teleologically-directed bearing towards any such issue accounts to me, likewise, for the entire impression of incongruity, striking upon me continually during the reading of Comte's works, which would otherwise be inexplicable to me. Whenever he passes from topics of detail into generalistic ones, such as touch upon my conscious instincts, I am forced into violent strain to follow him. Every leading thought, every leading word, seems constantly where it should not be. It stands where its position seems to falsify it. And this is in fact represented by the very designation of his scheme. If I think I understand his meaning of the word "*Positive*," I am baffled as to his idea of "*Philosophy*." To me, Positivism is so much one thing, and Philosophy another, that I can by no means assort their ideas together ;—except precisely by compromise : that is, in the manner in which we habitually speak of a blue-green ; or, by a closer parallel, of a "rational faith." But this is the farthest from Comte's intention by the phrase. By his own putting of Positivism and Philosophy together, he insists that the heretofore meaning of the latter term is wholly absorbed into that of the former.—So will he have Religion to *be* Science, and Science to *be* Religion.—And this appears simple confusion. The effect of it to me is, that when I turn from Comte to Nature, and see if by *his* method I can read *her*, I feel—to use a homely simile that has constantly occurred to me,—as if I were trying to play on a piano, cramped in gloves shaped regardlessly of right and left :—nay, with my right hand thrust expressly into a left-hand glove. And just as much as I should find it impossible, while my fingers were thus thwarted, to extract from the instrument music that should be really such, do I find that by Comte's compulsory unity is Nature herself unharmonized.

And yet it is true, that neither does Mr. Spencer's philosophy, which I have accepted as that which is destined to do for mankind, finally, whatever Comtism has tried to do, but has failed in,—neither does this philosophy, any more than Comte's, show the least of tendency hitherto towards such culmination; nor indeed does any other that is known to me. But there are two reasons which prevent this from being a real difficulty with me. On the one hand, this at-present unfolding scheme is far from having yet reached the point where the matter of thought-division can naturally come into question: all probability lying against its ever doing so while, at all events, the natural term of my own life shall suffer me to benefit by waiting the event. On the other hand, my own idea of religious method is that which banishes all religious importance from the circumstance; without, however, the least of diminished confidence being thus implied as to Mr. Spencer's manifest ability of carrying out best in his own person his own scheme.

From my first expression of adhesion to this scheme, I have taken it only as that which yielded me the indirect support, which now I am asserting it to be the true need of religious thought to receive from the scientific. It gave me nothing of a religion in itself, but the much better thing of the means of working out one. It has simply done, in this respect, the one thing needful to science, of making a distinct and reverential acknowledgment of religion's existence and requirement, and otherwise has followed separately its own course:—to the incomparable advantage, as I believe, both of the one subject and the other. Even what it did afford me,—namely, the immense good of a scientific basis, together with the

instrumentation of working principles to build for myself upon it,—it afforded tacitly. I needed to take it: that is, it was to me of the nature of “externally-received impression”, which I believe religious sustenance must ever consist in. I imbibed out of the scheme that which I felt assured, by instinctive conviction, was the possible maintainer of a kind of evolution, which seemed however the farthest from its own contemplation:—that of a religious continuity, borne specifically through religion’s wonted path of dogmatic and metaphysical theology. It has happened also, to me, as it might to any other religionist, that the effect of this application of evolutionary principle has extended itself, subsequently, throughout the general field of topics such as are capable of being affected by it; causing the peculiar aspect of them, which I am here proposing to describe, as my only means of depicting what religion itself has thus become to me. And this event to myself assures me, that it needs only for a sufficient number of fellow-minds to undergo a similar process, as the consequence of receiving kindred impressions,—by no means restrictedly from Mr. Spencer’s views, but combinedly from those also of a host of his scientific co-operators,—and a *world-effect* upon religion will follow, such as shall be of a correspondent character. Hence is my apprehension of religion as impersonal in one sense, as it is individualistic in another! Providence has still to bring it about; and not any particular man, or men, but Time itself must give shape to it!—And as to my hoping for any immediate recognition of metaphysical method, of the systematic kind that may indeed precede realization, being actually wrought out into system, upon the scientific plan of working, there seems even a moral impossibility against it. The point where the suggestion, if any where, must arise, as to Mr. Spencer’s process, must be that which presents



the parallel occasion to whatever it was that occasioned Comte's actual transition—though, as I conceive, possible here to arise only in the gradual and natural manner which will render the change altogether different from the abrupt reversal of method in Comte's case: such, from its very abruptness, as appears, to many of Comte's warmest admirers, an effect of cerebral re-action amounting to actual cerebral disorder. And according to my belief, that point must be this very one of coming into contact with dogmatic theology. I think it is not for a moment to be supposed that when Mr. Spencer does arrive at the need of referring to this, he will treat it with the same—*non-chalance*—that Comte has treated it: but if not, the very conscientiousness of science must surely be that which will show him that a subject so naturally alien to scientific predilection as this is, cannot be the one to be treated by scientific minds with justice; and this, I believe, must compel him to the need in question, of obtaining a check to his own impressions about it, afforded from a specifically different point of view from his own. For, to enhance immeasurably the difficulty of dealing with the subject, is to be remembered that, from his own point of view, this will be but one out of a multitude of other topics that will presently burst forth in a flood of new demands upon him; comprising that insistency for human concerns to be measured, as such, by a Philosophy of History, which he must necessarily bring his system to submit to.—I am convinced that a true Philosophy of Religious History is in no other way to be gained than by a sympathetic sifting of the whole series of by-gone Religious Controversies.

Thus for the strengthening to my own footing which a scientific corroboration to my conception can alone afford me, it is still from Comte's systematic impatience, and not from Mr. Spencer's surer mode of philosophy, that I

must look for the aid available to me,—turning what here is negative in such assistance into the slighter than scientific form, possible upon my own very different from scientific method, which however will suffice, if successful, for the end I need it. This end, I must repeat, is entirely apart from any mere criticism of Comtism. And yet it is the case at the same time, that the following of my own object will be but the fairness, due to Comte's doctrine of religion, of dealing with his really strongest of arguments in support of it, in that stock of proper strength to the whole of his doctrines, which consists in its systematic foundation. That argument may be stated thus : namely, that if Science-evolution be really what Comtism has shown it, there was no possibility of any other result to it than Comte's assigned one, of a Sociology to which Religion *should* be only the bare attendant. It is therefore in every sense a desiderandum to see if, through the peculiarity of my station, which ought to show me weak places in this foundation, such places are not rendered actually discernible. To this most difficult, and most important matter of comparison with Comtism, I will therefore now proceed.

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SECTION III.—A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF COMTE'S PLAN OF SCIENCE, DIRECTED WITH THE VIEW TO GAIN FROM IT A BASIS OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE METAPHYSICAL EFFORT WHICH IS TO FOLLOW.

In the first place, I approach the subject with a clear understanding, accordantly with Comte in his earlier writings, that the idea of Religion needs altogether to be withdrawn from attention during its entertainment ;—just as I agreed previously that the express reference to Deity

should be withdrawn, even under treatment of Religion. Under scientific treatment, every object concerned can only be treated of *directly*; and this, by my conception, suffices to banish Religion.——Religion, in truth, has resolved itself for the moment into simply the one great object, latent throughout Comte's original effort, of finding in Nature a principle of All-Comprehensive and Over-ruling Unity.

But this gives me at once an expression for the difference I have to explain. When Comte, subsequently, found the necessity of dividing his idea of this Unity into the two sorts of respectively Subjective and Objective Unity, he so assorted his meanings for these terms, that the former *alone* was of the kind that he adjudged to be rightfully aimed at. The division, on the contrary, that I am myself desiring, is that which shall exhibit the Subjective Unity as constantly receiving its support through the maintenance and extension of the Objective Unity. And I base this expected result upon my own meaning attached to Subjective Unity, that it is the sort of recognized self-consistency in Nature which is appreciable to us through the sole Introspective or Metaphysical estimation of Nature, as opposed to the correspondent recognition obtainable only by Observant Science. These two kinds of recognized Unity are, I maintain, not only compatible, but mutually assistant. And this shows how entirely my contest with Comte lies in his denying to Metaphysics as permanent and improvable a position as the partner-method possesses;—although with *old* Metaphysics, *unimproved* by communion with Science, I wish to have no more to do than Comte has, or than I myself have to do with *old* Theology.——For the present, however, as just implied, I am leaving Metaphysic method behind me, together with Religion. I am only endeavouring to see,

from the *quasi*-scientific station which I am alone able myself to occupy, how the true principle of Science, in objectively treating Introspection, must in rightfulness compel from Science the due admission of the partner-method. I am not in the least yet trenching upon the *moral* ground which Comte contemplated as furnishing Subjective Unity. My two desired methods are to be, one as well as the other, intellectual; however not equally so.

But I feel immediately that to take in all that is required for an adequate defining of these two methods, a farther pair of terms is in requisition;—precisely owing to the connectedness assigned to Introspective method with History. I need, that is to say, words which shall carry with them a tacit reference to the grounds for division which I have alleged upon my hitherto plan of thinking: namely, the mingled fruit of attention to Nature and pure Metaphysics, which out of the dividedness of the “social unit” gathers the conclusion, that the regard to effects of succession in Time-intervals, constituting Philosophic History, ought to be associated with the frame of mind bearing on Parental relations, this being the Religious frame; while, reversely, effects of Space-allotments, determined by Fraternal relations, are those which by antecedent probability ought to be exclusively placed under Positivistic treatment. And such pair of words are the signally important ones of “static” and “dynamic”. By means of these, I may throw the entire gist of my instinctively-felt objections to Comtism into the following *a priori* assertion:—

Although, by accepted hypothesis, Comte’s attempt to render Historic treatment *Dynamic* treatment, was the true necessity of the case; yet so essentially in reason ought Positivism, as such, to restrict itself to *Static* treat-

ment, that the attempt to include Historic treatment within the single method of Positivism herein condemns itself.

Still, since I am here obviously forcing the words into a meaning different from Comte's own sense of them, it remains for me to justify the change. And this, in fact, will give a convenient index to all that is to follow. If it be really called for to make the difference in the respective methods of thought so much intenser as I believe it to be, so must it be necessary also that the meanings of the qualifying terms for the methods should gain additional intensity. And in seeking to demonstrate this necessity, I shall come into contact with every particular matter that touches on my own purpose.

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My general plan of thought may be laid out as follows :—

First, I can see no other meaning possible to be attached to *dynamic* treatment of History, even on Comte's own terms, than this, that it needs to be such as shall exhibit a capability of tracing out, amidst the mass of events concerned, such as bear with a speciality upon certain effects, estimated as sequential upon them:—implying, that is to say, a *power* in the mind of the historian, adequate to track the lines of *power* in eventuation. But Comte's usage of the term seems defective of reference to this implication: having regard solely to movement, as force-producing movement, in the objects that History concerns itself with. And hence this metaphysical extension of the meaning forms the end which I have properly in view, as the final result of the added intensity to be gained for it: since as soon as *dynamic* treatment shall be held as implying one determinate attitude of mind in the thinker, and *static* another, the thought-methods will be

established with the fulness that I desire for them. But Comte's ordering of the division, so long as it remains in force, seems by its artificiality to expressly impede such intensification. For, supposing that after completing his secondary, or prevaillingly-dynamic effort, Comte had turned back to re-write his earlier works: is it not to be considered the true course that a new dynamic influence would thus have told upon these, causing his return to the secondary mode, if this also be imagined, to be a very different—a much less abrupt transition than in the original case?—thus leading the way, naturally, to a dissolving of the originally-conceived division into one which should admit of a minor co-existence of the two methods, even in the properly static matter of that primary systematization of science, where, as it stands, Comte seems scarcely to have recognized the need of a dynamic method at all? But this result must involve the breaking up of the present form of Comtism: so far as it resists which, therefore, that form is an obstacle to the system's improvement.—— And in this way is confirmed my conviction that whatever of inadequacy lies in Comtism, turns upon its want of a sufficient idea of Evolution, *first* betraying itself by its dealing with History. The “tracing out of *lines of power*” in any subject, is obviously identical with tracing the subject's Evolution; nor is the subject of Science itself, however perhaps the last to require such tracing, exempt from the demand. But Comtism, under its actual rigidity of constitution, seems to have closed itself against this.——Accordingly, I assume the one point of “the sufficient intensifying of dynamic thought” to represent the entire amelioration to be contended for. If only a measure of this could be infused into Comte's proper matter of Staticism, or Science-classification, I conceive that when the time comes for Dynamic agency to ostensi-

bly assert itself, it will do so with the effectiveness that alone belongs to distinctive separation. I mean, as to clearing away the incongruousness of images, which I have spoken of as creating confusion to thought in every department of Comtism, but which here is of incalculable importance. I believe, namely, that whatever is mainly at fault arises fundamentally out of the entanglement of mind-operations which is caused by the endeavour to hold compounded in *one* the kinds of operation which culture has come to require the assorting in *two*. That is, for the want of *differentiation* carried into the very nature of mind, in the same way that Mr. Spencer has shown it universally else carried out in nature. And to this doctrine of Mr. Spencer's, indeed, I need only appeal, to show *how* it is that the intensifying of *power* to the mind appears to me identical precisely with the effecting of this assortment.

Following this plan, then, it will be the chief object of this section to consider in what way the dynamic influence in question might really act upon science-arrangement; and even, deeper back, upon the ultimate conception of mental progression. But previously to this, it is needful to deal with the alleged inconsistencies in general. I must explain, as far as I am able, what it is in the pervading character of Comtism, that appears to me thus, in the most essential respects, to set his system, as it were, altogether at cross purposes with itself.

And in truth I see no better way of expressing the want of *power* felt in this system of principle, than by still describing it, as I did upon original impression, as an actual exhibitor of the very defect against which it sets itself, by profession, the most strenuously: namely, of metaphysical defect, pertaining to the old and bad sense of metaphysics. (See *Thoughts in aid of Faith*, pp. 265-7.)

Just from its not classifying metaphysical method, accepted as legitimately such, in a true apartness from positivistic, the natural and inevitable tendency, without being improved upon, seems left by it to mar and distort every generalistic topic that is entered on.—But there are two opposite ways in which this chiefly appears; according to the respective leading of topics into physical grounds, or those to be accounted rightfully-metaphysical. And therefore I must try to unravel these from one another.

By “metaphysical” defect, I mean the excessive, or unorganized habit of resting upon *types*: that is, of resting upon them, as if they were not mere devices of human thought, contrived by thought solely for its own convenience, but as if they were natural realities. I shall presently have to argue that this single defect really includes all others that appear in the system, as to the particular matter of specific sciences, necessarily accounted of by types. But more obviously does it show in the light of defect when the system is under general consideration.

On the one hand, this over-resting upon types seems to cut off from thought the power of arriving at a true sense—a sufficing sense,—of Causation, or Creation; on the other, to involve a peculiar feebleness in respect of the physical basis requisite by hypothesis to any system aspiring to be a Developmental one. But I have also this especially to argue, that these opposite effects are in the strictest sense counter-effects: or, such as inevitably present themselves together, if they present themselves at all. Such conclusion, at least, pertains to the Developmental aspect of the matter; and upon this I will therefore proceed.

The accounted *im*-potency, comparatively speaking, of Comte’s physical basis, lies in his resting contented with what, by modern lights, must necessarily be judged the



extremely defective appliance towards a Developmental Science, alone at hand for him in his own day :—that is, in his having taken up with this, as if it had been really a sufficient foundation for the building of a finished scheme, like his own, upon. I believe, in fact, that when the consequences of this are sufficiently traced (as I am about to try and do,) through the working of his system, little beside them will prove needful of being opposed. But if so, there is a corresponding importance in our seeing rightly where the failing lay. And if it be really the case that Comte had no alternative present to him, except either the acceptance of this appliance, or the abandonment of his scheme altogether (—abandonment of what filled to the brim his whole of being!—) the world will scarcely think itself the worse for his rashness! Let me therefore show my reasons for thus understanding his case; and for thus believing that the one error of over-haste—over-eagerness towards what Mr. Mill condemns as over-systematization,—ought really to include within its single accountableness even the special short-coming on which Mr. Mill has laid, additionally, so notoriously heavy a hand.

Certainly, the scheme of Comte could not do *without* an appliance of the kind that Gall's "Phrenology" was, though no other than this was accessible to him. But, moreover, there seems to me a valid defence for his acceptance of this, to be found in the peculiarity of its *fitness* to Comte's own ground, such as could scarcely have done otherwise than content him. I mean, with a view to that adjusting of the whole character of his system, which was all-in-all with him; and which indeed was a thing that by its nature *must* have been done on the spot, by systematic impulse, if it was done at all. And that is, the plan of its resting upon types, to the extent of Comte's

actual manner. To this he had manifestly the inducement springing from the simplicity of his own idea of progression ; especially such, if it be contrasted with what must be the character of progression, if under the two-fold bearing here desired. But he had also this particular promotive to the same effect, that, in his allotting the entire potency of eventuation to produce a subjection to "Sociology", he left himself deficient of precisely *that* which otherwise would have broken up the simplicity of his idea, and rendered it *no longer* adapted to representation by types—or, at all events, by types of the nature of his own. For it is nothing but the consideration of Individualistic progress, held as at least of *equal* importance with Social, that bestows requirement for investigation of progress-conditions, such as should go the requisite lengths of investigation sufficient to throw "Phrenology", typically-adapted as it is, nevertheless out of adaptation to the real demand of the case. Under Comte's idea, whatever of due importance was un-recognized as to the Individual, self-evidently *must* have gone to swell the factitious importance of the type, assigned to Society. But the factitiousness was, at the same time, the very thing upon which Gall's science of mind, in so far as it *was* a science of mind, supported itself. I mean, such is the sentence of to-day, although as different as possible was the intention both of Gall and of Comte at the time ; and although each of them severally attempted, in the two required ways, to diminish as much as possible the metaphysical defects in the effort : Gall, by increasing the much-wanted physical support to his ideas ; Comte, by legitimately philosophizing them. Still, neither of them in the least admitted, what however it seems now essential to admit, that all the so-called "organs" of Phrenology are in no way different in reality, as to their nature, from

the previously-accepted types for metaphysics ; except as being extensively sub-divided, together with a certain observed connection with outward brain-configuration. Namely, that Combativeness, Causality, &c., are after all the very same kind of typified attributes of the mind, that Will, Perception, and other symbols of the old metaphysicians were : each of them belonging to the entire field of brain-operation, however suspected, on empirical grounds, of exercising themselves to a proportionate excess in particularized portions of the brain. And yet, both Gall and Comte built upon the idea of these attributes, as if they were physically-attested realities : taking their mental evidence, whether rational or conjectural, not merely in the place of physical evidence, sufficiently such, but as if it actually *were* the latter ; and thus committing the incongruity of even falling back on a lower stage of the very practice they were opposing :—so that, as to Comte, the fact appears that he was really taking a cruder example of metaphysics than any which metaphysics themselves would have suffered, for the basis to his own systematized opposition to metaphysics. For the crudeness lay in his failing to be conscious of what he was about, while they were expressly alive in the matter. And still the crudeness was serviceable, just because it furnished the systematic desiderandum of a common treatment made universal : human faculties bound up in types to exactly the same model as that upon which Comte bound up the epochs in progress, and in progress of all sorts, as to which succession of epochs constituted progress.

Nevertheless, that crudeness *is* but comparative impotency, here as elsewhere, shows immediately that we set this typified conception of progress, by the side of the properly-developmental one of Mr. Spencer, supported by the brain-science of our day. And especially this is shown

in relation to the idea of true creative agency, from which by Comte's idea is robbed the important somewhat that may be considered the correlative to what he gave to his "type" out of the due of Individuals. According to Mr. Spencer, Creation, except for being diffused, is as true a thing as ever it was, when it was theologically supposed to have been effected once for all, at the supposed beginning of things, by the immediate hands of God. The efficiency of it, instead of being in the least denied, or ignored, is merely spread over indefinite ages, which simply from their *being* indefinite can have neither assignable beginning nor end; and in which, consequently, what formerly counted *as* beginning, now stands merely as the amount of such ages that remain anterior to existent cognizance: and the efficiency is proved such, through an incessantly however slowly increasing exhibition of its effect upon the entire organic constitution of things, specially inclusive of mind-organization. Mr. Spencer's doctrine can do this, just by its leaving the metaphysical image of Deity as much spiritually cleared on the one hand, as it gives substantiality of action to circumstance on the other. And hence is gained a recognition of *power*, as to the exploring of historic events, which is *dynamic* in the full sense of the word. But to Comtism such ability is shut out. *Power* is as much cut off by it from eventuation throughout, as *God* is cut off from its "beginning". And with a notable relation, also, in the modes of attendant degradation of principle: since, just as Comte, in desiring to ignore the idea of God, hitherto enthroned over the world's "beginning", and thence to ignore "beginnings" in general, has done this in favour of inferior types to the sovereign one (—following thus, perhaps, the polytheistic instinct of intellect?—); so, by his consistently discouraging inquiry into the anterior processes underlying

the formation of all types whatever, has he left to his own employed ones the mingled grossness and emptiness which is signified by his presenting them, as he actually does, in the mode of being self-existent.—It will be better, however, to offer an illustration of this.

And nothing can be more to the point than the following, relating to my own subject in hand, of religion : from the fifth volume of the *Philosophie Positive*, p. 36. Comte's object here is expressly to rebut the very supposition respecting religion which it has been the aim of my preceding volume to carry out : namely, that the successive phases of religion, shown by history to have been at various times extant in the world, ought to lead us back in theory to a time when man had not begun to be religious at all. And this he does upon the following ground : that, in that case "il faudrait admettre dans l'humanité une époque où les besoins purement intellectuels auraient absolument pris naissance, sans aucune autre manifestation antérieure : ce qui serait directement contraire à ce grand principe fourni à la sociologie par la biologie, que, toujours et partout, l'organisme humaine a dû présenter, à tous égards, les mêmes besoins essentiels, qui n'ont pu différer, en aucun cas, que par leur degré de développement, et leur mode correspondant de satisfaction".—But is it not evident, I appeal to Comte's disciples, that in this assigning of primary station to "human needs" over any other possible circumstance, he is in truth doing *that*, which, if prior circumstance in due relation to it be found discoverable, of necessity convicts him of the "vice" in philosophy himself was so bitter against : namely, setting up hypothesis above need of evidence ? And, as to myself, I have given my own reasons for believing to have found such antecedent circumstances :—nor only with regard to the need for religion in general, but also for the particularized

needs which relate to the leading sub-divisions of religious principle, demonstrated by reliable history to *have* answered to distinctive human needs, at the time of their historical flourishing. That is, having first shown how there might well have been a time when the pre-human brute, about to pass insensibly into truly human condition, originally conceived the religious phantasm whose perfecting and purifying was at once, and ever since has been more and more, the "need" which above all others constitutes the distinctive "need" of human beings;—so, I have farther shown how there also arose, in subordination to the central desideratum, helpful and connected minor conceptions, each one of them carrying similar "need" for its own fostering. And moreover, as counter-proof, I have pointed out, in relation at all events to those minor "needs", how positive *functions*, answering to the needs, have, through the very exercise of the "needs", taken manifest root in the human constitution. For instance, eminently these four:—first, the specific capability (not in a fluctuating or transitory mode, as heretofore, but henceforth in a fixed and definite fashion,) of conceiving mankind under the character of general brotherhood, which involves the abstract idea of Humanity;—secondly, that of adequately concentrating the scattered kinds of conscious individuality into what we now think of habitually as the human Soul;—thirdly and fourthly, the moral capabilities allied with the correlative ideas of Duty and of Sin: neither of which are possible, without, on the one hand, the two preceding capabilities; on the other, without an accompanying connection with the entire remainder of Christian generalizations, of less prominent kind. And if I be reminded that, as to at all events the three latter of these conceptions, Comtists deny at once their moral validity, and therein their functional reality, I

simply make protest that here is effect of the instinctive antagonism which I base my whole argument upon.—As to the possibility of “originating” human need, in fact, I conceive that the commonest experience of instinct ought to be enough to convince us of it. What new idea is there, of any sort, suggested for the first time, in any age or place in the world, by the leading spirits of the world, which does not thenceforth create a *need* towards carrying it out, which as it can never again be absent from the world, so was never before existent in the world!

Indeed, the especial point of metaphysical “viciousness” in Comte’s words, is this very one, here opposed. I mean, the covert implication contained in them, that “needs” could possibly have existed in human nature, prior to their manifestation;—or, “faculties” for gratifying the needs, independently of exercise of the faculties. Surely, when rightly understood, the exercise of faculty is the *only* thing intended by “faculty”; and the impulse to such exercise the *only* thing meant by “needs”. Both “needs” and “faculties” are those which, by nothing else but exercise strengthen themselves and one another; seeing that every exertion of faculty involves, by force of habit, the deepened need of exerting it again: while for the primary effort I have conceived a happy inspiration—a successful accident, as it were, befalling the urgent strugglings of sorely-driven thought. I have marked the occasion that might naturally create original effort: while, once created, this must inevitably have been repeated, until habit, in its turn, created what we conveniently figure as “faculty”. But Comte supposes a faculty for religion antecedently to *anything* capable of calling it forth. And although it would be easy enough to shift his meaning, into that of implying merely a pre-existent disposition towards the faculty,—which is a true Developmental ap-

prehension,—*this* is precisely forbidden by Comte's systematic homage to types, supported by his actual doctrine of Development.——Not, however, that I have the slightest intention of fighting against types, when these shall be distinctively ordered; and when the ordering shall be based upon a clear understanding of the pure metaphysicalness of all types (—the latter condition being, as I believe, the true preliminary to the other—). But this, again, is forbidden by Comtism.

The manner in which I find my own view of Christianity's agency assorted with a physical basis, according to the Developmental brain-science which takes—or, as I am satisfied, *ought* to take—the place of Comte's phrenological basis, for ourselves of the present day, is the following. According to that view, (described particularly in chap. i.,) creative energy has displayed itself here constantly in alternate fashion. First of all, the human needs, such as they were prior to Christianity, thrust forth their impulses until the peculiar kind of eventuation known to us as Christian history, had acted itself out in the world; while constantly the events, in their turn, deposited, within a sufficient time after their occurrence, a new set of needs:—the primal creation thus repeating itself with added effect as every fresh individual, ever subsequently to the religion's first establishment, went over the process, or a part of it, for himself. And this means, that the part of mankind which was Christian men and women, so moulded their mental habits for a succession of ages into Christian beliefs, that their minds came to have an *organic* inclination towards them. One person after another, truly, did but think out “the multitude of thoughts within him”,—so occupying his life, regardlessly of any other's life;—nevertheless, it is testified by eventuation, that to every person was a certain general track of thought habitus. Well



then, just as here is manifestly presented one of those lines of concentrated life, which of speciality philosophic history takes note of; so is the possible connection of these lines with the physics of human constitution, hereditarily supported, also the most obvious. It is but to be conceived that the hereditary organism of these persons adapted itself to the long-prevalent habit. And this is precisely the sort of action which the cerebrists of to-day show as continually in progress throughout the entire field of brain-action. According to Professor Bain, and many others, no separate act of mind is there, of any sort, which, provided that it be persistent enough to include retention in memory, does not entail a fresh arrangement of brain-material, such as constitutes in fact a creation of fresh fibre to the brain. But this, if it be true, converts the event I have just imagined into even a scientific necessity. By this idea of cerebration it is impossible *not* to admit that the protracted habitude of so many generations to believe in Christianity *must* have resulted in producing specific brain functions, newly such, in the class of persons so devoted,—spreading, moreover, from them, into the constitution of the general race. This, then, I count to be the really *dynamic* estimation of the case, any falling short of which is condemned as defective. Apply the idea to Comte's judgment both of religion and metaphysics, and see what is the case that follows! He supposes that for generations and generations a largely-prevailing habit of thought *has* been in action, and yet that it has left behind it *no* correspondent trace, impressed upon human functions!

But Comte's "Phrenology" was altogether un-prescient of any sort of brain-science like this: just as it was equally un-prescient of the signal antagonism to itself, in the contrary matter of metaphysical typism, which is

deducible from the new doctrine of "Species", given to the present age by Mr. Darwin. By the latter all supposition of pre-fixed conditions whatever, in regard to organic nature, is to us exploded, once and for ever, *except* as to metaphysics; so that, if Comte had lived until now, it would have been impossible to him,—and to him above all men,—to have spoken any longer about "*besoins essentiels*". Should not the very word "essential", indeed, have reminded him that he was here upon metaphysic ground?—And, if it had, it would have enabled him to hold his Phrenology legitimately: that is, as a merely presumptive hypothesis, confessing itself as such, and spread only for the future entrapping of its evidence, yet wanting. As things are, however, Comte is even destitute of the vindication that otherwise might have been argued for him, that he treated Phrenology upon pre-vision, safe to his philosophic instinct; for the fact has been, that since Gall's time, it has been eminently the metaphysic side,—the viciously-metaphysic side,—that has fructified in excess over the inductive.

Still, there is in all this, as I have already suggested, what appears so venial to Comte's position, that in Mr. Mill's severity towards it I cannot help finding an actual argument; and one that tells with singular pertinency on my own point. For if Mr. Mill be really the truer Positivist of the two, in any consistent sense of the term, and for the reason that I believe him to be such, it is inevitable that Comte's inconsistency must to him be more offensive than it has a right to be to any other person. I believe Mr. Mill to be the representative thinker that he is, through being the age's static philosopher, by eminence: and to be so, through his characteristically never transgressing the bounds of topics which lie within the due limitation to static treatment,—except, indeed, in so far

as the very fact of his being a philosopher implies dynamic action to this extent. He seems, namely, to go to the very verge of what static treatment admits of, without however going beyond it. But then, this very restriction could only tend to conceal what was the real nature of Comte's problem, as the latter felt it presented to himself: namely, that of trying if, by dynamic compulsion, static treatment might not be forced to become evolutionary. As to Mr. Mill's own proper subjects, there is nothing that comes into question of dynamic evolution; nor, thence, of finding an adequate basis for dynamic investigation into mental conditions:—logic, mental analysis, political economy, political morals, being all of them topics that scarcely require anything at all of attention to be paid to the fact, whether or no, of fluctuation existing, or being possible to exist, in the very elements that at present make up philosophy's basis. Static reasoning *must* base itself, and exclusively so, upon *fixed* conditions. Neither, I suppose, could it be possible for any one, starting on the ground on which both Comte and Mr. Mill started, to divine beforehand, as to the dealing with History, that this in itself would entail the need of estimating other than fixed mental condition: so that Mr. Mill's expressed and full approbation of Comte's efforts in this direction,—natural, and indeed inevitable as it was to occur to a mind of advanced culture like Mr. Mill's, even as the ordinary effort of culture,—in no way compromised him in regard to accepting, at the same time, Comte's physiological adjuncts of principle. And the latter, again, were in themselves the half-measure that *could*, and could not *but*, expose themselves as such, to Mr. Mill's point of view, in the very stating of them:—for this reason, that all typical devices, when rested on with the implicitness with which both Comte and Phrenology did so, cast human thought in-

evitably back on the very struggle with theology, which static philosophy, purely such, succeeds in extricating it from; and *without* the unnecessary (and therefore condemnable) disrespect to theology which Comtism has fallen into. I mean, that typically-fixed conditions, when accompanied by the prohibition, whether actual or virtual, to look for anything anterior to them, *ought*, in right reason, to involve the assumption of a theologically-estimated Creator, which however it is specially not in the idea of Comte to retain attached to itself.

Yet there is another side to this controversial aspect of Mr. Mill's position, affording a check or counterpart to the present one, which is still more significant as to my point in hand, and the one I have already referred to as mainly in view with me. Namely, that which is exhibited by his relation to his specially un-positivistic, his metaphysical opponent, Sir William Hamilton. If static limitation, consistently observed, justifies, and therefore in a manner requires, omission of reference to Deity; so does it similarly justify and require omission of reference to Causation, as to the perpetually-occurring and minor events which habitually are without association with thought of Deity. And here, therefore, since theologic reverence is out of question, Mr. Mill and Comte are at one. But the same limitation and consistency *ought*, accordingly, to make it even impossible to Mr. Mill to enter into the meaning of Causation, as belonging to a totally-different class of thought from his own, such as is that of the representative modern metaphysician. And that this should have occurred, therefore,—as it notoriously has been seen to do,—confirms me most substantially as to the classes *being* essentially different, without however requiring me to judge either of them to be false. For, as to Mr. Mill, although, in being a philosopher, he cannot absolutely

pass over the idea of general Causation, yet his static limitation prevents him from needing more than a merely negative one ;—while a positive idea of Causation necessarily requires an extent of eventuation to be taken into account, such as in no way pertains to static consideration. And thus he is in every way maintaining his own ground, by adhering to the definition of Causation, that it signifies to human apprehension merely the matter of an invariable sequence, observed between accounted causes and effects : differing herein from Comte, who by the very same act of consistency proves himself at fault, just by carrying the definition into the domain where a contrary definition is called for. But this contrary definition is Sir W. Hamilton's :—so unpalatable, so actually incomprehensible to Mr. Mill, that the latter expressly intimates that it was only from its proceeding from a mind of so great authority, that he considered it worth the trying to enter into. And to complete the circle of experience, there is on the other hand the aptest of correspondence—or, rather I should say, of relationship,—between the metaphysician's idea of “causation”, and the developmentalism of Mr. Spencer. Let me, to show this, quote what suffices for my purpose, from the extract given by Mr. Mill from Sir W. Hamilton, in his *Examination* of the latter's philosophy, at pp. 290-1.

The extract bears upon the alleged impossibility of conceiving of any such thing as an “absolute commencement”.——“You can conceive”, Sir W. Hamilton says, “the creation of the world as lightly as you can conceive the creation of an atom. But what”, the metaphysician continues, “what is creation? It is not the springing of nothing into something. Far from it: it is conceived, and is by us conceivable, merely as the evolution of a new form of existence, by the fiat of the Deity”.\*——Now, if

\* It will be well, however, that I should here add the sentences consecutive

we translate the latter metaphysical, and, as I believe, perfectly justifiable phrase, as such, into the more definite rendering of the same idea which gives, as the equivalent of Divine Will, the "Unknown Power of insensibly-proceeding and universally-applying development," this purely philosophic explanation of creation says every thing that even a development-principle of the most extended sort requires to be adjoined to the idea of causation. It signifies, namely, the primeval *potentiality* that has lain in nature to produce all the forms of existence that ever have existed, or that ever may exist; and *so* signifies it, moreover, as specially to infringe in no way that doctrine of the persistency and unalterability-in-amount of original "Force", which is the root-substance of developmentalism. Assuredly, diffused existence which is *not* existence to ordinary apprehension, *may* become conditioned existence, which *is* proper existence, so esteemed by us,—as developmentalism says that it may;—and yet an absolute beginning of the latter be, philosophically-speaking, out of the question.—But to Mr. Mill's position, on the contrary, "diffused existence" is a nullity. It is that which he ought not and cannot, consistently, attend to.

—Hence, then, to myself—trying to put things together in a way that shall show me how master-thinkers like these can so disagree, and yet *be* the master-thinkers they are,—it is an at-once felicitous explanation to find, that by only allowance made for respective position, in this manner of static and dynamic difference, the opinions

to this, not only for my own better elucidation, but to show more accurately, by means of Mr. Mill's italics, the special part of Sir W. Hamilton's statement which he, Mr. Mill, takes exception to.—"Let us suppose", the extract continues, "the very crisis of creation. *Can we realize it to ourselves, in thought, that the moment after the universe came into manifested being, there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than there was the moment before, in the Deity himself alone? This we cannot imagine.*"

concerned, diametrically—or, may I say? triametrically—opposed as they are,—Sir William Hamilton's opinion, Mr. Mill's opinion, and Mr. Spencer's opinion,—are yet each of them absolutely true.—But quite different is the case with Comte's. As to *his* opinion, if I do not accept it as inclusive of *all* truth, I find no place for it anywhere; since no means open is there, by which it may fittingly be joined with that of others.

My conception is this. Only let Mr. Mill's idea of "invariable sequence" be, so to speak, multiplied into Mr. Spencer's idea of development, and the invisible quantum of causative energy that can be no *more* than invisible, as to any events amenable to legitimately static observation, becomes magnified into clearest apparency. And as to the theological aspect of the matter, favoured by metaphysics, here is my ground for saying that this invisible quantum, when become visible, wears an actual form that is sequential, and rightfully so, to the theological configuration of it. On the one hand, namely, it is plain that by developmentalism every minutest instance of creative action in nature is backed by a reference to the universal principle, just as indispensably as in theology every creature-act is backed by consent of Deity. And, on the other hand, is the mode of universal creation brought by it into conformity—relatedly, in every case; if not every where ostensibly,—with the mode of production which, as it is most of all familiar amongst ourselves, however mysterious, so is instinctively allied by us with all our symbolized notions of Deity. As God, by theology, is inevitably the *Father* of men; so is the mode of universal production throughout nature, representatively estimated, likewise a production by *parentage*. By this one word, in fact, may be expressed the entire character of nature's dynamics! But, if so, the case becomes, that

every lower form of existence whatever—in striving, as it does, by every kind of movement pertaining to it, to rise into higher form,—constitutes, *as* backed by the universal Potentiality, a true cause, however a merely partial or immediate one, to the mode of being that succeeds to it. In taking this one idea of parentage, therefore, for the type of natural creation, never, as I believe, shall we fall out either with natural fact, on one side, or with theological generalization, on the other. But then, in the very acceptance of such type, all idea of “invariableness” vanishes. In filiation every thing that is known to us, is known as specifically liable to variation:—nay, to variation in the very modes of variation.

And here is also completed the explanation why Comte’s idea of progression falls foul, utterly, upon this view of nature’s dynamics. His types, I conceive, are as artificial, as they are grossly metaphysical—are the one, just because they are the other: holding by what ought to be the fugitive part of metaphysics, and doing this because they forsake what needs to be its permanent residuum. For, in representing, as they do, specific kinds of existence—such as include specific assumptions respecting human nature, human “organs”, human sciences,—not only do his kind of types inevitably imply specific efforts of theologically-Divine creation to have produced them; but they necessitate their own assumption, in the viciously-metaphysical light of “entities”, as effective “creators” of whatever ensues from their own characterization. And this anomalous result is manifest through Comte’s whole writings;—just as it is manifest also through the whole style of phrenologists, all the world over. Comte could no more do in reality without using the word “cause”, and inferring the idea of “cause”, when occupied on generalistic views of things, than any metaphysician could;



but he satisfied himself as to the so using it by hiding its true intent under an interposed reference to "organization". And so, to phrenologists in general, do also a man's "organs" account for every thing whatever that is done by a man, or that effectively befalls a man. To say that any thing has been done, or undergone, *because* of his "organs", is constantly explanation sufficient. And thus are these, as I have said, the real "gods" of Positivism. No more has Positivism ever inquired into *their* origin, any more than theologians (with much better reason for the forbearance,) into that of the Divine *causa rerum*.

There is, however, one peculiar instance of Comte's usage of types, which appears, on momentary impression, to be an effective escape from artificialness, and a seizing upon the truly natural mode of typification; although, as I believe, it transgresses actually, as to theologic incongruity, beyond any other. And this equivocalness, as well as its importance in Comte's system, causes it eminently to demand attention. I mean, his adoption for his idea of Humanity of the embodiment given to it by Pascal, as the life of a single man:—notwithstanding the entirely different conditions under which the intrinsic nature of his own scheme, as a developmental one, required him of right to conceive the idea. To the theologic faith of Pascal it was perfectly appropriate that Humanity should be thought of as a definitely-sundered portion of general development, in the manner that the type renders necessary. For to this faith stands the cosmogony, according to which there was indeed one definite moment, in time past, when by the creating word of God the human race was instituted; and, in answer to this, the assurance that there shall be another definite moment, in time to come, when, at the sounding of the last trumpet, the human

race shall expire. But what have either of these conceptions to do with Comtism! The attempt to assimilate to Comtism what is naturally adapted to *them*, seems to me to entail a confusion between abstract and concrete, ruinous beyond measure to all perspicacity of thinking. It throws, in very deed, the image of Humanity into that barbarously fetish aspect, which Comte's own strength of perception recognized to be present to it; but which, I believe, has not the least of occasion to be there, if thought, instead of being held *back* to pristine-religious conditions, goes *forward* in harmony with purely-religious ones.

And yet it is this image which is rationally indispensable to subtend his prime and pervading idea of culture's being the definite matter of "three stages"!—For, what *other* reason is there to be found for this, *than* just their forming the answering fact, in culture, to life's ordinary divisions, counted as "infancy, youth, manhood"?—There seems, in truth, to be so involved in the one assumption of this peculiar type, all whatever that I am taking here for general defect, that I may use it now, for my own occasion, just for the sake of bringing all my objections to a point—that is, to precisely *the* point needful for myself. I cannot help, namely, regarding Comte's adoption of this type as a correspondent sign of in-organic feebleness in his fundamental design, with his premature acceptance of "Phrenology".

My reason for considering his dealing with types in general as metaphysical in the bad sense, and therefore a comparatively un-organized practice, is that he *over-rests* upon them. Well then, the remedy for this I believe to be the bringing of sufficient consciousness into the practice: this, when it is introduced, producing metaphysical method in the true sense. And here is the evidence as to this, afforded by the present example.—No one would

for a moment demur at this triple division, if it stood in the light in which symbols are habitually used. That is to say, if it merely represented to us that in Comte's estimation of human phenomena, taken on a loose average, there is a prevailing tendency exhibited,—in the rudest ages towards fetishism, in semi-advanced ones towards metaphysics, and in the most-advanced hitherto known towards positivistic culture,—such as, to a sufficient degree for symbolization's sake, corresponds with the manner of individual advance. But in two most essential ways does Comte fail to present it thus. On the one hand, he offers the idea especially *not* as what is to be accounted in the ordinary light of symbol, but as what constitutes a *law*—an ascertained “law of Nature”:—throwing us out, surely, as to all those conditions of scientific accuracy, which hitherto have been held, and otherwise specially by Comte himself, to be indispensable to the meaning of “law”. And on the other hand, he does violence to the principle of symbolism, if we hold to considering the idea as such, in a way that the peculiar nature of the symbol concerned—and because it is a theologic one,—renders peculiarly injurious. I mean, through his omission to take account, with a speciality of consciousness in so doing, of his personal stand-point:—all metaphysic images being necessarily personal ones; while a theologic image, such as this is, requires a peculiarly definite sense of the condition. This would have brought his idea to the simple meaning that, up to the present time of culture's history, the above division seemed desirable; leaving open the possibility, as surely it ought to be left open, that a future philosopher may find it necessary, for instance, to include Comte's whole three stages under the symbol of the world's infancy!—And indeed, as to the point of Positivism standing for the world's maturity, my own conviction, here being expressed,

is precisely that it stands as the obstacle to human nature's maturing itself: through forbidding the differentiation become necessary to it. Without undergoing this, I believe the mental constitution can never reach its maturity.

On the contrary, when once the condition of full equipoise in importance shall be accorded to metaphysic thought *with* the positivistic, as I anticipate that it will when the just mentioned possibility is habitually left open,—I believe that the symbolic idea in question may truly gain a certain character of "*law*",—however vague in comparison with the strict understanding of the term. For no characteristic of nature's proceedings that is a merely vague (or generalistic) one, can be better entitled to rank under the name of "*law*", than that of *gradualness* in bringing about her ends:—or, the never producing of results *per saltum*. But the crudely marked-off periods that Comte's idea supposes, when taken without the metaphysical proviso, especially involve the *per-saltum* proceeding.—And I must not omit to allude also to an artificiality in his general type-usage, which seems to me the natural counterpart to what I have already, in my first volume, complained of as defect, of the æsthetic sort (p. 110). I there complain, namely, that Comtism does not recognize how *forms* of belief, as such, are necessarily transient things, which need just as much to die, as to live. Now, I complain that it makes a natural *principle* the thing to die, though by nature it is that which ought never to die.

The following, therefore, is the inclusive result which I have to carry with me into the matter of intended examination first awaiting me—that of Comte's dealing with the Seriation of the typical Sciences:—I conceive that Comte's thought fails in dynamic intensity, as to what now concerns me, mainly because his insufficient conscious-

ness of, or attention to, the metaphysical nature of his own thought-action, causes his types employed to be to an injurious degree indurated against the natural agency, which especially demands of them to be adapted to fluctuation.

#### THE SERIAL GROUPING OF THE SCIENCES.

By this manner of stating my own position, I bring myself, in fact, into the very relation to the popular estimation of Comtism, which my religionism, and yet modified religionism, ought to produce for me. I mean, that which requires to ensue from my holding, for my own part, to a method *not* Comte's, and from my admitting, nevertheless, that *a* method opposite to my own is specially the demand in the case. And let me enter upon my present object, therefore, from the popular stand-point, showing, as I may best do in this manner, how my divergence from the latter, through being a *mere* divergence, is identical to me with the need of obtaining, for my own occasion, a totally different principle of classification from Comte's, extending even to his own ground of science-arrangement.

The matter in Positivism which notoriously has drawn upon it a larger amount of instinctively-guided clamour than any thing else has done, excepting its accounted irreligion, is, its practice of treating "mind" on no different set terms from "material" objects. And certainly I think that universal instinct, counted as first-blush intellectual impression, must inevitably assert itself against the practice. Let any thinking person whatever set himself to consider, with an enforced freedom from prepossession, what *should* be the first step in classifying the different existing means and kinds of knowledge, and it seems impossible that the primary distinction occurring to him should *not* be that which separates mentally-discerned

objects from physically-discerned ones. And accordingly upon this instinctive impression has the whole practice of professed metaphysicians supported itself: harmonizing thus with theology;—while Comte's utter over-ruling of both kinds of judgment, the merely-impulsive and the deeply-metaphysical, could not therefore do otherwise than raise prevailing condemnation. Yet, for my own part, I perfectly admit that Comte gains a true justification, to a certain extent, as soon as first impression yields to scientific; though the case is such, that it seems only by a hunting of the subject through a maze of contradictions, and precisely down to the point of adopting a thoroughly changed principle of classification, that it is possible to give reason for the admission! For it is not by any means sufficient to urge *simply*, that "static" thought may be suffered rightfully to deal with its objects, whatever they be, in the "materialistic" fashion that Comte does; while "dynamic" thought needs to be owned free to trace them just otherwise, and to be equally rightful in so doing: although this is necessarily the bearing of the result I tend to;—but to give any thing like accuracy to the idea, there are needful most complicated qualifications. Nay, it seems as if it would have been actually impossible in any way to make out the idea, *with* its qualifications, if the assistance of Comte's experiment, taken as such, had not been present, to be made use of. And hence does my argumentative position towards Comte become a correspondingly qualified one.

I may perhaps intelligibly describe it thus. Instead of saying, as ordinary religionists and metaphysicians do, that "mental subjects" (or subjects best adapted to metaphysical treatment) are forbidden by nature, absolutely, to be treated like "material subjects" (or, subjects naturally fitted for Comte's sort of treatment): I would have it

considered that nature's special will and pleasure is, that the two kinds of treatment should fight out the matter between them. I conceive that each method has so plainly its own ground to begin upon, that it cannot indeed do otherwise than begin there; and as to where it should need to *end*,—why, the only limit that nature desires, seems to be that which is determined by the respective power in each to maintain itself, and thus to encroach upon, or be restricted by, the domain which pertains to its adversary! I imagine that, according to nature's terms elsewhere imposed on strife similarly conditioned, either method is solely impeded in this effort at encroachment by its own inability to sufficiently adapt itself to the alien character of the province attempted to be subdued.—And is it not evident how from this state of things, if this *be* the real state, the complication in question must naturally proceed?

The imagined struggle obviously *can* be imagined only from the Introspective station: that is, when classification consciously operates on Subjective, and not upon Objective thought. The only thing in contemplation is mind-action *per se*. And thus the conception implies that the whole extent of mind-capability has within it some certain destiny of being included in *both* of the methods finally to be differentiated, though in reversely-ordered proportions as to the two classes of mental tendency concerned. That is, it is primordially open to every person's thought to take up for its habitual or central position either "static" or "dynamic" method. And, as the consequence of this, whichever method is the adopted one, by the time that the two are realized as two, still retains the assistance of the other, in the same manner as the conqueror over an alien province retains, or may retain, the subordinated ministration of the native governor of that province. But

this shows sufficiently how impossible it must be for any mind to estimate the nature of the differentiation befalling it, so long as the operation is merely in progress: and accordingly, I would say, how inevitable it was that both theologic metaphysics and positivism should err as to their classification in the first instance, until sufficient experience—experience in scheming,—should assort their respective intentions in connection with the respectively best modes of carrying out the intentions. If, namely, it was the necessary course, as it appears to have been, for rude instinct, developed into metaphysics, to take it for law that “mind” must be estimated decisively in one way (the theologic way), and “matter” in another; so it seems equally necessary that, in downright opposition to this, positivism should have insisted upon no difference at all being made between them. And so, farther, must necessarily the course, now to be taken as a desirable one, lie neither in the direct contradiction of either the one or the other mode of proceeding; but *only*, I repeat, in the duly sorting of the provinces over which the modes seem to have proved themselves qualified for ruling.

The following, then, I would state as what I have in view for the qualifications actually requisite, in order to make the terms “static” and “dynamic” subserve my own desired plan of classification, by superseding the heretofore “mind-and-matter” characterization.—First, it must be held that the terms, in relating solely to mental posture, receive their chief import from this, that “static” implies an admeasuring of objects by a *fixed standard*, present, whether consciously or not, to the actual experience of the measurer; and that “dynamic” implies a *progressing standard*, always consciously such, adjusted to historic periods of progression.—Secondly, that this condition is nevertheless to be thought of only as the prevail-



ing, or regnant attitude of mind.—Thirdly, that the “static” *frame* is the one found best adapted, experientially, to consort with the scientific mode of mental *action*; and the “dynamic” frame with generalistic action.—And, lastly, (only now arriving at the point desired,) that hence does scientific *action*, thus assisted by static *posture*, show itself befitted, characteristically, to deal with subjects rightly to be classed as “material” ones; and generalistic action, supported by dynamic pose, show itself adapted to subjects to be accounted of the “mental” or “abstract” class.—Nothing less than these distinct stages of admission seems enough to give to the instinctive mode of judgment an adequately sound basis. But the manner of expression for the last will show the extent of weight claimed for subjectivity. It will show, namely, how the respective classes of “material” and “mental” subjects are here supposed to fall into such division, *only* according as the instinctively-felt adaptation of the respective methods approves itself upon them, or not. But this bearing given to the matter, is that which, as I may now go on to show, enables me take up, and avail myself of, my own arrived-at conclusion (p. 101), as to Comte’s failure being expected to lie in the unadaptedness of his plan of science to fluctuation. The whole system of types employed there, manifestly belongs to what I account the “mental” class of thought-objects; and the defining conditions just stated show why this involves to me essentially their openness to the alternating movement within which lies the means,—and, as I conceive, the only means—of thought-progression.

It is true that Comte himself exhibited the working of the principle of fluctuation, to a certain extent, upon his own plan of science-arrangement, and thus evidenced, in

so far, the dynamic effect I have referred to, as likely to follow from his later mode of thinking;—while still farther do his present followers appear ready to carry similar modifications. I mean, such as lie with the changing, for instance, of the original designation of “Physiology”, for one of the typical sciences, into “Biology”; and that of “Social Physics” for another, into “Sociology”. But this sort of alterations—this minor sort,—has nothing to do with the large general alteration I am now contemplating:—except, indeed, that I consider these a real argument for myself as leading *towards* the greater one. According to the “qualified” character of my present antagonism to Comtism, I leave all limited modifications of this kind, such as pertain naturally to the working of Comte’s own principle, as a static principle, implicitly in the hands of static thinkers, whether Comtists or others; just as I wish it to be clearly understood also, as to the plan of science as a whole, that I take this likewise implicitly from Comte’s hands as a true and sufficing exhibition of the purport of science, judged from Comte’s point of view. If I did not thus accept the scheme, it is obvious, in fact, that I should gain from it nothing of what I am actually desiring from it: namely, as means to my own end.—Let it therefore be well observed, that my restricted object is only to set forth how it seems to me that a generalistic scheming out of science-arrangement, fully adopted from a contrary-to-the-static point of view, would operate upon Comte’s plan in a way that no Comtists can possibly submit to. And the mode of difference to be suggested is such, that this effect of it will approve itself immediately.

What I mean by it is no less than this, that it implies the entire excision from the list of sciences, of *the* two which, from their position, seem to give the true distinctiveness to Comte’s arrangement. That is, of

“Mathematics” from the beginning, and of “Morality”—as a projected addition, expressly owned by Comte to be essential to the true completion of his idea,—from the end of the series. The latter excision, in fact, I *have* already virtually made, on my own account, through my hitherto ignoring of any such intended sequel to Sociology. Nor can I do otherwise, indeed, than so continue to treat it until I come to the subject of Morality in order; except in so far as the final exclusion is involved in the initial one. I confine myself, therefore, for the present, to the question with Mathematics, and to the stating of my reason—as a quasi-instinctive reason,—for the exclusion of *this* from any series that is to be a consistently-generalistic one.—By this double excision, it must be observed, I leave to myself, to be dealt with as sciences, only these five intermediate ones: Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, Social Physics,—taking the latter two, however, as interchangeable with Biology and Sociology.

And how, it may well be thought, *should* there be any reason of this imperative sort, attaching to the utterance of instinct, in regard to a matter like this, of the setting apart of Mathematics from the sciences!—It arises, in fact, precisely from the view just given of the nature of thought-operation. That is, from my sense of the needful dualism of this:—*now* extended, however, as I must farther explain that it requires to be, beyond the matter of primary division into Observant psychation and Introspective, into that of subordinate divisions, carried forward indeed without assignable limit. For this is what necessarily must ensue from the retaining, by the actually dominant-method, of the subjugated method in subordinate companionship: since the inevitably-varying proportions of domination and subjection can only, in their turn, give rise constantly to fresh repetitions of dual distinction.

On this view, however, when accepted, hangs, as I consider, yet this for its consequence : namely, that it compels the adjudging for Science, as perfected Observant method, only that which retains subjected to itself the mode of Introspection most relatively-perfect of any kind of Introspection that *can* be held in subjection. And that *is*, Mathematics.—But this requires, obviously, to be expressed more at large.

I have said that Comte seems right on his own ground to take Mathematics for a science. And why? Just for this, that Comte's principle fails to recognize need of dualism. But directly the latter *is* recognized, it becomes manifest that the almost-pure mentalism of which Mathematics is composed, forbids its being generalized *upon*, in the manner in which true matter of science is by hypothesis required to be, to make it science. Mathematical thought of necessity *evades* the treatment, which to materialistically-associated thought gives precisely the abstractness, which *here* is precisely not in requisition.—I know, however, that Comte considered the mere fact of placing a type-symbol around the so-classed thought to be in itself a work of generalization sufficient.—But to this I set in opposition, the idea of enhancement gained by “integration”. And, *by* this idea, I argue, that when Mathematics is accounted as henceforth merely “integrated symbolism”, it must necessarily become, as to the characteristic sciences, the assistant *to* the latter, as to their requisite classification, to an incomparably greater degree of efficiency than it could be *without* such allotted character. For in this way it becomes, as to the averaged conception of science in general, instead of *a* science, the perpetual *test* of science : determining, as to all subjects pretending to the character of science, in the first place, whether they *shall* be so accounted ; but moreover, and with essentially new

benefit, what sort of rank they shall possess, as so accounted. And this, as I must farther argue, carries with it yet the point now mainly in view with myself, which is that of lessening the present insistency of positivistic "leaning upon types":—since, manifestly, in thus giving the office of fulcrum to Mathematics, stress must be taken off the lower mode of symbolization. And it is difficult to express how much of consequence seems enforced to attend on this mere shifting of fulcrum!

Comte's scheme is what it is, through showing the sciences as an *hierarchy* of sciences. That is, as I understand him, in taking Mathematics for the leading realization of principle which ought to *govern* all others, he signifies these two things: first, that so important to human welfare is it that Mathematics *should* universally govern, that in our thinking we need resolutely to subordinate even Sociology to Astronomy, as to their relative values, until the far-distant time shall come when Sociology shall be mathematically-perfected to an equal degree with Astronomy;—and secondly, that hence we need to assume that, in the nature of things, such equality of perfectness is *possible* ever to be obtained.\*—This latter seems to me, truly, as manifestly of the viciously-metaphysic sort as ever any pre-assumption could be; and yet, without it, how would it be possible to crush down the inevitable judgment of our general intelligence that Sociology rises in importance above Astronomy? I imagine that it was this consciousness which forced Comte subsequently into the *moral* department of study, where it struck him as the happy solution of the difficulty to set *moral* importance as a matter of integral counterpoise to intellectual;—while

\* "If the different sciences offer to us a varying degree of precision, it is from no want of certainty in themselves, but of our mastery of their phenomena."—Miss Martineau's translation of the *Phil. Pos.*, vol. i., p. 80.

this again seems to me an anomaly in the interpretation of nature: since never in any instance do we actually find in nature that moral considerations *can* be integrated apart from intellectual ones.—But all this amount of intricacy proceeds from the supposed necessity of *government* in the case of the sciences. Let Metaphysics stand simply as the humanly-selected *test* of success to the sciences, and all this perplexity surely vanishes.—Yet, once more, with a breaking-up of Comtism. For it is the very design of this to place the whole range of sciences upon one level of legitimacy—the whole series strung together in one straight line, all upon one common footing. But if Mathematics *be* made the *test* only, instead of *governor*, it is plain that the relative legitimacy of the sciences must diminish exactly in proportion as these follow after Astronomy; so that it may well happen to Sociology, as I conceive that it does, to become of the excess of feebleness *as* a science which renders it impossible for it to have a successor;—while, therefore, Comte's resolution to append yet Morality to the string, forms in itself a distinctive condemnation of his method.

Few readers of Comte, I think, can fail to retain upon their minds the general impression, as a final one, that notwithstanding his clear announcement at the beginning, of Mathematics standing "at the head of Positive Philosophy", and holding "the first place in the hierarchy of the sciences", it is still Sociology which, after all, remains possessor of the situation—even as to the author's own intention. Nor is this phenomenal contradiction without a sufficing explanation, precisely in the need for "minor alterations" to his plan which I have referred to, and which I find luminously explained by Mr. Mill in his criticism on Comte in the *Westminster Review* (April, 1865, pp. 356-368). For, as the original reason for the image

of the hierarchy was the relative subordination occasioned by this, that the simpler the science the more is it both needful to other sciences, and itself independent of help from them: so, when, in arriving successively at the discussion of more complex sciences, Comte was forced to see that these latter *do*, in fact, return manifest aid to their predecessors, it was surely inevitable that the image of "government", if retained, should correspondingly vary itself,—even to Comte, and as if in spite of his pre-arranged determination. And here appears, therefore, what I have called the injurious "induration" of his type-system, as preventing the possibility to it of accommodating itself, not only to the scientific or detail-alterations of which Mr. Mill speaks, but also to the large generalistic modification which, as I plead, ought to be made realizable, so as to meet the subtle, but most practically-important occasion relating to our moral estimation of the sciences. This, I urge, can only be met by the allowance for fluctuation in our general estimation of them, which is furnished through the conception I have described: namely, that of a pair of competitive methods, always present to the mind, and always striving to possess themselves severally of every topic that comes to be entertained by the mind.

To take the body of sciences in the light of a *consensus*, as Mr. Spencer proposed to do when he wrote his *Genesis of Science*, seems to me an altogether insufficient treatment of the evolutionary matter that a serial consideration of the sciences must be; however preferably adapted it may be, and appears to be, to a simply static consideration;—while the idea of *filiation* in regard to them, associated with that of an *hierarchy*, seems hence the true necessity of the case. And if submitted to the subjective condition which I seek to impose on it,—so far as sub-

jective classification is concerned,—there would arrive means to it, I believe, of covering every occasion that has proved itself incidental to the use of the symbol. Let the case be imagined, namely, of a mind—any individual mind,—having arrived at, and being temporarily stationed at, the point in self-culture which is represented by its having substantiated to itself the stage in science signified by the conditions of Astronomy: what I conceive is, that such mind, then and there, ought to feel it an open question to itself, whether the future stages of science-application should actually fall as an ascending, or as a descending line. Through the free play of general considerations thus implied, I suppose that there would be naturally determined for the mind, according to its previous bent, whether Mathematics, as the standard of scientific legitimacy, should stand as matter of ruling importance in general, or whether the comparatively un-scientific matter of Sociology should set up, and substantiate for itself, a quite different sort of standard. And I believe that only through such method of free play,—thence arising into the condition of fixed predilections, which again produces ground for salutary personal controversies,—does the final settlement of the true limitation, as mutual limitation, between the respective spheres of the competitive methods, rightfully arrange itself. To try and do this upon artificial plans of arrangement, is found to be the very *crux* of perplexity to systematizers! But in this manner of letting the methods, as it were, struggle out the adjustment for themselves, the systematizer has only to hold fast to his own method,—or, as fast or as loose as it pleases him,—and the problem will solve itself incomparably better than he could have solved it; while the controversial phenomena produced are those which, if he *does* allow himself attention to spare to them, may show him the natural



regulation of thought in order to the event of adjustment. Scientific thought is safe as to the mastership over Astronomy; and so, I believe, is generalistic thought safe as to that over Sociology; but beyond these head-quarters to each it seems the essential matter of instructiveness to observe, how each of them needs to feel itself more and more cramped by the rival success of its adversary. And when they do actually meet in close conflict, then, I contend, must necessarily be exposed the kernel point of the conflict.

I mean thus, as to the scientific case just imagined:—The mind that has substantiated Astronomy, necessarily aspires to similar result with the more complicated matters yet undealt with, and does so with the instinctive assurance that these will bring successively higher advantage and glory with them. This, therefore, stamps the series as an ascending one. But no sooner has the student done his best on the next in order,—or, it may be, on the one or two next,—than this happens: not only does his diminished degree of success go far to counteract the enhanced glory in success, so as *thus* to contract the ascending character, but there results, eminently, the back-influence on what had previously seemed settled in Astronomy, which forces a measure of attention to flow constantly downwards, instead of the whole of it being ready to prosecute itself, as before, onwards. And this effect necessarily increases itself, in larger and larger proportions, as to each new domain advanced into. It is, in fact, *that* which constantly keeps bringing more and more of abstractness, into the comparative concreteness of all original science whatever:—tending, namely, towards constantly raising primitive ‘ologies into correspondent ‘onomies. In this way, assuredly, was typical “Astrology” converted into typical “Astronomy”;—and in similar manner do yet the feebly-beginning sub-divided sciences, constantly out-starting

from the typical ones, urge themselves forward in conscious pursuit of the transformation. But here is the touch-stone idea:—that of consciousness.—“Law” cannot be “law” without a certain degree of human consciousness in question; and yet the intervention of consciousness *beyond* a certain degree throws instantaneously the whole mind of the thinker into a reversed attitude in respect of “law”! Let it be considered how totally different is the kind of consciousness which goes together with Mathematics, from that which goes beyond it: that is, of course, from *self*-consciousness! Consciousness under Mathematics is only *its* consciousness of *itself*; and there is nothing to awaken any other.—It is true that all philosophic thought, be it Comte’s or of a contrary sort, recognizes that what science deals with in any case, through the mere fact of its being science, is nothing but abstract mentalism,—however low in the scale of physics be the object of it. Not at all more strictly “mental”, in reality, are the “social relations” which are the topic of Comte’s later science, than are the “relations” between suns and planets which are the topic of Astronomy, or those between molecular particles which are the topic of Chemistry. But then there is this of sufficing difference, practically, in the cases, to give real distinction between them, that in these lower studies nothing calls attention to the fact. Even the most philosophic of students by no means bears it *always* present to his thought that a “planet”, or a “salt”, is an abstract image; while assuredly *never* do students of an ordinary sort. The whole class of men of science in ordinary take it simply for granted, that the sciences named the “physical”, *are* so named because they treat of physical substances. Well then, what is it that first suggests question on the subject—supposing the serial treatment?—Not even, I think,

does Biology produce it; and for this reason, that still are here the living beings contemplated to such extent regarded as subjects of merely "material" analysis, that even yet "immaterial" considerations stand over in abeyance. Only, in fact, after the student has gone on to make the special living being that *Man* is, the object of his study, does he even do right to the idea of Biology, as to the properly abstract and relational idea of *Life*, to be made in itself an object of study.—Let the student, however, pass yet another stage, and attempt the daring leap that Comte attempted, and in a manner accomplished, onward from Biology into Sociology, and now are immaterial considerations become so overwhelmingly predominant, that no possibility of ignoring them is any longer present to him. And this means that *self*-consciousness of the thinker has been touched. Directly *Man* is thought of *as Man*, and not as a mere living being, *self*-consciousness in the thinker *must* be touched:—not, however, as to his personal selfishness, but as to the selfishness of men in general.—And here is involved the compulsory settlement, in some way or other, of the struggle between contrary methods. Metaphysical or instinctive judgment accepts at once as final the impression that here springs forth, by right of instinct, that once mind has come to look consciously on mind, *this* must be the topic to take lead over every other. And that means, that the relative proportions between Objective considerations and Introspective ones are reversed. Whereas hitherto the latter have been subordinate, henceforth they are accepted as dominant.—And this, as to the line of the sciences, must necessarily be figured by its appearing henceforth, characteristically, as a *descending* line: the part of science that perseveres to *ascend* being only that which ministers to Generalism:—by which I mean, the principle of universal Evolution.

Here then, as to this compulsory settlement, we strike again upon the note of discord in Comte's plan, which makes his *sin* in the popular estimation:—his running of his systematization right through the ground of "materialism", commonly allowed to him, into the ground of "immaterialism", stringently, in ordinary, denied to him;—and thus his flouting of the metaphysical instinct in question, as to the "lead" required to be taken by mind, the very instant that it is contemplated *as* mind. For this, to my thinking, includes everything.

As to what I have said of this "*sin*" lying with his over-resting on types,\* here is the showing of it. If his system had been open in a sufficient degree to fluctuation, I suppose that, by the time he engrossed himself with Sociology, he must have felt that it was so incomparably *lower*, as a science, than Astronomy, that to take this view of it as a *practical* one, was a necessary degradation both to the idea of science and to subjects implied by Sociology. And this is only coinciding with the common accusation, that he needed to have retained the idea of Sociology as a merely theoretical one, and *not* to have tried to act upon it, as in his later works he did attempt.—And as to the farther matter of Morality, here is what already appears as the consequence to *it*, of most pregnant significance, to arise from the abandonment of Comte's plan.

\* And yet, to show how far was Comte's own penetration from failing to see the mischievousness of this practice, of making types too concretely prominent, I may refer to that peculiar device of his which Mr. Mill has found so amusing, and so contemptible:—namely, of always thinking of them "as written in space, green on a white ground."—(*W. R.* lv. p. 39.) Such contrivances seem to me the inevitable effect of the native unyieldingness of Comte's construction: the natural resource *from* superstition into ritualism,—as to which, again, I find a curious parallelism with the case of Butler. Superstition in both cases took the form of so desperately clinging to ideas once adopted, and because of their systematicalness, as to cause a resolute ignoring of any to-be-offered reason against them; and as a retribution for this, both of them seem to have fallen under the temptation to cover up the weak places with mere varnish.

Through being eliminated, in the same way as Mathematics, from the imagined straight line of the sciences, it is rendered instantly capable of being taken in a parallel light, in regard to Sociology, to that which is assigned to Mathematics in regard to Astronomy. That is, as an integrated adjunct, serving as the *test* to Social principles;—and thence such as, although at head-quarters in Sociology, nevertheless applies also, in lessening degree, to subjects concerned with living creatures lower than men.

Yet still the parallel is not a mere parallel;—and this is what specially heightens the aptness of it. I ought, in fact, rather to describe the case, that Mathematics forms simply the *analogue* to the sort of adjunct which in the higher department of Introspection is required to possess similar function. For the intervention of self-consciousness as to the latter, causes that to Morality is it as essential a condition to be two-sided, as it is to Mathematics to be one-sided. And this condition is fulfilled, as I believe, by the fact of Morality's owning a precisely correspondent relation to that which it holds with Sociology, with *Religion*,—considered as the purest kind of Introspection possible, and therefore forming, as to itself, the really most effective counterpart to Mathematics; and also the best test of oppositeness to the worldly and sense-subservient thing that regard to Society stands for. *Religion* also, through Theology, has its own "integrated symbolism"; and, as I believe, it needs only that this should be refined, like other '*ologies*', up to the true mark,—that is, here, not of conversion into an '*onomy*', but the mark of self-consciousness,—in order that it should finally do for the whole Introspective domain precisely what in the Objective domain is actually done by Mathematics. Mathematics means un-conscious Metaphysics. Theologic symbolization, I consider, means the sort of Meta-

physics which, *when* duly understood by mankind, will bring practical realization into offices of affective import, such as now blunder over their functions in a like manner to scientific efforts *without* Mathematics.

And here I have touched the final matter of my own design. This is, that *after* the condition shall be thought of as fought out, by which static or proper Science has been forced into descending character, it needs to be dynamically accounted that the remaining or distinctively-mental portion of the seriated course, shall be coincidently estimated as itself integrally divided. Namely, that the now Generalistic mode of Science,—to which proper Science is only ministrant,—requires as a whole to be tested by a thoroughly-separated mode of Introspection:—that is, down to the point of separation; leaving proper Science unaffected. The barest reference to Morality, as an integrated topic, seems to me sufficient to reveal this, as a necessity:—just on account of this instinctively-sprung conception of its needing to be esteemed common offspring of Social feeling *and* Religion. (See vol. i. p. 376).

For this opens up the whole view of what I account to be the central or inner defect, subtending, and at the same time explaining, whatever appears as outer or formal defect in Comte's scheme. Morality, by its subjective origin, is as essentially individualistic, as social principle is the contrary. And I conceive that the confounding of the two sorts of principle, forms the very core of mistake to Comtism.

The critical point of settlement,—so esteemed when, as here, two opposite methods are contemplated; though forcibly ignored as such by Comtism,—falls of necessity *somewhere* between Biology and Sociology: that is, at the juncture when Man begins to be dealt with apart from his animalism, or,—as the same thing,—on account of his

mentalism. But this juncture, *before* it is well-defined, signifies the eminently-debateable ground of Physico-Psychology :—the ground which, although taken by Comte as sufficiently ruled by Phrenology, appears here, on the contrary, to be that where, even yet, but incomparably more so in Comte's time, the meeting and whirling together of opposite currents of thought makes the whole soil as if alive with questionableness ; so that Comte's philosophic leap *over* the ground—over the enormous reach from Biology into Sociology,—with *only* Phrenology for his leaping-pole, and *that* planted right amidst the quicksands, may well have been to the straining of his philosophic sinews ! But he caught at Phrenology, apparently,—and just in the same way as otherwise he caught at Pascal's personifying image,—because precisely of its availableness to *prevent* Individualism from starting outside of Generalism.

If in sheer and open symbolism, and without the slightest attempt at seriation, he had bound together Phrenology, on its sole metaphysical side, together *with* Pascal's image, there seems a possible consistency. That is : in taking the sciences, sectionally, as a *consensus*, it might perhaps suitably be conceived that the collective brain of Humanity, as to its intellectual department, possessed *im*-material "organs" severally directed towards Comte's typified sciences. For the whole conception being thus metaphysical throughout, no confusion would arise as to the different periods of creation for the respective functions, which a serial view expressly claims to respond to.—But this was the reverse of Comte's plan. He used Phrenology, as I imagine, specially as the instrumentation for treating individuals as virtually *not* individuals, but only members of a mass of men ; and thus of confounding ideal conception with realistic. Let me try to show in what way.

I think Phrenology does this in the following manner: namely, that its subdivision of human attributes into particularized "organs" affords precisely the means of that limited and peculiar allowance for differences in organization of individuals, which yet fails to affect the community of the human type. That is, it altogether befriends class-distinctions, as to be held dominant over personal ones. For this result was inevitable when its very principle has been that adaptation of brain-structure to assumed typical needs, "*toujours et partout, les mêmes besoins essentiels*", which belonged to the practice of homage to types that in Gall's time was followed without question. If every man, to be a man, must be possessed of these distinctive needs, fitted with respective organs, minor differences, such as lay with varying proportions of size and intensity of force amidst the organs, might well be allowed for, in subordination to the class-idea, without fear of infringing on the latter. And this was the very condition that Comte asked for:—though it may be met, and as I believe confuted, on two of the securest kinds of grounds.

The first of these is the attested principle of Evolution, that all fixed conditions, such as *can* be estimated by types, are *not* laid out in the mass in the *first* place, as Comte's idea supposes, but *follow* in the mass from the successively-obtained instances of fixture that occur in particular parts of the mass. The minor types are seen to make up out of themselves the common type, instead of this giving birth to them.

But the second argument is the plainest to follow. It is that which may occur, and which cannot help occurring, to the thought that mounts up to human condition serially from lower conditions, and thus feels, by express force of the contrast, what individualization of the human sort *is*, compared with that of lower modes of being. As to the



lowest of all such modes, the molar or molecular aggregation of inorganic particles, certainly the counting "in mass" is the only possible kind of estimation. Passing by, however, this primordial stage, let us take up the idea where first it obtains its characteristic meaning: in Physiology. Here, still, although beings, as living beings, are beings in the true sense of the word, they are nevertheless evidently *best* regarded in the mass, so far as abstract classification is concerned:—and thence, I must say parenthetically, I suppose was it Comte's instinct of sequence, that the science which was to produce the same treatment into the sphere of humanity, should be thought of as "Social Physics." But is it possible for human thought to treat human beings even as vegetables! Vegetables,—and animals, so long as these *can* be counted on the same terms with vegetables,—are, by the understood meaning of Physiology, the sort of objects which demand no other than class-distinctions,—however carried out now, contrastedly with the case of minerals, into signally more of sub-division than those; while animals, again, contrast in the same way with vegetables. That is, mainly, we here separate mammals, for instance, from fish; men from dogs, &c.;—while even as to the latter kind of distinction, there is still nothing in the least of offence to instinct, in this over-looking, for class purposes, of distinctions that are individual. One animal, as such, is always as good as another. Certainly, at all events, an animal of the lower sort is. A snail is always-and-indiscriminately a snail; though indeed we can scarcely, in every sense, consider that even a fish is always-and-indiscriminately a fish; and assuredly a dog is *not* always-and-indiscriminately a dog! But as to men, the case is so more than enhanced,—is so specially varied,—that this two-sided aspect appears. While to think of one man,

amongst men, as by any faintest implication "always as good as another", is an immediate insult to the whole number of mankind; it is also an insult if, physiologically, we should condescend to particularize. In comparing a man, namely, with a lower animal, our consciousness just as much rebels against asking ourselves "what man?" as it does, when in comparing one man with another we approach to signifying that there is no need for distinguishing. Here, therefore, seems the natural prohibition against the taking of Sociology on the same terms of generalization as even Biology; and, much more, on the same terms with still lower sciences. To make Sociology really consecutive to Biology, as Comte desired to make it, is required to coop mankind in a mass, in the very same way as not even animals in general, but only the very lowest animals, are rightfully wont to be cooped!

And that Comte did not shrink from this, appears to be the effect of the fascination for him of his prime Sociological idea. Namely, *that* by means of which he saw to himself the entire constitution of Society only as the magnified repetition of his imagined "social unit:"—family relations, known as such in the germ, spread out now into gigantic proportions.—Is not this, however, in reality, the very kind of result that *would* have been in nature, if nature had permitted it, arising out of her retaining around the full-grown bird, the identical egg-shell which encircled the chick!

The true course of scientific generalizing, in Comte's case, seems as if it should have been this. Consciously feeling the scientific element to become feebler and feebler, he ought apparently, after having forced his amassing treatment within the bounds of Sociology, thence to have backed, for new security, into the Physico-Psychology behind him—as, indeed, he did, when first of all he accepted

Phrenology. But I mean, with the altered thought-fulcrum belonging to the owning of two lawful methods: for, literally, it is the degree of *pressure* with which he should arrive at this ground, which I conceive to make every thing important of difference. If Comte had not *over-learned* upon Phrenology, but had felt himself free to leave the question of Physico-Psychology open, till it could be rightfully dealt with,—as the admission of two methods specially *would* have permitted him,—he would not have made his whole later portion of science rest, as he appears to have done, precisely on this weakest part of his whole science-basis. And, on the other hand, what would have ensued from his approaching the debateable ground *without pressure*, would have been this superlatively helpful result:—namely, the peculiar furtherance to a maintaining henceforth of two methods, which can only be likened to a *hinge*—naturally creating itself out of the two-fold emergency.

The interpretation of the simile is not difficult. Comte's materializing method, of treating social concerns as quasi-physics, by true analogy must have forced him into treating *mind* itself in identical fashion. That is, having first treated *living* beings, and then *mental* beings, in the mass, he must have proceeded farther to treat abstract *mind* in the mass:—just as, in turning Physiology into Biology he treated *life* in the mass. It was the regular course out of the concrete into the abstract,—or rather *towards* the pure abstract. And yet still by it would mind be corporealized: through the very fact of being treated in mass.—But oppositely would the true course of Introspection, if this be imagined allowed for at the same time as the other, have been propagating itself towards Materialism: conquering ground to the last extent possible to it. And this would be to the bourne where consciousness finally

loses itself in brain-tissue. *Here* occurs the subtle inter-linking, and even over-wrapping of extremes, which, while each of the methods holds firm on to its own tack, has the very condition of a *hinge*! The methods do more than meet. Consciousness, before it loses itself in brain-tissue, is forced into thought-embodiment; the fining of brain-material renders matter what is only thinkable. Yet still remains the clearest distinctness between the blended courses. Attention has still to spring from one kind of habit into the other, however phenomenally they are approximated, and however smoothly inter-joined,—and however easy be the play of the hinge, so that by means of it, the thought that makes the spring needs scarcely to be aware of the angle of direction overcome, except by the new kind of phenomena presented!

And here is where the brain-science of to day especially transcends Phrenology: through the clear recognition of its pursuers that it does only hinge on mind-science, and by no means coincides with this,—leaving full possibility to both Materialism and Metaphysics to speculate, on their independent grounds, as much as ever without limit;—while Phrenology's claim to coincidence leads only to baffling confusion between the respective philosophies.

Comte, however, had no object to fulfil such as needed a thought-hinge to turn upon; and therefore Phrenology's being too clumsy to act in this way, was nothing that stood as objection to him. What he required of it was merely to strengthen his one straight path into Sociology. He required of it, namely, precisely to bind down the Individualistic spirit of men, so as to *prevent* this from diverging aside from the stock-habit of aggregation, and thus from becoming a true rival to the latter. But this was a cramping influence that told fully on the entire character of his later systematization, as that of a crippled

vitality: namely, just by constantly increasing more and more, instead of reducing into less and less, the cooping-up principle attached to it.

I mean, as to the multitude of brooding sciences of genuine sort, which were all ready to burst through their coop, even then, and which *have* burst it now, amongst ourselves, where Sociology keeps itself to simple theory:—the rich host of Social Sciences, working in real practical efficiency. So long as theory holds mastership over these, to the degree that Comte's principle implies, the deleterious effect occasioned to these minor, but higher-natured sciences, is such as nature indeed gives us constant example of. It is that, for instance, which we see at once demonstrated when we compare the crushed and incompleated florets enclosed within the calyx of syngenesian plants, with the freely-neighboured bunches of flowers that bloom without such hindering cup, or *coop*.—And the hypothesized reason for this seems plain. If the scientific force of generalism becomes lessened in the upper forms of science, just while the contrary force of Introspection increases, it surely *must* happen that the relative importance of particular items of science, compared with that of the including generalization, *should* thus reverse itself, so as to cause the phenomenon asserted. That is, that the hitherto-contained particularities *should* thus overflow the boundary devised for them, and by so doing develop themselves on a scale of success as great as it is little pretentious.

What result have I then gained from this stage of examination, as to my own purpose?—It seems to me, the following.

The matter has been to see how far the *Progress* of Science, as a thing to be tested by History, is actually

furnished by Comte with a standard idea of the *Order* of science-development, such as shall befit itself with the historical estimation ;—while I have reckoned with myself to account any treatment that does assort with History, *dynamic* treatment; and any that does not assort with History, however otherwise sufficient, merely *static* treatment. Well then, my result appears this :—Although Comte's Serial Ordering of the Sciences, in the very nature of it, is a *dynamic* effort; yet it seems to be such as, at the utmost, can be considered adequate only in so far as the matter of proper Science is concerned, which I conceive to reach actually very little way in the series :—so little, that in desiring to estimate Knowledge-Progress on a fair average, Comte's Series appears (from its fixed stand-point of estimation, instead of a consciously-fluctuating one,) to be in reality still the flatly *Static* Ordering out of Science, (comparatively speaking,) which therefore does *not* yield the sort of standard-conception adapted to aid study of Scientific Progress.

So far, therefore, I have the very confirmation that I looked for, as to excluding Positivism, in my own thought-arrangement, from philosophic handling of History. In aiming, as I do, to fix static method as appropriate to Science, and nothing beyond Science, properly such, I can only assort with this the kind of standard Order which is of the nature of *consensus*, and which also has a decidedly personal stand-point of estimation.—But Comte, so far as Comte's Positivism goes, holds to the personal stand-point even on historic and dynamic territory.

And he does so, again, because he must needs throw Progress and Order into the same kind of forced combination that he did the elements of the "social unit":—striking, once more, a note of utter un-harmony with Nature! It is never "Progress *and* Order" with Nature! With

her they are ever at war. Progress never appears except as the destroyer of Order ; Order never but as the stoppage to Progress. Temporarily, of course :—thus giving occasion for alternating compromise, such as admits of our expressing ourselves that “Progress becomes orderly, and Order progressive”. But, from the human point of view, they have never one object between them. And here therefore is a new significance added to the desirableness of splitting up principle in two, in the way that I would have it.—Order-breaking Progress is the watchword for Generalism ; Science must keep, for its insignium, to Progress-stopping Order.

#### THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF MENTAL PROGRESS.

But the foregoing “physiology of Science”—so to call it,—needs to test itself by going much deeper. That is, it needs to measure itself by the fundamental “laws” of investigation, on the strength of which Comte proceeded, in order to his actual result.

As to this great consideration, however, I have somewhat designed my course already ; although without the slightest view to it at the time. For in striving to make clear to myself the sort of mental process that constitutes the religious thought-operation, upon a progressive estimation of religion, my readers may remember that I have wrought out an actual formula, to represent my experience, (see vol. i. pp. 35-40) :—or rather two formulas, virtually coincident in purport, but still representing in separate ways the different kinds of experience which are severally immediate experience (pp. 38-9), and the effect of reflection upon the latter (p. 35). My present task, therefore, is reduced to the following : to see whether the difference between this and Comte’s enjoined method, is that which lies within the bounds of variation which the division into two

methods at the latter part of Comte's seriated line, in which religious thought-action occurs, must inevitably occasion, when allowed for ;—and without any questioning of the fundamental principle. My conviction is, that such adaptation for what I have gained out of purely subjective resources, may actually be demonstrated :—although necessarily with the changes, even in terms, which belong to the transition from scientific method into introspective.

The demand for modification to some extent, is indeed attached to the very idea of progress-estimation :—since the very fact of turning the static or *consensus*-view of the sciences *into* a serial or dynamic one, implies in itself that the action of principle which may be sufficient at the base of the series, will *not* be sufficient at its termination. And Comte himself accordingly, lays down that the one method of investigation, which he gives to serve throughout, must still afford various applications, increasing in complexity. My argument therefore restricts itself to this : that whereas *one* method might, by foregoing considerations, perfectly well have sufficed, for the convenience of classification, while science was thought of as pure science throughout ; yet the branching of science, after Biology, into diverging compartments, if admitted, implies in itself the probability that varieties in application will thence become multiplied and enhanced to the degree of rendering a distinct allowance of *two* methods eminently the simpler proceeding. And, if so, I may indeed claim that an actual back-influence from the division on Comte's very foundation, ought *a priori* to be considered a part of the condition of the case.

Let me then recall the formula of my own devising, which I am hoping to amalgamate with Comte's foundation. And it must be remembered how, in that devising, I was at what by positivists must be esteemed the disadvantage of beginning at the *wrong end* of Comte's series :—namely,



that of possessing none of the impetus to be gained by arriving through passage out of simpler spheres of thinking; and resting therefore on sole force of intuitions, personally attached to me. For it was this which compelled me to seek out a very beginning for myself: one that should be specially fitted to my personal *status* of impression. And it was this too which drove me, in respect of "words", to use the ones which introspective philosophy had ever been wont to use; without feeling need of any others. Hence then, did "subjective" and "objective" stand to me in the place that now, under present and larger occasion, I desire to fill by "static" and "dynamic":—and with no little puzzle to myself as to certain phenomena of self-contradiction to which the usage was liable; now cleared up to me *by* the comprehensive way of judging the occasion. I mean, by the seeing, that if "subjective" bears translation into "static", and "objective" into "dynamic", it does so only under relation to the stand-point assumed; since otherwise the meanings would fall reversely.—My position was, that whereas crude Subjectivity furnishes but one sole, undifferentiated condition of religion to be conceived by us, a duly-ripened consciousness on the subject exposes *four* separate stages of progress towards the final ripeness of its aspect; counting the original state of unorganism as the first. Seeing that the intellectualizing of religion, by means of a compelled objective contemplation of it, was the means which I regarded rightful in order to the final purpose of deepening the internal consciousness of religion, I accounted that the second stage was an attempt at Objectivity, impeded by yet uncleared conditions; the third a fully Objective station; and the fourth a bringing home of results into Subjective condition.\* My entire design

\* I must observe that even here, in repeating my own results, I am obliged

was bent towards the conception which is all-in-all with me, of alternation between two thought-methods, each of them respectively holding the other subject to itself:—in which conception seems to me to lie the special vivifying of the whole matter of thought-progress. With whichever method the mind begins, I conceive that it can only improve upon it by first diverging into the opposite method, and thence for ever after retaining the habit of similar divergence, as a perpetual ministration of improvement:—force of contrast being, in the nature of it, every thing for giving life to thought.—And now let me show how I would fit this idea on to Comte's general principle.

Comte's formula for science, as representing the one universal method alone rightfully to be pursued, is the following:—" *Observation of phenomena, aided by Experiment, and tested by Verification.*"—Unless this fundamental rule be carried out, no pretence at science is admissible for true science. But still he allows that certain points of growing complexity in science mark the necessity for additional modes of carrying out the rule, not previously felt to be necessary: these new modes being laid down, as to leading considerations, as that of *Comparison*, first called for in Physiology; and that of *History*, dawning into requirement only in connection with Human subject-matters.—What I propose to myself then is this. Taking his fundamental rule as in itself sufficing,—and not only for higher and lower sciences alike, but moreover for the ground that I suppose to lie over and beyond that of science,—I would desire to throw all possible modifications to be required under the single character of Experiment.

to allow, in terms, for the shifting of stand-point. For, whereas to my then position, it seemed to me right to divide the subjective and objective stages so as to make the two first of the former kind, and the two last of the latter; I require now to account the first and last stages subjective, and the two middle ones objective. And I see that the present is by far the simplest arrangement.

For as to the crucial consideration, of the limiting distinction between observant thought and introspective, there is this simple but all-comprehensive inducement to the amalgamation. The very instant thought *has* over-leapt the boundary, fully and fairly, what before counted as Experiment may, through the amalgamation, count in the mass as Static condition; and *vice versâ*. For, by my conception, the latter means universally whatever state is natural and habitual to thought,—whatever thought can estimate *passively*;—while a state of Experimentation means always that which implies a strained and unusual posture of thought: that which needs *active* endeavour. —And is it not manifest that Verification, of the safest possible sort,—surely, of the *only* sort really safe,—must be that which arises out of comparison of the fruits of the two states?

The shifting of subjective posture gives a thoroughly new bearing—primarily, to the final nature of Verification, but intermediately—to the nature of the Experimenting. This is all that I mean. And if we look back on the course of Science, in the interest of Metaphysics, is it not evident that we may, perfectly well, measure its products just as sufficiently *by* one line of direction to them, *as* by the other? Namely, by telling off the number of abstract ideas, gained to us by science; just as well as by calculating detail and practical results of science. But if the end in view *be* taken as a metaphysical one, then is immediately the character of operation this: Observation, turned into Self-Observation, estimates mental deficiencies; Experiment tries concrete ways of satisfying them; Verification comes by appealing, for comparison's sake, to the general mass of experience, as to whether the want has indeed been fulfilled.—But then, it is always true, that to look upon Science “in the interest of Metaphysics”, is

against the grain with the proper, or characteristic nature of Science ; this being essentially directed to detail communication with nature, and concrete ways of communication. And therefore must the terms, in ordinary, hold by their ordinary meaning. This much, however, seems true, as to both aspects. From the very first, and least dynamic, character of Experimentation, it holds essentially the same function of "back-telling influence", which at the upper end of the serial line becomes of such magnified importance. It is *experiri-mente*. It is always an act of Mind's exploring, as opposed to an act of Sense's exploring. From the very simplest turning about of an object with fingers, or even tongue, there must be a previous hypothesis present to make the act count as Experiment ; while immediately the hypothesis is there, so is the character of Experiment.

But farther, it seems easy to show, how indeed the later conditions of the character, which only become apparent in successively higher modes of science, are really latent there, much lower down in the series. And by only this, I shall be able to reach very quickly my own final point respecting *History*, as to this being restrictedly the mode of Experimentation that needs to be characterized as *dynamic*. But I must work up to it gradually.

From the very lowest kind upwards, Experiment signifies conquest of *time*-conditions ;—just as un-aided Observation imports, characteristically, the dealing with simple *space*-conditions. For, to show this, take the case of a chemist, bringing together a number of varied acids and alkalies to see how they will combine into the character of salt advisedly for human purposes : which seems to me of the true type in ordinary of scientific experiment ;—what does he otherwise here than just effect in a very *short* time, the very same thing that nature must be inferred capable

of effecting for herself, provided only that he allow her a sufficiently *long* time? Man's action is simply a forestalling of the operation. But, if so, it is manifestly the dealing with *events*, instead of *things*, by which all classification severs dynamic thought from static. It is that which compels eventuation to lend itself towards yielding what the started hypothesis in question demands: namely, the rectifying it into shape, to the degree of enabling it to stand the comparison which Verification requires with nature's results, brought forth in her own natural way of producing them.

And still, when the physiological department is reached, the same process of forestalling time-events is surely only deepened. What is the whole making-out of Comparative Physiology and Comparative Anatomy, other than the hypothetical framing of a course of development, for constitution of plants and animals, such as stands to the thinker for ages' long workmanship on nature's part, formalized by himself, with a view to understanding the latter, in a few years? And the Historic method, when this comes to be overtly recognized, is surely only the plain revelation of the character, previously concealed.

But then, Historic method is two-fold. Did not Comte himself bear witness to this, by his own different treatments of History, attached to his earlier, and later works? One of the methods, I imagine, is naturally possible *only* for human topics; the other, the philosophic method, common to these with perhaps the whole range of scientific topics. And this is the crucial consideration, as to the intrinsic import of the method. Upon it hang, as I believe, first, the sub-division in the character of Experimentation, allowed for by my own second and third stages, taken as two instead of one;—secondly, the over-weighting of Experiment to the degree of forcing it to abandon

the character ;—thirdly, the intrinsic change in the nature of it, which induces a thorough reversal of operation.

The point of crisis obviously lies where first, in the range of science, *moral* considerations present themselves :—this being the matter which leads off finally to the individualistic portion of existence, refusing to be generalized upon, like common matter of science.—Yet even these, I conceive, are preparing *almost* from the beginning of the seriated line : as I will now endeavour to show. Every single act of dynamic experiment tells on the static foundation, as to raising the nature of this ; and so does every rise in the latter give birth to heightened experiment. And if so, it must be that inner ingredients of psychation are engendered long before their power of formalizing themselves.

Let me begin, then, with an instance clearly *below* the spring of moral import. Say, that of study engaged on a mineral substance,—on Iron :—regarded according to the conditions of the present intention, which are these :—on the one hand, that the study be treated in the typical fashion of being isolated from naturally accompanying studies ; on the other, that every heightening of its character be held persistently as bearing on practical application.—Well then, the beginning point of science in the case, rests plainly with possession of the *name* of “Iron”, and the consequent experimenting with some certain grey-coloured, hard-feeling, substance in view, as to whether this fulfils or not the hypothesized nature of Iron ;—while, very soon, will the results of these immediate acts of handling, melting, &c., be followed up by inquiry as to what may be learnt on the subject from fellow-experimenters. That is, he will *compare* notes with them ; *this* kind of Comparison succeeding to the previous sort between one specimen and another. But thence he will

desire to know whatever mankind have hitherto known about Iron, and done by the use of it. And this is the quest into History: that is, into the History, not of Iron, but of men's acquaintance with Iron. From this, farther, it is possible that, in consequence of the raised level of the subject, he may carry it into connection with Geology, Archæology, or the fine arts; but the normal line for science to follow is this:—namely, that study of Iron, mingled with that of other metals, should grow into Metallurgy; and thence by larger combination, into Mineralogy: while, beyond this, no stoppage exists to the final consummation of all kindred topics whatever in Astronomy. But Astronomy itself is capable of subserviency to human purposes: just by force of the pre-vision accompanying it;—since the long-established instances of hypotheses fulfilled, in regard to it, have rendered men's action on the knowledge gained, as safe as the knowledge itself appears certified. Have we not just been witnessing, how Astronomy's promise of Eclipse has actually driven men of science across the globe; laden, moreover, with expressly the consummately-wrought instruments which it was their very object to use?—And even supposing that action be out of question, and that pure science remain in its state of abstraction: still, this state is of value to man, surely, on account solely of the general power of communication with nature which it yields: and this, again, remains essentially of the detail or sense-supported kind of communication. Nothing, therefore, of inner selfism has been touched upon.

But pass to the study of an organic object, even of the lower physiological kind, and see how an element appears that gives at once a new and decided prominence to eventuation *above* sense-phenomena! Suppose, namely, the same beginning to experimentation as before, and does

it not appear how, even from personal examination alone, variations in results of observation present themselves, totally absent in the former case, which enforce attention to time-conditions as the one demand specially indispensable? I mean, of course, for the cognizance of Growth. Here therefore is what causes a thorough shifting of the former proportions in the value of results obtained; at the same time that the entire amount of value is enhanced. As to properly scientific value, indeed, or that which lies with power of pre-vision, it is manifest that this new source of variation carries an element of uncertainty into the matter, which decidedly lowers the standard. And yet, even here, seems the cause of such immense gain, of scientific sort, that the lowering should be felt as atoned for. That is, the contrast afforded of present *un*-certainty, to what thence becomes appreciated, now first, as previous *certainty*:—this being the very creation of the Mathematical test for science; and at the same time, of the scientific idea of “law:”—while *here* is every thing for the final distinctiveness of classification. What I am urging is, that moral subjects are *not* amenable to scientific “laws”, but have peculiar “laws” of their own. But the difference can only be made out in the end, by a clear idea ascertained of scientific “law” to begin with.—Meantime, as to present point, Mathematics, framed to this character of test, stands as the culminating mode of Experiment. The idea of “law” furnished by it, is, namely, the most purely mental (or absolute) postulate conceivable; precisely through its incognizance of variation. For it assumes, as to the matter regarded by it, that no possible variation in the nature of that peculiar matter needs to be allowed for by the thinker, beyond such variations as have already been allowed for. And this clearly shuts out even lower organic objects.—Opposed to this, however,



turn to Historic Experimentation, and,—additional to all the enhanced means of practical benefit, arising from the increased knowledge thus afforded of former usage of plants and animals,—additional, also, to the kind of Historic result which imports human progress in regard to this knowledge, sequential to that of the former case,—springs to light the quite *new* kind, importing progressive nature in the object of his study: that is, Natural History; or, as it is now accounted, Developmental History:—the sort I have just set apart from ordinary human History, by the attribute of “philosophical”. This is the critical benefit arising out of the raising of Experimentation into the integrated character of Comparative Physiology. A critical benefit, that is, for abstract science in chief; but still one that has a true bearing on practical usage of plants and animals; and thus, approaching to affect human selfishness, though not yet actually touching it. For there is still a kind of pre-vision, however diminished, attaching to the accounted “laws” of Physiology.

In fact, notwithstanding the sinking capability of science, as to objects of this class, every ‘*ology*’ attained under it aspires still towards the rank of ‘*onomy*’: following, in humble imitation, the triumphant course of the Star-science. And eminently Physiology itself, having first submitted to the elimination, out of itself, of Biology, requires farther the parting of this from Bionomy. But, once more, it would seem that the really chief result from this, of final benefit, lies in the comparative failure. And by this I mean, the mental experience (or function) whose realization—by means of the successive ranks of conception thus made permanent,—gives condition to the next example I must come to.

Having taken, first a mineral substance, and next a lower organic form, as the object of study, the one I must

now select, to show by it the actual inclusion of moral apprehension, must necessarily be a mental one to begin with. No otherwise can it rise to the height demanded, whatever experimentation act on it. And precisely the fact just referred to, preserves the sequence from anomaly. The very habit of science, in thus imagining action of one mode of thought, in the mass, upon another mode—as in the saying, for instance, that “Mathematics”, embodied for the purpose, turns “Astrology” bodily into “Astronomy”,—fitly prepares the way for the Introspective custom of the same kind; and thus, in general, for the quasi-concrete, or objective treatment of conceptions as *things*, which gives true consecutiveness to mind-study with external observation. I will accordingly select Slavery as my instance. The desire to gain understanding upon the subject must indeed be supposed attended with a definite view to practical benefit, to follow the investigation; but this being supposed, every condition seems present that is needful to the type of science; and therefore means afforded of seeing the variation now to arise.

Suppose, then, experimentation entered on, with the view to rectify original impression of the Slave institution, as the step duly in order to the practical end: this would lie naturally, in the first instance, with the spontaneous action of mingled reflection and conversational discussion. But how immediately would the conduct of the latter betray the difference between this kind of experimenting and the really scientific;—exposing to the thinker, as it would, in every statement made, the influence of passion and personalism—of passion, *because* of personalism! For the effect of this would be immediately to show him that he needed, in fact, to note, as of plainly greater importance to the subject, *who* it was that rendered such and such evidence of judgment upon it, that *what* might be the

purport of the judgment. And hence would this shallow sort of experimenting go so little way with him, that he would very soon betake himself to History: expecting thus to escape the fallacies of personality. But would this in reality be the case? Let it be considered. Must not the immediate effect of his tracing in History the varying aspects of Slavery, as presented at different parts of the world, and especially in connection with different epochs of culture, throw him back inevitably to re-consider and re-adjust his own opinion about Slavery,—shaken as to its original impression by his seeing how incomparably less abhorrent a thing it has been at some places and times than at others. And this would at the same time give weight that had been originally unfelt as to the opinions of controversial opponents. But all this would enforce upon him the need, for the true interpretation of History, of a constantly varying standard of judgment on the subject. And what does this mean but that he must set aside the History of Slavery—properly such, in the ordinary understanding of the purport of History,—until he has first designed a History of Human Opinion about Slavery:—while this constitutes the sub-division in historic method, which has to carry all the effect of detention from practical theorization argued to be necessary.

History of Opinion, on a moral topic, implies of necessity the impeding Subjectivity which, as such, renders a truly abstract view impossible; while yet the latter, as I conceive, is the only means towards an effectual rectification of original impression. And hence are my own four stages here produced; while, as to my idea of Comte's plan, all this doubled need of History goes solely to the over-weighting of Experiment. History of moral Opinion goes obviously to the final making out of a general Philosophy of History; provided that the entire number of

social topics, of a similar character to Slavery, be supposed as carried forward into similar results, and then brought into combination. And yet History of Opinion, here, must still form the sequel to History of Opinion in the lower departments. We must ask therefore, to what end did similar experiments lead, in those lower cases? And certainly the answer can only be, that it gained a constantly more and more abstract view of the subject in hand; and specially not a more and more practical one; except as being an *indirect* means of furtherance to action. By Historic experimenting, of this philosophic sort, we have seen that out of simple acquaintance with one of the metals, grew Mineralogy, long short of Astronomy; and, out of study of one single plant or animal, grew Physiology, long short of even Biology;—while, in reality, only the mathematical perfectness, present in Astronomy alone, has permitted of *direct* bearing of the Science on human action. And now, as to the mental case in hand, variation of phenomena has multiplied to the degree of clearly banishing all possibility of mathematical pre-vision, and with it all power of directing *action*, from science.—Hence, in every way, the event seems ensured that whatever advance towards Sociology be made by the pursuit of knowledge respecting Slavery, and the mass of companion topics, can only be of the nature of *mental* cultivation, held for the time *apart* from our acting upon it. When Comte brings the whole Philosophy of History, as he does, to bear upon immediate action, in order to the realization of his ideal of Sociology, he seems to me as if committing the enormous fallacy of forgetting the very terms that he started upon! He seems to be using Sociology in the way that Astronomy would be used, if, by means of it, earthen balls were expected to be made to roll in actual planetary fashion;—or, on the other hand, in the very way that

Astrologers *did* use their star-science, when to this they attributed direct influence.

Surely, the true course of the student who finds his scientific aims thwarted by moral questionableness, even upon the would-be impersonal ground of History, must lie in the confining his science, for the present, to Mind-science: that is, to the objective quest of Psychology. The moral questionableness is equivalent to that fixing of attention, henceforth, upon personal selfism, which is the rousing up of the factor, never likely to let drop the lead in importance, which it seizes the instant it presents itself! And the only possible means of uniting selfism with the philosophic pursuit of History, is through an objective Psychology: since, *by* this arises the view of mind-evolution, fitted to give standard to historic interpretation. But now let it be considered if this is not indeed the abandonment of all character of Experimentation to historic research, and the rendering of it, instead, a true home-station to thought! To the principle of Evolution, the whole field of History is but the very condition of simple Observation. Experiment, on the other hand, is become precisely that working out of would-be practical schemings, which as to their own intention, count as Verification of original hypotheses:—while true Verification *for* Historic Observation is simply forborne to be asked for. To the mind that should be supposed comprehending History as a Whole, is obviously its full interpretation alone possible:—that is, inevitably, to the metaphysically-imagined mind of Deity, whose original pre-vision may be conceived, and must be conceived, as absolutely coinciding with its teleologically-accounted memory.

But here I must take up a point of reference that till now has waited inclusion. I mean, respecting the needed allowance for “stages”; since I conceive the occasion for

this, when it arises to experience, to be a special phenomenon indicating progress towards Introspectivism. As I have already signified, the need of *four* stages, incidental to my own impression of need, in the case of desired scientific quest into Religion, seems to me to mark the deeper subjective requirement, compared with cases dealt with by Comte, of adding to the formalized conditions that which is previous to any conscious action at all. For I conceive,—first, that Observation only becomes known as such, after the contrast of dynamic effort of Experiment has been begun to be felt;—but, in sequel to this, that the very consciousness of Observation compels allowance for state yet earlier. And thus, I contrast power of Introspection with power of Mathematics, on this very ground. For as to Comte's laying out of his three-fold formula, surely it *was* under compulsion of the deep mentalism of Mathematics. Owing to this, surely, he first designed his plan of the sciences; but this again demanded classifying-arrangement of thought-processes.—Well then, out of this I seem to find a meeting argument to my instinctive distrust of his otherwise-laid “three stages”: namely, as applied to the symbolized processes of the mind of Humanity. On the ground of personal self-consciousness, the stage-recognition seems perfectly evident and explicable; but, as applied to an external abstraction, its meaning seems lost altogether. How is it possible to image to ourselves the thought-life of human existence in general!—and, much more, with positivistic consistency!

Thus I return to the essential ground, that what Comtism wrongs above all things is the integrity of Individualism, needing to have its personal stand-point made *as* sure as the abstract stand-point of Science. And let me finish the case of the student of Slavery, to show how the Individualistic abutment of his researches is *not* truncated,

though the Generalized one is so. I left him planted in Objective Psychology : quite apart from practical action, and bent only on wandering at large through History. And, as Objective Psychology seems the last possible of the truly scientific sciences,—involving a strain of unnaturalness such as, by the very painfulness *and* unnaturalness, must suffice to drive back thought from farther prosecution of such effort,—so does the expatiating on History indeed lead naturally to the proper substitute : namely, in the easily appreciable matter which appeals to the Subjective experience. For is it not the manifest fact that History shows constantly, how Slavery, wherever it has existed, has been bound up with institutions of Religion ;—how the very origin of it was from notions making part of Religion, in the barbarous origin of the latter ?—Here, then, is at once the appeal, which when supposed as followed up by the mass of companion subjects, leads straight on the track of Introspectivism.

And here we find still another type—the last type,—of the possible working of scientific searching : since only when science is carried into this track, does Introspection yield what is needed from it. The History of Religion, namely, helps the student on moral topics, only through partaking of whatever scientific character the subjection to a general Philosophy of History can give it. And here is to be recalled the effect, so important, which results to sciences of lower rank than Sociology, through the restraining of the latter, in surely the true hierarchic fashion, from *direct* action on human proceedings. Just through the theory of Society being held aloof, as merely theory,—supported by the provisional resting on Mind-science in the abstract,—is room given for the ripening of minor efforts, on eminently higher terms than could have been possible to the inclusive science, in the mass.

Amongst these, I suppose, must class topics such as Jurisprudence, and Political Economy, and generally all whatever over which now presides Logic, in the same way that over lower sciences presided Mathematics, although with the inferior efficiency, involved in the nature of the case: this being, that the true correspondent to Mathematics must really be its opposite, instead of its sequent—not Logic, but Introspectively-furnished Morality. Thus my argument leads necessarily, as I have stated that it would (p. 73), through the intellectualizing of Religion, in the manner of the rest of this group of topics:—since, in a *merely* intellectual view, I have no slightest repugnance to class Religion beneath Sociology.

I imagine that the rendering of Religion into a science is parallel to what has lately been done, for instance, with Language. And has not this been done, manifestly, by the very sort of Historic treatment, two-fold divided, claimed here to be distinctive of these upper sciences? No principle of Language is reached till, in a manner, all past existent languages have been allowed for; and these *can* be allowed for only through first estimating the natural evolution of Language. And perfectly similar has been the course which, according to my own experience, is needed for the gaining of science in Religion. The experimenting which I found necessary to try upon it, was the finding out of the successive phases which it has, in all time past, presented to the progressing feeling of progressing men; but in order to trace this effectually, I found that a preliminary investigation must be inserted, to show the intrinsic relation between religious forms and human feelings. And this inserted stage was full of the effects of impeding subjectivity. My purpose of tracing Religion's History was incessantly thwarted by the need of clearing out of my way obstacles as to the very mean-



ing of the terms to be used—Religion, Fear, Duty, &c.,—on account of their liability to varying present opinion. And my only means of effecting the clearance, was by the help of Psychology.—But the main point as to science is, “wherein is to be sought Verification?” And here therefore is it that I count this sort of investigation to be the exponent of a totally new principle in human thinking—leading off by an exceptionally-fruitful offshoot from the ordinary line of the sciences, into a destined main branch of the common stock of psychation;—and doing this precisely through the back-influence of frustrated Sociology, diverted from flowing altogether downwards by the “hinge-joint”, of which Objective Psychology forms the one side, and Cerebrology the other:—while the vast import of this “hinge”-symbol lies in the power of oscillation between Introspective and Observant methods, bestowed by the fact that one single item of added or of diminished Experimentation in any case, may suffice to throw Verification in a new direction, and thus change the whole nature of the mental act.—As to the question then, of “where lies Religious Verification?” I would answer, that so far as mere science is concerned, I would state my own problem thus:—my hypothesis at starting was the instinctive conviction of Religious Continuity; all my experimenting on which brought the continued satisfaction, finally, to my instincts, allowed for as *growing* instincts,—growing into self-consciousness,—which seems to me, in a case like this, the true, as it is the only-possible, correspondent to the effect of pre-vision in Mathematical cases.

But the character of Science is at its minimum of relative importance in Religion. To reach it is the unnatural strain which makes the rightful character assert itself only the stronger. And hence proper Verification

for it, even upon intellectual ground, remains solely in the *influence*, gathered together by Religion as into one generalistic focus, of all the practically-wrought-out solutions of moral question, exhibited by History in connection with Religious institutions, *told upon* each individual student's moral nature;—while this again, by the true principle of hierarchy, must prove its own verity by exercising similar influence on personal conduct. And let it be remembered that this relates only to the Sociological, or moral, side of Religion; since, in its entirety, this must reflect the universal aspect of generalistic conception!

Thus I return to the primitive ground of my antagonism to Comtism, in the wrong which I feel it does to the very nature of Religion;—and which *now* I see, is only in common with what appears defective in the very root-work of his system. Through his ignoring of the check which Introspective principle, if carried out, must give to his scheming, he ends, every where, by confounding the purely intellectual effect of *personal impression* with the *immediate* bearing on *practical action*:—with an apparent injuriousness telling equally both ways.—But I have yet to speak of another of the upper group of sciences, which displays this injuriousness with eminence.

I mean, the Science of History, itself. As Comte treats this,—compelled, in the mass, to lend itself in subordination to his idealized Sociology,—the whole course of human eventuation bears fruit in the solitary thinking of Comte's own brain! But take the present view of science, on Introspective terms, and this monstrous conclusion is dissipated at once. By this, the science of History means simply the intellectual sublimation of men's experience, as to the collecting and writing of History, which may supposably conduce to the future improvement of the art of it. The object is to find the true principles of Historic

composition; and the process, surely, the very same as with Religious investigation. Namely, first the seeking out, as plain matter of Historic Observation, whatever historians have been wont to do, in former times, in this way;—and thence, the learning of what has constituted the intrinsically-evolving practice, in writing History: preparatory to the finding out, at last, the true History of the art of writing History. And certainly, in the true light of *indirect* influence, all this must largely tend to improve the practice, henceforth, of individual prosecutors of the art.

But the crowning matter lies with the treatment of Morality, in the light, whether or not, of a Science. This also, to be a science, in so far as its nature admits of the character, I can only think of in the same category with History, and Religion, and other matters of kindred nature:—namely, as abstract principle, gained through historic investigation of the natural growth of moral feelings, which needs to act *indirectly*, and no otherwise, on practical regulation of those feelings. And hence appears to me the suicidal effect, in every way, of Comte's contrary treatment. For this, by which he places Morality on parallel terms with Sociology, in order to the stringing it on, as a finally-to-be-added science, to the continuous line of sciences previously strung, includes the intrinsic wrongfulness—surely such,—of supposing “addition” to be possible, in such manner, to an organic scheme. That a new science, of generalistic sort, *should* be imagined possible, except as the discovery of a new principle whose working can do nothing less than modify existing arrangement from its very foundation, seems to me an evidence of *in-organism* in conception that necessarily condemns itself:—just as would the idea of Physiology, by which we should imagine Nature, for the improvement of the pre-

sent human frame, adding to it a new limb!—And yet Comtists, in their implicit homage to their master's design, are constantly asserting that nothing remains but to give simple *extension* to it!—With this against the plan, however, on the very face of it, stronger than ever shows the immediate objection, lying with the natural unfitness for junction between the matter desired to be “added” and that on which it is sought to be inserted. To render Morality generalistic, in the manner which its linking on to Sociology implies, would be, according to my whole conception, the depriving it of all that gives character to it. It would be, in fact, the same thing as asserting that “on moral subjects one man's opinion is as good as another man's!”—since, however important, in a relative sense, be the moral superiority of the exponent selected, yet the taking of *any* man as absolute exponent, on Comte's plan, virtually amounts to this result, for the rest of mankind. Here, therefore, I have stated my case in full against the “addition”.

And with this point, also, I seem to wind up my entire argument, as stated at the head of this section, against the “dynamic” capability of Positivism. The false tack followed by it in regard to History, as to man's supposed gain of power from it, to exert *active control* over human affairs, instead of his being held, as by philosophers heretofore, limited to the *passive reciprocity* of instruction from it, helpful only *indirectly* to practical action, seems to me to vitiate every part of Comte's philosophy of science lying above the mark where History is characteristically important. And this is the peculiarly mental, or dynamic part.

Yet, if this much *be* considered to lie against it, what remains of Positivism as an *ism*? How is it possible to

think otherwise of even this best part of Comte's doctrine than as still merely a Philosophy of Science, and by no means *the* Philosophy of Science which is henceforth to content the world; and therefore only one of men's experimentings in this way, out of which, in the mass, Nature will finally evolve the true principle?—But if so, the distinctiveness of Comte's scheme, in whatever gives effect to it as such, is abolished. Room is given—necessity has arisen—for a new *ism*, capable of answering to the widened requirement.

Such principle, regarded in a scientific and controversial light, has appeared to me that of *Comparativism*. By this term seems expressed the "relationalism" which is caused to the religious consciousness, by its need of taking account of what is so naturally alien to it as the matter of a regulating principle for Science. But the word seems equally significant for the scientific occasion. Let me be suffered, in finishing, to show what is the especial turn to the Philosophy of Science which I anticipate as likely to be caused to it, by its admission to itself, when it shall make the admission, of the Introspective check here pleaded for.

I refer to the essential change in the estimation of progress which must follow from the taking into account, all along, of the *motives* to it:—this being, necessarily, the element, as a moral element, which Introspective consideration must call for the admittance of. It seems to me that in this way there will actually be introduced, so far from a new complexity, a most effectual simplicity;—while, in an immediate light, is also this of advantage afforded, of the greatest interest to myself. Namely, the apparent power of reconciling the signal point of opposition which was many years ago set forth by Mr. Spencer,

in his *Genesis of Science*: as to Sociology being proved, in real historic showing, to be the actual leader of the sciences, in respect to prior manifestation.\* For what I have now in view is precisely this: that Sociology should be counted as from the very beginning the constant aim of men's thought-work;—just because, in the nature of things, the regulation of Society is the desiderandum which, with Religion only excepted, comprises every thing men need to have regulated; and which therefore may well have afforded the impulse to scientific quest in general, not in the least likely in barbarous ages to have had any charm on its own abstract account. With this for stock-motive, what is more explicable than the successive attempts, successively successful, to master the preliminary sciences, in the order of their attainableness? According to my own terms, the Sociological aim forms the constantly *static* condition of human psychation; and the emerging out of this, from time to time, in speculative endeavours, has been the series of experimentings with Nature, which have finally improved the stock into the ability of dealing truly with its aim, measured by human conditions. But here lies the point I contend for. I claim to have it allowed, that always the main condition to be attended to, is, that pursuit of this sort is not the *only*

\* Comte indeed appears to be dealing precisely with this proposition, in what he says at the beginning of his *Phil. Pos.* respecting "Historic method", as contrasted with "Dogmatic";—while, for my own part, I have anxiously recurred to this distinction of his, in finishing the writing of these pages, to judge whether—or rather, how far—I may take it as the actual equivalent, on Comte's terms, to what I am here seeking by names of "static and dynamic". But should this be so, decided more than ever would be the ground of my antagonism: since what he expressly states in the matter is, that "Dogmatic Method is for superseding the Historical, as we advance to a higher position in science" (Vol. i., p. 23, of the translation); while the present idea of "static method" supposes an exactly contrary event.

pursuit needful to men; but, on the contrary, is that which, to the non-scientific side of our nature, must be known as alternating incessantly into the character of a subordinate ministering to the *moral* occasions of men. The very instant that intellect becomes passive, relatively speaking, this must occur; while, as I have been describing, the minutest preponderance of the one half of mental action which consists in experimentation, over the other half which is plain observation, suffices to shift the mode of active or *dynamic* effort *into* the passive: this again, by the law of contrast, only producing the stronger revulsion to repeated action. And by this principle appears solved that universal meaning of back-influence, resulting from Sociology, in proportion as this is realized, on preceding thought-arrangement, which altogether coincides in character with Religious influence, in so far as Religion is intellectual. For although it is true that Religion, as a science, has no direct connection with Sociology,—but, on the contrary, is *the* one amongst the sciences that propagates itself aloof from such connection, ministered to alone by inward resources,—yet the back-influence from Religion necessarily falls in virtual parallelism with that of the Social kind: destined more and more, as I believe, to work alterations on whatever the scientific aim, on its own account, realizes:—so that a true reciprocity must be thought of between the two agencies. And for the effect of this I would assign the following.

First, as to the lower stage of Science-evolution, previous to the parting, and where Sociology is merely incipient: here, I imagine a mode of action and re-action such as this.—Suppose the time before any science was defined: was it not now that social aims were exclusively bent to either agriculture or warfare; so that hence were earth-works

and metals the objects of study that was inevitable?—Well, but so, on the other hand, was the mode of social government attained such as itself was also, in a manner, metallic! What, in any way, did pristine governments other than seemingly take pattern from science extant; by treating, as they did, the social bodies of men as if these were also but lumps of earth or metal, to be moulded or battered at despotic pleasure!—And so too, meanwhile, was it not the case that household and pastoral occasions were inducing knowledge of chemistry and biology?—while hence, in return, were not despots becoming paternal?—To render them, however, actually humane, in the true sense of the word, was an office that still must have stood over: waiting, as was natural it should need to do, the final event to Science.

And as to this final event,—the event of division,—has not the symbol I have given to it, on perfectly intrinsic grounds, said enough as to its humanizing effect! I have figured, namely, the parting of Mind-action into Socialistic and Religious (or personal) aims—ever thereafter apart, and yet on that very account to be closer than ever intermingled,—by the Branches, Male and Female, into which the Human Race itself is divided. This however being once allowed as the true harmony of the case,—harmony between the stock-constitution of Mind, and the stock-constitution of realized Humanity;—while likewise another postulate be admitted, which I own to be equally necessary, however possibly disputable: namely, that rendering of justice to this corporealized distinction forms the essential of Social regulation, that is true to its purpose;—and have I not every precedent from hitherto experience of Science, to look for the effect of reciprocation from this, as from every lower event? Let it be remembered how every other truth



attained, of characteristic sort, has told upon previous stages, down to the very foundation. Namely, how Astronomy, (taking this for such foundation,) has gained already reflected impression in all these ways:—from Mineralogy, shown by Astronomy's treatment of its own subject-masses on the very terms of homogeneous grains that earth or metal fragments are;—from Chemistry, inasmuch as, even beyond this, it has arrived to treat its starry worlds as molecular particles, bound into substance, one with another, by stupendous affinities;—and from very Biology, if only we reckon up planet-growths by equinox-precessions; or, still more plainly, if we trust ourselves to nebular hypotheses. In rightful sequel, then, to all of this, how should it be forbidden to expect reflection, and reflection universal, from the grandest peculiarity of all, revealing itself as the consummate problem in Nature's designing, for man to interpret as he may!

And here is the matter which, if any, will give body to the thin speculations of the following pages. For only to the Metaphysical kind of gaze is such revealing, and such possibility of interpretation, in the slightest degree open. Here also, therefore, does the purport of Comparativism, as a needed regulator of thought, bring itself to an end. All that Science can do, towards a problem like this, terminates apparently just in the one generalization where, for the first and only time, it strikes concert with Religion. And that is, I imagine, precisely in the act of intellect, whereby conscious experience effects the reciprocation suggested. For what this amounts to, in other words, is just the following: that we are enabled to carry with us, *into* the metaphysic region, the scientifically-qualified assurance, of at least high probability, that all parts of

*thought* have the same mode of action and re-action upon one another, which *by* thought has been discovered to pervade all parts of *nature*.

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Thus I feel that my whole end, proposed to myself in this examination, has indeed been answered. Nothing that I find myself obliged to take as result from it condemns, but very much, on the contrary, goes to support my design. On the one hand, Comte's prohibition of Metaphysics appears proved to me to have wronged himself, as to what is even best in his doctrine;—on the other hand, I seem free, by disregarding that prohibition, to take *from* Comtism specially this, which is invaluable to me: namely, the definite form which Science wears when, stripped of all other qualifications, it stands out as Opponent, but also Co-partner, of Religion.

For this, by contrast, entirely confirms the view of the nature of Religion, which I depicted in my first section. There, I expressed my conviction, how all that is improvement to Religion consists in the rendering it more and more of an insensible influence,—vague, as to intellectual lineaments, to the utmost degree of vagueness,—and especially such as is appreciable only *personally*. And here, I have gathered for corresponding result, that similar consequence attends intellectual effort universally, wherever, and just in proportion as, the true limits of Science are over-passed. That is, I seem to have certified that it is where Science is at home, and only there, that mental action bears *directly* on circumstance: having for object

to conquer circumstance, and, because of this, and of the energetic attitude required for it, basing itself firmly on *static* or normal self-forgetfulness ;—while, every where, in proportion as Science diffuses itself into aims above its reach, the two-fold event ensues : on the one hand, of abstract generalizations gained, which act as I am contending that Religious intuitions act ; and on the other, of strivings promoted, of the habitual sort, which have only a latent connection with the abstractions. But thus does there constantly arrive, as Generalism gains ground over Science, increasing need for mental passiveness, forcibly restrained into such, in order to the taking of impressions from general nature, by the rightful means of internal sympathy with nature : this being the living mode of communion with her which here has been counted as *dynamic*. And yet, always, must Religion stand here in a manner alone, through its being, in right of Internalism, the true representer of this kind of sympathy.

For I accept fully the belief, prepared-for by Mr. Spencer, that all our intuitional conceptions, of leading sort, are of the very nature of the *theories* embodied in scientific classification :—as, for instance, that the non-entity of “Astronomy” possesses us with actual knowledge of the stars :—excepting only that the former are such as have grown insensibly on mankind, while the latter have been wrought out by individuals, and consciously. And here, therefore, is concerned the work of interpretation, inwardly directed, which I have just spoken of,—as to tracing the natural connection, and consequent seriation, amidst these instituted generalizations : limited, however, as to my own purpose, to those which, in being theological, abut in moral conclusions. For by my own manner of understanding Theology,—through pursuit of the very

course of historical experimenting which science demands,—I have come to own that results associated with it *are* to be calculated, rightfully, in the way that science cannot deny to be lawful, in the abstract, though not the way rightful to itself: by acquisition gained to us of abstract ideas. And this, I claim, is a real turning 'of Theology into the thing which not Comtism itself ought to refuse;—although truly an argument *against* itself must lie in the very admission. For wherever past Theology has shown itself, historically, injurious to mankind,—as I fully concede that it has,—this has been through its being made to intermeddle *directly* with human affairs, in precisely the way that Comte would have Sociology to do. Let Theology, on the contrary, be eliminated from the stock of practical Religionism, and set apart as a mental abstraction, in the true manner of other '*ologies*, and surely a corresponding benefit must follow:—a *greater* benefit, rather, than in any other case, just from the nature of the matter. I might sum up the whole of what has come to me, as benefit, from Mr. Spencer's scheme of principles, by saying that he has given me the idea of Evolution. But Theology, on my own terms, relates to the internally-appreciable Source of Evolution, whatever it be; and much more must *this* be a matter of abstraction than the other. And yet the idea of Evolution, too, has the effect that answers to religious effect:—for, at the same time that it hides itself away from any sort of mixture with my acting movements in life, it permeates entirely my region of *thinking*—just as does the theological image my whole domain of *feeling*.—May I not well say, therefore, that a field of investigation lies spread to *self-consciousness*, ruled over by Theology, which Science, on its own grounds, should not object to? It is that which forms,

in reality, but the night-side of contemplation—necessary, surely, to be added to that of day, *as* that of day is necessary. It is the view of nature where, day-theories banished the horizon, an incomparably wider, however dimmer, sense of nature unfolds itself to us:—*nay*, where the dimness itself is relieved by the glimmering intuitions peculiar to it, amongst which the sun itself re-appears, *as* a star.

And for the opening to us of this view of nature, and the preparing for us of the terms of this abstract communion, we are indebted to the old Metaphysicians! By accepting the position, we fall anew into the power of honouring as glorious a line of spiritual ancestry here, as we continue to find—as we find more than ever—in the Fathers of Physical study. A two-fold continuity is presented which unites us with every mental working of the past, with which any noble feeling in us, of any sort, can long to respond to. And this is a gain, to possess which—not to have been prevented from possessing which, in the way that Comtist restrictions must have done, causes in myself, I cannot help wishing to acknowledge, the strongest thankfulness not to have lain under these. Discipleship to Comte, if I had been early initiated into it, must necessarily have prevented me from feeling the very meaning of this harmony;—as it must also have prevented me, in regard to Science itself, from rejoicing as I do in those unprecedented successes in the Science of to-day, which have notably sprung, as it is impossible to avoid reflecting, outside of all influence of Comtism. And indeed the two things run together with me. In a personal sense,—as to which only now am I speaking, considering this to be identical with a religious sense,—scientific gain is comparatively little, except as it helps to support my

trust, in general, in mental integrity: *this* being the gain which each one of us personally draws out of the past of experience. But what sort of soundness could *that* be, which, however made out for the one half of experience, should be bound up with *un*-soundness in the other half?

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I may then now return to my proper object in this work. That object is to throw myself fully upon the Introspective stand-point, thus appearing legitimated to me; and thence to produce into ostensibleness the phenomena that I find presented—or rather such of these as show on them, at all, an influence from my altered belief. And this, in fact, *is* precisely the aim at tracing this very continuity for my own thinking, with that of past metaphysicians and theologians; since the very nature of my present religious conceptions—I mean, of the purely intellectual sort which are alone to be dealt with in the present volume,—coincides with my being able, or believing myself able, to realize in a manner to myself the Evolution of those very mind-images with which Metaphysics have constantly been concerned: these appearing to me, namely, as simply the now-inborn results of past Introspection, which solely, and in proportion as, they *are* inherited by us, and not personally acquired, have come to be known by us as “intuitions.” Much of what I have to say has in-

deed been forestalled in this preliminary controversy: but the peculiar need of the case is that suggestions should be treated in groups; and this is only possible by leaving every interest except that of Metaphysics behind.

I have said of this that it must be a matter of cloud-painting. And that it may be seen how inevitable is such character, let it only be considered through what kind of thought-material it is that the junction in question requires to be sought for. The one point that old metaphysics needs to drop, in order to our taking up their thread, appears to be in truth the identical "vice" of confounding the "personal, with the "general", in this inner department, which seems to disfigure Comtism in the outer. That is, in aiming to see "Mind" in the universe, just as Comte aimed to see "Law", they appear to have neglected the condition—which indeed Evolutionism alone sets forth,—showing how Human mentation, as our medium for discerning the General, is really separated from the latter by the whole process of ages'-long mentalization, of which our present ability of conceiving "Mind" forms only the culmination, and by no means the constant attender. Evolutional metaphysics, on the contrary, involve the perpetual sense of the difference, and the remembrance that what is inwardly gazed on forms the attribute solely of our own personality—though truly as blended to consciousness with that of universal human beings. And thus the Mind-painting which is to report on such gazing, must have regard, above all things, to the sort of personal effect on which the shiftingness of Evolution has mirrored itself. It is by no means the mere painting of actual thought-images, that is implied by it;—nor even the painting of mental circumstance, considered as running parallel to external circumstance;—but rather, as I have intimated,

the much vaguer object of only hinting at the *perspective* in mental eventuation, as actually measureable. This is, however, the mistiest of effects to be rendered!—And still, as I have also implied before, there is no means of avoiding to attempt the effect, while regard is had to the object of the “perspective”. By this is signified the meeting at last of night-shadowings with the verge of day-and-ordinary topics. And when this twilight-aspect *is* reached, by this mode of successive contemplations, cloud-amassing becomes the instrument of simple *shading*, which no kind of painting whatever can dispense with, for truthfulness.



## **PART II.—FIRST DIVISION.**

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**THE EFFECT OF PRESENT RELIGION, ON ITS  
PURELY INTELLECTUAL SIDE.**



## CHAPTER I.

### COMPARATIVISTIC RETENTION OF THE PROPER METAPHYSICAL BASIS.

This, at all events, I have of agreement with the old Metaphysicians:—most profoundly do I believe in the Reality of that which is now to concern me, as the rightful matter of Metaphysics. Though my reason for so doing is a very different one from theirs,—even directly contrary to theirs,—yet I think I can prove, and in a manner indefeasible alike to Metaphysicians and the opposite class of thinkers, both that the meaning I would assign to the term “real” is only a consistent heightening of the ontological sense; and that it is in itself legitimate, even by the scientific standard to which I have bound myself.

By scientific rule, the test of scientific character to be admitted as to the mental generalizations made use of, is, that they shall stand contact, to some certain extent, varying according to the nature of the case, with the practical handling of the affairs of life: the manner of this variation being—as I have seemed entitled to infer,—coincident simply with the more or less of directness found in the serviceableness of such generalizations. But, in accepting this test upon my own part, no immediate

obstacle presents itself, which should forbid my looking for similar authorization to those of Metaphysics.—It is true, that the generalizations here employed are rarefied into a degree of abstractness that is incomparably greater than that of scientific abstractions, even of the remotest from ordinary sort ;—and consequently that the mode of utility to them is correspondingly needful to be accounted almost exclusively indirect, instead of in any degree direct.—And also it is true, that by my own postulated condition, it is to be expected, beforehand, that the mode of classifying-experience, which is to assist ordinary experience, must proceed, to be successful, upon a contrary plan of classification to the plan followed by science, purely to attain that kind of harmony with science, which obedience to science in itself calls for.—But when these two things are only remembered, I see no possible reason why the very highest, or purest, points of Idealism should not be as realistic as the most comparatively concrete. The matter of “indirect” utility being on common terms with “direct”, forms indeed the point which constantly abides by me as the most pertinent of all that Science has confirmed for me.

Certainly, I account that the whole working of Metaphysical perception is under relation to the ordinary mode of perception : *is*, therefore, in itself a mode of experience. But then, by development-principle, I have learned that manner of its arriving, to individual holders, by inheritance, which plainly attests the desirableness of this specific characterization for it, *by* “indirectness.”—Thus, within this very point springs up my advantage. I gain from it means to judge of the “reality” of my innately-possessed intuitions, upon a basis of opposing-adaptation to Science, which is simply the following :—that in all my reasoning I adhere to my own desire

for such harmony, as my subjective starting-point.—For this desire is the nearest possible of experiences to me. It is immediate. And by working *from* this subjective actuality towards remoter experiences, I feel that I am doing what Science should require of me, though I am thus contradicting Science's own mode:—since it certainly *is* the practice of Science, under its own outwardly-observant condition, to begin, whenever it classes its own objects, with precisely the remotest from such as affect subjectivity, working up to these only in the end.—But old Metaphysics began also after this fashion; delusively imitating Science, as I imagine, where it ought to have offered contrast. For what can be possibly remoter from subjective actuality, than the conception of an "Absolute Existence," wherein the philosophers of old trusted for support to *their* conception of Realism?

Nay, it seems to me that by sheer force of my own refraining from the latter ground, I am actually gaining in a measure the very *sort* of proof which *they* cut off from themselves by their crude pursuit of it. By the mere fact of the pure relativity of my own postulate, I seem to gain a portion of absolutism, undeniably such.

But here I must include two other considerations; which are, in truth, so inseparably involved with the matter of Realism, as to suffer no independent treatment of any one of the three points. As the very means of clearing up my consecutiveness with old Ontology upon this point, I need to prove similar relation—on the one hand, as to the fact that Metaphysics deals, and ought to deal, solely with "Essences";—on the other, as to this, that its presentation of evidence, as such, both can be, and ought to be, only that of "reasoning in circle."

And, first, as to "Essences": can I find difficulty here,

when it is the case, both that in the gain of abstract ideas is that which I have learned to see the true estimation of metaphysical gain, as opposed to the safest measuring of scientific gain (pp. 131-2); and that assuredly all gaining of abstract ideas does inevitably, by the common habit of mankind, express itself *as* the making out of the "essence" of the topic in concern? I have not the least occasion to go beyond this plainest vindication of my continued use of the term.—Nevertheless, let me note how immense is the effect of this shifting of the former significance—this reduction of it to community with ordinary import! The change implies all that difference of character between metaphysic and scientifically-viewed phenomena, which I have symbolized by the idea of viewing nature—itself remaining the same,—under severally its day and night aspects!

Say, that all production of abstract ideas, be they common, scientific, or metaphysic, *has* been of one and the same kind: that is, always effected by the elimination of concrete particularities, originally attached to every possible idea;—is it not clear that this very community of production must have been the occasion of that peculiar but amazing *difference*, witnessable by our subjective consciousness, which I have figured by supposing for metaphysic truth the exclusive resemblance to *stars*: seen best, if not seen only, when all lower objects are hidden?

This class of truths are such, distinctively, as have to so incomparable an extent succeeded in parting with all particularity, that they have become—at least, virtually—universal. Different as their nature is from simplicity, they have yet all the effect of simplicity, in being appreciable to the subjective experience of every individual mind, amongst the mass of human minds, without needful exception. They apply to every subject; they are

capable of being seen everywhere. But accordingly are they as few in their actual number, as they are rare in their actual quality.—Farther, this must be reflected upon. Various as is the present condition of different sorts of abstract ideas, owing in chief to their varying capability of reaching this final measure of success: so that scientific ideas must be thought of as falling, as a class, very far short of such success, while those of the ordinary class fall immeasurably farther short;—yet originally, or at the first production at all of ideas, there was not the least power of discernment to men (pre-rational beings as they then were,) as to *which* of the images had it in them to attain this success. There was a common aspiration, or rather a common assumption, as to success, present in every case. Ideas, namely, that were based on merely sense-impression,—such as those of “greenness, hardness,” &c.,—showed nothing as yet of the typical limitation which, in the nature of things, must so speedily bind them down to a subordinate range. And the case was parallel with the internally-based ones, while restricted by the superficialness of import that was primary to them: such as those of “hunger,” or of “fierceness and gentleness.” Nor is there need to express the same about scientific ideas, when these are supposed to have arisen, since here the limitation of range is the very matter of hypothesis, in regard to them. The consideration is, then, in what manner will the spectacle of such mental working present itself, when, from our actual station, we look back at the whole field of it:—I mean, when we look *inwards*, to see reflected there, as we may, upon our inborn convictions, what in reality is produced as from the heaven above us?—The effect of such spectacle, conditioned in this manner, can only be that of exhibiting the successful ideas apart from all competing

ones ; since it must be of this sort. Namely, in each instance, that of our looking on the extremity of a current which has borne directly towards it from the beginning of mental existence :—a current which has made its way to its present destination, by driving before it, and aside from it, every influence that could have impeded it ;—as to which, consequently, the yielding mass of concreter topics has encrusted itself, in retreating, so as to form a containing definition for the longitudinal nothingness ;—while this, all in *being* nothingness, as contrasted with its environment, appears to our sympathetic subjectivity the most signal reverse : forming, in truth, to mental vision, a burning line of distinctive spiritual Force !

Nor is the star-likeness anything but intensified when we add regard to the third point :—that of the needed “arguing in circle”, in order to obtain, so far as we may, what sheerest instinct calls the “roundness of truth”.

When an old metaphysician was asked “*why* he credited the idealistic images in which he trusted, for realistic ones ?”—he could only answer, that it was because he possessed an intuitive conviction to that effect :—which is, in fact, the same thing as saying, that, “he believed them *because* he believed them.” And I grant indeed that this is a circle of such utter flatness, or shallowness, that science has a perfect right to call it a “vicious circle”. But development-principle shows me the means of obviating, and of utterly deepening this shallowness. The circle becomes, under it, that which it was actually symbolized for, by those of the philosophers of old, who in the then first-creativity of their thinking faculties, were as truly poets *as* they were philosophers. I refer to the image by which they described Truth, when of the diviner sort, as a Ring, formed expressly in this signifi-



cant way :—namely, by the coiling of a Serpent, figuring Wisdom. For here is comprised the suggestion—first, that even when the Ring is looked upon vertically, in the full aspect of subjectivity, however a circle to all intents and purposes, it is yet not a *true* circle, but only what may pass for such ;—secondly, that if our thought force itself obliquely, into ever so little of the mode of objectivity, there is manifested that character of spirality, in the construction of the Ring, which is of such immensity of import, considered in quasi-connection with physical teachings.—And here is the manner in which developmentalism actually induces this effect of spirality on the “vicious circle” in question”. To the demand, “*why* are intuitions believed realistic ?” it supplies the following answer, pointing to the *how*\* of the intuitions’ origin. Namely, that “intuitions are reliable, because, just as they were produced in us, at first, as the consequence of external agency, so do they now, and evermore, enable us to exert a counter external agency, with regard to whatever be the species of externality, or of circumstance, implied.” In this reply, however, I conceive there is exactly the circularity which is effective through being only a quasi-circularity, instead of absolutely such ; and there is the means left open of showing how far indeed the personality acted *on* in the first instance, may be justly identified with the *agent* in the second case ;—and thus of obviating a fallacy to which the old metaphysics was liable, of the most enormous sort. The latter supposes that every mind’s own intuitions may justly be taken to represent those of the race. And this seems to me the kind of Ring-argument where the serpent should conduct itself so against the nature of a serpent, that it should

\* I use these interrogatives as equivalent : for is it not obvious how, in dynamic survey, and with the present idea of causation, the “*how*” and the “*why*” of phenomena fall to be necessarily identical ?

take its tail directly into its mouth by a single coil. Under development-doctrine, or the contrary, it is clearly by means of the coiling, through opposite mind-circumstances, of an infinite number of mind-individualities, that the metaphysic circle finally attains, and thenceforth evermore preserves, its requisite annular consistency.

And in this very way do I suppose that the pathway of abstract ideas, just spoken of, produced itself in reality. The mode of the abstract propulsion, issuing finally to ourselves in the coruscating forcefulness of mental stars, I suppose to have been a constantly spiral alternation between the two operations of the formula:—the one, an imbibing of mentalism, by mind-effort, more and more *out of* circumstance; the other, a proving of the veritableness of the mind-function, by exercising it in return *upon* circumstance.

For see: this accounts for everything found at variance amongst the different dealings with abstractions, rendered necessary by the different characters of the topics subjected to abstraction. Low-level abstractions, whether of sense-origin, or internal origin, cannot in any way be reasoned on, in the proper method of reason; just because their immense liability to variation forbids their aimed-at circularity from any thing like approaching a true circularity. That is, ideas such as those of “greenness or hardness”, or of “fierceness or kindness”, rest as simple *assertions*, incapable of formalized proof, notwithstanding their virtual proof, which lies always in their experienced usefulness. This is the natural, realistic evidence, which the very fact of their continuance makes good to them. And hence I would count their circles *as* circles, indeed; but still of such swaying and bulging imperfectness, that they admit of no actual usage as such.—As to scientific abstractions, on the other hand, quite is the condition

reversed. These, on account of their artificially-mentalized nature, are such as of necessity limit themselves to the detail method of demonstration, which secures each step-by-step acquisition of truth in turn, by merely clenching it upon its predecessor, already posited and assumed as certified for *fact*. The claim at universality, therefore, which is represented by the circular argument of self-demonstrableness, is here unmistakeably out of place.—Once, however, on metaphysic ground, we find not only the natural method of proof restored, but with such perfect capability of fulfilment, that it purely commands our adoption. The self-evidence works on us so instantaneously, that we have nothing before us but to accept it.

And here is plain cause for the pureness of subjectivity, with which we know, as sheer matter of experience, that metaphysical subjects ought to be treated :—even by those of us who are all the time holding fast, in addition, the results procured by objectivity. The latter has given us a consciousness of background to the actual phenomena ;—and this is a grand step of realization to the latter ! But the very effect of that consciousness, it seems to me, is to enable us to throw ourselves fully upon the phenomenalism :—always, however, in owing to ourselves that it is such. And here is the singular deepening of the star-import which I hinted at. If we do gaze fully upon our intuitions, without thinking for the moment of their spirality of origin, the true, the *mystic* import of spirality comes upon us : in this way. No longer do the beamy openings in our night-heavens speak to us of force-currents, but they gain the solid brightness of globes. The *orbit*, namely, is suggested, which carries necessity of *orbs*. And spiral movement involves suggestion of orbit. Just by the fact of the Ring-roundness, produced sectionally by

it, being not a true roundness, is there called up, inevitably, the idea of an outer-lying, and incomparably-extended roundness; while this means, in the mental instance, a correspondingly-widened experience. And thus, when we look on these star images, we feel that they shine as they do for us, only because our own thinking lies on the very track of their orbits. But this gives individuality and form to them. If the whole course of the abstract thinking does indeed abut in our own personalism, we can, as it were, see our rounded thought-objects, of a truth, on all sides of them;—and to see that which makes a circle, whichever way it is looked on, is the same thing as to see a solid globe.

Nor is this a mere inanity. The essential force of metaphysics *is*, that it does in this very way produce thought-solids out of sense-esteemed nothingness. For this is the meaning involved, in general, by Types.

Let it be imagined that two equal and opposite forces—those of observant and introspective mind-action—have been from the beginning acting on each several mind-production, known to us now as intuition. Is it not immediately a physically-approved notion, to image that these—precisely in their being, by hypothesis, the cases where such action has gone on undisturbed, or rather has worked itself free from disturbance,—*are* the sort of mind-objects rightly to be thought of as rounded, actually, into globes?—But, if so, here is what I have intended by the shade of absoluteness, that seems to grow out of the very relativity of such mode of production assigned to them.—And, truly, is it not inevitable to instinct that we add yet this, in respect of such relative absoluteness: namely, that with roundness, thus perfect, shall be associated, as by necessity, the quality of self-sustainedness?—nay, the very quality of possession of *being*, dis-

tinctively such, which clenches the propriety of the metaphysic idea of "essences", attached to metaphysic thought-objects?

Yes: and it seems to me, farther, that a similar kind of absoluteness goes with the whole conception of the growth of abstract ideas, thus ordered. The taking of them all, in the first place, on the footing of a common experiential origin;—and, in the second place, the supposition, here followed, that through the whole course of their growth, the modifying ideas have still been able, notwithstanding their successive variations of form, to prove themselves by their force of utility: that is, by their power of preserving harmony between the human mind and circumstance:—this mode of viewing the case, I conceive, brings a new sphere of relativity into contemplation, specifically self-balancing.

But this view can only work itself out by degrees. Let me keep, for the present, to my subjective actuality, which requires me to hold these star-like intuitions, *not* under thought of their globe-solidity, but merely phenomenally, under image of what they show like habitually to myself. As I have said, my wish now is to paint, much rather than to analyse. And absolutism itself *may* be treated phenomenally.

Here, then, is what I take for the proper use of typism in the matter. The question which of all others forms the typical problem of metaphysics, is this:—"Does such mode of thought imply, does it support, belief at all in an external world?"—And by the foregoing method of typism, I think the puzzle may be safely disposed of thus.

As under typism, I bethink myself, it is perfectly right that the circle of proof should take the actually un-natural, actually impossible, form of a perfect circle. Well then,

I would reply :—"Certainly, the true mode of metaphysics both implies, and supports, such belief. It makes belief even in myself a nullity, except as backed by that in external things. I have learned by it to know myself, as the mass of my internal sensations, only as outwardly derived; to know the outer world only as through the medium of these. I believe in these,—that is, I believe in the existence of myself,—*because* I believe in the existence of the external world. I believe in the latter *because* I believe in myself. Neither existence is truer to me than the other; neither would have means of being true to me, without the truth of the other."—Here, I consider, is the true resting of each half of the demonstration upon the other, which gives sense of the whole being self-sustaining. It is the precise meeting of the head and tail of the serpent-argument, which, notwithstanding its realistic fallacy, furnishes, aptly enough, the type towards which metaphysical demonstration may in all cases most usefully aspire to.

And let me employ it, at once, with regard to the experience I have in view. That is, in the manner of an abstract standard, which, as such, may guide me in the application, to metaphysical ideas, of the realistic test of science.

Of these ideas, most perfectly-of-all produced, and hence most purely star-like in their aspect, are the venerable ones of Time and Space :—utterly intellectual, utterly removed from effects of varying subjectivity. But so also is it evident, to immediate reflection, how the rotundity of their self-evidence is so close to a perfect rotundity, that it needs the most forced effort to think of them as what they must have been *previously* to becoming round :—I mean, in that time of their amorphous beginning which is all but lost to our present capability of

realizing. To ourselves, the fact respecting them stands as follows :—just as of necessity we infer that the rise of them must have been ministered to by each, out of all, of the various kinds of experience possible ; so do we actually find that no possible dealing with experience is open to us, without calling these very ideas into question. Not a book can we read, for instance, without thinking of the *time* that it takes us to do so ; not a place can we seek for that book on our shelves, but we must judge if there is *space* for it. However do Time and Space, when subjectively fixed, and for metaphysic gaze, retire into the heavens as stars, yet none the less for this, I repeat, do they diffuse thence an universal serviceableness.

And the very same as this is also the case, so far, with those heretofore *idola* of the schools, “Form” and “Substance” ; to be added to the case already pointed out, which is that of “Essence”. We could scarcely do better without any of these three terms, even in our habitual talking, than without the two foregoing. And there may be many more of such, which do not at present occur to me. In these five, however, is sufficient specimen of what seems to me to fill up the true character in question. As to all of them it is obvious, that if for a moment one should be extinguished in the human mind, the human mind would be dead as to such region of thinking until precisely it had created the term over again.

My leading object here, however, is always to show how the idea of Deity itself needs to be ranged, of speciality, amongst the metaphysical group :—though not on the same terms as Time and Space, and much less on the same as the other three. The idea of Deity, when once it is divested of the theological concreteness, hitherto hanging about it, I am here aiming to show—as already stated,—to be reducible to the very same kind of diffusion as all of

these: only varied by peculiarity that sufficiently characterizes it.—And yet, before coming to this principal image, let me prepare for it by dealing with the one that to a certain extent coincides with it; and that remains, in fact, constantly interchangeable with it, as to the matter of giving a central direction to thought. I mean, the idea which by old metaphysicians was taken—as I think, wrongfully,—for their starting-point: that of an “Absolute Existence.”

Now, looking at *this* image phenomenally, of a certainty it offers me *nothing* of a diffused utility. It yields me no circle whatever:—unless it be merely the word-definition which is utterly shallow of meaning behind the words. That is, it affords me means of believing, no ways in an “Absolute Existence” itself, but only in my power of verbally outlining, so to speak, the emptiness of my conception in regard to it. What shall I say of it, then, but that in rightfulness this image ought expressly to be known as *merely* phenomenal—through its utter absence of realism?—But if I do so take it, here, observably, is this prime advantage in metaphysics. By conceiving in this way the negation of realism, I gain a standard for judging of its opposite: the sort of realism that is positive. The very idea of phenomenism, purely such, can surely be held by us only under force of such contrast.—Through this especial quality of negativeness, however, does this idea of “Absolute Being” coincide with what remains of Deity, when handled by Science. It becomes that, alone, which gives opposite to Actuality. That is, it becomes,—under development-principles,—the unconditioned Force, which when conditioned we know as the producer of Evolution.

Quite contrary, however, is the case with the subjective image, consciously such, representing Deity. I mean, the



*proper* image of Deity, which I think does best to be thought of alone, whenever we habitually use the term. This, as a moral image, seems to me incalculably more concrete, less purely abstract, than idealized Space and Time; and herein do I suppose that it is also eminently more positive, in its action upon us, than those are. They, in their star-character, rest ever unchangeable in our thought-firmament: purely cold, immeasurably distant. But the ideal of Deity, the instant we release it from exclusive intellectualism, beams naturally into our Sun. It glows immediately with the nearness of interest, the magnified largeness and gloriousness altogether,—yes, and with also the enhanced liability to shadows of change,—which separate its nature all-essentially from theirs. For how can this otherwise than follow, under the import now given to it! If the idea of “Absolute Existence” be that which, as to Science, gives a Source to Evolution; so is this moral aspect of Deity that which bears combat with what, as to the soul’s own concern in Evolution, is the soul-crushing Foe to Evolution: in the Divine Ideal’s being, as I suppose it to be, that which alone controls rightfully in us our necessary subjection to Death’s stoppage on Evolution. I suppose this Ideal to be that which, in its very deepening of Death’s contrast-to-brightness, through its own bestowal of day-effulgence upon our souls, yet at the same time casts the real blackness out of the Death-gloom. And so far from this being all, I include the fact that it moreover affords us the constant shade-defining of our every pursuit in life, which signifies the will-limitation by Duty:—so that never can its presence be otherwise than needful to us. No more can there sorrow befall us of any kind, than can there occasion for any moral action arise, without also its being well, as it is natural, that sense of “God” should be felt behind it,—

long before we have time to seek it out. Such expressions as "God help me through this straight!—God forbid my doing the wrong thing!"—testify of themselves, I argue, by their very habitualness, and very unthinkingness, towards an in-dwelling need, which we can no more live our lives without expressing, than we can speak of general outer things apart from reference to Space and Time.

Nor is it by any means *only* in this heightening of star-character into sun-character, that the idea of Deity is separated as required from the latter ideas:—chiefly through this casting of shadows, which stars are incapable of casting!—There is a true indication of the same matter, of the peculiarity of *interest* to us in the former, contrasted with our impressions about Space and Time, which effectively remains, even when we abide by that pure intellectualism, which as showing them on common terms of abstractness, I count for the night-aspect of Ideals.

For I have learned to apprehend the idea of Deity altogether as standing at one with our sense of Individuation:—tracing, as I have sketched out in what I have called my "Scheme of Mental Creation" (Vol. I., pp. 478–518, and especially at pp. 501–3), a definite plan in nature, by which our actual feeling of Selfism appears traceable, entirely, to the theological image. And by this I mean more than commonly goes with the recognition of Personification, as the habit which thought, under rude conditions, inevitably betakes itself to, in its dealing with abstract conceptions. I mean extensively more than the subjective consciousness which, when little refined by culture, produces Mythology. I conceive, namely, that every simple act of giving *name*, to thing or to image, signifies giving Individuality to it. For only in this way does Individuation become a condition, as to the placing of universal thought-objects under it, which competes with

the Time-and-Space ordination;—while, in its being so taken, the competition is surely obvious. By imagination, if not by realistic means, every possible existence, or portion of existence, *may* be individualized: down to minutest grains of sand, or even ultimate particles. And yet, I own, not so legitimately as these are to be thought of under Time-and-Space conditions; whence I admit here a lower metaphysic rank. The order of legitimate application in fact is reversed. Time-and-Space conditions belong chiefest of all to un-individualized objects; Individualization has its source within ourselves. To individualize inorganic substances, is the abstract effort of finding out their essential constitution, by which we may definitely classify them; to individualize ourselves has become to us simple instinct. Still, what I insist on is, that to know every object whatever under Individuation of some sort, is on a par, for necessity, with our knowing it as subject to Time or Space. And manifestly also, it is identical with finding the Essence of the nature of such object.

And is it not the essence of the matter, as to our actual consciousness of “being”, that we should feel how our peculiar allotment of “being”, separated as it is from the remaining mass of “being”, stands under relation to that mass?—But this is typified, as it is solely capable of being typified, by our attitude towards God.

By this metaphysical utilization of the idea of Deity, moreover,—superinduced, as it thus is, on the proper, or habitual utility of it,—arrives the whole of the rectification needful to the fallacious argument of old times, already condemned as such. Instead, namely, of our resting, for belief-evidence in general, on the shallow form of the “*Cogito, ergo sum*,”—while, in truth, the final assertion here contains implication of an *Ego* especially

different from, especially contrary to, the pronoun which is solely latent to the primary verb,—the phrase needs to be enlarged for us thus :—“*Cogito; ergo mundus est; ergo Deus est; ergo sum Ego.*”—Only in this way is struck the balance of a lawful conviction in the case, which seems to give real validity to the *ergo*. For, by interposing the “*I am*” of Deity, to give background to my own cogitated selfism, what am I doing but simply arranging to myself, that my experience of Egoship rests on identical terms with all my other experiences, of a cogitative sort?

My acquisition of the idea of Deity means that I have learned to take a self-adjusted measure of the *Whole* of my creating environment, such as perfectly checks, and corresponds with, my estimation of the same in parts. “God” means to me the “essence” of creative energies; and my conceiving of such “esse” in Him, gives conscious “esse” to myself. A ratiocinative force is thus brought into my own utterance of the dogmatic “*sum*”, which is in every way more substantial than the absolutism of theology. I throw, namely, the entire sum of cogitative experiences into one single category, as to which one and all have this identical law, that “every species of belief supports every other species.” My cogitated self rests on the same ground with every other idea that is cogitated. And that means, it exists in consequence of human nature’s having arrived at the faculty of cogitating it.

But here follows to be noted an eminent attending reflection. Is it not evident that, in treating thus the idea of Deity as the principle of Individuation, not only is the conception of “essence” as it were absorbed into the former, but those of “form” and “substance” likewise fall into connection with it? Individuation of necessity includes recognition of these, as well as of “essence”.——

And this leads to a consideration so important, that it gives plan for the whole laying out of metaphysic classification.

Each metaphysic ideal forms obviously a centre of force, or of thought-motion, to the whole region of topics dependent on it. But if so, does not this imply a natural method of classification, which, as such, is indeed imperative in the case of Ideals?

The idea of Deity is shown to be working towards the abstract purity rightful for it—in emulation of those of Space and Time,—by the means of forcing lower thought-images into an appropriately-ordered subjection to itself. And what is this but the making of it a focus: the furnisher of subordinate orbital movement to these? The fixed stars that such conceptions have appeared to be, are in fact needful to be thought of as interchangeable in their character with *planets*, as well as with *suns*! The spiritual current implied by each of them, is rather an *axis* for mental motion, seen in extremity by us, which thus carries the whole body of thought subject to it in revolution around it;—while also amongst the Ideals themselves must fall a similar centre, and similar axis: determined by the mood of the observer! The habitually subjective mind will insist, for ever, on giving to its own Introspective Representer the obviously-fitting sun-character;—but equally must the objective contemplator, when also dynamically-addicted, insist that, for accuracy, the sun itself, as to the actual focus of the sun-system, remains but a planet.

I have said that dynamic recognition, when habitual to any mind, turns thence into being static. Well, and hence it is that these stars of the mind ought to show, as they wontedly do show, for *fixed*. It is their very excess of motion, concentrated as it is thus in focus, that paints itself as extinction of motion.

But what follows, other than the perfect imitation of the analogous consequence in physics!—The phenomenal arrest of motion, such as signifies outwardly-effective motion, issues in phenomenal motion that is henceforth effective inwardly. It becomes, namely, *that* which produces *relations* for the thought-object: partly, as to its engendering of minor abstractions, differentiating the character of the parent-abstraction; partly,—and much more importantly, for present concern,—as to the producing for it of relations with fellow-abstractions. This, I conceive, is the subjective consequence, only requiring attention to be unmistakeably perceived, which follows inevitably from the intensified energy of subjectivity, brought under metaphysics to bear vertically on each of these ideas.

As example of the first kind of such consequences, shows the derivation from “Space”, of the related images of “Finiteness and Infinity”; or that from “Time”, of the abstract Time-divisions which make the “Future, Past, Present” of Time.—Or, again, if we pass to the idea of Evolution,—which I consider to form the consummating addition, only now in the act of being made, to the entire grand category of such ideas,—I would attribute with the character of such derivation those which stand, or may stand, as the proper “laws” of Evolution.—In fact, this peculiar mode of self-productiveness in the primary Ideals, is that which I take to represent the precise course of deductive thinking, which may lend itself approvably in aid to Science.

But the contrary mode, I repeat, has the greater interest for Subjectivity:—the mode that brings the various Ideals into relation with one another, and thus gives general force of “balance” to all of them. I have expressed how the reason why Evolution, to my personal actuality

of belief, takes upon itself the consummating character, is, that this youngest Ideal has arrived to comprehend within itself the entire force of the previous amount of Ideals, save only that which stands as the not-to-be-comprehended Source of Evolution. And this means the striking of balance for the competitive foci of motion :—while, how incomparable in extent is the matter of judgment! What I am here tending to, is to assume, of the ideas of Time, and Space, and the Individuating principle of Deity, that these constitute, and exclusively so, the primary order of the class ;—between which, however, and the final idea of Evolution, I suppose the intervention of other Ideals, not yet alluded to, but still indispensable to the group ;—but whether, after all, the word “primary” shall here be restricted to mean only “first-originated”, or whether it shall mean also “of leading importance”, forms an additional occasion for judgment. I believe, for my own part, that the instinctive impulsion to create an Ideal of Deity, specifically adapted to personal need, was both incomparably earlier in its rise in the human mind, and correspondingly deeper-seated there, than occasion for ideas either of Space or of Time :—resisting also, in proportion, eradication. But, for all this, it may well be, as I have supposed it to be, that the former is immeasurably less pure, as an abstraction, than the two latter :—less capable, indeed, of becoming pure.

And here therefore is involved what seems to demand the peculiarity of the present effort : namely, to aim at the subjective classification, in regard to these Master-Ideas, which shall assign to them, legitimately, their respective dominions over us. If there had been no equivocal aspect respecting them, relatively both to us and to one another, the matter would have been simple

enough. It would have been merely this :—Human nature, by the constant working and improving of its own faculties, has finally *grown* into power of appreciating consummate images like these. Also, the very *gradualness* of production thus assigned to them, in itself implies that impossibility of their cessation, or of any discernible alteration in our holding of them, which is represented in our ordinary language by taking them as intuitional verities. Hence, we need only to go on as mankind have done before us, working out the proof of their efficiency, by continuous use of them.—But if the respective uses of them intermingle,—nay, in a manner, conflict with one another : at all events, when reasoned upon :—then becomes classification indispensable. The alteration that *does* appear to have ceased as to their nature, may *not* have ceased as to their relations.

And in order to this effort, thus much has my scientific test befriended me. It has guided me, at all events, to this basis of security to my classification, that I can at once assign a reason, as to any possible idea, for its entrance, or not, within the range of the class. I mean, by the fact, whether or not, of its utility being universal. For any idea to be really metaphysic, this at all events must be possessed by it :—first, that it shall have sprung out of universal kinds of thinking ;—next, that it shall serve upon its own part, as far as its nature goes, itself to interpret the universe.

But more than this, the test has set on clear footing for me, what else is so wontedly baffling, as the distinction between *Facts* and *Truths*. Any belief that is realized becomes therein a Truth on the subjective side of it, just as it becomes a Fact on its opposite side—a *Mental Fact*. Which it shall be taken for, depends alone on the aspect selected. And here is betokened the especial mode of



class-difference which I am seeking between Scientific Beliefs and Metaphysic, all the time that I maintain harmony with Science by the present insistence on intrinsic community of proveableness. A Mental Fact, I am supposing, is simply *farther removed* from that connection which it nevertheless possesses with the outer reality of things, unappreciable by us, than a so-called Physical Fact is ; and therefore is more naturally to be taken in the light of a Truth *than* of a Fact, however capable of the latter aspect. A belief, on the contrary, such as that, for instance, in a Solar System, allies itself, notwithstanding its actual typicalness, so closely with concrete impressions, as notably to fall chiefly into the objective aspect of a Fact.—And yet still, I conceive that, as to intrinsic character, belief in Deity itself, as the representative case of metaphysics, holds station, whether *as* Truth or *as* Mental Fact, only on identical terms with such belief as that in a Solar System. It is a form of thought which fits itself to its occasion :—what more is needful to be said of it, or on behalf of it !—Nevertheless, belief is no more than belief :—not in any case, even of the humblest sort. What difference, intrinsically-speaking, *can* there be, whether it happen that what I believe in is the ball that I hold in my hand,—the larger ball that holds me in grasp,—or, as an ultimatum, the Power that upholds the Universe ?

## CHAPTER II.

### THE NATURAL OCCASION FOR METAPHYSICS.

Thus far, then, does the principle of "balance", taken as a substitute for the heretofore "absolutism" of Metaphysics, seem to yield me available foundation.—And now I must see, as the next step in order, how it will help me towards that which indeed "absolutism" never attempted, or could possibly give condition for : namely, the subjective arrangement of Metaphysic Ideals, made on the very understanding of being a variable arrangement.

For this, it is obvious, I must inquire minutely into the manner in which the principle of balance acts, wherever it is found, or supposed to be found, discernible.—And such case I believe to be, as it naturally should be, that which regards the working of the idea of Individuation : alternating, as this does, between the image of personalized Deity, and our immediate feeling of Selfism. Here, I conceive, exists the peculiar correlation of diversified experiences, where the effect of balance *must*, if any where, display itself ; as I believe that it *does* display itself.

And yet only in the mode now followed. Not only would neither member of the correlation furnish what is requisite, taken without the other ; but specially must the manner of relation between the members be such as is

here supposed. That is, the idea of Divine Individuality must be held, not as the result of that of our own, but as the true condition of the latter.—I mean, this must be taken as the intrinsic mode of the relation, stated generally;—while, all the time, the two processes must be remembered to be incessantly inter-acting; with only the leaning towards respective attributions of antecedency, which answers to existent requirement. The view, for instance, taken by Feuerbach, of the production of the Divine Selfism, with all its theologic consequences, through reflection of our own,—true as I consider it to be, as far as it goes,—in no way suffices to give the adjustment to the subject now called for. This can only be afforded by the deeper handling of it, which belongs to a deeper principle than Feuerbach's, of Development.

What I am proposing to do is, in fact, to reduce all the phenomena in the case simply into subjection to a commonest mode of self-delusion, which, as science has long had it to deal with, under its physical form, so may science well teach us how to deal with under a metaphysical form. I mean, our habit of instinctively referring all external movement seen by us, in the first instance to the objects themselves that appear to move. It is *this* kind of treatment, through consideration of *movement*, which, because it is such, I believe to be the needed deepening of the subject, that effectually surpasses Feuerbach's:—*his* being merely the showing how the *stationary* image of Deity is to be taken, as he does take it, for the outer projection of our own internalism. For,—as to the added depth of the now-suggested treatment,—let it be remembered well that metaphysical movement is far from being ordinary mind-movement. Easy enough is it to correct the sort of false impressions about motion which

*are* corrected amongst us, habitually, as to our ordinary environment of moving things. But the movement of Ideals means *that* where the sphere of oscillation is so large, that this in itself involves its evading all common observation. Manifestly, also, does the very fact of this largeness explain, both why the kind of movement concerned is what *must* paint itself to us as that of heavenly bodies; and how it is, therefore, that science has earned its right to be helpful to us, respecting it.

When it is taken in this light, the oscillation that befalls our immediate focus of Selfism, shows us what can only be accounted to correspond with the infinitesimal variation that our movements as living beings upon the surface of the earth, cause in our general relation of gravity to the entire substance of the earth:—while the large-scaled phenomena above us show us how gravity *there* is directly balanced by effect of movement (that, namely, of so-called “projection”).—Hence, all obvious as those movements of posture and locomotion are in themselves, it is perfectly natural, as it is the case in experience, that nothing in *these* leads attention to the matter of gravitation; but that, on the contrary, these require to wait until celestial effects of the same sort have undergone *their* scrutiny, which does awaken attention.—Moreover, let this be thought of. As, under physics, celestial effects have it for their very nature that they require to be known as different *ranges* of effects,—namely, as star-effects that are by no means merely such, but these only as interchanging with planet-effects,—causing *thus* the complication which draws forth the deepness of science to cope with it;—so, as to metaphysics, does similar complication arise from *historically*-piled-up movements of psychation: such as nothing but a philosophized mentalism can cope with; but which, when the latter *has* coped with

it, similarly yields the teaching that assists us in our dealing with home-phenomena.—The “planet-effects” in regard to the Ideal of Deity, I suppose to be the relational changes in the aspect of it, which are brought to our view through the tangled meshes of thwarting philosophies, and self-inconsistent, because grossly concrete, theologies. But,—to complete the parallel,—these planetary effects, while we take them for such, have still to be allowed for as subject to the check that pertains universally to the case of our thought-firmament: namely, to that delusive condition of movement *in toto*, affecting stars and planets indifferently, which I conceive to be in reality the *main* source of what we account in general as celestial phenomena; though not, truly,—as Feuerbach would have it,—the *exclusive* source.

Once, however, let the “astronomic” apprehension of theology be gained,—which is the same thing as the introduction into Idealization of a true self-consciousness;—and the loftily-ordered principle acquired, becomes here also, as in physical understanding of gravitation, the set standard which is usable for us, even in our humblest occasions of idealizing.

Now, if it be considered what is really meant by the doctrine of “relativity”, applied to all our knowledge without exception, it *must* be that our Self-conscious Ego ship does act as focus to the whole range of intellectual psychic movement. I assume this, accordingly, as needless of farther proving; and my entire object will limit itself, as therefore it may, to the peculiar kind of movement which pertains, as I allege, *to* the focus.

Let me then select an example where I believe that, in reality, this movement ought to be admitted for discernible:—an example also, such as shall not be a merely

casual one, but such as shall help me, besides, as to the final distinction that I must presently superinduce on the above generalism.

And here is what serves to this purpose :—a phrase of the most ordinary cast, within the small bounds of which, nevertheless, I conceive that the focus of self-gravity occupies no less than three several stations, shifting itself twice.—“*I* desire both to strengthen *my* body, and to cultivate *my* mind.”—Is it not evident here, I would ask of any thinker, both that the personal pronoun which is latent respectively to each of the possessive pronouns used, is not in either case of identical import with the “*I*” which gives subject to the sentence; and that neither, *à fortiori*, are the two possessives on common terms with one another?

Certainly, the original nominative represents the Ego-ship which is mine habitually; and as to which, therefore, I must assume, that the general mass of my psychical sensations are in one common state of rest.—But how can I speak of “*my* body”, without thereby throwing my Ego-ship exclusively, for the moment, on that portion of such sensations which, precisely by their apartness from “body”, may be held capable of possessing “body”?—And how can I speak of “*my* mind”, without directly reversing the station?

Only carry out the example, moreover, from this extreme character, into phases of minor variation, and surely it is manifest that the variation of stand-point is incessant. When it is said, for instance, “I see”, it can only be inferred that the real meaning is, “All the part of me which is not my visual organ, makes use of that organ”. When it is said, “I think”, it is meant, “All the part of me, not my thinking faculty, makes use of that faculty”. And so on. Whatever of myself I make the topic of re-

mark, and equally whether directly or indirectly, I thereby abstract for the moment from my estimate of Self. And since this cannot be done with regard to the smallest item without in so far altering my centre of Selfism, surely it is inevitable that our whole use of language—yes, and our whole guidance of meditation,—falls under a condition of perpetual shiftingness.

But farther, only allow for the “directly or indirectly” just glanced at, and the class-distinction arises *here*, which conforms entirely to that which is my general aim—as between science and metaphysics. For the instant that two large assortments of movement are produced, as this implies that they are, it is evident that what appeared as general shiftingness before, henceforth is compelled to be taken by thought in the mode of oscillation, stably determined for such.

And sufficiently have I made out, already, the circumstance in science-progression which corresponds with this present indicator of the general division. Sense of Ego-ship at all, as concerned with the workings of science, can arrive only, as I have seen, in connection with that highest endeavour of science, towards mastering the knowledge of Mind, which coincides of necessity with its borrowing of assistance from metaphysics. Its conscious alliance with the latter, and only this, forces it in any way to concern itself with the “relativity” of its own conclusions. But this is precisely what I mean by the “indirect” presence of the Self-ideal.

Let me then now unite the cases of the two Ideals, the homely and Divine, upon the common footing of the scientifically-corrected delusion:—namely, the under-

standing that *everything* in metaphysics turns upon the focal establishment of subjective stand-point. My argument is, that if the oscillating variation of that stand-point really acts, though without our need to notice it, in our commonest usage of language; so does it act, only with essential importance as to our noticing it, on an incalculably larger scale in metaphysical contemplations.

The forming of an Ideal of Deity, I conceive to be *only* the result of magnifying the experience reflected in my illustrative sentence. Suppose the knowledge of things about us, which is represented by our speaking of "my body" and "my soul", simply extended in every direction, so as to comprise every result attainable by us,—and there is presented the very occasion which experientially has compelled the imagining of an Egoship to the Universe, such as assigns *this* to the holding of Deity, and the remainder to corporeal Nature. And this effect is perfectly imaged by saying that the spot round which the heavens revolve, phenomenally, is such through answering to the axis of familiar self-revolution. But this manner of estimation granted, I draw this stupendous inference (—no less a term will suffice me!—). The shifting of our actual focus, whenever we do shift it, as I suppose that we incessantly do shift it, signifies the whole consequence which, when systematized on, means the rendering of philosophy either "material" or "immaterial". That is:—whenever the subjective Ego occupies the station from which only it can permit the speaking of "my body", the mode of universal speculation can be no other than that which sees entire Nature as corporeally conditioned;—whenever the Ego takes contrary focus, by which is allowed speech of "my spiritual part", the mode of speculation sees Nature correspondingly spiritualized. And the former seems to me as much the rightful view,



and essential truth of the case, when Science amasses its results, as the latter is rightful and true for Religion.

Each truth is only a relative truth ; but the consistency between the opposite forms of truth is an absolute mode of consistency.

And every support is given to this idea, by the tangled experiences of controversy, alluded to. Throw such controversies under the diminishing lens of History, so that only the broadest lights may be visible, and I think it will appear, that constantly whatever has been offensive in regard to them—or, obstructive of mutual understanding,—may solely be referred to the delusive instinct of subjectivity, *not* to perceive, and thence *not* to acknowledge, the fact and the consequence of our shifting of stand-point.

For consider, eminently, the views taken by theologians of the “character” of Deity ; which certainly have been the chief causes of the want of such understanding.—If Deity be directly regarded, as by theology is required, it is surely inevitable that a correlation is enforced, between the two Egoships, which essentially wrongs the very aim that is intended. That aim is, one of sympathy with the Divine Ideal, for the human one. But, for means to this, it needs to *turn away* from Deity, and look in the same direction that Deity is supposed to look—towards *its* correlate, which is “body”. Looking directly at Deity, the more we seek to spiritualize ourselves, the more we corporealize *it* ! And controversy witnesses to this effect. The more men have sought to blend themselves with Deity, the more they have given to it—primitively, the most grossly concrete of vulgar passions,—afterwards, the most humanly sentimental of emotions.—Hence, with religion such as this, science can have nothing to do.—

But quite different is the case with what I judge alone for the true mode of religion. Namely, *that* which utterly prostrates the human consciousness as incapable of sympathy with Deity :—*that* which, in order to behold as much as is possible of Deity, falls back as to itself, on the innermost conviction of bodiliness : calling itself, as it has done so wontedly, the “mere clay on the potter’s wheel”.——In order to give glorious attributes to God, it must be, inevitably, that we keep all the debasing ones to ourselves.

To Science, again, for its own occasion, just as necessary is it that the mind should hold itself purely to its spirituality. Desiring, as it does, to paint the tangible conditions of things feelingly and forcibly, what else can it do, by the sheerest instinct of what is desirable for the purpose, than seek to raise its point of view to the utmost ; and thus, to look down upon Nature from the proper heights of immateriality ?

And when the contrary attitudes *are* allowed for, and explained as I would have them, the result is only that the religious (or subjective) intellect must be owned for a lower, an altogether humbler, kind of intellect than the scientific :—a consequence that neither side will object to.

In my next chapter I shall test this plan of conception by comparing it with what seems to be the actual mode of allowing for the contrary aspects concerned, by those leading thinkers who are the answerers for science, at the present day :—aiming thus to see if indeed mine be capable of that harmonious contrariety to theirs, which from my own point of view it is needful for it to possess.——But I have not yet expressed sufficiently—not sufficiently described,—what I believe the inevitableness to

the human mind, of its falling thus into the state, or the habit, of oscillation.

I believe this to coincide, in fact, with the mind's realization of a new pair of Ideals,—so accounted as succeeding to the primary three,—such as form, moreover, the indispensable step, in reason, towards the full scheming out of "materialism" and "immaterialism". These are the Ideals of *Rest* and *Motion*.

I have said, just now, that metaphysic movement is not ordinary movement; and constantly must this be remembered. For, in appreciating the ordinary sort, it happens to us that while our selfism is necessarily assumed for stationary, no slightest attention as yet is called to the fact. To see movement, our instinct alone suffices to assure us, our stand-point of right *must* be that of rest; and under ordinary circumstances, no suspicion is awakened that ever it should be otherwise than such:—just because here is none of that communion with science in question, the nature of which it is to suggest the suspicion.—But let it be supposed that there has occurred what I imagine, of that leaning on adverse *self*-condition, in order to the judging of *outward* condition, which I take for the proper means towards the end; this being also extended to the degree of instituting for us true *foci* of distinctive self-movement:—*now*, I argue, the possession of consciousness in the matter becomes that which is enforced upon us.

Soon as the Ideal of Deity is formed, I have already shown how is thus infused into consciousness the feeling of concentrated energy, which of itself impels us to subjective creativeness. To this idea, then, add the reflection that the very meaning of focal quasi-fixity is, that all subjects around the focus are *in motion* around it. Is it not

evident, hence, that once *God* be present, to our sense of nature, and both upon this fact does every fact else in the universe turn, and by this means is *Life* produced into every part of the universe?—And yet; since this is only felt when our thought does actually assume the focus that yields this Ideal;—since, expressly this experience vanishes, whenever we back our thought by the sense of its *own* spirituality, and thus look downwards instead of upwards, into Nature;—how can it be otherwise than that science's view, which is the downward-looking one, should, by its very contrast with the subjective experience, impress upon us sense of *Deadness* in Nature?

Here, accordingly, I suppose to spring forth the necessity for an interpretation of the difference, which in reality is the root of Metaphysics. Science, for its own part, so far as it meddles with the problem, must naturally limit its investigation of the contradictory phenomena, to the bare gaining of symbols, such as may fitly generalize the ideas now requisite, because sufficiently rendered abstract, of Motion and Rest: in so far, and solely, however, as these are regarded for outwardly-occurring. But Life is an inward apprehension; and *this* having once been kindled, it is inconceivable that it should not be recurred to, so as ever to perpetuate its own counter-mode of symbol.

And this is why subjective thought, by very rule of contrary, seems to demand, under metaphysics, the character for itself of dynamic mentalism, and science that of staticism; although under science, it is *it-self* which of specialty is dynamic, and religion the matter of fixedness. Subjectivity implies *motionless mind*:—to science a paradox in terms! To see motion with our reason, just as much as to see it with our eyes, it is needful to stand still.

And intensely does Mind, when it is subjective, stand still; while hence may it therefore, in naturalness, perceive the mental motion outside it, which otherwise it would want the means of perceiving.

But still, the power of its passing from one to the other mode, and thus causing the oscillation I speak of,—of so passing, that is, with the freedom which implies its being acted on, as the life-giving quality of mentalism,—rests altogether with the subtle facility I have imagined in the transposableness of the respective estimations of nature. By this, namely, do I suppose that it is always possible for metaphysical apprehension—in one moment to symbolize into life the deadest portions of nature;—in the very next, to fix the most vital,—to fix the whole region of life, into the *hortus siccus* of science!

### CHAPTER III.

ASSORTMENT WITH OBJECTIVITY: SUBJECTIVE "BODY AND MIND" CONSIDERED AS ANSWERED—HOW FAR, AND WHEREIN,—BY SCIENTIFIC "MATTER AND MOTION."

And yet still, the actual scheme of Nature adopted by the present mode of Science, no more deserves in fact to be held any longer as of the "*hortus-siccus*" kind that its old scheme did deserve to be held, than, according to my own belief, is my present Pantheistic view chargeable, in justice, with the "grossness" which I think *has* justly been chargeable upon heretofore modes of Pantheism. With my power of proving the latter of these assertions, precisely as in conjunction with the former, rests in truth the whole matter of my now obtaining that support from Science, for which throughout this chapter I shall be occupied in seeking.

It *can* be only the advance on either side, of this very nature, respectively, that will ripen the means for that future fellowship of Science and Religion, which I look to as the implier of every possible benefit from advance. So long as the two methods concerned, of outward and introspective observation, have adhered with rigidity to their different characteristics, this fellowship has continued impossible. And indeed there remains as an obstacle to it, that difficulty in reversing the old condition of hostility,

which is here in itself so formidable. By no means is the sort of approach that is necessary, for each to make towards the other, merely the simple movement of inclination, which might easily have been predicated; or even which may easily be understood, after it has actually occurred. It implies—I must once more urge,—that thorough re-moulding of characteristics for either, which must finally produce an assortment of these, such as will show them to have been previously often assorted transversely.

What I mean by the “grossness” of former Pantheism depends, in fact, solely upon this wrongfulness of position. It arises out of the effort to personify Nature, *without* regard to the self-position, which, by the argument of my last chapter, ought entirely to regulate any attempt at personification that can rightfully be persisted in. Under such regulation, namely,—and by means of the correction of natural self-delusion I have spoken of,—personification of Nature falls purely into that confessedly-symbolic or subjective form, which requires *only* the idea of Deity for its embodiment; and this, as the understood reflector of immediate condition in the observer of Nature. And to this embodiment there is, properly-speaking, no “body” at all. The whole of the representation concerned is that alone of the human “soul” or “selfism”; without any regard to the “body”, either of self or of nature, that goes in any way beyond the allowance for it as ministrant to existence of “soul”. And accordingly is my own sort of Pantheism only that sense of the “God everywhere” in Nature, which means simply the infusion of an universal Life into my thinking about Nature.—But, on the other hand, if Science would take up of specialty the Pantheism that does regard “body and soul” equally in nature,—as also, in objective treatment, are already the “body and soul” of ourselves important

equally,—I should consider that whatever of “grossness” lay with the embodiment, was “grossness” no longer. Some embodiment for a general view of things not Science can do without, any more than Introspection. The only offence that ought really to offend, lies, I am convinced, with a symbol that is out of place.—And, for an instance of such, I find no need of going farther than to Comte, and the suggestion made by him, of our holding Nature as a “fetish”: such symbol applied to Nature, as to my own thinking, being the most inapplicable that could be chosen,—the kind of combination to the utmost degree un-assorted.

But why?—Certainly, because the image contains a contradiction, that is of all others most inherently harmful; as causing our instincts that are our highest, to deny themselves. A “fetish” means an object of worship that is barbarous; and worship that is barbarous means, in every case, the self-degradation of professing honour to what is really beneath us. For a civilized man to be symbolled as honouring a “fetish”, the only true occasion would therefore surely be, that of desiring to express how he brutalizes himself:—while, manifestly, the direct contrary to this was in the intention of Comte.—But the whole of this incongruity, or of what is liable to be similar to it, in attempts at such generalization, is effectually shunned,—and, as I believe, *can* only be shunned,—by a just division of the involved points. Never must Mind look *up* to Body, as worship implies:—this is the one indispensable postulate:—but there may be, nevertheless, that due sorting of considerations, which will do right even to the corporeal view, as well as to the mental one.

And that is, as I have said, by the mode of estimation—upon-average, the result of which has been figured as the



two separate consequences, of our viewing of Nature falling as if under different focuses. I consider that a real legitimacy is given to the habit of Science to look *down* upon Nature, as from its station of highest Mentalism it does, just by this fact, that the focus of scientific view is *not* the truly-general view, subjectively estimated, which alone imparts Life-quality to Nature, of the kind that we can feelingly own to be such. And when it is considered what a focus-view means, this difference will at once be appreciated. When the sense of Life *is* in focus, is it not obvious that there must be a whole world of significance present, which vanishes the very instant we depart from the focus? Hence then must the method of subjectivity be that which it is, always to look as if *upwards* into Nature;—although merely for this, that while the mind lies thus, as it does, under the full light of Mentalism, it can only be dazzled, as it were, into quasi-forgetfulness of the corporeal side of Nature.—Nor is this in the least an assumption of superiority over Science: since the very fact of this dazzling involves the incapability produced, of all that accuracy and clear-sightedness which makes the merit of Science.

Indeed, as to this latter point,—of “superiority” to be either assumed, or admitted, between the respective views,—so changed is the case when once the idea of true fellowship is accepted, that precisely the method which is not under engagement, becomes now the one whose importance is likely to be enhanced. If the Idealism of Religion, namely, has the tendency which it has, through its natural accompaniment of over-deductive impulse, to carry us beyond the allotted limits of Science, which it is Science’s merit to regard; yet the very manner of this effect causes the strengthening companionship of the latter to be only the more needed. Nor do I believe it

possible, on the other hand, that to scientific thought should prove otherwise than desirable, the sort of Idealism now taken *as* Religion: appreciative as this kind of thought is, so incomparably more than the opposite kind, of the value that ever belongs to the gaining of abstract perceptions, such as respond in any way effectively with experience that demands them. And thus is it that I conceive to be enforced, towards final attainment, that true balance of mental powers to each one of us, which, only so far as it is attained, enables us—according to our several measures of ability,—to address ourselves with success towards the one great object, of Nature's comprehension, before all of us.

For let me again remind both myself and my readers, how more stringently than even before, when philosophy was in question, is it necessary, now science is concerned, to hold unevasively by personalism. It is only what I am able to make out of the showing of science, that religiously concerns me :—while this means, according to the special ground I am advocating, the mere presentation of science that personally I am able to set forth, of the kind that to myself appears justly to weigh against the contrary presentation, which I simultaneously hold of my religion.

By the form of modern science, which I am asserting to have transcended altogether the *hortus-siccus* fashion of science, I mean, of course, that doctrine of "Correlation of Forces", and of Matter's amenability, in sole, to varying "modes of Motion", which I suppose no one would question as by eminence making the actual glory of science. And yet it is acknowledged in full by the propounders of this great doctrine, that the science of it, truly attached to it, is yet in its infancy. In order, however, that it should avail as I would have it, the science needs to have ripened into that perfect form of generalism,—

parallel to the precocious form of Comatism,—which should display, not only the thorough adjustment of spheres for these several modes of Motion, but also their seriated combination. Serial composition *alone* is that which affords purport at once dynamic and religious :—all that I am now seeking, as the desirable “shifting arrangement” for Ideals, being merely, in fact, the mode of seriation felt rightful to them. But hence it is inevitable, that all my power of harmony with science depends solely on my belief, that to *it* also is destined, in time, the realization, of its own sort, of its own sort of seriation. And therefore, all that I have now means for, as to my own purpose, is the following : simply, to throw together, with as much order as I can, those considerations which, from my own point of view, seem to promise this final compatibility.

I will begin my attempt, then, by stating the peculiar points that appear to be such as further the assortment, of the nature intended ;—leaving till afterwards the general argument, as to how this assortment is calculated to maintain my own conception of religion.

#### POINTS THAT FACILITATE THE ASSORTMENT.

I. First must stand, manifestly, that fundamental support to my idea of the distinction between Science and Religion, which relates to the former’s peculiar treatment of its subjects *in parts*,—opposed, as I conceive, by Religion’s dealing with *wholes*. For while, on my own part, as to present object, I am expressly seeking out for Motion that Idealization which *shall* render it into an ideal whole,—as the Ideal next in order requiring to be realized as such, in order to the due filling-up of the metaphysic series ;—the magnificent scheming in which present science is engaged, tends altogether to show the nature of Motion in detail. What precisely distinguishes the treatment of

Motion, namely, by Mr. Grove and Dr. Tyndall, pre-eminently, from previous treatment, *is*, that by these modern investigators the dividedness of Motion-operations has been carried, in effect, into such excess of dividedness, that the phenomena implied evade all ability of sense-appreciation. And may I not say indeed, that here already is justified the truth of my assertion, that actual science is being caused to approach metaphysics,—however strictly it adheres, as unquestionably it does, to the proper characteristic of science? This being, to rest upon sense-foundation, in no way does the modern spirit of science depart from its limits, even when it trusts itself to *inference* upon this, instead of immediate sensibleness: seeing that the inference itself is solely based on the latter;—but, nevertheless, it must surely be allowed, that in treating of such merely thinkable objects, as are the infinitesimal atoms and molecules concerned, *is* to bring science into a degree of subjection to metaphysics.

By leaning on this single distinction, I seem truly to gain a fulcrum, on which the whole arrangement may perspicuously turn. For, by help of symbolism, it is as easy to think of particles of Motion, as of particles of Matter; and this is all that is wanted, as a true preparation for bringing the subjective image of “Soul in Nature”, into that accommodation with science’s peculiarity of method, which will finally clear up the restriction to be set upon the sphere of science. Ask for “particles of Soul”, and certainly they are to be had, as (*inter alia*) “thoughts”;—while abundantly are “thoughts” the distinctive things that, as such, are at least as capable of being individuated as are atoms and molecules. Moreover, so far as my own thinking is concerned, I am fully ready to admit, that all advance in our knowledge of the Soul is as much coincident with this practice of taking it

"in parts", as is that which mankind has obtained about Body. Knowledge of Body, even as this be meant for the immediate investment of Self, was begun as to its very crudest improvement on mere subjective acquaintance, by knowing it as a composition of members; nor was the properly-philosophized knowledge of it other than an increased result, of a similar kind. Philosophy worked here by, in the first place, extending the meaning of "Body" till it covered the universal investment of things; secondly, by the divesting it, for this purpose, of all subjective particularities to the precise degree which involved the finding convenient, for the future, to know Body only as bare "Matter";—while specifically the attribution that was found rightful to give true definition to this term, *was*, that "Matter" should be recognized as admitting of division to an extent considered infinite: the vagueness of this expression being, as I suppose, that which is at the present time only rendered more accurate, and not at all importantly altered otherwise, by molecular interpretation. Believing then, as I do, of the Soul, that *it* also is of the same noun-of-multitude character, for introspective reading, as Matter thus shows itself for scientific reading, this simple distribution arises to me:—while Science's view of things has for its formula, "*Matter moulded by Motion*": the formula must be held equally rightful to Introspection, of "*Motion moulded by Matter*."

A massed effect, such as this, brings incomparable means of facility. But there is also a consequence attending it, of a farther sort, which is of the highest importance, metaphysically (—I mean, as to my power of explaining to myself, in my own fashion, what has been propounded in an opposite fashion by men of science). And this relates to the carrying of the same "accommodation" into the sub-compartments of the topic of Motion.

Namely, into the understanding of what shall be held as to "modes of Motion": Heat, and others so named.

By assigning the purely noun-of-multitude character to Matter, it is plain that implication is made as to the ultimate particles of it, that each several one of these is endowed with whatever attributes, of "solidity" and the like, Matter in general has been attributed with. But to this appears now to be added the significant recognition, that the very fact of all these attributes being possessed by every particle in common, causes that any distinction amongst them can only lie with their manner of *relation*. To estimate duly *relation*, on the other hand, no means is present to us, except that mental assumption of characteristics, aggregated upon certain kinds of relation, which I count to be *focal* estimation. What follows, then, respecting those grouped relations of particles, which are now explained for "modes of Motion", can only be, that these are to be thought of as adding *nothing* to the particles besides "shifting relation":—"nothing" being meant in a sense that is absolute; or that would be so, if science did, or could, adhere to the static estimation proper to science: seeing that Motion is manifestly a nullity, when statically viewed. But with this ensues the corollary, so important for clear understanding, that the possible "modes of Motion", arbitrary as they are, are therefore innumerable. Or rather, they are *as* numerous as would be the amount of possible relations of particles, when into these the actual amount of particles first should be multiplied.—By so much does it appear that Motion-particles, *if* so accounted, must surpass in number Matter-particles:—surely a quasi-scientific sign of difference.

II. Next, let me note how the very nature of the division, thus defined,—by treatment in Whole, and in

parts,—shows a simple cause for the *discordancy*, as such, between Science and Metaphysics : accepted here as natural, and therefore never capable of entire removal; and yet as always capable of the amelioration which, at a certain point, turns the discordancy into proper matter of benefit. The whole of this discordancy to be accounted final, rests, I believe, with the mere fact of the restriction which this definition shows, by an immediate inference, to be inevitable to the nature of Science: so fitly to be seen yet as answered by the nature of the contrary method, when once the two methods are considered as present within the same mind,—which is my special condition,—that the very defect, matched as it is by a contrary defect, serves to clench the two methods together:—loosely, indeed, and freely; but, none the less, intimately.

If Metaphysics deals essentially with Wholes, its need of embracing *everything* is inevitable, however it be left us to allow for degrees of imperfectness, in its compassing of this. Never can a Whole be less than a Whole; though it *may* be, and *is*, more or less intensely estimated as such.—But Science, just because of its practicalness of treatment, not only *may*, but even by necessity *must* stop short, in any case, of estimating the full complement of details, needful for entireness;—while atoning, as it does, for the restriction it is subject to, by the accurateness wanting in the former case.

Let this idea, however, of adaptedness-by-contrariety only be concentrated, as I desire, into that of the clear outsideness of Science's station to what gives the true, or characteristic, focus to generalistic estimation: and radical explanation arises for that ignoring by Science of the chief object to Metaphysics, which makes the sole important difficulty;—and which is the less easy to be allowed for by metaphysicians, that to themselves the

doing of justice to scientific topics is as much enforced upon them by their own mode of thought, as the doing it to their peculiar topics. If Metaphysics, namely, fail to include regard to both sides of any subject, it is untrue to itself; but so far is this from being the case with Science, that the latter does best, does right, practically to hide from itself the side that is not its own.

III. In what way then has the amelioration proceeded?  
 —Always, I believe, *towards* the end now contemplated.  
 —And *this* point is best estimated on the metaphysic side. Namely, by watching the massed effect of progression, as shown upon Ideals.

I have noted how, when we start from the original crudity of attributing "Soul and Body" to Nature, the first step to be observed is the effect of scientific impulse towards detail which is represented by the rise of the conception of "Matter"; seeing that in no other way could be gained the attributes constituent of that conception, *than* by the particular sifting of natural phenomena. I have noted also, how, for all this, the present experience of philosophers in science is that of finding it best, in actuality, to drop all allusion whatever to attributes that are positive in their definition of "Matter"; taking, instead, the merely negative basis of definition, which signifies Matter's relation to Motion.—May I not well then assume for a fresh point, this:—The true means of ripening the Matter-symbol, is identical with that *direct* regard, henceforth required to be paid to the opposite of Matter, which implies the ripening also of Motion to be in Science's eyes no longer the "nothing" that it previously was, but in truth a most important "something",—equivalent, in fact, in importance, to itself?—That is, there has been a shifting of the mode of correlation, such



as first brings out the true meaning of correlation, as to that effect of mutually perfecting the members, which is henceforth to be known as the true office in the case. Originally, Matter was correlated, for the interim, with subjective Body; but its true respondent is, *that* in Nature which answers to subjective Soul: and that is, barely, Motion.

Here ensues, however, a suggestion as to what forms always the main difficulty,—of science's *limitation*, needed by instinct,—that seems a true lightening of it. Certainly, the shifting of the mode of the correlation, in the first instance, implied an unfitness in the primary mode, as to science's estimation; while the second shifting—in its aiming at a substitute for Soul, responsive to science's substitute for Body,—only doubled the distance from what had contented subjectivity: since, while appearing to restore the form to a parallelism with the original form, this was so different from a *real* parallelism, that the divergence of intention was only confirmed. The divergence lies with the fact, that while the crude Body-and-Soul image *does*, nevertheless, so fill up the whole complement of intention, as aptly to symbolize what itself has in view, there is a clear wrongfulness to the subject in asserting the same of the scientific symbol. And yet, although this is the inevitable judgment of instinct, science would fail in its own intention, if it might not be suffered to make the assertion: just because science's theory, *as* theory, depends as much on universalness as does the theory of subjectivity.—Hence, the conclusion I come to, and consider a helpful one, is simply the resource of compromise. I admit that in practice, while standing on its theory, it would be folly to ask of Science that direct acknowledgment of limitation to itself, which would be a virtual abrogation of its theory;—but,

none the less, do I require of Science to be conscious of its predicament. I would have the equivocation to be so open an expedient, adopted as inevitable, as that in future it might cordially be smiled over, by Science and Metaphysics together:—instead of any longer, as heretofore, quarrelled over.—And this is only a new statement of their need of coming into a state of friendly conflict together, and *thus* of settling spheres to each, which I am constantly insisting on, as the main sign of progression.

The equivocation imports, both that it is obligatory upon Motion—as the generalistic factor, required as much to be supplied on terms of “law”, as on contrary terms,—to include *mental* phenomena, ordinarily so classed, with physical, under range of Motion’s partition of sway with Matter; and that a contrary necessity is in force, severally attested, which forbids the inclusion.—As to Science, the need of stopping short, for Science, within its generally assigned limit of cerebral anatomy, seems proved to sufficiency by the fact of its losing itself here, again, in the same ground of mere-thinkableness, out of which, as to primitive molecules, it started.—As to Metaphysics, the same thing is determined in this way:—cerebral-fibre-motion, where Science’s interest in Motion vanishes, here, on the contrary, comprises the whole amount of Motion any where of consequence. Here, all other motion of particles ceases from import, save only as, in the end, having first run the series of lower modes of Motion, it abuts in the furnishing of basis for what subjectivity knows as Thought-motion,—unless, otherwise, as *E*-motion!

The truth that is evident about “God”, is evident also about “consciousness”. No more as to *this* idea, than as to *that*, is there possibility of its being treated in detail. So long as analysis is at work, the very substance of either is extinguished; ready as it is to re-produce itself,

the very instant Science leaves it alone.—Nor let the fitfulness—the flitting constancy,—of the phenomenon be ignored. Let it stand as the ground to Metaphysics of her own share in the need of equivocation :—that which, again, may both parties in common, not indeed smile over, but rather, in fitness, submit themselves under.

IV. The equivocation, as to Metaphysics' own aspect of it, is indeed represented, to a certain extent, with such faithfulness upon the symbol I have adopted, of star-phenomena, that I may help myself by it towards the next point that concerns me. Namely this :—the virtual homage that Science does pay to the insignium of Religion, even in its restriction apart from Religion, and without direct intention of rendering it.

When Metaphysics gives full sway to itself, independently of Science, I account that the view of things is that where the Introspective Ideal—conveying Egoship on one side to Self, on the other to the Universè,—influences thought with the overpowering habitualness, which is that of day-light. But that means in no way that other Ideals are extinguished. It means only that these, in their likeness to stars, are forced by the sunlight into temporary concealment.—When, on the other hand, Metaphysics gives right to Science, by suffering the Introspective Ideal to rank only as with other Ideals, a star amongst stars ; *this*, again, loses under concealment, as to obvious apprehension, the whole of that character of ruler, or regulator, of other Ideals, which makes its true nature. There is truly the compromise, of accepted night-time, as to which the resource for religionism is, that it is well to be slept under.—Nevertheless, on Science's part, (as already said,) this levelling of characters is the true means, as it is the only means, of that institution of a

scientific idea of rule and regulation of ideas in question, which forms, as I believe, a genuine equivalent to religiousness, proper to the case.

The eminent result to present Science, which has followed from the duly balancing, or averaging, the effects of the whole number of Ideals, taken as thus levelled, has been the pressing forward towards a doctrine of General Force, abiding throughout Nature. This accordingly it is which, *when* qualified by apposition with the latest-produced Ideal, as "Force of Evolution", I consider Science's effectual equivalent to Deity, in respect of regulating ability. Into the idea of Evolution have been moulded up the whole elements of thought which, under the different condition of earlier times, went to the creation of Time, Space, and Individuation, and of the variously-named and still-shifting correlates that followed. Nevertheless, Evolution is meaningless, except as accompanied by Force. And I conceive it is so, because this latter term is required to give the weight that otherwise is wanting, to the Ideals in the interest of Introspection. —Has it not long, namely, been recognized by philosophers, and of opposite sorts, that the sole pertinency in the idea of Force, *is* that which is furnished to it, by our conscious association of it with that Will-energy in ourselves, which is the very expression of Individuation? — Only, so far as I am aware, never yet has the Ideal of Individuation been counted as such.

It is true that I believe this effect of just balance will be better obtained,—only truly obtained,—when Evolution shall be subjected openly and avowedly, and no longer, as heretofore, covertly, to the requisite allowance:—this being identical with the assignment of respective provinces of Evolutionism, supported by Outer and Inner-Observingness. Only when the principle of Introspection is fully

treated on this level of rank with its opposite, testified by the mutual *owning* of Science and Religion by one another, do I suppose that the real desiderandum will be attained. —But still, even as it is, the idea of Evolution holds the contents needful for the parting.

By Evolutionism, I mean, according to my constant acknowledgment, the peculiar exposition of the doctrine which I have drawn from the works of Mr. Spencer. For the due *effect* of this doctrine, then, I mean the deductive impulse, which, as to all accepters of the great scheme of "Correlation of Forces", I infer must carry them, as it has carried myself, to assume, upon subjective instinct, the necessarily-*universal* application of what else, under scientific conditions, might rest for a time, sufficingly, with the merely *physical* application of the doctrine, to which its original expounders limited themselves. The general idea of the "Conservation of Force", which is the subjective side of the "Correlation of Forces" as particular "Forces", forms the very essence of the whole scheme of "First Principles" which Mr. Spencer has set himself to work out; and by the essential generalism of the latter, these would frustrate themselves if the Forces of which Correlation could be predicated were merely those which eminently the first propounder of the doctrine —Mr. Grove,—set forth as subject to it. Only when physical forces are taken as correlated with *vital* ones,—only when these again are taken as including *mental* ones,—does the generalism on which Mr. Spencer's scheme has based itself, and which therefore his scheme takes for granted, approve itself. —But, if so, his scheme requires to include—such is my own argument,—every effect of mental action which itself is attested for general. Human thought and human feeling, as to whatever is general in their manifestations, are the sharers, by eminence, in what

Mr. Spencer counts Evolution. Hence, therefore, do I conclude, that above all things is reference to *religious* action, and religious sense of Deity, essentially wrapt up in it.

So long as Matter-and-Motion remained unaccompanied by admission of Evolution, I see that all which owes itself purely to Introspection could only drop out of Science's calculation of Nature. But the instant these are backed by Evolution, is restored, effectively, that full complement of impression, which once more turns upon an adequate centre: the recognition of that mysterious fount of Nature's Energy, which Introspection names "God". And thus, I infer, does the Ideal of Evolution, *when* added, produce that combining efficiency, as to the effect of preceding Ideals, which first conditions regulation within the region of Metaphysics.

But, moreover, it does this in the very fashion after which has Religion, for itself, attained orderliness. I have stumbled just now,—or rather hinted a stumble,—between terms of "Force" or of "Forces":—but what is this, other than the very intimation of victorious Monotheism, over the lower range of superintending principles, which betrays, to sufficiency, the intrinsic religiousness of the doctrine in question? Heat-Force, Light-Force, and all other Forces up to conscious Will-Force, are compelled by modern science to blend themselves up into the One Force, as an Universal Force, of Continuity.—And certainly this is the result which is *due*, when Mind-Force, as now, exerts the sway that is rightful to it, over Matter-Force!

V. Here, however,—as the last point to be adduced,—is right given to what I have been throughout insisting on, as in fact the all-inclusive demand of subjectivity. That is, the sufferance of utter *elasticity* in the forms which are to be classified upon. For what is it that of

specialty gives condition to this scheme of Continuity, but precisely the interchangeableness of character amongst the particular Forces; enabling them in this way to own the control of a One Universal Image of Force?—But this, on the other side of consideration, is all that I am asking for, to be allowed as 'of Modes of Mind—representing always Modes of Motion.

I allude to my desire of naming the respective kinds of Mind-action (as such Modes,) by terms of "static and dynamic", on an especial understanding, co-inherent with the need of these names, of there being present, and habitual, the power of incessant alternation of the characters (see p. 151). When I compare with this demand the principle of Correlation, it seems to me indeed that I have only been pursuing for subjective classification what here has been gained for objective. By their reducing, namely, all definition of Matter into that which betokens appositeness with Motion, present Physicists have assumed, by rational necessity,—both that the *vis inertiae* of Matter forms merely the stock-condition of Matter, which as such implies the static *un-affection* by Motion, only to be thought of as phenomenally possible;—and that this stock-condition is experientially departed from, both incessantly, and with incessant variation: while to meet this latter occasion, they have allotted to Matter's original attribute the defining opposite of the *vis viva*. And by this they mean, that with regard to all existent forms of things is asserted a true *dynamic energy*,—or energy in action, in some way or other perceptible to us as such,—which rationally assort with the merely latent, or *potential energy*, that with it makes up the entire amount of natural force.\* As to the latent condition of energy, more-

\* See the article by Professor Tyndall on the *Constitution of the Universe* in the *Fortnightly Review*, xiv., Dec. 1st, 1865.

over, they have added this explanation: namely, that the reason why otherwise-perceptible forces here lose themselves to perception, and sink into the phenomenally negative form of *vis*, qualified as the *vis inertiae*, is, that they mutually cancel one another, or become set in *equilibrium*; from which it follows, that the very instant this static balance is in any way disturbed, there must of necessity be cast loose to apprehension some portion of imprisoned force, which forthwith assumes some form or other of *vis* positive. All this, however, involves of necessity the *flexibleness* of the constitution of forces,—the power, for instance, of Heat passing at any moment either into neutrality, or a character that calls for a different designation from Heat,—which surely requires manifestly to be answered, metaphysically, by a similar *flexibleness* in the whole plan of the mentalism by which designations at all have been given to the physical effects. None knows better than Physicists themselves, how great and entire is the change in mentalism, implied by the changed designations, which actually are now substituted for scientific terms of old.—To meet this demand, then, I have proffered what seems to me a true parallel to the case in physics: so far, at all events, as is concerned the alternation there between modes of *vis viva* and *vis inertiae*, with interpretation of stock-condition as “state of equilibrium”. It is true, the meaning of equilibrium must be shifted, under metaphysics, to a contrary character from its meaning under physics: importing now association with *vis viva*, and no longer with *vis inertiae*;—and hence, instead of the variations concerned being counted, as there, in the light of “departures from stock-condition”, the better view has appeared that of continued oscillation between *two* stations of equilibrium. But these differences admitted, as proper to the nature of metaphysics, my



whole idea seems justified.—Nor less, the terms I have used: since, to call the mood of mentalism a “static” mood, when set upon the scientific kind of balance, surely does bear relation due to the scientific stock of *vis inertiae*; and to call the contrary mood “dynamic”, answers certainly to that claim of seeing “Life and God” in Nature, which metaphysically is identical with perception of *Power* abiding there.

Nay, here seems to me in a manner explained—or, primarily illustrated,—the whole cause of offence, as that of equivocation, allowed between the two respective practices. Namely, upon that root-term of *vis inertiae*, which is Science’s own paradox. Just what “*vis*” is, qualified thus by what casts all real meaning out of it, is “Force”, in the sense in which Science takes it, destitute of reference to “God”. May not Metaphysics well suffer the paradox, then, by help of this reflection :—Ignoring Deity as “Force” does, yet, so happy is the term, that what it ignores actually, potentially it contains?

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But I have said that the consequence of this shifting of Mentalism, between moods of subjective *vis viva* and *vis inertiae*, is the same with the experienced difference of “immaterialism and materialism”. And so important is this identity, as concerns subjectivity, that I must glance over the means of exhibiting it,—manifold as are the considerations here crowded together.—In fact, the identity of the subjects has lately been illustrated, in a manner so inclusive of all that is now mainly in question with myself, by a controversy lately engaged in, that if I may be permitted to use this for my own purpose, the object is altogether facilitated to me.

I allude to the discussion following upon the discourse

by Professor Huxley, on the "Physical Basis of Life". Here,—if I may venture to say so,—seems to myself precisely to be set forth the need of "due assortment" of views, as alone the event that can ever do right to the whole amount of what is concerned. Holding, as I do, the position of "religionism", my own opposition to the balance of opinion which Mr. Huxley has personally determined on, is as decided as that of any other sort of religionist. Nevertheless, so rightful a matter is this of opposition, in my own eyes, when intrinsically supported,—I mean, by a common principle at foundation, such as I claim that there *is* in my own case, as compared with Mr. Huxley's,—that what I have really to find fault with, is only that he denies the occasion for such un-hostile opposition. His "materialism"—although it suits me as well to know it for such, as it does other religionists,—is "gross" to my view, *only* in refusing this assortment. On its own ground, on the contrary, it seems to me the very purest kind of materialism I have ever seen in expression;—just as Mr. Huxley's whole feeling in the matter seems the true exponent of exclusively-scientific interest. As the expounder of even "metaphysical science", he seems to me perfect;—but none the less failing in the true "metaphysics *of* science", resting *only* in due assortment.

Let me quote the following from him, as entirely corroborative, so far, of all I require (*Fortnightly Review*, xxvi., p. 145):—"In itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit; or the phenomena of spirit, in terms of matter; matter may be regarded as a form of thought, thought may be regarded as a property of matter—each statement has a certain relative truth. But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to

be preferred.”—The same paragraph, however, after a few words of explanation, finishes thus:—“whereas, the alternative, or spiritualistic, terminology is utterly barren, and leads to nothing but obscurity and confusion of ideas”:—followed by the judgment,—“Thus there can be little doubt that the further science advances the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of nature be represented by materialistic formulæ and symbols.”—And *this* is the conclusion against which my whole present work is a protest!

The real answer to this, however, is the very attempt which I shall presently enter on: that of showing what I believe *due* to a spiritualistic formula, such as nevertheless *shall* be based on Mr. Huxley’s own principles. And therefore, waiving this, I will confine myself here to the merely dogmatic ground of difference.

The point of “dogmatism” which separates my own opposition to Mr. Huxley from that of the orthodox kind, lies with my throwing the whole subject under the typical arrangement of Ideals: in this way, as I consider, gaining a force of argument which otherwise is quite wanting. —What constitutes the sum of offence in Mr. Huxley’s exclusivism, is, that it purports to be capable of including the sphere of Consciousness. By my plan, however, of concentrating the whole matter of Consciousness upon that of only *Self-Consciousness*, I submit that a totally new ground appears for the exception claimed from science. For surely it is inconceivable that Selfism, as such, should be otherwise cognizable than by a purely reflective effort of cognition. To suppose it capable of objective analysis, appears to me exactly as self-evidently impossible, as it is that, in physical vision, there should be made the object of sight the very eye that sees. So exclusively can I think of Self-Consciousness only as the *instrumenta-*

tion to us of analytic observation :—and thence as furnishing the very ground for that pure mentalism, attached to scientific effort, the recognition of which, so clearly made by Mr. Huxley, causes him to eschew for himself the name of “materialist”.—The only part of Selfism which Science has access to, I count as “Individuation”: the Ideal which, as to Science’s “night-aspect” of Ideals, I consider to range, on level terms with Time and Space, as showing conditions, under which our universal thinking requires to regulate itself. But what is signified by Individuation is incomparably small, set against what is comprised by the very same matter upon its other side, open only to Introspection. And therefore, truly, would I assume the latter—the proper fact of conscious Selfism,—for the source of an entire systematic view of things, borne always in distinctive reference to itself.

Let me be allowed to recapitulate my idea of development in human schemings, actually leading towards this dualism :—as under the alleged “points of assortment”; and always as following upon what I account the “natural occasion of metaphysics”.

My foundation proceeded upon, let it be remembered, is, the necessity to metaphysical generalizations that if they *be* such, they must include “everything”: in, at least, intention. For this gives me, immediately, the character for all *failure* in philosophy, that the “everything” intended, shall really be represented in a more or less inadequate fashion.—Let only be added, however, attention to the needed “oppositeness of stand-point”, in all cases of philosophy, and at once is my hypothesis of explanation expressed :—both as to *why* all philosophy had the subjective beginning which it did have, and without which present philosophy would lose its whole ground

to work upon ;—and *why*, moreover, the continuousness of the opposite modes of philosophy, must be sustained as I imagine.

Subjective philosophy, I have considered, is that which it is, *upward-looking*, because under it the intellect engaged is of the lower sort, *as* intellect, which is concretely loaded :—is not here then a reason sufficient in itself, for this being the kind of philosophy which alone could *begin* the course of philosophy's development, with its comparative rudeness, while unsupported by objectivity?—And the sign of this fact is, that in pristine cosmogonies, the mere *local* fulfilment of what ought to be universal presentation, fails in the manner of a total ignoring of Matter-considerations. Nothing amidst these seemed originally deserving, in the least, of Idealization :—not until that epoch of mid-way philosophy, when first the World, in thoroughly subjective fashion, was symbolled for the purpose. *That*, on the contrary, which did seem deserving of such effort,—which, according to my conception, had in it the true impelling force upon human thought, even incipiently such, which of necessity drove it to Idealization,—was precisely that deepest-set feeling of all others within us, which belongs to our central individualism :—that natural repugnance to obstruction of Selfism, in the true “rounding-off” of the personality allotted to Self, which is known by us commonly as our fear of Death.—And here is there not, truly, an obvious source of permanence to subjectivity !

Hence worship of ancestors, to begin with ; and generally of all that Past of existence which has attained, in some way or other, to surmount the Death-obstruction :—*this* being the peculiar mode of idealization which from the first had it in it to approve itself, finally, the right-fully introspective mode :—namely, when once the start-

ing embodiment of Death had been fully, or monotheistically, answered by that of Deity.—But *with* this latter event,—making the true origin of Religion,—I consider begins also the true occasion of worldly or “bodily” things rising into idealistic importance. That is, through the character of the *minor* agencies, which here come in question. While the fetish-form of Death was in the ascendant, the subordinate modes of Self-Obstruction calling for attention, and hence to be successively raised into entities, as ministers of Death, were—if not diseases, which were the *internal* terrifiers,—the *physical* disturbances of storms, earthquakes, &c. Once, however, the ideal of Deity asserted in true counterpoise to that of Death, it was inevitable that the creation of entities thus entered on should repeat itself on phenomena of the beneficent kind, in ordered antagonism to the terrific kind. Not otherwise, but thus most naturally, does it seem that homage might at all begin to be paid to the concrete side of Nature:—the naturalness, indeed, being attested by that fact of our own experience which is so notoriously such, that never are we taught, in actuality, to know the real value of ordinary things, which *are* the mainly beneficent things, till danger of losing them *has* first been encountered, and then overcome.—Long after Ouranos, therefore, and never before him, must Terra have been added for worship;—while in far greater degree, again, must both of them have been anticipated by Chronos.

But here is true preparation, not only for that rise of Science which is built on attention to physical things, but, as I contend, for that conflict between this and Religion, which admits only of the compromise in question, and only when Religion is estimated *as* Metaphysics. The root-cause of Science’s difference from the latter, being its externalism;—while yet, in reality, externalism and in-

ternalism are inevitably bound together by our own Individualism:—it cannot be, I contend, in the nature of things, that any degree of separation of character between the two,—notwithstanding their diverging, as they must, ever farther and farther from one another,—should ever sunder them absolutely;—nor, any more, should end in one of them absorbing the other: *this* being forbidden by the very same set of facts which obliges us to class “body” apart from “soul”.—Hence, although at first it was inevitable that for a time the “World” and “God” *should* appear as apart from one another,—this necessity remaining through the entire duration of Christianity,—the present resumption of a *true* Metaphysics involves for its very basis, the essential connectedness, and with it interdependence, of the secular and spiritualized aspects which those terms idealize.

What “God” means, *besides* “Individuation”,—over and above that which Science *can* deal with,—thus lies parted by this scheme, between, on the one hand, our mastering and exultant feeling of Self-Consciousness; on the other, our humbling and tremendous sense of Death-limitation.—Is not this, I would ask, a sufficient reason why the Ideal of Deity is not fairly answered for, by Science’s reduction of it into that of bare “Force”?

I have no slightest idea, nevertheless, of interfering by this division with that principle of the “relativity of all knowledge”, on the strength of which Mr. Huxley disclaims for himself the name of “materialist”, as in opposition to “immaterialism”. That principle of “relativity” seems to me as if it might well henceforth be laid aside and done with, as to discussion, just from its irrefragableness. Accepting it to the full, I so perfectly rely on it, that the distinction to which I would henceforth refer by

these convenient *isms*, is merely the different sides of our subjectivity concerned by them :—the subjectivity of sense-impression for “materialism” ; that of pure reflection for its opposite.

When each of these distinctive modes is hung upon its own kind of balance, fairly and lightly ; only preponderating towards, and by no means exclusively fixed by, the mood in which the thinker’s general inclinations are hung on balance ;—and with freedom, therefore, for the alternating departures required, from this “stock-condition” into contrary mode :—I conceive there is the true means for *harmony* between the scientifically-favoured mode and the religiously-favoured ; while the harmony is still that which calls for terms that shall mark the distinctiveness. And no terms seem likely to be invented that shall be better than these.

The very meaning of the root-term of “matter”, shifts anew by this perfect admission of relativity ; taken also as coincident, in the way that it is, with the idealization of Force.—This Ideal, in fact, appears by its attainment expressly to mark how entirely Science’s progress, through all its changeful terminology, has been as much directed *towards* the division as the foregoing kind of progress, though arrested from attaining it : that is, towards giving the full equality to the Ideals of Matter and Motion, which admits of the play of balance between them, represented by the formulas I have suggested (p. 205). For the addition of Force to these, is altogether in the interest of Motion. Motion-*plus*-Force becomes truly the metaphysic stuff and substance, identical with metaphysic truth and reality, as to which forms of Matter are only the varying conditions, which contrarily are exhibited by modes of Motion, acting on Matter. And Motion-*plus*-Force is immediately converted into Mentalism : causing



the term of Motion to be interchangeable at pleasure with Mind, Soul, or Spirit, according to the occasion ;—while hence the whole portion of Force-substance lying beneath Mentalism, in the series of modes of Motion, is thrown into the character of background, specifically as *not*-forceful. And that is, it appears for “material”.

The very definition of Matter thus becomes again needful of change, for the purpose of subjectivity: namely, into the form which shall reduce its whole attribution into simply this, that it means “whatever conveys to us sense of *Passivity*”. For thus are the two things allowed for, that are necessary. There is made the due implication of appeal to subjective impression, which is the first essential; and also there is furnished the elastic mobility of the relational term “*Passivity*”, instead of the positiveness of “*Rest*”, hitherto qualifying Matter, which makes room for the dynamic attribute of *Activity*, to be taken as the parallel distinguisher of Motion.

And is not this the definition of Matter which habitually we act on? Let it happen, for instance, that I fall under sway of an intellect, keener and stronger than my own: is it not plainly the feeling of the case, that my act of discipleship, to the very same extent that it thus reduces my intellect's activity, also materializes me? Let even the case be that of a much lower order of circumstance:—let it be only a violent wind that over-masters me, and carries me off my feet before it:—still the event is surely this, that the *vis inertiae* attending it lies only with me, and the *vis viva* of the case with that which is active in regard to me.—And here, upon my own plan, is the reason for it. The very fact of the impression made, to excess, on certain parts of my nature, neutralizes for the moment that which ought to have been my response

to it, under just poise of my selfism; and this neutralization, again, lowers the general aggregate of my sensations, down to the experience of being mastered:—while only needs the natural energy of my selfism, and hence its natural posture, to be resumed, and anew it is possible to me to become, either the active affecter of the mind that affected me, or that which forces the wind into inertness, in respect of me.

Nay, the very phrase which runs so glibly off our lips, when we cry “what is the matter?”—even this bears subtle relation to what is the whole intention—the whole spirit—of the definition, thus elastically ordered. That which disturbs us, and gives rise to the cry, is a somewhat that needs, or may need, the being acted on! And what other meaning than this either has regulated, or ever ought to regulate, the parting out of the Universe?—while thus is not the perfect metaphysics of the usage made evident?

But a yet more subtle, a yet more efficacious, exhibition of true metaphysicalness, lies with this: the *causative* relation, properly such, which this mode of definition renders apparent. If subjective feeling rest on balance,—while the very meaning of balance is, that every preponderance on one side *enforces* subsequent preponderance on the other side,—the taking thus of subjective feeling to regulate our views of material continuity itself, implies that aspect of universalness to our idea of Causation, which in a manner over-rules science’s resistance to the idea, even upon that ground of its own, where the resistance has hitherto been so well justified.—I mean, that the heretofore merely-static idea of Causation, accepted by science, as that of “invariable sequence”, is shown to be universally reducible into that dynamic idea of “prepared

states of condition", which developmentalism gives as the true import of Causation.

I have gathered it for my conclusion, that the true evidence of *realism*, properly to be accounted such, lies always in Continuity ;—while to this I am striving to add the farther result, that the *manner* of Continuity, in all cases where mental estimation avails to us more than sense-estimation, is that of which we gain cognizance only by means of a continuous oscillation between opposite states of our own mentalism. This, however, being known as the product of circumstance, it is inevitable that circumstance, down to the very lowest point of its creative capability, must be credited with a certain class-variation in its own realistic nature, corresponding to the experience. But hence appears the transverse image of "preparatory condition", which, represented in mass, is the following :—"Whatever it be in the absolute state of things which has given rise to, or cause for, Motion, must, at all events, have been of the nature of Rest ; whatever has given cause for Rest, must have been of the nature of Motion."—And thus becomes infused into our general idea of Nature, a principle of eternal self-balance :—a principle which, as it certainly has nothing unworthy in it, to forbid such application made of it, so has nothing which is not manifestly fraught with dynamic influence.

Let me, however, try the question on experience. Is it indeed possible, by any strain of effort, to think either of Matter or of Motion, *without* recurrence, almost instantaneously, to its opposite ? Let me experiment first with the former.

Well, for a single instant, this does seem possible. Frightful as the imagination is, yet I fancy that I *can* paint a universe which has nothing in it but stillness :—

an eternal and dense immoveability.—Having done so, however, what is sure to befall me, the very moment afterwards, is only the rushing back upon me of an intense flood of self-consciousness! And what is this but a restoring of the balance without which reason is as incapable of treating the Whole of things, as it is of treating any particular kind of things:—that is, without which reason is a nullity?—In order to attain such image of cosmical deadness, thought was compelled to drain away from the outer world, and thence to absorb into itself, the whole share of lifefulness which rightfully it acknowledges to the former. But to hold the condition permanently, is simply what nature denies us.

How, then, as to Motion without Matter?—There is, indeed, but one way in which this can barely be shadowed. And that is, the following. First, Motion must be exclusively limited to the higher kind of Motion: to thought-Motion;—and secondly, the “Mind” which thus rises into conception, must be, again, to such extent liberated from the conditions of thought-embodiment, elsewhere indispensable, that it must be conceived of as *Divine Mind*. Thus attributed, I agree, there seems again a momentary possibility, in this case of Motion also, of our conceiving an unique occupation of the universe.—But, the moment past, and so equally unnatural, equally untenable, is this position with the former, that the very Solitude of Life occurs to us as identical with Deadness.—Pure Light is as black as sheer Darkness:—our seeing it is the same thing with Blindness.—And abundantly is this testified by Theology. God as pure Spirit, is no God at all to men; but as purely a *Vis Inertiæ* as that which we make our attribute of Matter. Any way, but some way, this idea has been found necessary to break up itself as one that should avail men.—Perhaps, by God’s falling

to pieces, as it were, in the act of world-creation :—this is the Brahminical way.—Perhaps, by His dividing of Himself into parts, that still are Divine parts :—this is the Christian way.—But, some way or other, the idea *must* be broken in upon !

And here occurs to me how similar is the dilemma of philosophy, naturally besetting it, to that of religion, such as I have before regarded it, in my first volume (p. 267). There, I have considered how sense of God can only be retained by us, fruitfully, through admission into the contemplation, of fellow-beings, as sharers with us in the sense. And now, I bethink myself how the same remedy, in fact, is the *only* remedy that serves, whenever philosophy falls into the morbidness to which itself is incident ; and precisely, it appears to me, as the effect of strained endeavour at this very condition of one-sidedness, unnatural as it actually is. I refer to the philosophic insanity, as I can only regard it, which goes by the name of Berkeley :—the “ Idealism ” which believes that Matter can be held constantly interpreted by Spirit. Such disease as this, it seems to me, is indeed that which is likely to befall the thinker, peculiarly such, who, for that reason, is liable to be the man whose intense power of abstraction, with small habit of going out of himself by the means of the affections, causes him habitually to isolate himself from fellow beings. To such person it is only natural that his entire surrounding should be firmly believed in for merely a mirage of his intellect-desert. But whatever cure be possible for him, if any,—has it not been proved so ?—must lie with his resource to human communion. Let him only take in hand a pupil, or enter into dispute with an antagonist, and his dream-region instantly vanishes :—while, *a fortiori*, does his true return to mental health,

for constancy, depend on his receiving help, in sufficiency, of the affective sort. By what conceivability could a mother be made to doubt of the realism, and real apartness from herself, of her child, or a husband of that of his wife!

In fact, when the ruinous self-consistency of Berkeleyianism is viewed in this way, it seems to me to afford the very help to genuine philosophy which is parallel to that of pathology in medical physics. That is, it becomes, in argumentation, the sheer *argumentum ad absurdum*, which may rightfully be enforced against one-sidedness, if it resist the direct argument.—And, as to the contrary sort of “Idealism” and one-sidedness,—that which makes Spirit solely interpretable by Matter:—will Professor Huxley guarantee that if *this* ideal of philosophy should realize itself, even as much as the other has done, in practical belief, the same need of pathological treatment will not equally befall it?—such interpretation affecting as it does, specifically, our whole class of emotive ideas; nor only this, but so extensively also our moral ones!

Let me however sum up the direct argument, as that which is clear enough, and every way sufficient, in itself.

Grant that our universal knowledge of things is only a regulated expression for the effect upon ourselves of different “forces”, attributable to Nature;—and thus, that our entire field of experiences, intuitional included, is reduced to one level of mere “seeming”:—out of this very levelling there arises—both the obviation of whatever was the invidiousness before, in the assertion of “reality” here, contrasted with “un-reality” there,—and the new test of realism which has intrinsic efficiency: that of contrasting and comparing the different kinds of “seeming” which severally the sense-impressionable, and the reflectively-impressionable sides of our mentalism, are capa-

ble of giving account of.—For by this throwing of the whole sweep of Nature under the common regulation of subjectivity, and hence giving the due share of importance to subjectivity, the full range of emotive considerations—honoured as these are *by* subjectivity, though mainly ignored under Matter-and-Motion regulation,—is added to give “body”, effectively such, to the “seeming”, whose thinness, under mere intellectualism, was indeed such as might well scare all lifefulness away from our thinking of Nature.

So long as our belief in “relativity”, namely, was merely partial, we had reason to make difficulty about it; but now, it falls to be simply the “general state of things”. And when this includes, as it does, whatever gives *happiness* to us, what more of solidity can we ask for?

Grant that our very idea of Deity *does* no more represent the abstract truth of things, than our sense of form and colour:—still, there remains in force this certain difference between the two impressions, which is indeed the whole of what signifies to us: namely, that whereas, by experience, form and colour have no special connection with our happiness; our gaining knowledge of God, through its implication with human relationships, and especially those of family, most immediately so connects itself. And what degree of theorizing, *however* it reduce domestic happiness into one level with intellectual experiences, can take the felt tangibility out of the former? If indeed domestic living, with domestic needs for exertion, *be* but “mere seeming”, I can conceive of nothing more actually real, or more desirable of being real, to mankind!

The need, so long held on to, of dogmatic insistency on recognition of “relativity”, had meaning originally in the now quite unnecessary separation, then sought for, between *human* knowledge and *Divine*. But distinction like this

being now meaningless,—and thence, I infer, the question of relativity, *as* questionable, settled and done with;—may it not well give way, in favour of the *new* effort of distinction, which shall be that of dividing, or classifying, simply the different *kinds* of knowledge, with their relative degrees of possibility to us?—From this, however, follows the notable re-arrangement of old assumption, involved in the present conception, which is of this no slight importance: namely, that while the intuitional kinds are still, and even more than before, to be classed as the *surest* kinds of knowledge; their reason for being so is precisely their *distance from*, and not their *nearness to*, the sort of reality which is ordinarily thought of for such: that is, sense-appreciated reality,—the really most fitting sort of reality.

And hence my appeal *ad scientiam*.—The perfect admission, by such men of science as Mr. Huxley, of this general relativity, disposes, with unprecedented gain to science, of what may be considered the “subjective idols” of science, hitherto counted as such, because hitherto worshipped *for* such;—and as to the whole class of them. That is: not only are the “idols” which heretofore have subtended conceptions of Heat, Light, &c., banished as such; but these are banished in ordered connection with the banishment of the whole category of scientific “idols”. Just as much, namely, is “Matter” in the abstract a mere thought, as is “Motion” in the abstract: what men of science are really intending by these, being merely an uncountable number of molecules, falling into a still more uncountable number of positions. Still beyond this, moreover, they remember, when driven to it, that as exclusively mental, after all, is the abstract image of a molecule, taken in single, as that of any compounded



mass of molecules. So infinite is the divisibility of the image of Matter, into always its severally realistic and imaginary sides, however minute be the fraction that is thought of!—so necessary is it to the image to have always relation, on one of these sides to our sense-supported judgment, on the other to our subjective reasoning! —But if so, with Science's own terms, why not the same with those which are special to Subjectivity?

Certainly, not in the least does Mr. Grove, or Mr. Tyndall, or any other scientific Iconoclast, cease, for his being such, to employ the very phrases, now shelled of their entities. Which of them shuns to speak as much as ever, of "Heat", for instance, "effecting" this or that; notwithstanding their having abolished altogether the idea of such agent, imponderable or otherwise? "Nothing" as Heat has become to them, in a scientific sense, yet none the less is that which *was* Heat as much a true noun-creator of "Heat-effects" as ever it was. Utility in the use of the language, maintains all that justifies the prosecuted embodiment. —Why then may I not do the same with the term of Deity, as to the eminently more important class of effects, which is that of "moral effects?"

And now let me show how this subjective limitation, *as* admitted in the proper subjective department, answers for present purpose. That is, how I imagine that the *belief* in Deity becomes realistic, in quality of utility, and even in a scientific sense of realism, just in proportion as the actual *image* of Deity is humbly and accurately owned for non-realistic.

#### GENERAL BEARING OF THE ASSORTMENT.

What is, then, the scheming-forth of Nature which is to answer the manifold conditions, seen to be called for?

—These, let me recapitulate, are :—the fairly averaging whatever in natural circumstance affects the subjective point-of-view ; as in counterpart to the contrary average, befitting the objective station ;—the doing so, with full justice paid to the thought-image of Deity, which, *for* subjectivity, generalizes the whole best experience of Selfism ;—and the doing so, moreover, in the way that shall satisfy the scientific practice of Idealism : *this* meaning, the showing how it is truly *as* possible, while *more* than as important, to read Nature by the light of Individuation, as it is to read her by that of the fellow-idealizations which are those of Time and Space.

When Nature is studied with specific reference to Time, we classify the fruit of it as *History*. And so, when the reference is mainly to Space, does the fruit appear, under present view, as to be counted the strict staticism of *Science*. If, therefore, Individuation *be* assumable for what I assume it,—as to its representation, on parallel terms with these, of whatever concerns subjectivity,—there *ought* to be some distinctive mode of apprehension attached to it, on a similar level with History and Science :—waiting only to be set forth with fitting terminology, duly to take its place with these.—Hence, my problem lies entirely with the seeking of such.

And singularly do I find myself again, with this object, on the track of old Ontology ; linked to it here, more than ever, by its characteristic doctrine of “essences” !—For what *is* the subjective side of Being,—now in question as the part of Individuation alone affecting Introspection,—*when* concentrated, as I would have it, on solely our consciousness of Selfism, *except* the very “essence” of our whole experience of consciousness ?—But, also, is my variance as important as ever : resting, as this does, always in my forbearance to compare human Selfism

with what seems only polluted and falsified by such comparison. While, namely, ontologists took the conception of "essential Being", in the mass, as under the concrete embodiment of personalized Deity; thus preventing the human knowledge of it from power of falling "into parts", as human knowledge requires to do:—my own conception, of the merely gaining thus of a purely "abstract idea of Being", is that which permits, and surely requires, the whole ordinary procedure in such cases to be carried out with respect to it.

I would treat the Unity of Being, symbolled by this abstract image, precisely, in fact, as men of science are dealing with Motion. I would divide it into "modes of Being". That is, in the subjective sense of Being: totally apart from, even although integrally connected with, those outwardly-cognizable "forms of Being", which it is the province of Science to classify. Such "modes of Being", when our actual Self-consciousness is taken, as here it is taken, for itself the sole key to Nature's interpretation, are constituted, of necessity, by their character of precursors to Self-Consciousness:—by the fact of their forming certain stages along that line of natural development, which precisely abuts in the possession, by human faculties, of this key of interpretation. They are, in chief, what are known to us for the class-attributes of Sentientcy and Life;—though in reality as numerous, as infinitely-divisible, as are the possible divisions to our apprehension of Motion:—seeing that every case whatever of co-ordinate experience, that only is such, furnishes condition that gives right to the term; and, by development-principle, these cases may be sought in the earliest conceivable state of things, long anterior to life-condition, actualized.

And perilous as it seems, for rational trust, to throw back subjectivity on a course like this, yet neither has

instinct nor science any thing that lies really against it! No profession is made to comprehend what Self-Consciousness is, by taking it thus to help comprehension of its precursors. Itself, *because* of its being made to unlock the lower order of Nature's mysteries, is allowed for that mystery of mysteries, which transcends all power of interpretation. It is taken as the primary *fact*, unique in the universe, as to its nature, which thence is simply incapable of being gainsayed.—And, as to science, it is specially in this sphere, of lower modes of Being than our own, that science is ready with aid. It lays out abundantly its own kind of inferences about these; and cannot object to have them set in check by whatever may be furnished of subjective analogy—provided this be done with sufficient conformity to the method of science.—Let me therefore pursue my endeavour at this.

Two principles, at all events, seem to me such as fulfil this character, and therein to meet my whole demand:—the one, of a sort that is thoroughly established; the other, of a subtleness that indeed makes it difficult in any way to lay hold of, but still that appears undeniable.

The first is, the principle that all whatever that is *felt* by us, as well as all that is *known* by us, is so through *limitation*. By it, I mean the fact that, from the very lowest of experiences, up to the crowning one of Self-Consciousness, one and all of them are demonstrated, in philosophy, to owe themselves solely to the *restriction* upon the actual degree of such experience, which is enforced by environment.—And is not this, in itself, I cannot help remembering, a sufficient argument against the attribution of true personality to Deity?

The second, is the wondrous effect which appears to spring forth at intervals, in general progress, from simple

*accumulation*:—*accumulation*, whether of particles of matter, or particles of motion. From nothing else than this, there appears to take place, occasionally, what ranks on every occasion as a true miraculous birth, so to speak, of experience. *That*, namely, arrives, which has nothing existent previous to it, capable of accounting for it.—Hence, my chief appeal to science—about to be made out—grounds itself here.—Granting this effect as a fact, which, however exceptional, still is a fact; the question is, does not the exceptionalism of Consciousness hereby become rendered only upon a level with a class of events, such as in truth, for possibility of occurrence, pervade our entirety of experience, both actual and imaginable? May we not feel, namely, that as Consciousness stands, in mass, as the effect of accumulated Sentiency;—and Sentiency as that of accumulated Life, barely such;—while Life, again, forms but the consequence of accumulated Motion, as barely internalized Motion:—so it must needs be conceived of the entire Universe, that everywhere it is pervaded by the potentiality of Consciousness, ready to present itself whenever there are conditions for it?

If so, however, to this extent must the Ontology of old be justified. On the one hand, there is shown a true “final purpose” in Nature, fairly to be symbolized as such, bearing always *towards* this culmination in Consciousness:—rendering our Ideal of the One Force in Nature always known to us mainly *as* precisely the Source of *our* Personalism, however wanting in Itself of Personality;—so that hence we have no other expression for the fact *than* to say that our Being is rooted in God’s Being.—On the other hand, there seems hinted a true explanation of that *spontaneity*, which metaphysic instinct has ever insisted on abiding by, although in constant despite of science.

I have already stated my conception, that what gives cause to the subjective feeling of freedom, termed metaphysically "Free Will", is really the lawlessness of comparative unorganization: attached characteristically, as is presumable, to that department of our mentalism which, although tending towards the fixed state in which mental action is automatic, because regulated determinately, yet remains for the present only *in the act* of being so organized, and automatically fixed; and which is therefore of specific interest to subjectivity (see Vol. i., p. 389). But what I have now farther in view is, the intensified effect of this phenomenal lawlessness, which of necessity attends each several instance of it, when regarded directly under the concentrated light of the metaphysical aspect of Selfism. To every individual thought and feeling, whatever it be, that springs up within us for the first time, the very fact of the consciousness accompanying it causes that the description is true of its being literally a "new birth" of experience—a *fresh creation*, a *species*, in itself, that never had existence before. But when the concentrated consciousness of Self-combination is, by reflection, made directly the point of attention, it is evident, that even old thoughts and feelings acquire a tone of distinctiveness, such as brings the whole mass of mentalism together into the same condition, of absolute newness. For is it not manifest, that every Self-combination that exists, is therein what never existed before?

If so, however, I conceive that *a* meaning is present, if not the *old* meaning, which as much as ever requires the term of "spontaneity" to be retained; desirous as Mr. Huxley is to discard it. What I am here supposing,—as the state of mentalism which, to clear Introspection, can only show as bristling and quivering all through, with incessant up-springings of newness,—surely is *not* so un-

aptly to be thought of, as metaphysicians have been wont to think of it, for a state purely of unchained Volition! —Let physicists tell, if they can, the amount of newness which must go to every single conscious act that is thus involved with the total re-modification of Selfism, through every portion of Selfism; and by how much it exceeds—as it surely must exceed,—that which occurs under volumes and volumes of changes in lower kinds of force-manufacture!

But let me represent the argument by means of Mr. Huxley's own illustration. In the case of "water", he fully allows for the effect of novelty, resulting merely from combination, and co-ordination. He points out, most effectively, how that which belongs, as character, to water, is totally different to any thing possessed by the oxygen and hydrogen which are the constituents of water; only, instead of resting, as I am here aiming to do, upon the novelty's association with combination, *as* combination, he still perseveres in supposing the effect amenable to *analysis*. He hopes and trusts, that at some future time, by the advance of molecular physics, men of science may be able to see their way clearly "from the constituents of water to the properties of water"; nor only this, but that they may even do the same with the very "matter of life". And, as to water, he hopes to do this without need of assuming "a something called 'aquosity'," entering into the water; just as in regard to conscious mentalism, he eschews the "something" named "spontaneity".—But may I presume here to appeal to Mr. Huxley's own metaphysicalness, as against himself? How can he compare things on such different plans of conception as are "constituents" and "properties", so as to image passage between them? Sheer science may think of "constituents", but surely metaphysic science knows

*only* of "properties". Oxygen + hydrogen properties pass, when the case is that of oxygen  $\times$  hydrogen, into water-properties:—and this is all that can be said about them! All along the whole course of development\* there can only, to metaphysic contemplation, be a continuous series *from* properties *to* properties.—But this being allowed, a free course is left for that course of interpretation, for subjectivity to follow, in which "aquosity" is actually the true and needful term for expressing the to-be-imagined self-experience of water:—just as I protest that "spontaneity" is needful to express the characteristic experience that attaches to human subjectivity.

And "spontaneity", as well as "aquosity",† has indeed, in this usage, a side to it which is proportionately open to science, in the same way that Selfism has its scientific aspect of Individuation. That is, there is attached to the first of these terms, to science's experience, what science recognizes as the constant implier of transformations occurring, in the excessive plasticity of nerve-substance.

Let me then try for the backward glance through developing Nature, which shall admit of subjective sympathy, considered as transfused along the particular course of development alone of concern to subjectivity. These three things seem necessary to it:—first, that I show what such quasi-sympathy may actually lay hold of, *as* afforded by the just alleged principles of "limitation and accumulation";—next, that I should point to some possibility of

\* This manner of judging the subject also disposes obviously of the case of the watch, offered as in argument by Professor Huxley; since all possible reference to selfism is forbidden when a winder-up is in question.

† In fact, however, the term of "aquosity" responds to the general sense of "humanness"; while the sub-term of "spontaneity" is better answered by "fluidity".



expression for the facts relied on, in terms of "modes of Motion";—and finally, that I should show the bearing of the whole on my own conception of religion.

If we remember that the very meaning of *organism* is, that there is afforded by it a system of internalism, ever in conflict with a surrounding system of generally-opposed character to itself, it seems obvious that the purport of organization *must* be precisely that which the two terms in question, combined, give expression to. Every organism, namely, *must* be describable as an "accumulation" of effects of "limitation";—the rank of the organism being also expressible always by the amount of such accumulation. Well then, the point for subjectivity to rest upon, is surely determined hence as that which may safely be referred, in every case, to an internal impression of *contrast*, lying to the subject between its sense of struggle with environment, occasioned by its limitation, and the stock-condition of inner development, which fills up to it the intervals of struggle. The more heightened, and the more numerous the contrasts of experience, the greater—*this*, at all events, we may be assured,—is the approach made in the case towards the Consciousness which is the topmost of all experiences.

And this contrast of "outer and inner", primely important in organism, does it not begin, nevertheless, even under in-organism? Does it not show itself, in fact, under already that state of bare aggregation, where the only modes of Motion in action (as reigning action,) are those of Heat on the one hand, and the natural antagonist of Heat, which is Gravitation, on the other? Is there not, I mean to say, a true matter for sympathy to grasp at, in the very experience referrible to world-masses, agitated as we may well figure these to be, by continually

these contrary forces :—continually possessed as by desire to stand still and develope, while, as continually, this native impulse is thwarted to them by the demand upon them of some more potent world outside, which compels them instead to rush on !—Nay,—much more initially than this :—the same condition of contrast is afforded us, proportionate to the case, even when we retreat backwards upon that primæval spectacle which Dr. Tyndall has opened to us—of tremulous ether, studded only with those imaginable precursors to world-masses, which fill up with the ether the full tenancy of space, as merely unit-molecules :—even here being present the ordained difference, which subjectivity—regarding it, as subjectivity must, in the interest of Motion,—estimates as severally *free*, and *imprisoned* Motion. Ether-tremblings are the one; the modification of ether-tremblings which lies within the bosom of each separate molecule, is already the other :—for molecules, as we are told, are themselves what are constituted by aggregations of atoms, affording thus indeed the inner enclosure for the portion of space-filling ether that enters it, which cannot in the nature of things preserve the same quality of Motion as that which remains in the general ether-atmosphere. And such enclosure, begun, with the proportionate modification attending it, is pursued as the condition of every aggregation of molecules upon molecules, subsequently ensuing, which thence leads straight on to the innerness of organisms !—so that ether's primæval “shivering”, as Dr. Tyndall paints it, may well be taken as whole Nature's prescience of the destiny before her !—Is it not indeed permissible, I ask of physical science, thus to consider of the whole stock of Motion : both as originally diffused throughout the level ether, and as continually supplied *by* the ether, to whatever masses the ether penetrates ?

Once the pre-organic stage over-passed, however, and plainly enough do the new contrasts arise, open in a fashion to our generalized sympathy, which are easily to be assorted with the familiar class-characters, laid out for organic conditions. What distinguishes such in general from antecedent condition, is the ability now present in aggregations to deal *actively*, as well as *passively*, with environment, whereas before there was bare receptibility: this being farther contrastible, as to the mere power of *veto*, for what shall be assimilated, possessed by vegetables, and the power of *election* of nutriment, which together with locomotion arrives to animals. The latter combination of capabilities, however, is coincident with the great fact in organization, which means the decisive separation of outer and inner spheres to the animal; while this, again, involves in the end that event to the higher organisms, which makes the grand stage of contrast with lower ones, signifying true *command* over environment, obtained by the former, as to one part of their nature, though not by the other part. Not as to heart and brain, namely, is this command, in a physical sense, obtained; but as to eyes, and hands:—since *these* work mightily upon what *those*, if freely exposed to it, would immediately perish under: heart, and brain-matter being as eminently more subject to environment—more passive under it,—than lower organisms, as human senses are the contrary. Let the same effect, however, be mentalized,—that is, let it be, considered how brain-and-heart internalism really furnishes, as such, the guidance which solely conditions to sense-action its possession of command,—and truly is the contrast realized, as the final one, which means all that belongs to philosophy's own deepest of distinctions as to sovereign-Intellect and subject-Feeling!

But chiefly to be considered, in all this progress,—both

as to its subjective importance, and the ease with which sympathy may grasp at it,—is the suddenness, the matter of genuine *catastrophe*, which the advent of every stage capable of being marked for such, by its nature implies. Every new contrast realized, it needs to be remembered, is never to be simply *added to*, but always to be *multiplied into*, the condition of contrast precedent!

And let it be imagined how this has told with regard to the senses:—how each separate birth of each of these, must have been that rising of a new day-star to experience, so filled with import, as that it must have brought to light, by being lived under, sense of what was never otherwise possible, as the experience of having been without it! The real meaning of the fiat, expressed in the crystallized phrase of the “Let there be Light”, is obviously this: that at a certain point did the organ of vision become so capably fitted to environment, that vision was realized. But when it was so, also was *Darkness* cast evermore behind the Light!—And so, of every other attainment. Day-star after star were all of the sense-realizations in turn; and with each of them came the same indelible consequence, independently of itself, as to absence of itself.—But beyond this lies always the grand contrast of sense-effect in general, opposed to general sense-destitution, which *when* reflected on, bestows the true character upon Mentalism, of being, in half, sense-impressional, and half, in pure, reflectional.

The manner of the fact I depict to myself thus. First, the back-telling influence of these successive day-stars has to be considered as accumulated from them separately and in conjunction;—then, as having met with, and blended with, their direct influence;—then, as working, together with the latter, on the sensitive plate of incipient Mentalism;—which, on its own part, as I have already

described it, is to be conceived as in thought-revolution : whence follows the gathering of impression, as to all the peculiarly-reflectible elements of impression, into certain foci of reflectional impression :—all this, moreover, being followed by the new *diffusion* of effect, as from each focus, on psychation generally, which—as also I have before said, of the greatest and typical instance of it,—becomes thence of the quality of *atmosphere*.—Was it not thus, apparently, that actual atmosphere produced itself?—namely, through the circumstance of living creatures proving their character as such, by breathing *out*, with a difference, gases absorbed by them, instead of retaining the whole of such absorbed matter, in the way that mineral conglomerations mainly do : by this giving means—and from the earliest presence at all of budding and creeping things on the earth,—for the incessant production of higher and higher inhabitants to it, conditioned precisely by this heightened quality of atmosphere?—It is in this way indeed that I imagine, at all events, the effect of a raising generally of the *mental atmosphere* :—first to have proceeded from the centralized births of mentalism, themselves the fruit of sense-observation, mentally assimilated ; —and thence to be that which conditions of right whatever is afterwards the real growth of Mind.

This final matter of contrast, however,—as between these specialized fruits of mentalism, of which sense of Deity is the typical one, and results that act on us directly, —appears to me identical with the true estimation of Consciousness, as based on *Self-Consciousness*. What I mean by this qualification, in fact, is immediately expressible under the present view. Sense of Deity, once become diffusible in the manner that this explanation of Ideals in general justifies, I conceive to add to our mental atmosphere the quality of Sun-light. But what sort of

feeling should we have about Sun-light, if Sun-light never changed itself with the condition, attributed to Science, solely illumined by partly artificial light, partly that of stars? The concentration of light-apprehension, naturally enforced, by the circumstances of our planet, on the magnificent specimen of planet-nature outside of our own, gives us a standard for the meaning of "Light", which assuredly it would be the utmost folly in us to attempt to ignore, if we would investigate that meaning. Yet this appears to me, in reality, exactly the character of Dr. Huxley's aimed-at interpretation of Consciousness: *that*, namely, which implies sole experimentation in the laboratory, and not for comparison with, but in proposed supersedence of, the glorious phenomenon abroad, open and common to mankind. All of us have lived by Sun-light, long before we thought of its being due to our planet's station in the Solar system; but for a light-investigator, as such, to ignore the fact, would be that which should lead us to demand of him, to show us what sort of light-condition the world would have had, if nature had made it destitute of a Sun!—Endeavour such as the present, on the contrary, to show as distinctively as possible what natural sunlight is, contrasted with humanly-instituted light, must inevitably have the effect, even of somewhat helping knowledge of earth-condition generally, but certainly, and specially, of heightening the contrast, *as contrast*, which is now being counted of such culminating importance.

But always on natural terms:—aided only by the difference remembered of multiplication from addition!—Each foregoing catastrophe of contrast, out of the whole series of such catastrophes, having been duly multiplied in turn, as to its effects, into those of its predecessor, up to the point of vague Consciousness-in-general: let it be

calculated, if it can, what *ought* to have been the product of final catastrophe, when this again should be multiplied, as this age is seeing it multiplied, into the essential import of Selfism!—Such product, my every conception assures me, can only have been of that nature of Miracle, which to ordinary feeling it is :—nay, rather, of the nature which, as that of Science's own sort of miracles in general, arithmetically shown, goes only beyond the power of ordinary feeling to judge at all of its depth of miraculousness.

Next, as to the sort of representation which the recognized distinctiveness of a Self-regulated viewing of Nature, from an objective viewing, may be expected to admit of in scientific terminology :—that of “modes of Motion”.

It seems to me indeed, generally, that the whole aim of present science to deepen the method of interpretation through sense-appreciation, *by* the extension of this into molecular interpretation, is, by its nature, that which *must* end in the substantiating of the difference between this and the generalistic principle of interpretation :—just because the very effort, now in course, of including the whole range of world-phenomena under amenability to special-sense evidence, must expose the limit, if there be one, which separates a part of these as due only to subjective impression.—But in fact, I gather a much clearer sign than this,—a matter of even positive indication,—from that which is the actual practice of Physicism.

What I refer to is this : the course apparent in molecular investigation of constantly bringing out the difference, as to certain of the modes of Motion, between action that is normal or proper to them, and action which is *radiant* :—*the* mode which of specialty exhibits the difference being also the one which of right *ought* to show it, fundamentally, if the two-fold seriation be present: namely, Heat. Heat,

manifestly, belongs to organisms, *more* than to environment; and yet also it belongs to aggregations anterior to organization, where radiation has in fact the certain equivalence of importance with internalization that precisely permits here the starting of the division.—Not that it is in this way alone, however, that the division is indicated. Where molecular investigation took rise, was in the much higher-seriated matter of Sound; and here truly was present an actual apposition, as between vibrations in air, and those internally-ordered vibrations of nerve-substance which belong to special-sense department in ourselves:—vibration-discovery having been the original parent to the whole course of discovery. So also as to Sight, with its Colour-variations; long before the efforts of Mr. Grove and Dr. Tyndall, I believe, was it duly assumed of these, that they were the compound result of motion, varied respectively as to atmosphere and human organs. But the matter of Heat, in being general, as to organisms, and precisely *not* special, furnishes the true ground for systematic partition. And indeed, beyond Heat, the same dividing-off of effect that is *radiant* has extended, at all events, into the department of Electricity;—while, lower down, the antagonism which is so manifest between Heat and Gravitation, places the difference between diffused and aggregated Motion altogether on the footing of class-variation.

Of Gravitation, indeed, Mr. Grove suspected, at his first publishing, that it might prove identical, and no other than identical, with the simple Motion, that we know as sense-perceptible Motion. If I wished then to throw the subject at once into a subjective formula, in the interest of Motion, I might express it thus:—Out of ostensible motion was primarily realized the foe to ostensible motion, which is the *latent* motion of Heat; and



thence, in alternate fashion, have been successively developed heightened forms of both ostensible and of latent motion, which only lose their capability of alternation by arriving, at last, at what is of necessity the culmination of the double series (as to present experience,) by its being the purely and inalterably latent motion of organic Self-Consciousness.—For, as to the “inalterability”, there returns here, virtually, the very effect of merely-sensible phenomena of Motion, uninterpretable by molecular explanation, attributed to Gravity:—utterly different as the cases are in a subjective sense. Self-Consciousness, namely, is, as I have said, that which betrays itself ostensibly, in so far as it does so, only by means of those utterly fitful, constantly unprecedented, movements of organic beings,—descending in a measure to the case even of the earliest forms of living beings,—which in ourselves spring from the lawlessness of Volition: and which, from this very lawlessness, so esteemed,—when it is so esteemed,—must be held, by men of true science, for that which it is well to keep hands from.—And this is only what I have seen before, as to the laying out of matters in series: that to Metaphysics falls share of both the extremes, while to Science is adapted only the mid-portion of the series.

As to that mid-portion, however, is it not safe to imagine, that there is a certain balancing connection, and thence a true causative relation,—shy as Science is, naturally and necessarily, of meddling with causation!—between the internalized power of interblending particles, making Chemical Affinity, and the external power, dispersive and re-distributive, of Electricity;—while again, is it not easily analogous to think of Electricity, in the original mode of it, both as parting with a portion of itself, in order to this internalization, in company with Heat; and *thence* as resting, for the remainder, in the

character, similar to radiant Heat, of radiant Electricity, *now* accompanied by Light—or, at all events, by what *will* be Light, in the creative series, when sense becomes present to meet it?—In the fact, however, of these three *being* internalized together, Heat and Electricity and Chemical Affinity,—with duly-opposite atmosphere outside,—appears to be conditioned that wonderful *protoplasm*, which henceforth creates a barrier between the two sets of constitutions, ordered for seriation, as decisive as it is unpassable. Once having appeared the “matter of Life”, there is surely the true catastrophe of dividedness furnished, which in point of “effect of catastrophe” competes with the appearance of Consciousness itself. \*

With the Life-condition comes that properly-internalized “energy”, whose differentiation from simple “force” is precisely due to the *activeness* of quality attendant on Life. And this implies the substitution henceforth, for what before was the virtue of accumulation simply, of what now is the virtue of *intensity*. This it is, which specifically and irrefragably parts off organisms from environment; while, again, within the limits of each organism, is carried on the farther intensification, in parts, which means the dividing off, finally, of nerves and brain, in chief, from the rest of each organism. And what except Consciousness *can* match in catastrophe with this; *unless*, indeed, it be another which also loses itself, as

\* In fact, as I conceive, conditioning the latter. And I bear in mind, how a parallel effect to this, with the requisite difference, has signalized itself already, to world-experience,—namely, as to thought-seriation,—provided for, as I believe, by similar decisiveness of separation previously made in the matter of progress, into a two-fold line of progress. I mean, the catastrophe of Christianity arising into the heart of human history (see Vol. i. pp. 296-9). If not the matter of *pre-Christianity*, yet at all events the matter of *post-Christianity*, now depositing out of the subsiding form, seems to me indeed the true *protoplasm* of moral existence, first conditioning a religion to be of self-inherent vitality.

Consciousness does, in the merely-thinkable department of physics? I mean, the possible first-rise of atoms, out of what previously should have been *only* the tremulous ether: a growth, if permissible to be thought of for such, that might have taken as many ages to accomplish, as the whole growth of the universe subsequently!—*This*, truly, would make a *beginning* of the import of accumulation, such as fitly might be followed up, in signalness of effect, by the incomparably-heightened importance of intensity.

Let me recall that “Constitution of the Universe”, pictured by Dr. Tyndall so strikingly. Everywhere, he tells us, is the present occupation of space (accessible to our faculties,) that of the inconceivably-rarefied, though semi-solidified, or jelly-like substance, which the ether needs to be considered; varied only by there being interspersed through it, “at enormous distances apart, the ponderous nuclei of the fixed stars”. Taking up the “molecular tremors” which proceed from these, the all-pervading ether carries the sign of their existence, “with inconceivable rapidity, to our organs of vision”;—so that, in fact, “it is the transported shiver of bodies countless millions of miles distant which translates itself in human consciousness into the aspect of stars”. And he states farther, that if we inquire how far this present state of things is to be referred to the primæval state, the man of science “can, at all events, prove that out of common non-luminous matter the whole of this pomp of stars might have been evolved”.——What I am now conceiving, then, is—first, that instead of star-masses, the variers of space should be taken as the primitive sort of masses which are mere molecules: attributed differently, accordingly as they are severally destined to form chemical, or only mineral, conglomerations;—but, next, that in place of molecules shall be thought of, as present, bare atoms;

—while ultimately, as before hinted, I imagine the æther destitute even of these in accompaniment:—just so much the denser, however, in its own substance, as may equalize the amount of solidifiable matter remaining thus diffused in it, instead of going as yet to the formation of atoms; and also, as to its natural tremors, deepened correspondingly in these, by the amount of Motion not yet parted with, in order to that event of being internalized, and therein concentrated, which must come with the earliest combination of atoms. Here, I suppose, is it that Matter and Motion may have met, in simplest possible manner of union: not being, as yet, in the least degree separated, really, from one another; but altogether resting mingled, in pregnant Uniformity.

The very circumstance of shivering movement, attached to a space-filling substance, where vacuum is not, can only signify, conceivably, an incessantly-shifting variation of density to the æther. And if any variation is possible, why not that effect of special condensation, at intervals, which might be production of atoms?—And also, as to Motion: is it not clear, that the very instant atoms *have* been produced, if likewise they be free of movement, so has presented itself the molar or sensible Motion, which, as soon as molecules have farther been produced, will be duly opposed by molecular movement: seeing that, soon as ever there is thus afforded the means of an internalized sphere for the æther, in contrast to its otherwise uniformity, the native movement of the æther must, of necessity, vary itself; and constantly more and more tend so to vary, in proportion as the aggregations extend? And this, surely, imports every thing needful for the future development of Motion.

Let me consider the original movement of the molar kind, preparing the means for very Gravitation: which

appears to have been that of Rotation:—so *level* a mode is this, for a mode of Motion, that truly it shows itself for common to the units that are solitary molecules, and the solitary units which are stars! Indeed, that which makes occasion for Gravitation to occur, as a beginning occurrence, seems precisely to rest with that fact of plurality of units concerned, which again lies with the matter of *size* to the masses, the same with effect of accumulation. So long as bare Rotation is concerned, it seems nothing whether the rounding mass, *so* rounding, be of microscopic or world-large dimensions.—But then the very fact of merely *two* conglomerations acting as rivals to one another, implies that one of them, mostly, will gain decisively, and suddenly, that advantage over the other, in gathering within its sweep the means of self-increase, which, in the circumstances of planetary orbs, means the becoming of one the sun-centre of motion to the other. And, supposing that the planetary system includes many orbs, this in itself involves the vastness of amount of self-increase, hence needfully present in the case.

Supposing, however, this stage of differentiation reached, out of the original absoluteness of mingled Matter-and-Motion uniformity; and by the same fact is attained, and established, that importance of internalism, through the size of world-masses, as therefore duly balancing to such masses the contrary importance of external propulsion, which interprets the speciality of Heat-manifestation:—followed up, as this is, by the whole series of contrarieties in organic and planet-condition, which *are* such through precisely Heat and Internalism being mainly prevalent in efficacy *here*, while the opposite prevalence is efficacious *there*. But in this is occasioned—may it not truly be inferred?—the very fact of *struggle*, as destined to lie, ever more and more, between the opposite lines of seriation,

which, in giving meaning, as it does, to the actual conquest over environment, gained to a partial extent by organism, finally justifies the whole matter of the division? —The condition for the struggle appears this:—that altogether in excess as the internalized constitutions of organisms are, over inorganized ones, as to the amount of Motion stored up, at least virtually, within them; yet the instability of their possession of this store, as compared with the tenure of their adversaries, renders their victory over these always a matter of dubiousness. Every existent mode of Motion, it appears, excepting what is fundamental, is constantly liable to be broken up, and to fall into modes that are lower; while, if the two lines of series are in combat, it must be, as it seems to be, that each is in state of striving, incessantly, to bring down its opposite in such manner. This must be shown, for instance, as it appears to be, by the constant tendency of Heat-supported Affinity to fall, as it does fall, if ever it fail to maintain itself, into the leveler mode of everywhere-diffused Gravitation. Nor is Mentalism itself an exception, counted *as* a mode of Motion; although by Mentalism of specialty is the true command over circumstance possessed, in so far as it ever is actually possessed. For the effect of such struggle, and shiftings of arrangement between the contending lines of seriation, *must* surely involve a cancelling, for a certain time, and to a certain extent, of the normally-assumed “laws” of the opposite principles. It must be, I mean, that in any case where the prevailing temperature in question is altered, so must the typical action of Gravity; and where Gravity alters its strain, that so also must alter the employable type of Heat-regulation. Nay, and the same must be true as to muscular action; every movement of animals in lifting or propelling being truly for the moment a shifting of the law of

Gravity, as to what this *would* be, if moulded to the occasion. But this means a certain *subjection* of Mentalism to the actuality of environment-condition, even as to the matter of Mentalism which is highest-as-possible above reach of circumstance. Let this, however, be conjoined with the condition in general of the intensified organisms admitting of such degree of Mentalism, and it is evident how close an approach to equipoise—how very slight an advantage on the side of such organisms,—causes the struggle to *be* countable in general for a conquest of these over environment:—the whole possession of Mentalism to men being thwarted, as it is, by the ever-pending liability to its Motion-machinery, great almost in proportion to the value of this, to fall from such height of constitution, into possibly a lower level of condition even than environment's condition.

And now let me consider what effect from such principle—of two lines of seriation, inter-antagonistic, and yet only elastically so; and of two modes of thinking, adapted respectively,—ought to fall on Religion.—Surely, only this, that if the sense of God, and of what belongs to that sense, *be*, as it is, both natural and requirable in the one kind of contemplation, it is *not* therefore to be expected as due to the contrary kind of contemplation.

Still, it is true, without doubt, that different enough from the ordinary meaning of Religion must be that which permits of this acknowledgment. With me, in fact, the import of "what belongs to the sense of God" is the same that to religionists in general means the sense of religious despair! It means, essentially, the *acceptance* of our instability of position: involving, as this does, the matter of our life-long struggle against the pending dispersion of our life-condition, without implication of more

than belongs to the struggle,—though always with *that* which gives moral and rational justification to the acquiescence. Namely, as accompanied by the conviction I have stated, of the debt which we owe to this instability, of actually the entire possession of whatever in our faculties is precious to us—of whatever gives nobleness to our nature as human beings! And is it not evident, on the surface, that a nobleness must go with the desire to advance, possessed by all elevated natures, *when* pursued under this consciousness of self-instability, such as is not possible otherwise: I mean, when first has been struggled with, and without being overcome by, the feeling of how doubtful is benefit to self, to result from the advance?—This sphere of consideration, however, lies with only the practical side of the question. What is now of concern touches solely the mere intellectual point, of the purity to be gained, by present method, to the Ideal of Deity, as always the representative matter in religion.

I am not supposing by the foregoing scheme—especially *not* supposing,—that it is either to mere protoplasm, or to atom-studded æther, that we must go for the furnishing of this Ideal;—however I concede, as I do concede, that it is rightful for science to see in these, as science is arriving to do, both the true “matter of Life”, and true “cause” for existence of Life. The “physiological units”, truly, of which God consists, as to my own Ideal of God, are human affections and aspirations; and certainly it is not for *these* that I should think of looking amidst atoms and shivering æther!—Abundantly less should I do so than for Heat and Light-cheeriness, and specimens of Creature-Vitality. Such confounding of the extremes of the series, and thereby working at cross-purposes both with science’s real aim, and the real aim of religion,—while it is manifestly the liability of a prin-



ciple of seriation *not* divided,—I claim to be expressly avoided by the clear separation now sought to be made in the lines of seriation :—Moral Continuity for the one, starting from present experience, and thence gathering in the whole estimation of subjective progression, as leading to this ; Outwardly-traceable Continuity for the other. And the express sign of this avoidance, as I have now to explain, lies with my being able also to resist the degradation of the mixed-scientific kind of symbolization, which, in falling on the idea of Deity, as so prevailingly it does in the present state of thought, seems to me the worst consequence of all from the actual lack of division.

When I look consciously and simply along the line of seriation proper to subjectivity, I feel indeed that there *is* retained by it every condition that true Religion requires, as to the feelings to be awakened by it, both *without* degrading admixture, and with only increased self-character. The chief of these conditions are :—maintenance of personalism,—depth in our consciousness of surrounding mysteriousness,—and capability of that sense of grateful, but trembling dependingness, which makes up religious *awe*. And all of these I believe to be supported duly, by the simple knowing of “ God ” as the Source of *our* personalism, though unencumbered to us with image of His own. But moreover there is fully supported by this view that sense of *direct* communion with the Source of Being, *as* an internal feeling, which—though denied here as to objective truth,—has ever been attributed as the proper experience of religion. For this lies with the very nature of the sort of *axis* to Universal Being, which this serial preparation for Consciousness, in the past succession of modes of Being, implies. The phenomenal aspect of the line to ourselves, as I have said, is that of our looking upon the extremity of a lengthened space, hollowed by

force of thought-revolution, which, as it shows itself to science for nothingness, so to our internalized feeling has the effect of sun-brilliancy. But this imports the lightning-flash of Consciousness along the line, which, by the nature of the line, should find nothing, as it *does* find nothing, capable any where of inducing stoppage between Selfism and God. *If* thought of under circumstance of stoppage, such as Science truly finds, or makes, by its own method of detail-treating, the whole series is seen to lie as *beneath* Consciousness; whence rightfully it is the characteristic attitude of Science to *stoop* to it, seeing nothing therefore of God in it. Consciousness, however, when *itself* supplies the attitude to be assumed,—caring, as it does, nothing about objects requiring to be stooped to; and contrarily enforced by its nature to attend only to the line as a Whole, seen all at once,—finds itself inevitably as in upward-bearing posture: catching the sun-message that comes to it, inevitably in the character of that which proceeds straight to it, out of an Infinity, All-embracing. —For can we, in the nature of things, image to ourselves Space and the Firmament as what is beneath us?

But what is the effect of the contrary principle, *not* admitting division, but trying to embrace Religion as included under Science?—It seems to me, that which does injury to both:—that which involves a manner of symbolizing Deity, both self-inconsistent and warring with the whole intention in the case. Acting upon it, as men of Science commonly do, whenever they mingle reference to Religion at all with their expositions, they are compelled by it wontedly to force whatever pantheistic symbol is held by them, on science's occasion, into as great an approach as is possible to the form which Religion would use, on its own occasion. But this, it seems to me, is precisely the standard of merit that is false to the case; while the doing

of true justice to both occasions must rather involve the holding as much as possible of the respective symbols apart from one another. And for an actual illustration of this view, it appears to me that I need only point, in fact, to the one instance of employment for scientific purpose of anthropomorphic imagery which signally has been attended with success, as to its general acceptability to men of science;—such as I may be permitted, perhaps, to contrast moreover by an instance of what I believe to be the *un*success of the opposite kind of scientific practice. By the former, I mean that idea of “Natural Selection” which obviously has been raised upon Science’s own ground, and for Science’s own occasion;—by the latter, I have in view that intended transference hither of expressly religious expression, which all readers of Mr. Grove’s work on Correlation will remember as forming its pointed conclusion: namely, that “Causation is the will, Creation the act, of God”.—To my own mode of thinking there is present as decided a reason for preferring the manner of the first example to that of the second, as there can be under strictest holding of the principle of Mr. Huxley; and yet with that difference in the character of it, as a subjective reason, from such as influences materialists, that makes indeed the stating of my own argument a specific showing, at the same time, of my habitual variance from materialism.

As to the pantheistic suggestion, then, which underlies Mr. Darwin’s image of “Natural Selection”, the success of it, when judged from my own point of view, lies with this:—simply with its *loneliness*, upon moral terms; which, because it is such, keeps the image from contact at all with feelings in us that, *if* it touched, it would necessarily revolt. That which is here attributed to Nature, as the Agent in Selection, is a mode of Selection which, if it pertains to man at all, does so only in common with vital beings of

the most inferior sort, to which latter it is solely characteristic; namely, that groping and minutely-acting Selection, which is truly the farthest possible that any vital action can be from calling up comparison with the proper working of Volition. Who therefore can for a moment think here of competition occasioned with imagery that is religious?

The phraseology of Mr. Grove, however, is so opposite in its bearing, that it signifies directly the transplanting bodily into the heart of science of the very purest of religious conceptions. And therefore stands against it the full charge of incongruousness, and of two-fold injuriousness so far as the idea of Will is concerned, which is heightened even to specialty by the aspect here assumed of Volition. According to what has here seemed due to that aspect, that which science needs to see in Volition, whenever it attends to Volition, is specifically its character of *lawlessness*; while to science this character is intrinsically the sign of *defect*, as plainly as to subjectivity the same quality is the sign of *excellence*. And hence, surely, for science to attribute Will-character to Deity is the reverse of what is esteemable for honour paid to Deity, either by the judgment of science or subjectivity.—But deeper to subjectivity is the farther injury which affects subjectivity alone, in this forced application of its terminology, as to the kind of inter-distinction here made between the terms of Creation and Causation: a distinction such as I protest that, as science has rightfully no occasion for, so it can only mar by, as here, attempting. To subjective judgment, the value of the import of Causation is precisely that which is concentrated out of the diffusiveness of that of Creation, by the very degree of depth beyond the latter which reference to Deity represents: nature interpreted by Causation being that view of nature which shows all things as solely ministering to apprehension of Deity. Hence, for

accuracy's sake, my argument is, that the more we think of God *as* seen in Causation, the more we ought *not* to associate the same idea with Creation, as different from Causation. And is it not evident, in fact, that by Mr. Grove's manner of assorting the difference, the type of Deity falls into the grossness of implying *hands* as well as *thought* assigned to it,—or else, that if Causation implies a thoughtful action in Deity, Creation implies action without thought?

Accordingly, I rest in the conclusion that the best practice of science is that which indeed men of science are more and more generally adopting : that of adhering constantly, in scientific connection, to the barely negative idea of Force, as representing sufficiently whatever in such connection is needful to be thought of as *Cause* to phenomena.—But always I claim from science the admission, freely to be rendered by it, that altogether different is the rule for subjectivity, even on ground that is proper to science:—nay, the admission that science is altogether benefited by the fact that subjectivity has a domain into which it is unlawful for itself to enter.

The legitimacy or not of symbolism lies entirely, I claim, with its accuracy : so that *only* because it is impossible to Science to symbolize attributes to Force accurately, is the attempt unlawful to it. And yet, whenever science reaches to a high stage of generalism, experience has shown that the need of pantheistic symbolism becomes what is practically inevitable to men of science.—I would finally ask, therefore, why, even as to this negative idea of Force, *so* left rightfully by science, it should not still be open to subjectivity to try the effect of its own action upon it?

It seems truly settled now in philosophy, that our possession at all of the idea of Force does in fact depend solely on our subjective consciousness of the efficacy of our

own Will-action;\* although exception remains strongly on the inductive side as to the mode of anthropomorphism—grossly and crudely such,—which attributes Will-character to Deity. And to this objection, again, can I offer my own counterpart objection, on perfectly subjective grounds. The very meaning of Will—expressing, as this term does, *that* in us which signifies the concentrated energy belonging to us in right solely of our Individualism,—yet owes its whole distinctiveness to our knowing, as human beings, what it is to vacillate previously to the arrival at Will-decision, under the infirmity of purpose attached to want of means for decision. And to carry this implication into my Ideal of Deity is as destructive to the value of it, as to Mr. Huxley it is destructive to rational soundness on contrary grounds. That is, *I* find it unworthy of Deity to hesitate, *he* finds it a rational folly to imagine *means* of choice to Deity: namely, as between the existent mode of creation, and other to-be-supposed possible modes. But, agreeing thus far with the scientific position of argument, I desire yet to demand of science the admission that, after all, subjective Relationalism has, by its very nature, the prerogative, inevitably, to go beyond that sphere of actuality:—to go where it is fruitless for science to go. Relationalism has no meaning for actuality, except as related to non-actuality. Nor do I think that science itself can refuse the fruits that may proceed from this exercise of subjectivity, *when* the latter keeps true to itself.

I have coincided with materialism altogether, as to the wrongfulness of symbolizing Personality to the Whole of things, just because of the impossibility here of the contrast between Outer and Inner experience. But contrast different to this there *is* still conceivable, when the affecting of Personality for Nature is dropped, and merely is

\* See Mr. Mill's *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 302.

attempted the figuring of natural Action. Namely, the contrast, Time-measured, that lies between Nature's existence in Wholeness and in Parts. I ask, then, if—seeing, as we do, that the actual state of things is that which pervadingly tends *from* Wholeness *towards* Part-distribution,—it is not a true analogical image—nay, a truly causative one, and, from its grandeur, a really religious one,—to infer thence a previous contrary state of things, with as general a predominance of what we know for Retrogression, as our actual state shows of Progress?—Such condition as this, indeed, is obvious at present, in a partial degree, things standing as they are; and may be existent even as general movement, on different planets from our own, thereto limited: making up in this way the supposable needed effect, as to different planets, of opposite simultaneous currents of creative movement.—But I am referring now to a current of Nature's entirety: that which should make a true action of Balance for her, as if moulding the whole form of her existence between states that are alternately these:—of Wholeness and Partition, as one way considered; of Development and Retrogression, as otherwise thought of. And what does this betoken, but instantly the effect that *may* have ensued, as to starting of the present state of things, from effect of antecedent Retrogressional constitution:—that is, from the effect of the finishing rush into levelness, which actually might supply the means of impetus forwards, into our actual condition of Progress!

I see no objection possible which the utmost strictness of science should make to "transgression of actuality" such as this. But, moreover, this idea supplies what in fact is precisely the subjective aspect, requisite as such, to Mr. Darwin's scientific imagery. For, let once such

stupendous balancing of Nature's tendencies be accepted, reflectively, and is it not reflectively necessary, on the instant, that whatever type of natural action be now required,—since it must hence bear respect to the average or pivot-condition of the whole range of modes of action,— must therefore fall on or about the mode on which "Natural Selection" precisely implies that it falls : namely, that of the lower forms of Life?



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE MEANS OF A FUNDAMENTAL CLASSIFICATION OF RELATIONAL IMAGES, WHICH APPEAR COMPRISED WITHIN THE STAR-SYMBOL.

My comparison with Science is then made; and a bearing found consistently through its results that entirely seems to strengthen the idea, for support of which I entered on it (p. 194)—in so far as mere negative help can afford this. Neither at all is it difficult for me now to do that which my own purpose renders needful:—to state with preciseness the nature of this believed furtherance.

I am aiming at a plan for the independent working of Subjective contemplation on that common matter of Nature's comprehension with which my survey has been showing me Objective contemplation as engaged. And accordantly have I found every where suggested, in this tracking of scientific experience, an existent department which Science itself is withheld from attending to:—a ground of investigation to the reality of which, although itself never trenches on it, the whole tendency of its own highest of attainments is the witness; and precisely with a pointedness that increases with all heightening of these. Beyond this, however, has it been made clear that what constitutes this matter untouched-on by Science, is identical with that which Philosophy's whole practice has

assigned to the working of Metaphysics.—What better, therefore, of foundation could possibly have been laid for the “harmonious contrariety” I am seeking for?

This asserted apartness of territory is indeed expressed in the bare etymology of the term of “Metaphysics”; and in the manner now supposed, of its province *transcending* that of Science. Farther, is the nature of the transcendent operation established in Philosophy for *Ontology*. And precisely, again, is it the study of *Being* that forms the very matter as to which, as decisively on present principle as in heretofore Metaphysics,—if not, rather, with eminently an increase of necessity,—the occasion arises for the striking of the separation. But still, as I claim, with a difference in the manner of it as now it is designed, that no longer involves for *Ontology* its heretofore incompatibility with Science:—provided that the Dualism be admitted into principle by the latter.

I have owned that the admission, on both sides, can be only on compromise; and this of a nature that to Metaphysics means equivocation on what most is of vital import to Religion:—implying an “accepted night-time”, during which it is recognizably as salutary as it is necessary for Religion to acquiesce in forgetting itself.—What forms my gain, then, from the admeasurement of my object with Science, I would say, is expressly the enabling me, according to my own standard, to adjust the terms of this compromise, *as* relating to the department found exclusively of concern. And in reality this must coincide with what otherwise was in demand for proper nucleus to this portion of my work:—since the *wherein* Present Religion varies intellectually from Precedent, is equivalent, by hypothesis, with *that* which gives power to it, supposably, of standing in true fellowship with Science.

The whole of this chapter, therefore,—and indeed, of

the two that are needful to come after it,—will be occupied in the working out of this definition, in whichever way it be regarded: as of due “terms of compromise” with Science; or, as due formulation, and a quasi-creed-expression, of my intellectual belief. With this also must be involved, of necessity, the required modifying of the import of Ontology:—seeing how purely, as now seen, is the significance of *Being*, when dually apprehended, the illuminating *crux* to the entire consideration!

In preparation for this broad consequence, to ensue from the effort of my last chapter, there must be remembered what I have laid of foundation to receive the application of its results. I have postulated in principle, namely, that for Metaphysics to make utterance of itself, the intrinsic method is by a Symbolism that is Astronomic. And, it seems well to state, to this conviction I have appeared actually compelled by what has been my own experience in the writing of this work: in the finding myself continually obliged, when endeavouring to embody any yet merely floating conceptions of metaphysical sort, to recur to exclusively star-imagery. The persistency of this experience has seemed so inevitably significant, that out of it has resulted the principle I am speaking of.

Moreover, of the Primal Ideas which I have dealt with, already I have assumed that of *Being*, as actually level in its rank with Science’s own admitted metaphysic Ideals of Space and Time. I mean, of “Being” in the non-scientific sense of Ontology, which respects subjectively-apprehended Individuation.

Here, then, is the one matter of compromise that alone I ask for, to be accorded by Science, in addition to the general admission of the principle of Mental Dualism: that this Ideal of Subjective Being *be* allowed such

station, for metaphysical usage.—And, on the other hand, what is answering compromise for Metaphysics, my very using of the Symbol, I conceive, has expressed :—thus intimating the whole purport of the Symbol. And that is, by the proffered consent to allow the proper sun-character of Deity, so felt upon its own ground, to subside, for communion with Science, into dwindled star-character. For this effect, as I conceive, is the same with what, in regard to Ontology, might be expressed in this way: that, for the time of such communion, Metaphysics yields consent to take the meaning of Subjective Being upon the very understanding which Science itself has laid basis for.

And truly, in a religious sense, it is a degradation to Ontology, to submit itself to these terms! Its own meaning of Being must inherently be that of the Essence-Universal which, in being such, is also purely indivisible; while Science's Ideal is piled up through only parted-off fractions of Being. In evolutionary definition, what underlies our impression of Being is a series of formations, successively ascending, and only in the end culminating in that character which, for heretofore judgment of Ontology, is the lowest that is worthy to be thought of, as condition of Being: the supporter of Self-Consciousness;—and, just as much as the realness of human Ego-ship would be *nil*, if divided, so would realness of religious perception be *nil*, if this were divided. But let the latter with consent suffer lapse in its character, for temporary merging into that of proper intellect, and surely the degradation will have right to be accounted-of as cancelled, if harmonious result be produced.

So far from the effect being that of real injury to religion, in this reduction of its Ideal into thought-appreciability, I claim that precisely is created a new sphere of

religion, genuine though subordinate, to be added to the principal one. And this consequence seems immediate to me, when I try to conceive to myself what is the general image which belongs to the evolutional plan of Being. I mean, in regard to the new kind of mystery—the new kind of miracle—that arises with the idea of Integration, conceived of as Science enforces :—the mystery of Wholeness, continually prepared for in evolution with utmost gradualness, and yet bursting into sight, when it occurs, with a startlingness that has nothing for a match to it in the old metaphysic apprehension, of a Wholeness that is stationary and *per se*. Each stage of effected Integration has been seen to bring forth, with pure freshness to human perception, a first-visible new-quality of Being : the event being repeated ever up to the platform where, through Deity's self being integrated, in subjective fashion, so also did Mind, to the thinker, start forth to first-visibility—to visibility that was therein self-visibility. (Compare Vol. I., pp. 516-8; and note to pp. 481-3.) Events found in series such as this, with such crowning event at its close,—and with nothing that is cognizable to us of a cause for them more than a mere coming-together of “parts,”—forms certainly a matter of thought-revelation, than which nothing of such kind has possessed more of true miraculousness.

Not even has it been transcended in this light by those fellow-conceptions, of Space and Time, into connection with which I am seeking to bring this of Being, for due filling up of the objects of thought-religion. And by no one will it be denied of these long-ago intellectualized images, that the impressiveness of them is indeed heightened, with peculiarity, for the intellect of to-day, by the very nature of the science now extant. That is, if they be regarded metaphysically :—no longer as being merely found ser-

viceable in science, for giving order to results of observation, but purely as thought-objects :—purely as Mind-integrations : representing what is the massive sublimity that it has lain with the very vaguest of all thought-materials to rise into. Assuredly it is true beyond question of these, that, when treated as Ideals, they possess fully the mysterious grandeur and awfulness which now I am considering to belong also to Being—when, shorn of its day-glory, this is reduced to shine only, with them, coldly and penetratingly clear, in the rayless thought-firmament of religion's night.—In this merely *reflective* aspect, it is evident that all of them are destitute of proper genialness of influence. And yet still, in different degrees ;—while, in the very fact of this difference, arises precisely the now-felt occasion for their classifying, which never otherwise has presented itself, or indeed has been capable of being suggested, on the ground of either Science or Metaphysics. The latter has had, hitherto, only its solitary Day-Star, as such, for contemplation ; while to Science has been nothing of requisite impulse to the classifying effort, through precisely its hostility to the ontological position of Metaphysics.

When hitherto men of science have made use of metaphysical Ideals, although more of these have been accepted as such by them than here are made question of, it has sufficed the occasion to set them in bare enumeration !—though indeed it is true of Mr. Spencer, that he has actually, to a certain extent, transcended this practice ; as also has the extent of his “generalism” over-passed, with notoriousness, that of other men of science. And therefore let me adduce his example, as what nearest has approached to metaphysical classification at their hands. In his *First Principles*, namely, (p. 497,) Mr. Spencer states thus the five Ideals that are necessary to him, in

this eminently significant mode of formula:—"Force, manifested in Time and Space, under forms of Matter and Motion."—But here, as much as elsewhere, is still omitted altogether the subjective claim of Introspection, to receive formulated expression. And in defect of allowance for the Being-Ideal, so also was there nothing to show need of attention at all to the subjective influence of Ideals, which here serves as classifying instrument.

This attention can alone, in its nature, be awakened on the proper mind-station of Introspection: namely, that which is *not* directed, as in Science, to the gaining of comprehension of the Universe; but only to the arrangement of our *ideas* of the Universe. And what is therefore true usage of Metaphysical Ideals, for this end,—let me now proceed to show at length,—is to take them specifically "for signs and for seasons" of mental advancement, in the manner that Star-Symbolism bears out.

The unfolding of this assertion—as the work of the present chapter,—will indeed be inevitably complicated: comprehending, as it must, the two kinds of explanation which are severally experiential and symbolic; and therefore veering between astronomy and mythology.—But then, here is very answer to what happens as to physical "seasons":—since what in reality is there simple in the matter of explanation of "seasons", however natural it may be, and it *is*, to pass actually under changes of season,—to *live* in transition from day unto night, and from summer to winter?

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The first thing that my own plan requires me to show, in setting forth the believed conditions of the Symbol, has relation to the perplexity of "reversion":—to show,

namely, how the adoption of the Symbol clenches with precision the ideas here already laid down of what is proper to metaphysics.

What of grossness has ever existed in this prime kind of imagery, I have seen to be chargeable mainly to the casting of symbolism too high: that is, to the attribution of personalism at all to conceptions that are scientific, instead of limiting it to the sphere of Introspection. As to the method of the latter, on the other hand, the reason why here the personic embodying of ideas is appropriate, as instinctively we feel it to be, I have seen to be afforded in due manner of a principle, through simply the method's being "reflective"; by which naturally is implied that reversed cast of images, which accounts for the required lowering of the symbol, to adapt it with rightfulness to the subjective dignity of this range of topics (Ch. II.):—so that naturally, as I have concluded, if the averaged conception of Mr. Darwin, for a cosmical figure, be the one that is adapted to science; the introspectional symbol-to-correspond ought to press to the extreme farthest from human likeness. And this, on the scientific plan of ascending products of Integration, points inevitably to the Being-ship of Worlds—the lowest kind of existences attributable for integrated.

But, in support of the inference, is it met by the symbol in this clearest of ways:—Stars, under science, are identical with Worlds. And that means to say, the Truths that are brightest and grandest, are also those lowly and humble ones, than which none are more common and familiar. By their *depth* they give basis to thought universal; and hence are they Spheres of conception to live in, just as much as they also are Lights set on high to shine down on us. What is "dominant" and what is "fundamental" come in them to coincidence (p. 182).



And of this, again, is sufficient cause always in the fact of the symbolism's being Mental Integration: since, naturally, in its own work of Creation, must not Mentalism, like Nature, make beginning at what is deepest?

When these deepest of truths are however duly exalted, to the station whither reflectively we transfer them, what should tell us of the manner of their position?—*If* figured out as Persons, their standing would have need to be downwards.\* But as Stars, indeed, through their roundness is their posture indifferent; nor have “upwards” or “downwards” real meaning in the firmament.—And with this consideration meets the pre-eminent fact, that in chief *by their movements* are Stars understood;—as in Metaphysics is accordantly the matter that of relations, much more than of objects (p. 187), and of specialty of relations that are shifting ones: whence its star-objects are in reality *planets* (p. 181). By science, in fact, we have been taught all but to identify the nature of Mind with that of Motion; and hence what should be unlikely in the parallelism?—But immediately our Stars are in motion, we have presence of phenomena where reversion of position is important: the tending either to East or to West, as to which arrives precisely the felt matter of delusion, whose called-for correction is first-step to astronomy (Ch. II.)

The turning to Eastward or to Westward, continually, however, is the import of “revolution”: the process

\* And lest this be only smiled at, let it be remembered what is actually the experience in theology referred to. Calvinism, in especial, is the mode of theology which in aiming at intellectual consistency has sought to combine this with persistent retention of personio symbolism for Deity. But of the character that it therein attributes to Deity, who will deny that the moral lineaments are, as here suggested, *upside-down*, as to what in human beings we should think of them?

which universally is associated with thought-operation. Is not "thinking" inevitably considered by us the turning of a matter as if over-and-over in our minds?—now taking judgment from reason, now from impressional feeling! Granting that our nature, of the spiritual sort, is thus distributed duly, as between Intellect and Feeling, the attraction for it of the needed benefit of due influence on each side, *must* certainly involve action of revolution!—But hence, in assuming, that to Feeling is the influence of Deity all-important; while to Intellect are requisite, in especial, the reflected triad of Ideals: there is reason at once for this movement having produced itself for characteristic:—this movement being that which in really being the turning of mentalism in one direction, shows celestial objects as revolving in the contrary direction; and this much being sufficient in full for interpreting of mere day-and-night changes.

The interpreting has also a much greater completeness than physical astronomy pretends to:—since metaphysics of right affords, every where that it comes, the true aspect of *causation*. I mean, through the principle asserted of "contrast." For truly I believe that not Deity itself would possess its real influence of benefit—would have influence at all—on the mentalism that is subject to its image, unless it were intermittent:—unless the impression to us of what nature is *with* sense of Deity in it, were contrasted at intervals by impression of what is World-without-Deity. Idea of God that were constant to us, surely would be therefore incognizable, and practically *nil*!—But in this way is supplied, in the salutariness of the effect that is actual, an impulse that seems empowered to account for even the movement of intellection *in toto*: not merely for rotation that as diurnal is simple, but also as considered in varying *planes* of rotation,—allowed for

in just speaking of the stars' being planets,—and bearing inference of full season-regulation. For the same effect of contrast is to be thought of as necessary, and as present, between all of the members of the triad; while for the power of drawing influence in several from the Ideals of Space, Time, and Being, it is manifestly needful that the posture of mentalism should in each case be entirely re-ordinated.

By day as well as by night is indeed each one of these Ideals, and not the Introspectional one only, to be thought of as abiding by us:—never setting but to rise again:—never vanishing as star but to re-appear otherwise, if not actually as Sun, in the manner that for us is exclusive to real Deity, yet in commoner fashion. And accordingly it is the mode of mental revolution which at present, though not always has it been so, gives this day-sovereignty alone to the Being-Ideal, which to us counts for arrangement that by eminence is salutary. But antecedent arrangements have antecedently also been salutary in their time. And thus arises a most legitimate extension, surely, of Darwinian principle! *Because* they are salutary, successive dispositions, I infer, have succeeded in being actualized.

In actual arrangement, also, are continual shiftings of the positions of the Ideals made visible to us, in the mode in which only they are capable of being so:—in their aspect of Stars. Namely, thus.

When the mind is intellectually postured in the manner that gives ascendancy to Space, the whole view of Nature is (by assumption,) rendered fitting to Science. Everything is made statically ordered: as if all were presented on the plane of an extended *Now*.—When Time is made regnant, on the contrary, the condition is

the thwart one of Sequence: that in which all things are laid out as for seeking of History, with requirement of dynamic ordination.—And when Being is accepted in dominance, then similarly—I claim,—is the tone of Self-Consciousness so perfectly diffused over Nature, that all becomes subject to Ontology. That is, to the rightful Ontology, aware of its own limits, which means purely the fruit of Introspective Analysis.

And in these three divisions of Knowledge seems truly the every thing that is essential embraced. The departments seem effectively made out by that treatment-in-whole—that intrinsic subsiding to compartments,—which makes addition to the number of them impossible.—Conjointly they give form to a supposable query, addressed by our reason to Nature, which should ask of her, severally, the “where” and the “when” and the “how” of existence to us:—and the answering of such query, if imaginable for effective, would indeed be the imparting to our knowledge of such requisite substantialness and consistency, as might well be considered for the giving to it virtually of true “length, breadth, and thickness.”

The same idea might be expressed metaphysically by this parallel assertion:—If the Ideals of Time, Space, and Being, be conceived of as multiplied into one another, with dynamic inter-penetration, it is Deity, in the highest modern sense, that arises for product.—And does any thing appear wanting to condition the integration?

But the triple partition is also adequately interpretable by the manner of historical origin here assumed for the Ideals. Namely, in regard to the principle, here accepted at foundation, that whatever of thought-images be accounted as Ideals, owe the elevation exclusively to their

relation to that of Deity :—to this as true genitrix, and perpetually-needed regulatrix, to the whole number of them. For, this principle being admitted, it is evidently not forbidden that the earlier of these offspring *may* be endowed with a degree of likeness to the primary one, needful to their inclusion within the same class with it, not adequately possessed by the sequents in the series ; although otherwise there be nothing to cut off these from sharing in it. The import of this likeness is the ability of shedding subjective influence. But in Matter and Motion, for instance, this ability is never thought of, through merely their late birth in mind-history.—Thus, the exclusiveness of the assigned triad, for a primary class, seems defended with sufficiency ; while, in consequence, these only are at all to be understood as here taken for amenable to star-symbolism.

Is it therefore to be taken on clear terms, that Deity is only an idea to us, like any other of pure human creation ? —Assuredly : for the moment.—Here is the safety in division of provinces !—Perfectly, for the time, can I assent to the admission ; and because of my perceiving that the view is one-sided.

For the purpose of this chapter, I am now abandoning myself consciously to exclusively a subjective view :—in no other way being the purpose attainable. But precisely for the reason of my being alive to the exclusiveness, is the predicament to my religion, now stated, innocuous ;—since at the same time I also am conscious what immediate restitution of full sense of it is in waiting. I am aware that I have only to spring back from this subjective effort, to the state that is the natural one of religion, in order at any moment to re-produce for the Ideal of Deity that coincidence required by it with its negative corres-

pendent of "Force," Science's counter-Ideal, which will bring it instantaneously again to its import of reality!

And here is concerned mainly the character of my scheme of Star-symbolism, as to its own integration; and therein as to the integrity of my whole intellectual idea of religion.

For, truly, as much as this subjective viewing is a *limited* mode of viewing, as to mental capacity in full; so also is it part of star-symbolism, needful to wholeness of this, that the kind of star-science concerned shall analogously be limited, and most specially allowed for as such. That is: in all use of the symbol that is strict to its purpose, there must clearly be perceived how short of scientific is necessarily the Astronomy that is available:—how, if not requiring quite to be degraded into Ptolemaic, yet eminently it must be less than Copernican:—an Astronomy, of necessity *sui generis*, indeed, although still in conformity, by hypothesis, with true principles of even riper than Copernican Astronomy.—The only meaning of subjectivity is, that to the Mind under influence of it all objects of mental vision are subservient. Mind, solely, is system-centre in itself to all images it produces; and thus, on postulate, is real sun, while these, one and all, are its planets.

But this, evidently, is a self-contradiction, as to that accepting only of Deity for sun which is instinctive, and here admitted for indispensable. And have I not already, in my first scheming-out of this subject, made implication of the inevitableness of this duplicity, attached to relationism; with this same kind of expression of the nature of it? Let me ask my reader to compare with this present exposition the counter-one of my first volume, where similarly I have spoken of mental judgments as *subjectively* describable for either "heliocentric" or

"geocentric", although otherwise there is needed standard of only the latter kind (I. 480-4). And farther let me now say, for illustration,—additionally to what before I have been saying as to my own experience with the symbol,—that the perplexity of this liability to duplicity has been constant to me, in the difficulty both of holding the right mode of the symbol that was true to the occasion, and of doing so with as yet no ability of showing reason, why the apparent inconsistency was in reality the necessity of the case.\* Thus, lately I spoke of "axis" of general Being; and eminently, in an earlier case, I assumed the idea of "gravitation" as expressive of the nature of moral obligation, due from individuals to an imaginary centre of the imaginary whole of moral beings (I. 396). But in both of these cases, and in whatever may have been similar, the character of my aim has been general, and in so far scientific, however always subjective at basis. Here, on the contrary,—in the matter of this chapter,—I am purely subjective, and thence individualistic; and therefore is it that now I take standpoint that is virtually a solar one: ignoring all station but the actual, and thus compelling even the sun-image to revolve as a planet around me. And herein is the principle non-Copernican, at once, and un-Ptolemaic:—because really what I am conceiving for system, is more appropriate of the two to a centre in the actual system's sun, supposed as giving birth to its planets, than to one in the actual earth.

Thus Astronomy, by its own history, affords me immediately the due footing of distinction to be held by, in

\* Let me not omit to add, however, that this vindication of perplexity inherent to the subject, is by no means intended to cover what may farther have been caused by my own want of mastering the symbol with sufficient nicety:—too often, I am afraid, making difficulty that at once is redoubled and needless.

this setting up of Subjective Classification : namely, as essentially on lower ground of intellection than the Objective mode.

And hence I may pass to the phenomenon practically chief in the case :—that of the apparent *externalness* of the images which are products of the mind, to the mind that reflectively judges of them. That is : to the mind that ceases to take these for its habitual worlds of conception, and that gazes on them only, by reflection, as on stars shining downwards.

The great instance of duplicity which this implies, refers us eminently to a solution for which Time-in-as-cendant marks the posture required. It refers us to Psychic History, dynamically to be interpreted by that doctrine of Evolution, under principle of which only has the power of explaining it at all even dawned on the world :—while this still belongs only to a heightening of the principle that may answer to the distance in this case of its objects. The Ideals now in question are those of the power of producing which anew there is nothing now left to us ; any more than indeed is there power to us of creating new worlds and new stars. And hence, alienated as this makes us from ability of entering with directness into the manner of their originating, we can do so alone by a process of Evolutionism that becomes complicated as follows :—by a calculating, sympathetically, of those phenomena of the inter-relations of the Ideals, historically exhibited, which, as connected of necessity with the relation held by each to the soil whence it sprang, must inevitably be our guide to the latter. And such process as this, involving a still-retained connection with that abolished experience which it nevertheless preserves the full advantage, in a religious sense, of



regarding as essentially external, may I not well describe as I have done, for effect of mental perspective, in regulating to us our consciousness of what is psychic distance?

The fact so represented I would figure to be this. To each individual thinker holding subjective station, his own mind, cast reflectionally upwards, forms a frame upon which, from the moment of his first mental awaking, he sees mirrored to him these star-like intuitions: which, all apart from him as they appear to be, intelligence has to show him, notwithstanding, for evolved, revolutionally, on a plan that is persistent, from the mass of precedent metaphysical intellection. The very meaning of such retrospect being taken thus under subjective condition, at once statically and individually, I consider for equivalent, of necessity, with that of the afforded control over distance, by regard to present point-of-view, which rightfully perspective has the force of expressing:—since a bringing in this way of its views into plan is always and essentially subjectivity's concern.

And the idea being admitted, how immediately does the import of Ideals for true "signs" of mental course appear established;—and with speciality as to that "distance" of the subject where otherwise all tracing is impossible! Far off in the utter depths of all history, where else everything is impenetrable of human living and human thinking, these still are the evidences preserved, for philosophy's vision, of what indeed has existed there of such, to amount unimaginable. Shining out from the dimness—so deep that the sky they are set in is only by them shown apart from the plains they hang over,—they are landmarks celestial, printed luminously for all time, of what mind has been doing on the earth for creating of itself, from the earliest of all of those busy multitudinous emotions which the mist covers in!—Nay, even

as to that stage of very birth to the mind, which means its spreading out for itself in any way a reflectional canopy to give home to its stars!

And this, again, concerns the need, so vital to the symbol, of its stars' becoming *planets*. For, let historical details disappear:—let there only be left, on the subjective frame which makes "sky" to each one of us, that pure and solemn loneliness of star-objects, which is properly the night-aspect of the subject:—and whatever was before understood by "perspective", with strained inference of inclusion of motion, is now easily and most perfectly comprehended in the planetary implication: what before were historical "ranges of effects" (p. 188) being still represented by the varying planes in which the mind's luminaries are believed to have held course, as reflecting the mind's own revolving. But a new kind of anomaly, it is true, is thus forced into subjective Astronomy: making necessary a blending into one of rotations that in physics should be separately daily and annual:—since, while always is the changing from sun-effect to night-effect the mind's necessary action, the complicating with this of effects drawn from History, means evidently the involving it with an incomparably-magnified cycle of rotation. Under aspect therefore always of mere day-and-night alternation, must be accredited for included all the ulterior phenomena of summer and winter.

But here does the subject so widen, that two separate treatments must be followed. The personal side of the symbolism becomes one with Mythology; while that which is Astronomic is too complicated for uniting with it. The latter, therefore, I will henceforth reserve till I shall have sufficiently handled the former.

And truly is the complication of Mythology, in itself,

enough of a mesh to be entangled in !——But I trust to the clue I am furnished with ! That clue is the clue of metaphysical sympathy ; and the principle which I have adopted for myself has a basis that *insures* this for present.

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The matter of Mythology has, in fact, been prepared to the full, and in manner most effectual, for the use I would now make of it. Partly by assortment that has sprung naturally, and partly by direct means of philosophy, exerted generally on History, already is established into popular recognition that connection between characters of nations and of national religions, which makes proper beginning to the classifying endeavour now in question.\* And thus, in my aim at understanding Christianity I have found how this has altogether been simplified to me, as to the accounting for its uniqueness amid the religions of the world, by my considering it, as I have done, for the fruit of specifically two of the nationalized world-religions, which precisely through the specialty of their antagonism have arrived as if into “sex-union” with one another, with completeness unparalleled :—the feminine-natured Hebrew religion, and the masculine Grecian (I. 288-292). And this conception is still what will serve me entirely, as to my now-designed purpose with Mythology.

\* It was not until the design of this chapter was entirely completed that I read, as I have since done, Professor Max Müller's *Lectures on the Science of Religion* ; and became thence acquainted with his proposition of a deeper than national arrangement of religions, to be effected by a scientific classifying of languages. But the popular result seems still so sufficient for my purpose, apart as it is from that of the *Lectures*, that I find no necessity for re-moulding the above : in these there being nothing called in question of that subjective ordering of the products of Mythology, and of weighing out their averages for points of “focal estimation”, which here are concerned ; but exclusively a setting forth of subjective transactions in belief, which indeed on my own plan appear rather for the elements of the *History* of Religion, than rightly for the *Science* of it.

I have need to inquire in what way, and under what forms, the triad of accounted-necessary Ideals may be traced in continuity backwards, through all the distortions and disguises which have hidden-in their meaning for perception in ordinary ; but which easily should be rectifiable if the assertion is true of the exclusive destiny of these three for permanence, out of the objects in general of Mythology.—If, then, my assumption just stated be also true of Christianity ;—and of this, on hypothesis, as representer in the main of religion's whole best of presentation in the world :—if Christianity, namely, be the product of a single pair of wrought systems of Mythology : it follows that the sources also of the Time, Space, and Being-Ideals, must be parted as of severally the two nations' creating, which have served as the parents of Christianity. Such demonstrating of the case is indeed the needful check to its first statement, which alone can prove the accuracy of both.—Let me work therefore on this track. All nations of the world, I make postulate, —as, in reality, all constituents of the nations also,—are to be thought of as having naturally been always *aiming* towards the Triad ; but Greece and Judea are supposable for alone to have succeeded in the aim, and alone by having arrived to coincide in it.

And I have settled the point for myself of *why* the attempt was begun upon, and *why* it was necessarily universal !—here is the “insurance of sympathy” I assert. All mankind, of one blood upon the earth, have been striving from the beginning, and evermore yet must continue to strive, to gain Thought-reconciliation with Death. This, I am convinced, is the import of religious imagery in common, from the crudest kinds of fetishism of barbarians, up to dogmas of St. Paul, and thence onwards. —My clue, therefore, is in hand ; and I have certainty

of being at home, with at all events an inherited self-interest, just as truly—however in less degree,—in the concerned matter of old Grecian devices, as hitherto I have felt myself in that of Hebrew ones.

Let me first resume my conclusions about the latter. —Hebrewism, I conceive, was successful towards creating the due Triad, alone in production of the stock-idea of Being: and because of the proper relationism that it gave to this, uninterruptedly from the beginning. Individuation, as an abstract idea, springs only from understanding of relations, such as pertain to the Individual; and the understanding of these, by my scheme, comes alone through Religion. But Jehovah of the Hebrews, even as a national God,—even as a family God,—was deified in sole for his relation to them. His protectorship, his kingship, his fatherhood, in a national sense, over them, was exclusively the reason for the worship they paid to him. And just as much for this oneness of attribute, in reality, as for his standing for the One amongst gods, do I believe that his worship became permanent in the world, for the world's never-effaceable root-image of deity:—whence Hebrew Mythology is uniquely Theology. That is, through its blending with Hellenism; though otherwise all incapable of arriving at the effect. For by the union was the Fatherhood over Hebrews produced fully into that over an Israel universal:—the typified Son of a typified Parent, who therein had condition for ripening—when Thought-occasion, as alternating with Feeling, should make lapse of the typicalness demanded,—into purely the abstraction of Fatherhood simple, which, by the implication of general Son-ship bound up with it, qualifies with entireness our subjective status of Existence:—our consciousness, namely, of being offspring of the Past of human beings, and destined engenderers of the Future of our race.

Let this religionism of the Hebrews, however, as being rightful of the kind, be now contrasted with what is parallel to it in the working of Hellenism. Cogitation of the Grecians aimed also towards Fatherhood: since otherwise it would have yielded not any religion;—and yet still, with such feebleness in the aim as that truly was its religion attained but a virtual un-religion. For, notably was the Zeus it created a Father-god comparable with others of the kind. And accordingly were his attributes *not* single but divided. The paternity of this Jove-Father was correspondingly a dwindled and unconcentrated relation,—as unfitted to prosecute itself, as actually it had little of efficiency to hold practically the religiousness of the Grecians together. This was left thence in fragmentariness:—in the brokenness of polytheism-by-eminence, which the Grecian Mythology is notorious for being; and therein for being eminently the Mythology that, of all others, is the farthest from Theology. Moreover, through defect of this subjective centre, must also the general sense of Nature have failed in comprehensiveness.\* The aspect of thought-images, in symbolic depiction, must have been that of a firmament all over sown as with dottings of stars, not replaceable ever by the glory of a solitary sun.

This refers, however, to the Mythology that was “popular”; and to this as merely judged of with the slightest kind of judgment. But the “focal estimation” of Metaphysics, when this comes in question, casts centres of due average amid the spheres of the star-dots. And hence even in this full-studded night-heaven of polytheism there may be, as I claim that there is, metaphysically perceptible the action of regulation that is solar-systematic.

\* Without the theological preparation of belief in Deity, as the one Law-giver in Nature, how could it have been possible for the human mind ever to have grasped its present conception of Community of Law-operation?

Two out of the star-host, and those even of the faintest, are discernible to speculation, as I believe, for dividing between them the solar control of the whole number.

It is the primæval stage of Mythology—looming, in Grecian history far behind the popular and conspicuous stage,—that must really have afforded the truest indication of the inward-seated genius of the people. And duly has Philosophy now betaken itself to the exploring of it. But still let me venture on my own interpretation.

The one phantom-sun to be fixed on for true ancestor in-line of our at-present named Ideal of Space, is manifestly Ouranos :—so shadowy a name in Mythology, that scarcely can we image it as having ever been invested with a form to be mentally visioned by! I am farthest from supposing, indeed, that its origin was ideal, in the sense that we now give the term ; but I do suppose, nevertheless, that in this image there was, from the beginning, that quality of relationship to subjective need, retained permanently by us, which also from the beginning made its figuring imperishable.—And let me try to depict what should have been the feeling to produce it.

In the barbaric struggle of thought, common to the whole pristine race of human beings, when the horror was awakened for them of the abstract believing in Death, the Grecians, by hypothesis, proved their actual inability of setting up to the fetish what should properly have been its respondent, in the deifying of the family relations. Yet, this failing, an alternative was at hand, that inferentially may, in a measure, have satisfied the emergency. And that was, in their power of clinging, with new intensity, to their Life, as a thing in possession :—I mean, with intenseness now reflective, super-added to the intenseness of mere impulse. And this kind of resource is what specially it is attributable to this people

to have adopted. The whole course of their polytheism, thenceafter propagated, bears witness, by its satisfying them as it did, to their natural content in the Present :—each instance of their spiritualizing of the fragments of Nature, as such, being the sign, as it also was duplicating cause, of new vividness struck into Nature, for immediate appreciation ; and this, equally whether the fractions were of the universe outside, or had import of the inner sociableness of human life.—But, also in hypothesis, the action of deifying, here as elsewhere, touched primarily *only* on that which seemed farthest from actuality of cognizance. And thus what in reality was a spiritualizing of Present Enjoyment, in its variety of experiences, seems naturally what may then have displayed itself as follows : in creating, for required Death-antagonist, an embodiment of general Nature that expressly should mean her power of maintaining Life : thence naturally the broad firmament, holding man as well as earth in its all-embracing bosom. Hence Ouranos, at the first, I conceive to have been so contrary to what now does the firmament mean, that simply was he the spiritualizing of life-genialness. What gave attribute of god-ship to him, I imagine to have been merely his ability of keeping men out of Hades :—of keeping them alive in warm comfortableness, and safely out of reach of the prison-house of the shades : the damp under-ground dwelling whither shivering human souls, all stripped of their bodies, were tremblingly thought of as being hurried, after sinking under the agonies of dying !\*

Chill image such as this did the Grecians indeed, with their innate magnanimity, retain constantly and consent-

\* The very name of the soul to the Grecian seems to have expressed its association with coldness,—*ψυχή*, as allied with *ψυχος*,—and so to prove their impression of stark dismalness attached to post-mundane existence:—painted



ingly by them; treating it for the mere bugbear which, in self-mockery at their fears of it, they signified it for by the skeleton that they garlanded at their feasts.—But, as to the thought that was united with that of Hades, the thought of Ouranos as the Life-domain, it is manifest how every degree of opening scientific intelligence to this people,—and precisely in respect of that “staticalness” native to them, which, as much as mere life-enjoyment of present opportunities, means a scientific availment of these;—must at once have been a diffusing of the idea of Environment represented by Ouranos; and a tending of this straightway towards the modern-felt conception of the Cosmos,—which again is the metaphysically-turned expression of what in full Metaphysics comes out perfectly as the abstraction of Space.

For the *how* and *why* of this advancing import of Oura-

afterwards so touchingly in the well-known verses of the dying Emperor Adrian,—“*Pallidula, rigida, nudula*,”—never to know jesting any more!

Naturally enough was it, that with such bodings of the soul's destination,—such physical crudeness of psychism,—the ancients should have cared for their tombs, in the way that has been seen as to some of them: furnishing them as *homes* to retire to at death. And in this, I must observe, there seems to me eminently more, in reality, of mere selfish regard, likely in barbarians, than of the sedulous piety towards progenitors for which first it appears. When I read, for instance, of those wondrous mansions laid out for their dead by the Etruscans, I am struck irresistibly with the feeling that it was personal anxiety of the architect in chief for himself, that prompted the construction: namely, that he was mainly desirous in this way to enforce upon his own descendants what they ought to do for him also, as to comforting and feeding him, when he too should become helpless and solely at their mercy, for what still he should be in need of *when* dead and buried.

And similarly does the whole range of worships paid to the dead, *as* dead, show for entirely of the same gross sort, even though the worshipped dead be heroes:—as different as possible from the true spirit of hero-worship which is ennobling in its effect, and therefore, *a priori*, incompatible with barbarism. Hence all of the former kind seems to me inevitably referrible to the fetish stage of worship, representable as Death-worship: under which also I would include that of animals, and generally of everything beneath the full standard of humanity.

nos, however, needs essentially to be remembered the partnership-course of his fellow-ideal—of Time:—alone capable of duly furnishing out the condition of the Space-progress. And here equally does the event appear traceable:—nay, with evidence that immediately is irresistible. How, in fact, is it open to us to doubt, that in the very shape of old Chronos we meet only the embodiment-universal, now adjudged for whole foundation of metaphysics?—the image, namely, of very Death in itself, with only the slender transfigurement upon him, which Grecian intellect and æstheticism were so likely to have devised for him? Most naturally by these may the original grossness of Death's cannibal attributes have been softened into that poetry of the mystic hour-glass and scythe, which are still, and must ever be, the emblematical bespeakers of Time the Devourer. Such nobleness and such beauty of imaginative effort as the transition implies—with its involved object of setting up due antagonist to the Life-image,—give assuredly self-evidence of the reality of the occurrence! It would be a step for the human intellect to have taken,—out of the crudest kind of embodying of mere terror, into the permanent enshrining of the deepest awe-inspired feeling,—that must rank among the very grandest that intelligence has accomplished:—signifying also what unrealizable amount of life-prosecuted thought-action in the beings that had concern in it!—And yet still would the event so attributed to the Time-ideal be scarcely more than a match for what has just been supposed of its fellow-ideal, as to resolution of Ouranos into Space.

The inter-influence of the two for refinement of one another, and with specialty as found acting towards effect of harmony by contrast, I conceive to be exhibited through the whole general character of the mythology ensuing.

And at all events I may glance at two sets of consequences, in evidence.—The one is, the ever-corporealizing of the Space-implication, as towards rightful consummation of its own sort ; while respondent to the spiritualizing of the Time-import.—The other is, that device of the mythology, so constant and so strange, of a perpetual resource to incongruous relations, assigned to its incessantly-multiplying deities : filial made exchangeable with conjugal. A statical partnership, mingling harmony with opposition,—I claim it for the necessity of instinct,—can only be referred to that of sex : whence each several attempt to fill in the two required aspects, of corporeal and spiritual, to each portion of Nature in course of being deified, must inevitably have caused a mating of the one deified side with the side that was wanting : while, in the circumstance of the case, the corporeal side was in ordinary made feminine. And yet necessarily must this arrangement have been neutralized whenever and wherever the need of attention to sequence intervened, as dominating in importance over staticalness ;—and the wife thus have been forced into daughter. Nay, into daughter that was interchangeable with mother : accordingly, or not, as higher dignity was to be given her. Thus it would seem, as to Ouranos, that it was precisely at first for the upholding of him in the spiritualness that was desired for him, that Terra was given to him as consort. And yet in Terra herself we may preferably see a coincident aspect, that, with sequence for our object, would make her the precedent over Ouranos in spiritualness : namely, as identifying her with Vesta, the primal Fire-image, which much better than Ouranos *may* have accounted primævally for Life-presence in the world ; while by this she would be rendered his precursor. And so, in all similar cases. In all it would appear, that while the attribution of conjugality was requisitely the expression of

contrariety of species under sameness of class : the very effect of the exposed difference was that of raising question of priority—of predominating excellence interpreted as chronological precedence.

And this sifting of the imaged characters, both in terms of coincidence and of sequence, could no otherwise have resulted than in clearing and realizing the respective Ideals. —But not, however, with success that was complete : not with the success that a conflict merely dual has no power of affording, if a third influence, as believed, is in need to be added. And in fact did the Grecian *philosophy*, as distinct from the faith merely popular, show the instinct both to see, and in a measure to fill up, the deficiency as to the third required compliment, of idealized Being. A trinity, it recognized by intuition, was the form of division indispensable. And rightfully it set itself to work with experiments at constructing the hypostases that should answer. It even went so far with the work as to cast forth successfully, as appears, that very abstraction of the “World,” as needed second to a ruling Intelligence, which fairly and fully corporealized that bodily side of Nature which injuriously at the first was ignored : thus affording the certain ground for what now is the Space-ideal, projected through abstraction of its contents.—Nevertheless, even here, the part of Greece must be held at an end. And similarly as to the Time-ideal : whose needed inclusion of developmental effects lay manifestly beyond Grecian power of accomplishment.—Hence, while the tri-une conception that was started, in being naturally the religious one that it is, went over into the Hebrew alliance ; the two secular Ideals were also naturally left by Greece for western nations to ripen : which nations again, *are* made competent to the work through precisely their inheriting what religion, as Christianity, has furnished for *them* of the

integral perception *not* possible to Greece through default of religion.

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And now let me return to the symbol, to bring this, by a quasi-astronomic unfolding of it, into actual adaptedness to the psychical process.—Change introduced into the method of the latter, *when* regarded as the matter of the historical cycle of observation, is assumed, it must be remembered, for the analogue of what season-variation in physics becomes, if this be regarded as super-added in one plan with diurnal rotation. That is, if the alternating between day and night be imagined for enhanced into a veering between summer and winter.—This anomalous condition of astronomy, involved in the peculiarity of metaphysics, I conceive to be capable, in reality, of giving causative explanation of the phenomena, *more* truly such than is science's explanation on its own ground of the mere physical changes : just because the one matter of our revolving as between sense of Deity and defect of this, accounts here for the every thing of phenomena that are possible.

And for the sign of this effective simplicity, under high complication, is the fact, that whatever is concerned of explanation, is comprisable within two definite points : these, farther, being intrinsically but one. They are the following.

The first has relation to the import of planetary *axis* : notably, in physics, the exponent of right, through its mode of inclination, to the matter of all season-variation. This, as to psychical culture, must obviously be taken, under present design, for a balanced mental status, between the triply-ordered departments of culture, such as now approves itself for desirable :—that is, the felicitous-felt adjustment between the three, which, for habitual position,

does indeed give the same sort of command over its functions to the mind, as that which an axis has the nature of giving.—But in astronomy, moreover, it appears, that so far from the adjustment which now subsists having always been such, we may actually, by considering fellow-planets to our own, with their varied inclinations of axis, read the history of variations that have happened to our own axis :—in the same way that in history we find varying and progressive dispositions of culture. And thus fully does the symbol seem to answer to the usage intended.

Let, however, the second point be conjoined, and the axial variation, as watched from its outset, obtains rational cause! And that means, as afforded in the analogy, so inevitable to be recognized, between thought-operation and *polarization*. These two matters of analogy combined,—the mind's need of an *axis*, and its habit of ever striking out opposites for very means of intelligence :—we seem actually to touch, for explanation of our experience, on the intensest of all conceivable spheres of explanation!

A one-sided notion on any subject, that has *not* had its magnetizing effected—that has *not* had due North and South of direction made out for it,—is obviously *not* intellectual. It is merely the apprehension of sensism, flatly superficial. But the instant that it hovers between its positive and negative, its character of intellection is produced. Let the mind then be thought of as a mass of such particles, demanding in several the character, yet only being capable of obtaining it when the mass in itself shall have realized a magnetism in general : in the waiting for which, the particles are left floating and purposeless. Surely the very fact of rotation, for the habit of the mass, does explain with all simpleness, how thence the “electric predilections” of the particles, as with common consent of these, might turn them into uniform direction,

and thus yield the mass its virtual linear fulcrum, transverse to the rotation, whereof one end should thenceforward be the pole that attracts the compass, and the other should be the pole that does not!—Like consequence to this, on the physical side, appears certainly to attend on rotation.

But let this kind of consequence *be* accepted, as transferable from physics into symbolism ; and therein be associated with what here has been assigned for the world-like creation of Ideals (ch. I.): and immediately is supplied status for an axis-variation, to be mentally measured by phenomena of Ideals. By the matter of my first chapter, namely, I have figured respecting these star-like productions of mentation, that specifically are they accounted for by our seeing them as the fruits of prosecuted mind-action, in the directions that they severally represent : so that each of them, regarded in directness, bears witness to an axial inclining of the mind, respectively adapted to such several view. Moreover, as to the process of abstraction with which the mental revolving is attended that works out the burning line of intuitional light :—the one point of importance is manifestly the eliminating of whatever in mind-action is essentially intellectual, from that only partially such ; or, in the beginning, from that which in no degree is such. For a right moulding of the analogy with planet-formation, therefore, needs only to be reflected how the mind, in its originating, *was* truly an aggregation of bare sense-impressions, in the same way that were planets of mere solitary molecules. Both, namely, are assumable alike for only this : the products of amassing, under effect of rotation. But farther : just as molecules, in single, are inferrible for yet various in their primal constitution, out of congregations of atoms : whence, those which are of chemical laying-out are of action that is not like the action of the mechanically-disposed ;—so equally

are the sentient impressions at variance ; and mainly as to outwardness and innerness of action. And naturally is thence cause shown, in this very character of distinction, for the thwartness to ensue, to the end, between currents of mind-action intellectual and moral. For, granting that in its nature is Intellect the proper *Iron* of the mind : it follows how analogous of right must have been its first assignment into mental condition, with the introduction into planet-nature of *magnetic* disposition : always rectangular, or nearly so, to the path of prevailing rotation :—so that, in counting the ordinary level of mentation for horizontal, what is pure intellection must be thought of lying North-and-South.—Nor only this ; but where this much is allowed, does there farther become obvious, how, in times past, when intellection was in less degree pure than now,—when it was only in progress of abstracting itself into the purity that is actual,—so also must the *axis* thence furnished have been unfelicitous in proportion.

This seems to me, in fact, the only means, the true means, of regulating our estimation of intellect's ascendancy over mentalism in general.—Necessarily, in this view, must the magnetic disposition of the Iron-like constituent of the mind, serve for index of its culture and its ripened constitution ; but only as accompanied by—only as, in reality, occasioned by—an opposite ascendancy of moral kind. Necessarily must the Intellect be remembered for inseparably lying thwart-ways to Intuition.—But still, this bare opposing of conditions—this restrictedly *polarizing* of the subject,—is not what suffices in the case ; not by any means what makes up to the full the required explanation of axis-variation. For this, I am contending, needs an influence that is triple : while the necessary third element is also not wanting. That is, in the effect of sheer Sensism, remaining permanently as this does to



the mind, even after Intelligence and Emotion have been severally completed in their characters.

Sheer Sensism, when this also is ripened, I conceive for produced into that "feeling of the Actual", both in Science and Sociality, which characteristically was exhibited in Greece:—a feeling that, in itself, is essentially as desirable for human beings as can possible be either interest in History, or aspiration towards Progress.—For the symbol, then, I would always make account of sheer sensism for the proper self-status of the planet: that is, in the beginning, its status pre-eminently of internalized heat—giving impulse that, in the nature of it, acts oppositively to the ordered rotation:—the latter being considered as sole product of Sun-creation, for its principle of perpetual regulation: which, for an influence that is "tropical", comes in turn to be contrasted, in sequel, by an influence that is accountable for "polar."—Thus here appears naturally the means to that rightful condition of axis—neither crudely under influence equatorial nor polar,—which inferribly *may* have resulted from a progress on this triply-laid basis of impulse:—the true compromise which represents effect of culture in the matter, being always assumed for that due blending of climates equatorial and polar which in Astronomy is now shown us for the state of our earth, and which has for its expression the "angle of the ecliptic."

But in mental Astronomy—I have noted the phenomenon (I. 484),—the *ecliptic* is to be counted as *equator*. And here is the magnified difference between day and night-postures which peculiarly is in need to be signified. Nay, more than this, if electric predilections are allowed for: since, obviously, if the mere fact of the ecliptic's lying north of the equator, as to the point of its giving status to the mind, is equivalent to the assertion for it of

a lengthened day-summer and a shortened night-winter ; yet the one side of the globe of the mind, to which magnetism that is positive is needful, ought naturally to give preference to the influence which is arctic, such as is not given by the contrary side. And is not this typified by precisely the fact that, in earth-habitation, it is actually the tropical climates that South of the equator are mainly the peopled ones ; while North of it the case of predominance is the reverse ?—as, in mentalism also, is an answering actuality not wanting any more, but is afforded in the sexual variation of human beings. The everything of required effect in the symbol of this sort, is however present in the mere statement of the equivocation now referred to, as pertaining to the very meaning of the “ecliptic.” For at once is it apprehensible how inevitably it happens, as familiarly we remember it to do, that what axis-movement brings of *winter* to the one-half of the globe, is identifiable with *summer* to the other half. But to this let there be added effect of “preferences” held respectively, and everything is supplied which should signify—and in fact adequately explain,—the phenomena of the experiences, so incongruous but compatible, which *are* those of Science and Religion. To the former, as we know, it is naturally *genial* to have night-season long, in the sense now attributed to night—of pure intellection, which, because it is such, is reversely to Religion only strained and *un-genial*. To the mood proper to Religion, on the contrary, what seems desirable to be lengthened can only be that which to feeling is *day*. Best admitting to be shortened to Science ;—while the best of what Science in itself has of day, is to Religion the mere mockery of true sunshine which is the utmost that polar regions can show, in the phase characteristic to *them*.—it is only the mere reddening at noon of

an arctic winter sky, in the place where of right the sun should be.

And now let me try the application of this ordering of the symbol, to the matter I have designed for subjection to it: namely, to the psychical history, correspondently produced into metaphysical presentation, as under those highly-strained fruits of pure thinking which make up thought's trinity: each of them, in several, a pure Absolute Existence for thought, sovereign in dominion over thought, while yet each a negation of reality, such as ordinarily is so accounted. What the symbol has the power to do with them, I believe, is no less than to depict the very mode of their generation.

Mental revolving, previous to ability of thought-imagery, I suppose was analogous with mere rotation antecedent to gravitation: that is, not rotation at all in the sense of being subject to regulation. It must have been only the un-axial movement which should have originated with interior heavings:—themselves, let me fancy, occasioned by internal contention between oppositely-natured particles: “chemical” ones, of which naturally the demand was for an entering into external relations; “mechanical” ones, seeking always to abide within statical disposition. The primitive interior of the planetary thought-masses must actually have been that which the symbol requires, of mere psychical earth-furnaces: seething up to the brim with importunate desires, passion-hot with brute selfishness, which continually by fierce impulses made vent of out-pourings;—and precisely by so doing, it is to be inferred, diffused rightfully the volcano's contents in rich elements of fertility over the part where well-being demanded the diffusion. Namely, over that surface of moral nature where true harmony of chemistry with staticism has first its

beginning in created Moral Atmosphere, henceforth to subsist as reflectional setting prepared for thought-images. By the sense of Environment thus conditioned, alone I conceive furnished the control of the over-flow of passions, which in the end, by the means of thought-images, has to perfect the regulation of self-movement into rightfully-gravitating revolution. And accordingly have I admitted it in plan for that recognized principle of Limitation, circumstantially set upon Selfism, which from the first must have had what ever since has belonged to it, of moral function potential. The question to ensue is therefore : in what way should this principle be imagined to have acted, so as naturally to have caused what is found, in experience, for the event wrought out by the regulating effect?—My own present proposition is, that it did, and could only, so act, by the three-fold distribution of motive agencies which my symbol has the means, and exclusively, of explaining. And my argument in proof is the following.

Intellection by its nature is reflection :—I take therefore even the lurid glarings, which barbarian passions must have cast on whatever was barbarians' general view of things, as predestined awakeners of real intellect to them. And when the intensity of them amounted to a proper sense of Death, as that of Life-limitation produced into definiteness ; so also, I argue, must have tended to increase their demand for mental Light, as made out to them by that very feeling of Darkness, which the glarings had before and initially made visible. But this purposeful demand, in itself, must have steadied in a measure the purposeless preceding up-heavings of the mind. What then is more natural than to recognize, that in proportion as self-motion of mere passion became steady, the glarings should concentrate, so as finally to result into Sun-effect

of Deity, such as actually should at intervals disperse with habitualness the felt Darkness ; and with it the dead Glacialness of terror ? Sense of Deity, at even its crudest beginning,—even when the god that was imaged was itself but in grossest repetition of mere savagery,—must still have afforded to barbarians, in alternation with a contrary feeling, that which was better to them than a living without it. It must have yielded them a torrid satisfaction, and ferocious contentedness with life, that not otherwise they had known ; or, in other aspect, a Thought-Limitation was indeed given form to, which Nature set stamp on, as rightfully for the time respondent-required to her fact of Circumstantial Limitation.—But, farther, regulation such as this now afforded to human estimate of Circumstance, by creation of such Sun, was the same with creating an equator to the mind ;—and this, with an affording of condition for magnetism, as process henceforward set forth of intellection-in-proper. For Ideal of Deity, in proportion as true state of intellection was present, demanded a true opposite-in-negative, to answer its own positiveness. And yet, from the first, was the polarizing effort not direct, but subjected to the alternation destined always to attend it, accordingly as either intellectually-electric disposition should be in prevalence, or that of the positiveness which is moral :—the which states have been typically exhibited by respectively the Hebrews and Grecians. Mentalism of the Hebrew kind must be thought of as so mainly “equatorial”, as that never, in itself, did it work out polarization for its idea of Deity at all. Mentalism of the Grecian sort, oppositely, must be figured as so slightly “equatorial”, that it acted to excess in the matter of the idealizing of Death,—raising *this* into a virtual sun-ship, though only in that still “polar” character, which signifies the negation of religiousness that is proper :

so that, here, in proportion as the polar fires of out-bursting internalism died out, what was left for their substitute was only the cold sense of Time.

Wherever, and in whatever degree, Death in itself has been worshipped, the subjective result must necessarily have been that of Death's image forming the virtual Sun to the mind. And thus, of the whole stage of this incipient Mythology, we can only now feel, "how great must have been the darkness" to men, with such depth of it for "the light that was in them!"—In *coldness*, however, must the worship of Time, as abstract reflection of Death-effect, have purely surpassed that of Death-worship. And accordingly, in Grecian poetry—which naturally supplies the true history of the case,—this shows in the awfulness, beyond anything to be compared with it in idealism, of the Grecian form of Destiny:—of that which, to Grecians, bore the meaning of such crushing as well as icy supremacy, that, by the farthest-seeing possible of intellectual intuitions, they admitted it for Devourer of *gods*, over and above its being Devourer of men:—they owned it, by prescience, for Destroyer of Thought-systems, as well as of mere form-existences!

That which was to give counteraction to this glacial apprehension, was the thereon-ensuing idealization of Sensism, as planetary Self-Life, tending to give a fellow-kind of Absoluteness, or Thought-negativeness, to Space. But, in hindrance of this, the symbol implies, of the Self-Life of the mind, that precisely through want of yet-afforded "equatorial" regulation, this remained incompetent to a more than quite inadequate exertion of the electrical function for the adjustment:—true effect of this sort resting naturally with a parallel intellectualizing of the third Ideal, of Being; while as yet this was far from being ripened for the effect. That is, there was nothing yet

attained of the realized self-consciousness respecting the sun-image of Deity, known duly for such, which, *when* realized to the human mind in the light of being still only the product of reflection, even in its utmost of day-brightness, becomes capable, for the first time, of being intellectually resumed in star-character of idealized Being. Next, therefore, must be considered the real means to this event.

Creation of the Being-Ideal, as an Absolute Thought-image, can only have been produced by the idealizing of internalness in the manner of an influence of true Moral control :—without which the nature of sheer Sensism, even accompanied with high Intellect, sinks only to the degradation of mere Sensualism, such as notably was the sign of false development in Greece. Nor, on the other hand, can Morality produce for itself a really directing kind of influence, so long as the power that is motive to it remains felt for *apart* from the mind, with such absoluteness of apartness as pertained to the original understanding of personified Deity. But then, what actually did serve towards creating of real Conscience, as Self-regulator within the mind, was, by the view of Christianity here arrived at, precisely what now may be symbolized in the very terms needed of a ripening of the Ideal of Time, by commingling and contrasting with effects of its fellow-Ideals. That is : as to the result of belief in Retribution, which, in acting upon Present-Life considerations, with enforcement that was outward in the same way that Deity was outward, cast inevitably onwards the expectation of Retribution into that sphere of Time-to-come, which, as adapted to Deity, possessed necessarily for the mind the un-limitation that gave aspect of Eternity ;—while, again, this very depicting of the Divine share in the Time-idea, had the double effect of first raising into metaphysical correspondence with

itself the thought of Time Past ; and thence, of leaving but the pitifullest idea of the sphere of Time proper to men—the meagre six-thousand of years, which lay bounded between the six-days' creation of earth, and the fiery day of ending for it, that was first to introduce Judgment at the close. As soon, however, as the futility of this mode of division was made clear to human intellect, for unauthorized and unnatural, through the mind's coming to be aware of Deity's real immanence in human nature, the elaborated Time-distinctions were immediately rectifiable into such as had purely the effect of completing the metaphysical abstractness of the Ideal. Time, namely, became henceforth but the same with Eternity ; while the idealized compartments, of Time-Future and Time-Past, contributed mutually now towards only a giving of full share in the abstract importance to Time-Present, in conjunction.

Also, though with lesser effect, has the Space-Ideal gained improvement out of polarized contrast made with Being, as well as with Time. For the concreteness that was in the incipient conception of a Cosmos, while set against a Deity not-immanent in nature ; and that in this kind of contrast has been seen to allot to Deity, for share in nature, the sole province of what stood for "Soul" to nature, and to man what stood only for nature's "Body":—when it arrived to undergo contrast in which immanence of Deity was recognized, gave way instantly to that idealizing of "Body", as into a level with the pure thought-nature already at least intended to be given to "Soul", which indeed was preparation for true realizing of conceptions both of Space and of Being. That is, Space became continually eliminated more and more from remembrance of what were occupiers of Space ; as Being from particular exemplars of Being.—And yet never, by the nature of



it, has the Space-idea been inter-blended with religiousness, in the manner or to the extent of the Time-idea:—bespeaking all along that absence of native kinship to be found at the end between Science and Religion, which contrarily *is* to be recognized between Religion and History. And this, again, is betokened by the fact, that never in their schemings have men actually aspired at that identifying of themselves with Deity in regard to Space, which they have aspired to virtually in regard to Time. Never have they actually supposed of themselves, that they were sharers with Deity in Space-ubiquity, as they have supposed themselves to be in possession of Eternity.

And even in this latter circumstance seems to me indicated what is requisite for winding up the whole effect of the symbol into the result that I contemplate for it. Namely, as to the power in mental culture, thus ideally represented, of showing its due analogue to that properly finishing point of all actual planetary development, which the conditioning of seasons is: by means of supervening control of an ecliptic on movement equatorial, inclining the planet's axis. For, as the meaning of this conditioning seems implicated indeed with "predilections", appearing those of respectively the two hemispheres which the equator marks out;—so, mentally it correspondently appears, that a preference for Time-respects over Space-respects, in the religiously-assorted character of mind, opposedly to the scientific, may naturally account for two several modes of culture, revolutionally brought about, having likeness to those hemispheres in precisely this matter of their possession of seasons. The settlement of the mind's plan of rotation which *is* culture, needs a balancing between its three several influencers of direction:—the polarizing influence of Intellect; the centralizing influence of Emotion-by-reflection; and the Self-influence of that surface mind-

action which bears contact with Environment. And therefore, since the latter, represented by the Space-Ideal, is necessarily always tending to excess while development remains actually proceeding; it may well be, inferribly, that a mingling of the other two—the signifiers of History and Ontology,—may suffice to support alternation of the kind that is supposed: between two modes of culture, desirable both in themselves and for the giving of mutual efficacy to one another, which therein appear naturally the mind's Winter and Summer dispositions of axis.

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Let this much suffice, then, for explanation of what I mean by Star-Symbolism:—utterly inadequate as it is for a due elaboration of the matter comprehended.—And now it seems best, before passing to what next lies in train to be considered, to attempt, more distinctly than heretofore, a general statement of the argument involved.

My aim, let it be remembered, is that of throwing into one the entire plan of Mind's dealing with Nature. I have design to make it show for self-evident, that the whole character of Mind-operation is purely and solely that which answers to character gleaned, indirectly, out of Nature's observation:—namely, as duplicated by reflection.

I have already said (pp. 153-4), that the fullest of assistance from Science to Metaphysics lies in the prepossession afforded, that “all parts of *thought*” will prove to “have the same mode of action and re-action on one another, which *by* thought has been discovered to pervade all parts of *nature*.” But by the now-designed method of metaphysics, I am endeavouring to fill in this scheme by a definite institution of connection between Thought and Nature, as to *Forms* thence ensuing, material and mental.

A *Form* arrived at definitely and persistently, is manifestly the accompaniment, and required indication, of realized Integration of the physical kind; nor, I argue, is it in any degree less so where the Integration is spiritual. And if farther it be admitted, that indeed to the latter is appropriate, as now asserted, the two-fold mode of Integration established for intrinsic to the former, the analogy is complete for the end that I design :—with exception as to principle of reversed order of dignity.

Wherever there has mentally been made estimation of the fact found in Nature, of integral parts systematically “acting and re-acting on one another,” a Mental Integration is manifestly as attributable for produced as the physical one represented. And why should not the same thing be true of that higher kind of Mental Integrations which indeed are only secondarily related to physical realities : having respect to what absolutely are Non-existences in Nature, in being Absolute Abstractions to Thought? I contend that as, primarily, the all-comprehending idea of Deity is an Integrated Metaphysical Reality; so the three great subordinate ideas of large class-divisions of the Circumstance of our existence, Time, Space, and the principle of Self-Being, are also true Integrated Realities :—in the latter’s being taken for, in one, the whole linked continuity of consecutive developments of Being. The only thing wanting, I consider, is to prove how the Abstractions have indeed continuity *as* consecutive and *as* truly linking them together, as precisely the natural formations which are primitively-classed for such in Nature; and which therein they reflectionally repeat.

Let me state the proposition in the terms of the old argument of “Design”: as supposing of Nature that at first she took counsel with herself, as to laying out her plan of creation.—What by primitive philosophy was

attributed to her, we know, with a view to this, was, that she made for herself "types" at the beginning, whereon afterwards were all forms to ensue to be moulded. In philosophy experiential then also, I contend, there must rightfully be acknowledged what practically amounts to the same thing, only closer to the purpose, in the matter being rather described thus. Namely, that, in perceiving at starting how her impulse for creation was leading her on to unmanageable multiformity of structures, she prudently controlled this by the Prescience which informed her, that for feasible arrangement it would be well to assort them—as human Thought, since it came, has precisely assorted them,—into Mineral and Vegetable and Animal divisions of Form-structure. Such conclusion, however, for arrived at by Nature, we might exactly express by saying that she gained "abstract ideas" of these destined divisions: the three types of these classes being just her own Thought-Integrations pre-realized for such to herself.—But, if so, there is herein supplied the very rationale to a systematized principle of Symbolism: showing duly the likeness-with-difference, and no more than this, which of right should exist between *our* abstract viewing, and that which by us is attributable to Nature. That is, if indeed be demonstrable the continuity in our own case, of the kind that is demanded.

In what manner Nature herself passes on from her mineral Ideal, *per saltum*, to the distinct one presently to be considered, may perhaps really have no other interpretation for us than *by* our reflection, with due allowance, on the process-correspondent of our own Thought! Let me explain, then, my design as to the latter.

I imagine that the effect of transition from Thought "mineral" to "vegetal", occurs still under no more than a need of an habitual re-modelling of divisions in the

subject-matter, such as duly may accommodate the plan of these to alternately the two sides of mentalism. For, while to Science the polarizing action of all Intellect makes necessary and sufficient a dividing in Two ;—never can this satisfy the opposite mental frame, through precisely the mind's being *not* all pure Intellect: whence inevitably it recurs to a dividing in Three,—although again this must subside into the dual mode, in a new form, as soon as Intellect masters the occasion. Thus in fact I would reduce the whole matter of continuity, both natural and mental, into a “law” making assertion of this need.

The adaptation that such “law” has to Mentalism, in regard to its here-believed essential two points, is the following. These are, the mind's need of contrasted images; and of their being held in a state of balancing oscillation: while the condition seems fulfilled, to the Metaphysical temper, by—on the one hand, its allying of its own conscious Images with the action of Nature's *mineral* Ideal;—on the other, by its responding to this, in a large and ostensible fashion, with the integral method of Ontological interpretation, which of right is the habitual practice of Mentalism. And, if to Nature's three divisions in series, of Mineral, Vegetal, and Animal, there be added what Subjectivity makes necessary, of a fourth division as *Mental*, this is properly in accordance with the stated habit of Metaphysics, in all cases of series, of taking charge for itself of the “extremes”, and leaving to Science the “means” (p. 249). On its own side, moreover, Science *has*, I believe, dealt symbolically with these “means”:—using for the one element of oscillation that un-mental animal type which seems generally implied in the scheme of “Selection”;—for the other, the Tree-type, notoriously the instrument of the Author of that scheme in his detailed exposition of the theory. This dual arrangement, besides,

while as such it suits specially an intellectual posture of self-consciousness, is responded to equally by what Intellect comes inevitably to do with Nature's three-fold division, on its own account: namely, in simplifying these into classes of "organic and inorganic."

And this necessity to Thought, if admitted for such, of continually re-furnishing its own plan of dividing natural objects in classes, adds only confirmation to my first-stated idea of metaphysical working: that, while need of but one single definition of its material is started with, the need is by communion with Science rendered four-fold (I. 35). The crudely-subjective view of Nature sees Mind diffused everywhere; while this is by Science chastened thoroughly into that for which the Symbols are barely inorganic. But when contrarily it is Science itself for which Symbols are in question,—as to which Mind is objectively excluded from being present,—the enforced narrow range causes closer division in the sphere intermediate: now regarding especially that progress in development of Form-structures, which means Nature's *history* in character of creator,—her course of "experimenting" with creation (127—132);—while our very ability of so following her up with symbolizing experiments of our own, is also for the "verifying" of both kinds of experiments.

But in order to show how the "law of alternation" just stated is indeed the true linking-conception between Symbolisms inorganic and organic, illustration may be given in what yet remains needful to be said about Star-Ideals. In the foregoing, because of my holding by metaphysical station, my basis for the classifying of these has necessarily been that of their relation to self-need of the mind, so estimated at present time: whence, even in regard to antecedent idealization, nothing else has been attended to save only the experienced varying of the exclusive three

images now assigned for prime class. But if, in dropping this immediately-subjective purpose, I turn to seek rather the true development of Ideals in general, as with special regard to *themselves* rather than personal self, I believe that the progress will manifest itself actually for having occurred in the very manner asserted: by a course of variations between a dual and a triple mode of ordination. That is, with additional allowance, especially made and remembered, for due branching of the series towards the two-fold effect here essentially contemplated. These successive re-arrangements I conceive to have been the natural means towards the very establishment of the primary class, in that actual character.—With the suggestion of such process I will therefore now finish with what lies upon this side the transition in Symbolism.

The here-considered secondary Ideals which are the correlated ones of "Body and Soul", "Matter and Motion", "Corporeality and Spirit", "*Vis Inertiæ* and *Vis Viva*",—each pair of them polarized opposites,—were all of them born out of date for Mythology to act on them: while the same cause forbids their being counted, as in sequence to Mythology, under likeness of Stars. Yet, for all that, soon as ever they are mentally sifted, one and all of them together, they seem trying, as it were, for that mode of genealogical connection which Mythology would have given them at once, just as Astronomy, on the face of it, denies it to them. And the symptom of this endeavour, I assume to find produced in precisely what Evolutionism has done for Astronomy, by showing progress in constitution for world-masses, recorded on one point: namely, their acquiring—by pure force of variously-determined revolution,—increasingly a desirable disposition of their axial self-balance:—of which progress,

again, I assume that our severally-accepted orderings of Ideals are exponent.

I suppose, then, a quasi-genealogy of Ideals (—always of the deeper kind which includes individuating ones, on fellow-terms with the merely spatial and sequential: since otherwise the idea could in no way be valid,—) of the nature that is this. Of Deity, for initial and initiating head of the series of them, I conceive that from the first it contrasted itself either with one or the other, or with both, of those offspring of itself which had destiny to become what are now its intellectual compeers of Space and Time: the shifting of *this* kind between “two” and “three”-division being the very means of the emptying-out of the at-first concrete contents of the Ideals, which, *when* duly eliminated, suffered properly the Ideals to retreat, as they needed to do, into purely the matters of mere thought-definition, or Metaphysical Entityship. In proportion to this effect, however, did there always ensue need to those out-shelled contents of new defining, and new entityship, to be obtained. And this, to the mode of generalism which now betook itself to exclude Deity for ostensible, gave residue scientific of Matter-and-Motion;—while, parted-off by subjective protest against the sufficiency of it,—as a merely evasive substitute for the old “Body-and-Soul” notion, more faithful of its kind,—a contrary mating of Matter with “Spirit” seemed, for this aspect, the more fit correlation, to express wholly what the first design had intended, before Space and Time with Deity had been virtually left behind. But this science still evaded by backing Motion with the new idea of Force: thus including the dynamic or true spirit-character of Time-action—all *action* being recognized for dynamic by the very meaning of it,—which by reflected enhancement of Matter also, involved the attributing of Force for a *Vis*



*Evolutionis* :—whence a Triad was completed, on the part of science : Matter and Motion and Evolutional Force : absorbing most truly the whole contents that scientifically were estimable in the still-evolving Triad for the other kind of mentalism.—Take the *Vis Evolutionis*, again, however, under polarizing action, and it gains for itself contrast in *Vis* negative ; and the effect ensues, which present science is displaying, of even Matter and Motion being driven from the field, into sheer Metaphysicalness in their turn : dualism remaining the conqueror. And what farther must happen, when the subjective protest once more becomes raised ?—I perceive that what lies in due course of this kind, for restoration of triplicity, must indeed be the constituting of an Ideal yet uncompassed for such in philosophy : an idealizing of the very principle of Dualism in itself :—an assertion made absolute, that wherever in nature the two modes of *Vis*, positive and negative, work evolutionally together, there also is made present an Idealized Necessity of *Two Kinds* of evolved Forms for result.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE CLASSIFYING-POWER OF THE TREE-SYMBOL.

But what comes to be the aspect of this linking-conception, when we turn to regard it by its opposite face?—The natural and obvious one that it never can be seen under by light of mere Star-imagery!

For the instant the “law of alternation” between orderings “in-Two” and “in-Three” is transplanted in full to the sphere of proper Organism,—the sphere where of right the principle of Growth is in dominance,—the “*Two Kinds* of evolved Forms”, so hardly before to be recognized for such, become clearly at one with the ordinary effect of Sex-difference. And by this, being so, is indeed shown a bearing of favour in Nature towards the method of “two-and-three” alternation, as to that which is its consummating presentation,—seeming held by her singly in view to herself, for inclusive desired end of her every thing of striving in creation,—which *does* to ourselves touch on matters that render it as familiar in its aspect, as in effect it is incomparably important.—Yes; and moreover that prove it to yield manifestly the Subjective match, adapted with precision to the very criterion of developmental advance which by Science, on its own part, is accepted for class-basis to its whole general plan

of the classing of organisms.—I mean, as to that culminating power in human beings, where first the Sex-difference is produced with completeness, of true Marriage-Union being effected, between the representers of Sex ; which hence bestows types on lower beings of “*agamous*” and “*gamous*”, as respectively they are apart from, or approach to, the ability of such Union. For what meaning has such Union except only in this, that the Dualism signified by it is signified also for exchangeable with Triplicity !

Supposing that we had need to define to ourselves what is the import of those terms of “Man” and “Woman” which stand to us for the Sex-divided halves of the whole number of human beings :—in what way could we otherwise do this than by the supervention of a third kind of being—a third element of division ? Of “Man” it could only be said duly that it stands for human beings not actually Women ; and of “Woman” that it stands for all those not actually Men. But this is mere negative definition. Nor for that which should properly avail is there any to be rendered, except in the addition of the idea of the Child.—But, this added, is the event of the case at an end ? So far from this, it happens only, as we know, that the very instant the new Child-relation is struck, Man and Woman become blended in the character of Parents : so that Dualism again has the victory. And this lasts for a settlement, how long ? Until, but precisely no longer than till, the Child for itself becomes credited with Sex : when new Triad ensues. And thus runs continually the story of human life, for a thing of relations. It is a changing incessant between the apartness of two-fold regulation, bringing statical firmness to our nature, and the softening geniality of combining Triplicity !—And the one word of “Marriage,” teleologi-

cally understood, says everything about this that is possible to be said !

But how shall I express what appears to be the magnitude of the implication here contained !—If the matter of grouped family relations, knotted up in the import of Marriage, while it certainly stands to our subjective experience for whatever in our human well-being is abidingly substantial, answers also to what in the judgment of Science stands best for criterion of physical advance to living organisms in general ;—and if the argument is a true one, that because Mind in its own development reflects needfully the lower development, therefore *it* must lie under the self-same criterion :—then surely a due answering basis is produced, irrefragably such, not only to the plan of Mental Sexhood in general, but specifically to that idea of Religion, as the Feminine side of the Sexhood, which so differently has been traced out before, in the first part of this work. Namely, the idea of Religion as having constantly consisted, for true latent import of it, in merely a systematizing of men's conscious apprehension of Affective Relations of the Filiative kind. While human beings were barbarians, it was obviously impossible that they should consciously know the real value of Marriage, as the source of these Relations :—far as, even in our own day, is the true estimation from arrived at ! But, as Marriage *can* be understood rightly only when Sex is known rightly ; and as Sex is known rightly only by due valuation of Filial Relations ; while on perfectness of the latter depends the everything touching men as a Race : surely, the purpose in Nature of leading onward to this, teleologically through each and every form of Religion, is abundantly what is worthy of the means ; and, more than this, even ennobling of these, beyond what previously has been felt of them !

The whole “final aim” of Religion, I thus conceive

to fall in with what is choicest of Ideals to Nature, made good for such : the type of " Father-Mother-Child, triply-conditioned by dually-parted Sex."—And so important is the understanding of this type, *through* understanding of this coincidence, to the object to which now I am betaking myself, of Symbolic ordination,—so entirely is it the postulate now in course to be proceeded on,—that I must shortly go over my ground for the conviction. That is, in adding to my first-gained result, in working out the subject at length, the clenching corroboration which appears to me derivable from now-discerned principle.

The concern is, that of the special requisition of a dividing in-Trinity of whatever be religiously-felt influences, acting supernally on us : counter-active to the polarizing dualism of secular classifying. While before I have argued, then, that an exclusive Parental relation—as conditioned by the natural rule of the case, that " the life of the Parent over-wraps mid-way the life of the Child ", (I. 149)—suffices in itself to explain the belief universal of Religion in God as a Father ; so now I contend, that a due form of Trinity, provided to alternate with such Dualism, is inevitably the reflectional effect of adequate recognition, made general to mankind, of the import of Sex. And, as this two-fold method of thought belongs only to the stage of thought-method where *this* is symbolically credited with Sex, so I consider that it was correspondently through defect of this Sexual distribution of thought-material that the original attempts at formation of a Trinity, made by Alexandrians, failed as they did : namely, by their trying to make a cosmical form of it, all in one ; and thus confounding the two aspects of external and introspectional, which, when Mental Sex is allowed for, necessitate Science's having one form and Religion another. (That is, in the only case in which

Science has any need of a Trinity : when the extent of its generalizing brings it closely to approach to the method of Religion.) But, if the Triad which now I have been allotting to Science, of Space-Time-and-Being for *its* proper supernal images, be accepted in that light : as dealing rightly with Environment for accordance with the practice of Science :—it has still the relationship, however distant, with the Trinity-by-eminence of Religion, affectively drawn out in regard to what only in Environment is subjectively important, that of near fellow-beings, which additionally confirms the Sex-character of the distinctiveness of the schemes. Namely, thus.—Certainly, the apposition of Paternal Deity with Self,—as the purest of all possible settings of religious thought, and that to which constantly recurrence must be made, for very life of religion,—is a treatment as in spiritual Space (I. 267 ; note, 265). But, representing as this does a metaphysic Dualism which as such shows the unnatural tension of it, with the obvious means of rupture to it when recollection of fellow egoisms intervenes (I. 268) ; while the latter brings necessarily a shifting of the ground into reference to Time-respects : under occurrence of this shifting, it proves itself natural that the ordering should be this :—the spatial idea of the Father made to fall under sign of Time-Past, for Creator of all actual condition ; having necessarily Time-Future for a Son, born to Him and to us (I. 522) ; and therefore Time-Present left inevitably, as endowed with Holy Energy of full Being-principle, for the generating medium to the Divine Filiation. And how manifest is it therefore that this requisite hypostasis, Third to the others, is essentially Feminine ; however in past stages of religion, through condition of intellectual experience, it could only be hesitatingly, and as if fearfully, acknowledged for such ! All

work of intellection, it must never be forgotten, has exclusively acted from the Man's point of view: and, hence the mixing with conditions of materialism, which indispensably are associated with Birth, has, ever before the time of Christianity,—and after it, only yielding in the aspect by degrees,—appeared necessarily to intellect for sole degradation. Intellectual Philosophy, purely such, held itself free therefore, stringently, from Sexism, as being grossness; while ever in Mythology, and lastly, above all, in the perfected Mythology of Christhood, the descending of Divine Nature by the Motherhood of Women has alone really satisfied subjective demand. And this—much more than any glorifying of Women through particular instance,—has rightly, as I conceive, raised Marriage, or tended to raise it, in estimation of Men. Here, as I believe, is the Woman's real debt, incalculably great, to the dogma of Incarnation! It was trifling as benefit, by comparison,—even great as historically it proved itself,—that Mary, like Jesus, should come to be deified in person: this was only the progress, slow moving forward, to an Abstract Perception finally to be realized as a part of the very element of human Intellect!

The very meaning of Marriage, measured to the experience both of men and of women, is manifestly at one with what all proper instinct of Philosophy has felt about the need of a mingling with "materialism", rationally enforced on it. In both cases, namely, the natural compulsion has instinctively been met with abhorrence, as bringing only utter degradation to the feeling that in consciousness is purest and best. But, while Nature insists, nevertheless, on the instinct's being made to give way, here shows the real manner by which, through precisely the doctrine of Triplicity, she permits the real nobleness of the instinct in no way to be injured by the yielding. Through

the very fact of the mastery being gained with peculiarity in the cases of the sexually-opposed sides,—with need, finally, of due principle of balance between these,—the nature of the process-in-full should evidently be that which, in proportion as it involves a more perfect surrender of the masculine side to the materializing effect, should accomplish the spiritualizing of the feminine side. And this can be done—this *is* done—in Nature, exclusively through the issue to the compound demand, in the cases both symbolic and real. For the Union between adequately-materialized Science and adequately-spiritualized Religion, is no more in reason approvable for legitimated by Nature *except* by its sequel, of Good Fruit in sound Offspring obtained by it, than natural Marriage is otherwise sanctioned, theoretically :—while the sanctioning, again, is made good by the establishing precisely of the Sexual Equilibrium. That is, by conviction made mutual of the needful equality—the librating equality,—of the theorized condition of the sexes : connected necessarily, as is evident, with the theory of Marriage thus regarded as the true one. And granting that it be such, how better could it actually have gained for itself due formal expression than by the very theory of Christianity ? The need is of a full Trinity of regards to be paid to the three several states of Husband-Wife-Offspring, before religious sanction to Marriage be assumed : and the expressing of such triply-joined need is immediately in view in the Christian hypothesis. The Father is impossibly a Father, except in the Son's being true Son to the Father ; and this again is made possible alone by a Mother made rightly adapted to the Father : whence truly,—with whatever contradiction in terms,—no one of the conditions is “afore or after any other.”\*—And for finishing proof, as it seems, to

\* The sudden definiteness which the idea of Religion seems in this manner



this theory both of Marriage and Christianity, as based upon principle of Equilibrium, is what now I am arguing for the character of universal teleology: the presence of an aim, reigning everywhere, towards a true filling up, in the end, of Nature's sacred design of Sex.

This idea then being held up for standard direction, I may rightfully return to my purpose with Symbolism. The realizing of Religion by mankind in this light of connection with interpretation of Sex, can only be effected, I

to have sprung into, by contact with such alien material, suggests an almost overwhelming flood of considerations, compelling attention, however unfit to be crowded into the already over-burdened matter of these chapters. Let me therefore subjoin here at once the following merely indicative remarks.

No one needs to be reminded of the large historical effect, in addition to that of Mariolatry, of the honour paid to celibacy, in proof of the deep natural connection of Christianity with the import of Marriage;—nor of that raising by it of Marriage into the form of a "sacrament", which indeed was only a true carrying out of a feeling towards it common to all religions. But to some of my readers it may seem as fresh as it does to myself, to observe how already in the New Testament the connection is betrayed:—not, of course, with attributable intention, but with traceable tendency. It is observable, namely, with obviousness,—as to that new ordering-out of moral precepts which rightfully attends on new religious ideas put forth, and is strictly the evidence of real faith in them,—how very large a part of apostolic injunctions has regard to the estimation of Marriage. But much beyond this speaks the fact which subtends the whole matter of the Epistles, of the form given to the "mystery" of Christianity, as such:—startlingly in confirmation of the present idea, when traced out in its dogmatic history. What Paul began with, as the basis to his own scheme, was the Jewish idea, requiring prosecution, of Israel as God's Son; with the means to the universalising and making good of it, of the added Grecian notion of the Logos, as descended emanation of the Father. But the natural scruple against incarnating the Divine, seems to have forced him the rather into the felicitous evasion of making of the Logos only Husband to the new Israel, converted for that purpose to a feminine image. And this view, for at all events a general one soon after, is manifested emphatically in the Apocalypse, by the Bride of the Lamb, identified with the body of Jewish saints as the New Jerusalem. As to the manner, however, in which the idea worked with Paul, whether originated by him or not, there is the faithful indication of these passages of his genuine writings: *Romans* vii. 4; xii. 5; *1 Cor.* xii. 12; *Gal.* iv.; and, especially, of *1 Cor.* xi. 8-12, where his mind appears notably at conflict with itself as to the nature of the Sex-relation, in being practically hindered from the view of it discerned by his genius.

conceive, by previously the symbolic uniting of Science and Religion—after first long and difficult wooing of one another by these,—having duly borne its fruit of Moral Principle. And Symbolism, of the kind to be now entered on, bears precisely on the means to the Union: acting now on the masculine side of thought, as before on the feminine. Namely, as to showing how Nature herself, when she worked for the first time (evolutionally,) with Sex full in view, surmounted the difficulty of “materializing” which is the difficulty also of human intellect.—

Compare, namely, the full theoretic perception in verses 11, 12,—“neither is the man without the woman, neither the woman without the man, *in the Lord*,”—with the incompatible insistence in the previous verses, made necessary by the feeling of his age, on the man’s being “head to the woman.”—And precisely this conflict appears that of the as-if here unconsciously-predicted Trinity, thenceafter to be logically produced, with the quasi-humanitarianism of original Christianity!—See next, also, the repetition of the dilemma in *Ephes. v. 22-33*: where in practically aiming at “obedience of wives,” there is still the contradictory dogma maintained of “husband and wife being one flesh”: guarded from being over-much leant on in practice by the writer’s breaking off, as he does, with—“This is a great mystery: *but I speak concerning Christ and the Church*.”—And in fact, the members of the Church were one flesh with the substance of the Church, which, while taken for the spouse of the Logos, kept shifting itself mentally with the image of the human Saviour, special Son to the Father:—while here seems moreover the true path towards the Athanasian decision, where finally what was Jewish in the dogma was absorbed; and accordingly where the Bride that was involved meant no longer the Church except secondarily to her who was Mother of the Son, and virtually therefore the Bride of proper Deity.

And is it indefensible to maintain, that the struggling of the human mind with this mere metaphysical problem, was still, in teleological aspect, the true cause of the attendant phenomenon of the outburst of monasticism?—namely, in impressing upon the ideal of Marriage the same temporary falseness, as between the yet-unaccorded ideas of chastity and conjugality, which, to present point of view, was also in the Trinity of Christianity, as first-stage of a permanent Natural Trinity, with regard to yet-unaccorded ideas of true spiritualism and materialism.—Under the primary humanitarianism, when the “members of Christ” were under feminine image, the effect must have been always in a degree that which Paul showed so finely, of the man’s proper feeling brought into sympathy with the woman’s. But with the unnatural idea that the Christian Trinity involved, of Virgin-Maternity,—in spite of its service æsthetically,—there could only coincide such wrong to the feeling of

In this masculine treatment, it is true, the feminine element must undergo depreciation: just because of the "materializing," concerned in the approach to uniting, being identified to this aspect with feminine implication.

—But the Tri-une idea, held in reserve, saves this from being injury, even as to what naturally is the feminine point of view! And truly, what should be such cancelling of injury may be taken for afforded on the spot, in the character of the Sex which by all rightful instinct, and especially of Science, is attributed to Nature. To the

the sex-connection, as *was* actually done to it in the dark ages of Christianity: the ages of asceticism.—And how, naturally, could the true view have been ripened at once? It was *too* deep a mystery to be instantly accepted, that the condition of *all* Birth is holy, in spite of true instinct to the contrary, *when* the sanction is obtained for it of genuine Religion.

What, besides, but a counter-indication of abuse to the ascetic, is the manifest liability to now-existent feeling, under change of the theory of Religion, to lapse into the contrary injuriousness of license, as to the theory of Marriage? —More immediate to my purpose, however, is the parallel which has respect to the instinct of philosophy, as now concerned with indeed a repetition, as I conceive, of that special "materialising" of thought, the figurative Birth-condition of new speculation, which Christianity itself underwent.

In apostolic discussions, however the new mystery of Triplicity was in germ, it was always the Cross that predominated in importance. But the instant these gave way to patristic, the Saviour's Birth was what pressed even more than his Death. And, apparently, with what agony of intellect did the Fathers encounter the predicament—the grossness of the humiliation their philosophy was condemned to, in their need of admitting to themselves of their God being born!—True parallel to this, however, does there not actually lie in the shrinking, so inevitable, of the religionists of to-day from the idea of developmental origin for man: stirred up at this moment by the palpable exhibition of the scheme in Mr. Darwin's last work? Birth-condition is shown there for involving, in all cases of proper natural human Birth, an incarnating of the Divineness finally to reside in the human being, by so deep a descending into lower than merely human materialising, as that primarily it must have sunk itself into lowest of mere animal embodiments. What is here then produced but the dilemma, over again, of the Fathers; with only the deepened degree of abasement concerned, which answers to the measure of deepened knowledge?—And such, it would seem, must continually be the effect, with every possible incarnation of new Truth, coming amongst us with power to redeem:—its means to exalt in the end depending always on the apparent degradation at beginning, which really means the sanctifying of new ground.

man of true Science the image of Nature that is natural is that of her being a *Mother* to him,—impossible to be felt by him oppositely-sexed, any more than by instinct of Religion could the God of Religion be other than a *Father*. Father-God and Mother-Nature, each rendered such by the sentiment that gives mould to them, are certainly but one and the same in reality. Or, at least, they are fellow-hypostases, proved such by the Third that is equal to them, of strict-Science's ideal of Evolutional Energy.

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The manner in which Nature does overcome the difficulty of materializing, or actualizing, her own creative intention, considered as having compassed the transition to Organic method out of Inorganic, is indeed entirely that matter of *Forms* which I have signified it for (pp. 306-7): demanding, at least, to be so treated for my purpose with it, just as also I am now treating human Thought by its Forms. That is to say: just as an altogether new light has now seemed to be produced into Christianity by regarding it for its Form only; so is the passage of creation physically into the ground of true Life-condition for its subjects, that which exclusively must be taken for demonstrating the importance of Outer moulding, acquired definitely and stably by these, in connection with intrinsic development.

The planetary Beings which I have associated with Metaphysic Ideals, become virtually Form-less to the now-assumed point-of-view, through their one only Form having been that of Orbs,—circular masses, following circular tracks;—while to Beings that are Organic and Living, the Forms, as well as movements, are innumerable. This

shifting of our standard for judging of them, accordingly, marks surely the analogous transition in Mentalism, from the one kind of Symbolism to the other; and in a manner that in no way breaks up the required continuity.

Let me recur to what I have before assumed for the proper universal image of natural creation (I. 479). That image, conceived in the spirit of present Ontology, treated Nature as from the first (not an ocean of æther, but) an "Ocean of Being": demanding, as human Thought demands ever, a breaking-up of itself into individualized portions, to be cognizably outlined. Primarily, it is to be remembered, neither Nature nor Thought has the power of doing more than making outburst of Forms in the manner of mere *Waves*, towards the individuating effort. So obviously, however, is this imperfect for such end, that when classifying intention is present, it is needful to begin with the accounting of Being-ship only at the point where *Worlds*, instead of *Waves*, come in question. If then it be the case, as now witnessed by their Forms, that even Worlds are yet still but initiative constructions, as to any thing that goes deeper than mere surface-design,—as to any thing more involved than mere sense-impression, or instinctive metaphysical generalizing:—the scheme follows in due course, that what now is to be thought of as creative issue, successive to Worlds and to Waves, is that of precisely Vegetation: of *Leaves* upon a *Stem*, in the fashion of the Tree.—In old Ontology, as still in all pure Ontology, the principle of Universal Being was imaged as throwing itself forth into act of creation by one single, all-embracing effort; but in present assumption the effort is progressive and continual. It is the very tissue of our comprehending of Nature, and the very reason of her type of maternal productiveness, that we think of her as constantly giving herself out into Forms:

—evanescent in themselves, and yet furnishing to Thought, by their regulated plans of Formation, the element of a permanence that is mental.

But, moreover, there is *that* in the very manner of Tree-comprehension now contemplated, that expressly betokens those phenomena of systematic transition which are Nature's, in her entering on vegetal method, repeated on the abstract ground of mentalism. I mean, in the new cast of modern Physiology, compared with old-fashioned Physiology, which precisely consists in its alliance effected with Morphology: that is to say, with a doctrine that of specialty makes account of the importance of *Forms*, as such.—— To no thoughtful person who has read that eminent Treatise of now many years ago, of "Bell on *The Hand*", is it possible any longer to think of human conditions, in the general mass of them, as in any way separable from the human being's possession of a Hand. So much deeper, however, has Mr. Spencer, in chief, carried out the idea of such connection with regard to the *Leaf*, as productive of the destiny of the plant, that the whole course of structural development to the latter is traced by him to what primarily is the structure of the Leaf: a bearing of causation being shown in the specialties of this, as acting on the specialties that become general to the plant. And this specially, as I am now about to urge, in the matter that is important to myself. Namely, with regard to the production of those two great distinctions in plant-structure, having respect to the method of propulsion of Leaves, which, as universally they have been seized on for leading ones in Morphological classifying, so now are the ones that I have view to on my own account, for affording me the sign that I require of Sex-division in plants:—the distinctions of *Exogenous* and *Endogenous*.

The heretofore understanding of vegetation has pre-

sented a Tree-life of the following character. A Tree has been counted for that, which, after a certain unseen beginning below-ground, shoots up from thence as a stem, which thereafter divides into branches, and finishes by crowning these with leaves. But, under hands of Mr. Spencer, the type becomes actually reversed. It is the *Leaf* that, with him, is typical seed, or typical root, or, at all events, typical basis, to the whole of the vegetal formation.—And precisely in this typical change do I gain for my plan of Tree-symbolism whatever is necessary to it:—since also in my view does every thing that is of mental formation depend purely on what is analogue to the Leaf. That is, effort at Idealization, religiously-directed: whence follows, as I believe, every possible item of mind-structure,—every particle of mind-cultivation. The scheme of Mr. Spencer has moreover been wrought out by himself to such closeness of approach to metaphysics, that my object here pursued, with regard to the analogy, is all but prepared to my hands. And at once let me state in what manner.

Two points of his plan of physiology will be all that I need to refer to;—but abundantly they suffice for my purpose! The first is, his wonderfully-displayed action of Leaves, which literally answers to that perfectly metaphysical expression—destitute of any physical realism,—the defining of every organizing process as a *storing up of Motion*: a hoarding internally of energy thenceforward latent. For he shows, of every Leaf-form that is issued,—from the rudest outspreading of primitive pabulum, to the perfected issues of Tree-forms exogenous,—how not only in this way is the requisite influence of Light made acquirable, for modification, essential to the plant, of its sap-matter into chlorophyll; but how, with equal essentialness, the fact of Leaf-diffusion in atmosphere, through

the struggling involved with air-currents, necessarily means movement carried inwards and downwards to the plant, with straining and twisting of its substance: whence in time is wood-fibre engendered, in proportion as true stem is produced. Thus, the typical firmness of the Oak is immediately referrible, in typical assertion, to the storms that its type has imbibed;—while, with absolute literalness, it is still to be said, that each separate leaf, of its widely-spread foliage, has contributed its share of *real* action, to make up the merely typical effect. And who can miss the instantaneous perception that *here* is true symbol, adapted unquestionably to a multitude of occasions that are human ones! Who can help giving heed, on the spot, to reflections innumerable which prove to us that our stock of Intellection—and especially our stock of characteristically-human Self-Knowledge,—has entirely been moulded through particular wrestlings with Knowledge, such as touches our human interest! As to Moral Intellection, it will truly be the purport of all that I shall have to say, when I come to consider it, that *this* lies at foundation of all Present Religionism:—this principle, namely, of Life-Struggle being every where esteemable, as such, for much rather the Creator of our nature, than even it is merely the effect of it. And as to matter of even pure Intellection, who can otherwise than perceive, that our idea of Humanity itself, as an abstract conception, is symbolized here with an appropriateness that justly condemns the disfigurement of it, made so commonly in the now-favoured mode of its symbolizing: Humanity showing rightfully enough as the abstracted fruit of individual life-strugglings, considered painted on Ideal Tree-stock; while the attributing of Human quality to that fruit in itself brings manifestly only grossest confusion of conceptions!—But, in view to my argument,



this uniform plan of "*stored Motion*" being the sign and the measure of organism universal, whether abstract or concrete,—just as much as it thus unites Tree-experience with Human, to the degree that is lawful; so equally does it adapt itself, with requisite difference, to that lower range of condition which I take for represented by Star-imagery. For there also I have seen how disposal of Axis—fundamental in importance to Worlds, as expressing what is stock-condition to them,—is assignable exclusively to "imbibing of Motion": though of Motion that in their case is normally only that of nearly uniform Revolution. And thus, as to classifying conception in general,—following the *wholeness* of intention always proper to Metaphysics,—I may even cast the ideal of Astronomy itself into figure of a Tree, by only taking licence of treating Solar-systems in the light of Pre-vegetables!—by which I mean, that while the proper Tree-type is specifically known in science as made of multiplied axes, blended in the Tree-stock into nominal single axis, the planetary Tree-stock must essentially have but one in reality, stationed in the substance of the Sun to it: as if its World-issues, standing in place of true Leaf-issues, were those of a single out-casting, statically compressed to a solitary whorl.\* And such view of the case is immediately conformable to Mr. Spencer's own plan of metaphysics. For this planet-bearing Tree is essentially describable as one

\* This appears a flagrant setting at nought, for subjective purposes, of that "nebular hypothesis" of planetary formation which makes part of the scientific scheme in question. But while the effect, as I contend, is inevitable under the condition now assumed, it has this for its reconciling. To subjective standpoint what *solely* needs attending to in phenomena is the mind's attained *consciousness* respecting them. If then it be the case that particular spots of environment, by their local condition of density, &c., have a power of especially reflecting back to the mind *light* that at first was sent to them from the body of self-consciousness: the attending to this *only* as effect, subjectively desired, is assuredly without injury done to the deeper consideration behind.

that is "extended in Space" only; while a Tree that is proper is additionally "extended in Time"—has "successiveness," besides "simultaneousness."

Hence, on purely general ground, I derive from this scheme of Physiology, an *argumentum ad Scientiam* on behalf of my own understanding of Metaphysics, which seems to me of culminating force. By Metaphysics I mean only an out-casting such as this is, of Forms to our Thought: which, because they are Forms, I believe to be the means of procuring, to simple mental pabulum, both Light-modification of Self-consciousness, converting it to proper mental chlorophyll; and energy of due muscular vitality, giving fibre and order to the mind. And in what other way could these ends have been gained, I ask of Physiology, except by the Leaf-like propulsion of Forms! As to Science's need of acknowledging Metaphysics, therefore, I argue that the case has become this. Whatever by Morphology has been done for Physiology, that, and nothing less, ought in sheer self-consistency to be admitted that a true Metaphysic has ability of doing for a true plan of Science.

But farther I urge, as my second intended point, that even as to physiological details the morphological principle of Mr. Spencer avails me in support of my idea of Mental Dualism. I mean, as to that which I have just now referred to, of his showing in the Leaf the sufficing initial preparation for what finally, in perfected vegetation, is display of in-several Exogenous and Endogenous distinctions: concerning which preparation I shall presently contend, that it is only in accordance with what previously is already-dualistic condition, existing in the elements of the Leaf's constitution. I claim, in fact, ground that is furnished by himself, precisely for transgressing Mr. Spencer's own ground. I claim the actual propriety, on

the part of Introspection, of going beyond the idea of Tree-life merely as matter of Time and Space extension, for which only Science needs to treat it; and of showing it, besides, as extended in Being, in the way that is proper exclusively to Metaphysics.

For this usage of his material, however, it is true that there is in Mr. Spencer's *Physiology* a point with which specially I am forced into conflict, by the terms of my principle. And that is, the classifying arrangement which he follows—in common, I believe, with authoritative physiologists now generally,—of assuming the two characters only of the Leaf and the Stem sufficient for the expressing of the nature of the Tree. "We see nothing in the whole plant," he quotes approvingly from Wolff, "but leaves and stem, to which latter the root is referrible." (*Biology* II. 34.) But division such as this—however by its Dualism appropriate to scientific Morphology,—would be fatal to my own view, with its essential demand of Triplicity, if I found myself bound to abide by it! Here then is the ground on which I venture to oppose it.

I see, truly, without disregarding it, the profound scientific reason which gives basis to this plan, and apparent defence for its ignoring in this way the morphological importance of the Root. Namely, the actual requirement in regard to plant-nature, of classifyingly expressing, above all things, the matter of the aggregated individualities, or multiplied axes, that in perfect plant-form are bound up for the furnishing of a single individual, or axis. For, under form of this typical requirement, it is made as if necessary to account of the common stock-axis, which represents the plant-individuality, as purely being constituted by the embedding into one united substance of all the subordinate root-systems. Nor, under method that proceeds upon details, does there seem any possible alterna-

tive ; though in integral estimation, a plant in which Root is made nothing of, as pertaining to the plant's own entireness, becomes instantly unnatural and offensive ! But Mr. Spencer's own scheme of "stored Motion", I consider, supplies me at once, both with reason for my feeling the offensiveness, and this argument directed to himself. *If* the function peculiar to Leaves is that which he shows it for, of gathering in Motion to the plant ; so equally is it a function-of-peculiarity, appropriate to Roots, to do that for the plant as a Whole, not accounted for *except* by distinctive allowance for Root-character, which alone makes Leaf-function efficacious to the plant's wholeness. Certainly, if the Tree-stock had *not* had that done for it which morphologically itself is incapable of, of providing for its holding with security to earth, vainly, for its furnishing with fibre, would the Leaves have made grappling with winds !—Nay, vainly would the stock have at all tried to rear itself upwards in atmosphere, *if* the Roots had not faithfully held it !

For my own occasion, then, I repudiate entirely the Dualism that satisfies Science. The true static Unity of Tree-nature, I require to have dynamically answered by a proper relational figure: *the* figure which, as just asserted, becomes due at the very lowest stage of organism, of "triply-laid forms, dualistically conditioned". All production of Stem, as Self-Axis to plants, I need always to assign to duplicate causation: to the properly married influences which, on relational terms, proceed equally from the Leaf and the Root.

My proposition, now sought to be embodied in symbolic explanation, let me repeat as intended for the following:—"Whenever Development is in question, as applied by our thought to things actual or mental

indifferently, the Tree-Symbol is in place."

And is not the very nature of Classification that which witnesses at once to the assertion? *Itself* is intrinsically a work of mental development—a process of accumulating Growth. Every classifying stage that is arrived at, whatever be the matter under treatment, is inevitably signified by our answering creation of an abstraction, bearing reference that is general to each one of the cases-in-particular concerned by it. And this has effect, in preciseness, of furnishing out stock-comprehension, in perfect fulfilment of Tree-process.

But accordantly does this image, in actual fact,—and in eminent contrast, therein, with the oppositely-desired type of Star-likeness,—meet us constantly in use, on all sides, wherever there is subject in hand for the classifying instinct to work on, amenable to the action of Growth. The example of Mr. Darwin of this sort, I have already seized hold of; noticing, moreover, what makes it so specially significant as it is to me, in appearing to me rightfully contrasted with the very different image, used at least virtually by him otherwise (p. 309):—namely, the Tree-illustration to his theory of the Origin of Species; to be compared with the pantheistic implication of his general idea of Natural Selection. But for the starting of such use of the Tree-Symbol, we must go to the times of Tree-worship:—that extensive department of mythological practice which, though hitherto I have in no way included it in notice, has precisely, to my thinking, an importance of its own of a very sort that the omission has made way for my now taking account of. That is, in one word, I believe simply that Tree-worship (—like Star-worship,—) was out of place in Mythology, as connected with what is proper to the object of the latter, through its rightful destination being laid towards Science, and not

towards Religion. And thus, when our own Scandinavian ancestors paid homage to Tree-nature,—transcending altogether, by this, the mere personalism of Grecians, and still more of Asiatics,—I imagine they were showing themselves, only, the race that by Nature was pre-ordained for the teacher of Developmentalism to the world! —Between these two cases, however, of Tree-symbolism,—from the Igdrasil of Scandinavia down to Mr. Darwin's Tree-diagram of yesterday,—examples of the usage appear every where. At least, in a form that is initiatory or fragmentary. Our literature is full of such cropping-out allusions :—the very genius of our language, it may rather be said, is even permeated by them. What subject at all is there, which has time enough given to it for time-considerations rightly to enter into it, that is not actually thought of, and spoken of, in Tree-terms :—as “branching”, for instance, into departments; and gaining “radical” meaning; and tending to bear “blossoms” and “fruit”? The image itself is “planted” in our method of expression, without power of being “up-rooted”:—whence also is the reference to it, which reflects it, a streamlet of perpetual poetry, meandering through our ordinary utterance!

And as to even the example of Mr. Darwin, where the usage is so different from this constant and low-level kind, the instinct of proper Science which gave rise to it must in fact be in some sort reproduced in every reader of Mr. Darwin that understands him! Supposing, namely, that the book of the *Origin of Species* had not been supplied with its illustrative diagram: what else could have been means for understanding it, but precisely that each reader should have furnished the figure mentally for himself? What other than his power of doing this, with whatever of identity was possible to him, could precisely

be the proof and the measure to himself, of his actually having mastered the idea of the book's Author?

But how manifest is it, that when the Tree-image is thus used systematically, with direct scientific purpose, nothing else is concerned in the mental act than a mere working out of the figure of *pedigree*: thus affording true evidence on the spot how the instinct of Science—shown for such by its ubiquitousness of action,—does indeed bear its witness to the relational principle now aimed at, by the tacit admission involved, that *developmental results, in every possible case, are ordered therein in the mode of genealogical succession*.—And what more evidently natural than the transition! To begin with the form of the Table, which is that of the Pedigree, is the artificially crude regulation, which every tendency in Science has the likelihood of inclining it to; but, accepted, this must necessarily give way in its stringency, because of its artificialness. It must burst itself necessarily away, if not technically resisted in so doing, by mere pedantry of Science, from its bondage of straight lines and right angles; and bend itself freely, perforce, to the curves and divergencies which the irregularities of genealogy demand in it, when these are done justice to. And in this, with no more, has the Table disappeared, and been supplanted by the Tree.

Leaving, however, this practice of Science aside, until presently I shall have need to return to it,—and with an added illustration from Mr. Spencer's own treatment of development, as an "example of today", even more to my purpose than Mr. Darwin's of "yesterday":—what chiefly I would now draw as fruit from the instinctive adoption of the image, in general, is the means it affords me of still asserting, paradoxically, that from my own point of view the low-level instances of Tree-symbolism, even down to the usage of Mythology, are really more

true to the case, however in fragments, than are the scientific, with their skeleton-wholeness. That is, because always the impulsive ones, merely poetic, have *Roots*, by implication; while those for which Science has occasion, are unnaturally destitute of *Roots*. Time-and-Space regulation alone is that to which Science is adapted; but the full and proper Triad of Space-Time-and-*Being* is that in which only do *Roots* become typically important.

The true instinct of *Being* cries instantly, that a Tree without *Roots* is impossibly a Tree:—that so different is it rightly from this, as that really what is due to it, in its Root-less condition, is that just it be inverted and shown under likeness of a *River*! A branching of this sort, subjectivity exclaims at first sight, betokens a stem that had never in its veins of composition aught richer than *Water*!—*Sap* cannot otherwise than have *Roots*! —And this gives immediate rationale, subjectively, to the very assumption which present Physiology lays basis in:—of the bare Rooted-Leaf's being “morphological unit” to the entirety of Tree-composition.

On this matter, then, of the Root's morphological recognition, my argument rests. And, so resting, I shall presently require to direct it,—not only, as here, towards the ordering of the Symbol by what I acknowledge as true Science, which in no way I pretend to dispute *except* as to right of making different ordering for myself;—but also towards a contrary incompatible usage, which I regard for intrinsically false. But first, and in order to this, I must trace more particularly the conditions of the Symbol, as to what I consider the points of Tree-life called in question.

And for means to the selecting of these, may I not indeed be permitted to use my actual experience, as to the usage of the Symbol? If all subjects of development are therein amenable to the Symbol, then assuredly ought the



subject which is my own, of Religion, to be rightly reducible to it. And truly may I say that it *has* been experienced for such in my dealing with it. As I said, in my last chapter, that whenever I sought metaphysical ordering to my thought, the Star-image rose to me, spontaneously and compulsively; so now I may similarly assert, that wherever—in, at all events, the writing of my first volume,—the ordering of my subject, in itself, became forced into matter of reflection, the Tree-image was so constantly presented, as to be to me in a manner a secondary self-consciousness, abidingly with me. And may I not even hope that to some of my readers this has made itself manifest?—It has seemed best to me to defer till this point making reference expressly to the matter; but still I have actually hoped that my design would thus far have betrayed itself. And, at all events, the word-diagram that I now propose giving, for exhibition of the effect, may thus answer a double end: helping out the purpose I had then, in addition to the purpose I have now.

What I have in view by the typical history of the Tree—and let it be well understood that it is *only* with what is typical in Tree-history, that I am in any way concerned,—includes nothing less than the following whole progress of general vegetation:—from its already-intimated beginning in the mere rooted-leaf, up to specially what is the signifier of perfected Tree-life, as the instituted division of its Forms into characters Exogenous and Endogenous: of which it is to be accepted, that although both are alike as to permanence of constitution, the former takes eminently the lead in Tree-rank.—What are the typical means of the progress I have also already signified, as lying with the postulated fact, that while Leaf-production always is primal; it is only through the opposite effect

of Root-production being provided for in the plant's constitution, that the plant has possession of its third desiderandum, of proper Stem-productiveness, in which solely is conditioned the ultimate two-fold division.

As to my own self-experience, then, so also have I felt, by pure subjective instinct, that while propulsion of Religious Forms of Thought was all-in-all the human instrument of Mind-development, this was yet merely impotent to succeed in the work except in being grounded by Science. Scientific endeavours have therefore constantly been to me what was needful to be allowed for, as independently essential towards the final up-rearing of my Tree. And yet, let it not thence be supposed that I assign crudely to Science the part of Root, morphologically so shown, and that of Leafage to Religion, in the same outward fashion. This would be to give rank to Morphology *above* Physiology, whereas only as *assistant* to the latter is the aid of the former in reality legitimate. And immediately I need to explain how my process has been that which actually has only so used it.

What consciousness takes record of safely in the matter of Formation, can only be that which is effect of *propulsion*: felt solely in that seat of stock-egoism where only, as to equally Mind-action and Tree-action, there can be an abiding of consciousness. Hence, soon as my thinking had fairly arranged itself, the contrary mind-efforts gained the permanent aspect of appearing to me properly as opposite *currents*: the one bearing constantly upwards, in the fashion characteristic of the Tree, towards creating of Leaves; the other bearing downwards, primarily into the Stem—as stock of general egoism,—and thence held in memory as passing into Roots. For the realizing of this was however required, in first grasping the idea, such stretching into bare metaphysical imagery, as of assign-

ing proper "tides" to these currents (I. 143-6), as involved, with its depth of pre-organic analogy, the following change to be undergone, by what had been my original Tree-notion. Already in my formula at commencement (I. 38-9), there was present to me the idea of Stem gained from oppositely-natured Leaves. Namely, as to the triplicate process attributed to mind-action, which I described as mental effort directed firstly towards History ; secondly, to Scientific Analysis ; and thirdly, to a blending of both in the matter of Development-recognition. For in this was already implied that idea of mental Forms doing battle with circumstance, and thence bringing produce of result to the source of them, greater than that they drew from it, which essentially I saw for the proper and dynamic interpreter of Tree-life. But by lowering the symbol of the case into that of mere "tidal currents", immediately was differentiated true formal Root-character, apart from that of Leafage. No longer, namely, could the two several methods of History and Science—with their difference of Time and of Space-relations,—remain, as at first, yielding only simple leaflets on one stem ; but the latter was compelled to tend always towards earth-basis : towards production of the part of my Tree which, in fact, required naturally to rest hidden to me, while my interest lay entirely, as it did, with the upper part ! Still, here in the Roots, however latently, what is typically to be credited as *impulse* of Leaf-creation must arise ; as, oppositely, the impulse of Root-creation is thus shown for proceeding from the Leaves. Hence such was the arrangement, *merely* typical, which I came to admit, though not easily, for the issue of taking Growth as in "tides". And the arriving at this understanding was, indeed, what first gave proper answer to my actual rooted feeling, of the need in myself of propelling religious leaf-forms.

The *turn* of the tide, which is mainly the point of concern, is manifestly referrible to the tip of the Leaf. And accordingly it was always experienced by me as that which was crucially the matter of thought-struggle—I might rather say, of thought-anguish,—in my seeking to depict the Leaf-meaning of Religion. The tip of the Leaf stood for that which had import of the primal depressing of the full tidal flood bearing upwards: effort of Aspiration checked into ebb, and compelled to retreat into effort of Investigation:—a bearing back upon itself of the impulse that was native, and a forcing it to subside, with a will, into impulse that at the moment was alien. And the mental sensation of doing this,—not merely in the ordinary fashion, where in thought, as in vegetation, the turning is made easy by minute ramification of organs that are concerned; but precisely in the mode of morphologically giving shape to the result, and here with acute angle, by rationally re-acting on the process-in-ordinary:—the sensation of doing this, in its pang of revulsion, is scarcely distinguishable from bodily! Thus, at times when the arrest came in question, I spoke of it in terms such as these. I called it at one time a “moment of crisis” (79);—at another, a “knot of difficulty” in “turning the corner” (155);—at another, that which gave me the feeling of “logical contradiction” (128-9). The peculiarity was such, of rational failing and distress, as indeed nothing, I believe, could sufficiently have sustained me under, but the confidence in my natural Analogy.

And why need I tell this, but for my seeing, as I now do, the relation of the experience to that which is also the point of crucial significance as to Tree-apprehension! From the whole of Mr. Spencer's dealing with the physiology of vegetation, it seems to me necessary to deduce the conclusion, that the checking in the Tree of what is

its own stock-impulse, towards Leaf-production, signified by the shortening proportionately of its Leaf, is the measuring standard, of right, of the final Tree-character. And Mr. Spencer himself, as I urge, has proceeded so far towards this generalization, as minutely to show in what manner is produced to real plants, by this means, their structural class-divisions. Let me shortly repeat the particulars of plant-history which go to the explaining of this assertion.

The difference of Endogenous and Exogenous is notoriously at one with the circumstance, of the plant's beginning its leaf-action with putting forth severally one only, or more,—generally two,—of those precursors of true leafage which have name of cotyledons. Endogenous plants, namely, are betokened as such in being Monocotyledonous. But Mr. Spencer has demonstrated (*Biology* II. 67,) how the effect here involved does indeed lie entirely in the matter of Leaf-structure which precisely I am contemplating: the lengthiness given to it in proportion to width, which subjectively I assign to an over self-impulse in the plant. The enveloping material of the seed, out of which at beginning cotyledonous formation proceeds,—spreading itself widely as it may do, in this character, for encounter with atmosphere: whence first is given strength to the radicle-respondent to stretch itself likewise into earth; this again being answered by the tiny stem-plumule's emerging from its bed in the seed, as the sign of a new individualism begun, with henceforth a diffusion of true leaves:—the very leaf of the seed, I would say, in transmitting as it does antecedent plant-character, has the over-eagerness for distension which now, as hereafter, causes effort so prolonged in proportion to the plant's strength, as that one single form to result from it is only possible at a time. And out of this ensues,

to the solitary cotyledon,—with identical reason to what actually rendered it such,—first, the mere sheath, which is furnished by the leaf's rolling round into stem; and thence, constantly, the hollowness of stem-nature, which in itself offers reason for the classified distinction of its manner of growth:—its habit of beginning growth inwards. The three-fold elements of stem, which as such represent the Tree's whole morphological composition,—namely, bark, repeating rootage; new wood, or alburnum, repeating leafage; and, as if cherished between them, the infant cambium, destined always to bring future increase to the stem:—have not time, in endogenous precipitancy of growth, to spread out in more than a solitary layer, even in habit of Palm-trees; so that even as to these, what is annually gained to them is not real strengthening of stem, but only as the rearing of successive plant-forms, each issuing from the top of its preceeder.—But the contrary is the habit with the less impassioned nature of exogens. Here, where the seed has its pair of cotyledons, leaf-production is comparatively deliberate. Leaf-forms are wider, and at the same time follow closer on one another. And with this comes the means of increased organizing. Each leaf, as it were, is more cautious and successful in its gathering of air-influence; with result in proportionate enriching of its substance. And hence in this case does the finishing stem-character gain also its typical solidity.

But here occurs the stage of estimation of the process, at which,—although falling short entirely of the catastrophe in Tree-life which *now* I see mainly to have import that touches me, for symbolizing Mental Sex,—my consciousness perhaps had its limit in the matter of my first volume. That catastrophe is the event of Leaf-transformation, into severally the modes of Flower and of Fruit: after the which has taken place, the Leaf that ripens in-

wardly, or endogenously, distinctively appears as pure Stem; while the Leaf that ripens outwardly, or exogenously, is always exclusively mere Leaf. And the plan of general Tree-Formation which should include this effect, has actually been that which in my present volume has given its chief weight to my instinctive dissatisfaction with Positivism,—here as carried out with peculiarity into the dealing of Comte with the classing of the Sciences; over and above that initial rejection of his principles which as on general instinct I gave expression to before (I. 68-9). But in fact,—and it is necessary to the object to explain this,—the Tree-sympathy which I felt to be in me in the first part of my work, matches fully with the deliberate Tree-view I am now making effort for.

The falseness of the spirit of Positivism to me, as essentially un-Treelike, has consisted all along in its felt inability to do justice to the opposite currents, which Tree-rule shows of equal importance. These have respect, in my view, to what I have alluded to as the “already-dualistic” elements of all psychical Leaf-composition: those of Intellect and Feeling, working never in the absence of each other, and yet independently. And Positivism has shown nothing of the Tree-Feeling, undergoing its specific Intellectual repression, which I take for proper sign of the conflict of those currents. In my first investigation, however, I had little to do with any effect of this conflict except what resulted immediately, as converting what I called a “mechanical” agency for production of Leaf-substance, into “chemical” (I. 79). But still when I passed, even there, from the point of Leaf-sympathy alone, to what rather needs be counted a concentrated Tree-sympathy in general, having seat in Tree-Stem, I consider that I gave answer, in reality, to the true formal trinity of constituents just referred to; which also in re-

ality respond to the Forms morphologically required, to make up the Tree-type: and *chiefly*, through the facts of my position, to that one of the triad which distinctively and consciously owes itself to the down-flowing influence of religion, ignored in that character by Positivism. And this means, that while then, in my state of mere young growing wood to my stem, my leaf-issues brought me continually stronger *bark* to support my *alburnum*: I now, in taking account of Morphology, perceive this for identical with increased formal Rootage, introduced to my plan. And beyond this, and included within it, an ability attained of henceforth passing forward into method of Tree-form, that may actually be either Endogenous or Exogenous, according to the proportion of the same effect:—as indeed I believe that the facts of vegetation give warrant for my conceiving as possible.

If we throw ourselves fully into the station of Tree-egoism, Tree-life shows for this: a life of Leaf-issuings, as to which the things issued *are* Leaves—above being mere water-jets, or earth-jets,—through their actually being answered by Root-issuings to match, whether reaching down to appear such in proper form, or only resting bedded in the Stem. And, let there be no question admitted of the one grand event of Tree-life, the catastrophe of Flower-transformation,—that is, let the type that is thought of be virtually Sex-less, as is the case where the exogenousness, as with Oaks, is to excess,—there is present indeed so approximate a balance in the alternate operations, as affords what in symbolism is actually the sign demanded properly under masculine impulse of Science: the sign of *perpetuity*, close enough for the purpose. And *has* Science ever sought for other kind of Tree-type? But to Generalism it fails, for this reason: that even as to Oaks there *is* difference in Leaf-issuings, apart enough,



that in reality betokens the very power of Flower-change as residing in them. Let us turn, then, to the case that gives contrast:—to that of Flower-bearing annuals. What now means the life of Leaf-issuings is this. Swiftly and palpably, after once plant-maturity is reached, the Leaves issued become finer and feebler, as they near the event of catastrophe: greater strain being continually involved to the plant, with exhaustion to its capacity of self-rootage;—till at last when the time of metamorphosis is come, the plant's whole gathered energy seems desperately put forth, that it may accomplish its utmost,—and die. The new beauty to the Leaf of texture and colour, the new preciousness of Seed-quality imparted to the root-particle of Stem, swallow up between them the self-life of the plant! As this result, however, is prevented for a fatal one when the range becomes larger of the vegetal existence,—through the number of the axes that become attached to the common selfism, whence death to any one of them is only partial and replaceable destruction to the combination,—it seems altogether rightful to think of the fixed modes of Exogenous and Endogenous formation as precisely intermediate ones to the two extreme cases; and symbolically masculine and feminine, accordingly as the one characteristic of self-perpetuation, or the contrary one of productiveness, exists in predominance.—And, analogously with this conception, it has occurred to my experience to find my Tree-figure made subject to it, in both modes:—nay, even with a specialty of analogy as to that which is ordinarily the sign of the classes: the beginning, respectively, with two, or only one, of cotyledons. That is, just in proportion as my substance of mentalism gained radical strength out of Science.

In this second part of my work, where my Tree has the need of taking Form, the Tree-consciousness has in gene-

ral left me; and only pointedly renewed itself with regard to my examination of Comtism,—thus obtaining, indeed, a Form evidently distinct to me. But deferring, for the moment, consideration of this, I find eminently an illustration to explain myself by, much nearer to the interest of my subject than Comtism, in the matter of Mythology lately entered into. I see, namely, that not only is it the true way to carry out what I have designed about this, to produce a Mythological Tree-figure, correspondent to the Astronomic figure lately given; but moreover and specially, that the Tree to be constructed needs *now* to be of type that is Exogenous, since my closer engagement with Science, whereas previously it would naturally have been Endogenous.

I have claimed of religious images in general, that the study of them is the necessary Morphology required to accompany universal cultivation of Science. But now I would say farther, that more fully is Mythology as Morphology, in relation to the specific Physiology of Religion. According to my idea of Religion, even that which is innermost in our feeling of it *now*, has produced itself solely into our mental constitution through heretofore shapings of belief, outwardly propelled, which thence have been matter of human history. Take Mythology therefore in a uniform general sense, as including the whole progress of these shapings, in the manner of successive and self-enhancing Leaf-issues, having tendency by nature towards Flower-change: and, as I urge, an importance becomes attached to what are accountable for *seed-leaves*, that immediately gains classifying effect. Seed-leaves, it must be remembered for assumed, are the means to the Tree of substantiating its inheritance of previous stock-quality: to be counted in the case of Religion as, in necessary evolutionary order, the condition of Pre-religion.

And precisely this effect of transmitted lower quality seed-leafage exhibits, as antecedent in the plant to its proper setting forth of true leaves. In my own offered scheme of Religion, however, one only such cotyledon has been shown: in the fear-impelled worship of Death. Nor still do I feel that this fails to suffice in the character, while intention is religiously restricted. But now, in my seeking to gain secular force to the idea, I find myself furnished, involuntarily, with a second cotyledon! That is, in perceiving myself driven to admit, through my attention to un-religious Hellenism, that in the real course of fact the base-matter of religion has been that which has need of division, so as not to be engrossed by the single formulation allotted: the Fetish-Image of Death having actually been mated, in pre-religious history, by an averaged ideal-to-correspond that may fitly be accounted a Sensual Image of Life,—requiring separation for the reason, that not only does it offer due contrast to the other, but it distinctively tends towards a necessary idealizing of Life's import. And this additional seed-leaf to my plan, simply in itself, has produced such enhancement to my consciousness about it, as ought, in my belief, to render it indeed a true Exogen for its ability of development, if only I had means to fill up its design! The cotyledon-function of this pair of brutish-images is that of precisely *elaborating*, out of brutish material, what is to be, henceforth, human quality of mind. And, as Tree-plan fulfils this by precisely that alternate shooting up into air of, first, feathery leaflets, growing stronger and stronger; and from these, feeble threads, growing tougher and passing deeper continually, to clasp at what is basis of condition for humanity: which together supply real stem, lengthening always between them, for the actual Tree-stock, to be that of Religion, endowed with propor-

tionate development:—so, in the real two-fold process, I conceive that every Leaf-form of belief that has actually been a true Leaf, and every answering Root-form that has truly been a Root, has continually borne only towards the end which the very cotyledons respected: that of ordering out with efficiency for us our Being-consciousness, *as* between images on each side, respectively of Life and of Death.——That is, nothing in Mythology do I actually admit into my Tree, but what has such reference, so adjudged from my actual point of view; this necessarily being condition that the very usage of the symbol implies: since what can be in reason attributed for *growing*, but that which *is* genuinely true!——But this sort of view, though not carried out to mythological details,—regarding much rather, as it does, the spirit of whole general mythologies,—gives inherent demonstration, as I imagine, to what only in my plan is the point in morphology demanded. I mean, in the historical branching, fundamentally, into Hebrewism and non-Hebrewism: considered as the effect of respectively the one or the other kind of seed-leaf having acted with predominance in giving tone to the Tree-character. For, while this several dominance tends finally, as I suppose, to cause prevalence respectively in Tree-course, after Leaf-metamorphosis, of Stamens or of Pistils, afforded as successors of Leaves; so this I suppose to be adequately represented by the notorious characters of speculation and practicalness, pertaining respectively to the two bodies of religious thought, which indeed give alone moral import to their being so classed:—therein rendering them also, as I figure, male and female in mental sex. Nor here does the rationale of the matter conclude; but, still farther, completes itself thus. The event of catastrophe in Tree-life which *is* that of Flower-change out of Leafage, has its answer expressly

in the event of all others that arrives as catastrophe in Religion: the event of Self-consciousness gained of its own nature. For, say that our perceiving of class-difference between Hellenism and Hebrewism is a perceiving of Sex-difference: and—just as really Men and Women know only that they are such, through seeing in one another a class-character which they have not themselves; so—this recognized contrast in the Forms gives first a Tree-consciousness, as it were, to our figured Tree of thought. That is, a consciousness to us that our Tree of conception has really the true elements of Tree-form:—a real branch-division of Stem: associated with, first, a power of supplanting only Seed-leaves by true Leaves; and next, of supplanting also these by severally true Stamens and Pistils.

Let such then be taken for what actually it is:—my idea of what naturally and indispensably is the course with Religion. For Religion to *be* Natural, I see not how possibly its progress in human thinking can have otherwise revealed itself than as Tree-like. And this, in very truth, is my own following out of Tree-worship, as most genuine adjunct of Mythology!

But my trust in Tree-instinct has as much been my guide in forming judgment of extraneous systems, as it has in the constructing of my own. That is, in regard to what rightfully fall under such kind of standard, as generalized schemes. Let me therefore now show how in this way it has served me: both as to such as I have felt myself in harmony with, and such as I find harmony with impossible.

It was the force of the Tree-image that first made the idea of Development that I gained from Mr. Spencer, in his original presentation of his views, approve itself in-

stantly to me, as it did, for a valid improvement on what previously I had only of such idea :—namely, as derived from the scheme of the *Vestiges of Creation*. I felt, as if intuitively, that while needful correction to what was faulty in the latter, was expressible at once as the bringing of it into Tree-form ; so the scheme of Mr. Spencer, on the contrary, was entirely imbued with Tree-character. And still more, as I have stated, the same image has given confidence to me in my judging of Comte : leading me, as I may add, not actually to content myself, as otherwise I might naturally have done, with Mr. Spencer's own answer to Comte, in his treatise on the *Classification of the Sciences*, but rather to work out independently my own argument. I mean, as to the effect of Tree-development regarded in metaphysical Wholeness, which indeed lies entirely apart from such handling of the Symbol as Mr. Spencer himself follows : seeing that precisely to me is the generalized effect, with its included implication of Sex, that which only gives reason for Development's Wholeness of Development being rendered, for itself, as my principle requires, subject above all to the Symbol.

The instance that I have referred to of Mr. Spencer's following the example of Mr. Darwin, in actually appending to his verbal explanation a diagram, at least capable from my own point of view of being taken for a Tree, even if, possibly, not intended in that light, occurs in the special chapter of Mr. Spencer's treatise of *Biology* (I. 103) which deals with the matter of Classification : the figure answering moreover, as Mr. Spencer acknowledges, to a classifying plan which was that of Professor Huxley. This plan, it is true, is restricted in its object to the department of Development-in-general which concerns only forms that are of animal life ; but still, for extending the value of the precedent into general application, I conceive

that I may rely on the whole leaning of the chapter : directed as it is, in the entire bearing of the discussion it comprises, against specially that principle of mere "linear arrangement" of classes which here I have treated as the principle of "pedigree," bound to the form of mere "table." Mr. Spencer himself here exhibits with sufficiency his own similar belief of the natural catastrophe of "pedigrees"; how Nature, in producing her groupings and sub-groupings of continually-divided new classes, will *not* be submissive in reality to the duly-~~ruled~~ boundaries laid out for her, but *will* keep transgressing them disportively, with vagaries most capricious. And all this the Tree-figure says at once, with its inference to the eye of spread foliage : here showing in one stroke those "multiplied effects from one cause" of which so eminently Mr. Spencer makes principle.—Yet, for all this, his Tree-diagram, if I may so account it, can stand to me only as depicting what is merely incipient in Tree-life : so far offering, truly, the suggestion that peculiarly I require, of precisely a dicotyledonous foundation. Supposing, namely, that what is the main branch of Animal formation, as that of Vertebrata, be taken in the figure for exclusively its Tree-stock : necessarily out of proportion as to final importance, through its need of being primarily shown in conjunction with lower divisions as fellow ones :—these inferior ones may thence, it appears, with no difficulty be made to subside into actually mere seed-leaves : dividing even fairly into two, and no more, if the leading ones only be accounted of. That is,—may I venture to particularize ?—assuming for represented the whole lower group by only the two of Molluscos and Articulate : giving sign, as I imagine, of formative conditions that actually do need to be worked on, with a structural purpose that when rightly adapted is permanent : and more-

over involving, besides, entire prophecy, experientially supported,\* of the necessary course of Tree-progress to ensue, with true *gamous* implication attached.

But as to Comtism, what I gathered as its typical idea of Development gave me means of no kind of such integration. Even granting, as I forced myself to do, that his line of the serial sciences, which my instinct required for a Tree, should only be thought of as Tree-stock, so limited conditionally, and therefore by admission divested of both Leafage and Rootage that should have gone with it: yet two things forbade it for even this. Chiefly, its absence of main branching, to give answer to the final effect of Sex: which of right, as I inferred, should have shown itself "somewhere between Biology and Sociology" (p. 118);—but also, attendantly, its persistent self-quality of stock, incompatible with imagining either Leafage or Rootage concerned with it. *If* these had been attributable, there should also have been so, by Mr. Spencer's mechanical demonstration, that intermingled effect of the functions of the extreme kinds

\* I cannot resist here adding a remark that has pressed itself on me in regard to Mr. Darwin's employment of the symbol, as to the intuitive force of it, which indeed seems to me here to afford even a generalized argument on the symbol's behalf.—The one point on which controversy with Mr. Darwin has notoriously turned, is the manner of required dealing with the idea of "species". But, let only the Tree-image be leaned on as standard, and this, purely in itself, yields the following solution. What the term has respect to in Tree-figure can only be the actually-found stopping at certain points, of certain lines of the progress which is general of ramifying evolution; with occasion thus probably involved to the stock of starting a new track, unaccordant as inconsecutive. This however is surely bringing nothing of real change to the original definition, but precisely with regard to its basis of definition. That is, in the exchange of *à priori* foundation for legitimate ground of experience: what henceforth shall be accounted as "distinct species", being simply those lines of development which *do* find their stoppage at certain points, with the attendant effect of discordancy with other lines, naturally their rivals. And such progress in the manner of the conception, is assuredly only that to have been expected—from basis of *à priori* to *à posteriori*.



of Tree-parts which Stem-organizing means: solely obtainable for the scheme, as here I have argued (pp. 103, 112), by a *balancing*, with due justice to each, of the duplicate forces. But in place of such organized axis to his scheme, obtained by such principle of balance, Comte seems to have accepted that inferior kind of fulcrum, incompatible with true axis, which indeed to my present thought, as just shown, is no more than cotyledonous of Tree-sort:—a mere “induration” of his outer type-system: implying a leaning over-much upon air-fed devices, where instead should have served him a root-fed internalism (pp. 109, 111): thus imparting to his types what I have described as a “gross” instead of true metaphysicalness (p. 96). Or rather, he appears to have framed what precisely combines this molluscou defect with the contrary one I ascribe to cotyledons: that mere articulation, instead of integrated junction, for his strung-together series of classed sciences, which naturally forbids its being really true backbone, or true axis. And in fact, there is answer in nature, of real Tree-sort, to this mode of construction:—precisely in that anomalous vegetation of *Dracenas* and the like, which notoriously has baffled physiologists to classify it: as neither being Exogenous nor Endogenous by right, and yet showing both kinds of character. For the very aim of Comtism, to bind down into Stem what should naturally be spread out into the foliage of the Tree-head,—by effect of its accounting of Sociology on common terms with the sciences at foundation,—must evidently, by Tree-rule, have compelled the Tree-stock into pyramid-formation—into shape, namely, actually of a pyramid *reversed*, such as is that of Dragon-tree stems! In the plan of the sciences afforded by Dr. Arnott, the idea is indeed expressed of their filling up the form of pyramid\*: naturally intended for standing properly on

\* *Elements of Physics*, Introduction, p. xiv.

its base,—as the very limitation of the view, in this case, to what was short of Sociology rendered easily possible the imagining. But with Comte, on the contrary, the monstrosity is left palpable of a pyramid upside-down, so left to be supported, not even by the extent of true root-age that even Dragon-trees are supplied with, but sheerly by the unstable holding of their hardened stem-casing.

Thus I find that the symbol repeats for me, as to Comtism, so far as to that of peculiar impression which has clung to me respecting it, of continually incongruousness, even in that which in a sort has seemed *true* in the system. When Nature produced Dragon-trees, we must needfully attribute to her, that precisely she had not yet sufficiently worked out her Tree-type, as really to have determined what the final distinction between Exogens and Endogens should be. What is analagous to this, then, I can only by Tree-instinct attribute to Comte. Namely, that *his* conceived type of Development was comparatively as little worked out.

But there is another case of Tree-imagery that is eminently needful to be added into view, as interesting in itself, as apparently it is capable of throwing light on the practice with the symbol:—a case which, though merely in its form of the low-level sort, instinctive and poetic, yet really, from the very depth of its poetry, runs fully into the sphere of systematic regulation, where it actually encounters the same dilemma with Comte's. I allude to the Vine-image of St. John. Here, as I conceive, what only can be accounted symbolically defective, is simply the same with which Comtism is also chargeable, so far as it answers to Tree-type, of falling under only that kind of Tree-type which is moulded on ancient understanding of vegetation. That is, the naïve kind of Tree-notion recently described (p. 327), which indeed every one

of us, even of this generation, began with, in that time of our childhood which was innocent of Physiology. And where the method of the Evangelist has advantage over Comte's, I would say, is also precisely in being child-like, in different way : namely, in missing, by its naïveté, the fatalness of "induration". That which makes the certain parallelness between the cases of the two, is evidently the intermingling of the false and the true, in perception of the problems involved of respectively theology and philosophy,—causing necessarily mental struggle between "abstractness" and "concreteness",—which *must* be the difficulty in all cases of systematic transition : as much that of John, in producing out of Hebrewism Christianity ; as that of Comte, in desiring to make end of Metaphysics. And undoubtedly in such state of transition, what is constantly held lightly, and perviously to new influences, can only be the form that is desirable.

This struggle between abstractness and concreteness, I imagine, then, to have been this with the Evangelist. —Certainly, in his making Jesus say of himself (*John* xv.) "I am the Vine, of which ye, my disciples, are the branches", he could only be contemplating him in character of the Man who, as such, was providing to the world, in subordinate repetition of himself, a course of world-teachers and world-examples. That such concrete design was in question, is proved by the earnestness of his tone, bearing on practical encouragement and warning of the disciples. If, as branches, they abode not in Him, neither would they duly bear fruit, nor would they be suffered, by the husbandman who was God, to remain on the Vine for its branches.—But then follows thought of *how* the disciples should bear fruit, if they did so. No *otherwise*, the writer argues, than through the abiding in them of


the Vine, their sustainer, in response to their abiding in Him. But in this very turn now given to the idea, Jesus ceases immediately to be as stock to the Vine, which originally he was, imagined as propelling its branches ; and becomes in its place the entire Tree—the spiritualized *type* of the Tree :—since only in this way could the virtue that was in Him be supposed for requirable to be inherent in them, while abiding on their stock. And this means precisely the exalting into Christhood of what previously was only human in Jesus ; while, as to the Tree, an inference is involved that indeed bears the effect of a pre-science of modern physiology, attendant on, and attesting, the true working of the Evangelist's thought ! For, by this abstraction of Christhood attained to, the Tree-stock which expressed the nature of Jesus became manifestly that which should, in true manner of Tree-action, be even from the first, and ever more and more, what really owed its Christhood to the branches it produced, through their abiding in *it*, even more than the branches owed their character to the stock : since, no more could the Vine-stock without branches have ever become really a Vine, than could Jesus have grown really into the Christ without disciples to have rendered him such. The mystic union of the natures, abstract and concrete, was thus painted, not with avoidance of the incongruousness that must ever exist when the type is mixed up with reality, but especially with full sense and acknowledgment of the incongruousness, made possible under right metaphysics by the sole elasticity of its practice ;—while in this elasticity, and especially in this openness, is intrinsically the neutralizing of whatever in the evasion might have otherwise been harmful,—*not* afforded in the practice of Positivism.

Of what sort then should really be the Tree, with full

Tree-conditions, that I might, by my own view, take as standing for what Comte's serial line is intended to stand for\* :—the organized figure, showing statical result from what has been indeed the whole Life of Knowledge ? As such, it needs expressly to combine in one form, at once what the Tree of especial Mythology, and a Tree to be that of proper Science, should singly represent. And, in fact, to make out for myself the import of such Tree, in at least bare perception of a possible plan for it, is my only real means of expressing, on my own terms, the result which I may consider to have gained in this chapter, as to what I laid out at its beginning. This was, to trace Nature's own method of working onwards continually towards a system of morphological construction, in which Sex should reveal itself plainly for her one all-inclusive design in creation :—my argument thence being always in view, that workings of Human Thought must (with difference) go over the same ground. To show, therefore, that integrated methods of Science, and of the self-conscious Mythology which is legitimate Metaphysics, are really capable of organic combination, or symbolical Marriage, is the Tree-scheme that it is inevitable to my plan that I should attempt. It is the Igdrasil that demands a creation of itself :—just as necessary to be shown in this

\* I mean, a "dogmatic" scheme, as differing from an "historic" one, although moulded entirely upon the plan of what might be the latter (see note to p. 150). A Tree of the actual world-progress of Knowledge, I must require to exhibit a similar general course of vegetative ability with that which I have here been describing for the sign of my personal experience, in its actual occurring: from the bare rooted-leaf up to form of accomplished Tree-life (p. 337). And such view would indeed correspond with the plan I have suggested of taking always the Leaf-natured Sociology at foundation: thence naturally supplying the double current of vitality of which one gives the *motive* to the other; and with this, the required unity of the scheme. As to the requisite final effect also, when main branching is effected, this view has most eminent assistance from what lately Mr. Darwin has argued, respecting the originating of Moral sentiments in men, precisely through social conditions.

light, though it *be* but of mere mythological fancy, as before I have believed the similar effort of subjective Astronomy, of which this needs of right be a development.

Such Igdrasil, then, let me try for :—or, rather, let me bring into junction my scattered provision already made for it. Just now, as to my Tree of Mythology, I have learned to determine how, really, there are two only points essentially to be regarded, in the shaping of the emblem. That is : the branching of the stem, at the spot where Tree-consciousness is inferrible to arise, as to the final Tree-purpose of Leaf-change into Stamens and Pistils, into two main divisions with respectively exogenous and endogenous, or Flower-bearing and Fruit-bearing distinctions ; and a backing of this with what, nevertheless, at the same time in a manner counteracts it, as to rendering the Tree as a Whole explicitly of one only of these kinds, with sign in the mode of cotyledons ; and desirably exogenous, with these rendered duplicate. Hence, for properly a hieroglyph that should comprehend everything, a figure such as this  might entirely suffice. Nay, less even than this would be enough, save for ulterior occasion with the cotyledons : since exclusively the branching of the stem—*if* attention sufficient could be given to the proportions of the figure, as to the angle of divergence in connection with the length of the lines,—might be accepted, in itself, as implying the full power of the Tree to develope to its utmost, which the pair of cotyledons primarily expresses.

This ulterior occasion regards my own ultimate principle, of real Tree-condition based always upon *balance* effected, between the two operating currents concerned :—the balance which I have *not* found effected in Comtism, and which therefore, by its absence, has seemed to me to render Comte's materials *only* such, needing still to be worked

up anew into shape that may really be organic (p. 102) For, in consequence of this principle, does the whole matter of Mental-effort at Knowledge divide itself simply into the very three classes, and no more, as leading ones, which this hieroglyph intimates. Namely, first, the full-ordered kind of effort, referrible to the Tree-head, because of its being sexually distributable, into methods extra-spectional and introspectional, in the same way that Leaves are occasionally modified into alternatively Petals and Pistils ;—secondly, the un-sexual, or rather *pre-sexual* kind, to be allotted to the lower trunk, as provided for by true Leafage only, and therein concerned chiefly with the furnishing of proper Rootage to the Tree, *by* the balancing of the qualities at extremes ;—and thirdly, the kind which, because of its ordinating into form having altogether been anterior to such effort of balancing, I must necessarily adjudge for no more than cotyledonous. And to such actual station as this latter does the constructive method of Comtism, as of the *Dracæna* kind suggested, seem necessarily to restrict Comtist scheming, when measured by the principle of balance: showing it only negatively helpful to a scheming on the plan of true Leafage.

That is, I need to take Comtism as exponent of *one* kind of classed efforts, merely cotyledonous: its own *un-Tree-conditioned* subnaturalism making one form of seed-leaf, to which must stand opposite the scheme-method of old theological supernaturalism\*. For, crudely, and in no degree fruitfully, are these antagonistic to one another; while precisely what balancing has to do, is to constitute opposites that are otherwise!

\* Such is the proportion to which personal perspective reduces the "general progress of Knowledge":—just in the same way as it would happen in our mounting a hill, that the last object passed might easily cover, in reality, the whole outlying prospect underneath us!

At the end of my last chapter I formalized an assertion, as fruit of my classing on Star-principle, which now I would develope into the following, for expression of what instinctively I am pursuing, as Nature's actual elaborating of the ideal of Sex. Namely, that the very fact of two definitely-opposite elements being concerned, with ability, nevertheless, of dynamic inter-action as *mutually* positive and negative, involves in itself the Two kinds of formation to ensue, whose differencing *shall* be of the nature of Sex.—What "balancing" means, then, must necessarily include the due sifting of ingredients, themselves of all kinds, so as fitly to order out these elements. And at beginning of mental vegetal action,—in which, as I have shown, it seems requisite to plunge into the "pre-organic depth of analogy" where the elements contend simply as in "tides",—the sorting of these elements affords simply the two currents of Intellect and Feeling: which now I would assign as respectively the Mechanical and Chemical agencies in vegetation; including under the former all action that is Polarizing, and limiting the latter in especial to the working out of Affinity:—since, is it not the peculiarity of Intellect to distribute ideas, and of Feeling to combine them? Or, in fact, may I not use advisably language that already is prepared for me, in saying that the tendency of Intellect is to form into particles that are "crystalline", and that of the element which is feminine into particles "colloidal"? (See Spencer's *Biology* I. 15.) —If, however, this may be allowed, the following appears clear for the formula of construction of the Tree. From the very first of real Tree-process, marked by started Roots tending downwards, to match Leaves tending upwards, each successive Leaf-issue must be viewed as the offspring, first of Chemistry-simple united with simple Mechanics, and thence of such constantly double series



of mentally-organized efforts (p. 248-9) as may naturally be represented by these two at foundation, blending ever on higher terms with one another; the "systematic partition" being inevitably enforced by the fact of organic objects arriving to be the matter of study. For, this general idea admitted, the simple assorting which I require of only *two* departments to concern me, in the laying out of my Tree, answers entirely to my principle of determining these by balance, exerted on the *test*-characters attached to them (pp. 112, 117-8). The knowledge of proper Chemistry, combined with the knowledge of Mechanics, may stand as producing Astronomy, for representative of whatever is subject to Mathematics. But the knowledge which is in question upon Living-Being conditions, in which Mind-presence comes to occur for object of investigation, in requiring for that reason to be parted into subjective and objective tracks, must inevitably fall under regard to what constantly is the sovereignty of Mind, wherever it presents itself, and thus mainly be represented by Metaphysics. And this agrees with the conception of self-consciousness coming into the Tree-condition, precisely and solely by the effect of its branching:—ostensibly manifested at "somewhere" in Comte's series between Biology and Sociology.

Thus the *two* only, of Biology and Astronomy, seem all that are left out of the original *seven* of the series:—the sciences of Star-condition and Life-condition! And the followers of Comte have indeed gone so far on this plan as to admit, with regard to Astronomy, the subordinate attachment of Chemistry and Physics. But they have done nothing with the difficulty that is greatest, in which chiefly seems to show what is cotyledonous crudity of Tree-principle in Comtism. And that is, with the tangled impossibility and physiological contradiction, as it appears,

of its dealing with the green-leafage of Sociology, as to forcing it into quality of Stem.

For my own part, I have shown how the weighing which I have made for myself of the *tests* of Mathematics and Metaphysics—expressly with *ex-parte* intention, and asserted predilection for the latter,—has rested entirely on the point, which indeed the very usage of my Symbol implies, of the unnaturalness and artificialness of the former. Judging as if by Tree-head standard, my argument-of-instinct falls utterly against what are symbols employed mathematically:—those straight lines, and right angles, and true circles, of which Nature herself of a certainty knows nothing, and has never drawn one in her life! Nay more: it falls even on the assertion which is the postulate of universal Arithmetic, as similarly that at which Nature only laughs, in the spirit of her own figure-working: our human idea of unit-integers, made mock of by her, as to the futility of any imagining them real matter of addition, or barely of enumeration, through any right implication, in her sense, of uniformity or isolation:—as if “units” could possibly *be* units, or “integers” integers, in our sense, with her! In *her* mode of addition, we may know, it happens not unfrequently, though always at odd times and without warning, that she shifts it into rule of multiplication: insisting besides, otherwise and especially, as what most is the caprice she delights in, that instead of its being “law” that one and one shall make *two*, they shall fitfully vary by proving instead to make *three*! Hence, to the mathematician, I conceive that Metaphysics, when he comes to do right to metaphysical principle, must be Nature’s *argumentum ad hominem*, clenchingly directed to *him*, on behalf of the general negativeness of all basis for knowledge, other than merely relative: plainly seen in such light by the metaphysician,

though by *him* only possible so to be seen with reflected assistance from Metaphysics. And, this showing of Mathematics for what I have called it of “un-conscious Metaphysics,—unconscious of its own limitation,—may I not fairly consider to give justification to my accounting of the former, by Tree-head plan, as on an assuredly lower Tree-range than the latter?

Nevertheless, this very plan admits perfectly of my estimating to the full the Root-effecting agency of those kinds of fundamental knowledge-efforts which *are* under test-character of mathematical. Before the Tree begins to work out its Sex-differentiation, I recognize that it is amply efficacious for it to expend, as it does, the whole of its downward-acting energy, not called for in making bark to the stem, in supplying Root-system, for maintenance of its masculine quality of perpetuity to the general Tree. Precisely in the sexlessness rightful to the lower stock, I see how, by comparison, this may be desirably artificial. —And curiously, I must remark, here repeats itself again the recurring equivocation, ever liable to the subject. While concerned with Star-symbolism, as to primitive laying-out of mental “axis”, I had the puzzle to get over of the night-winter of Science, so appearing to Metaphysical view, being yet the same thing with what Science, on the contrary, in its own view, accounts for day-summer; and *vice versa*. Such, however, is here also the puzzle now offered, between the appropriate aspects of what, for myself, I would call the “artificial light” of Mathematics, contrasted with the light that Metaphysically appears as celestial. For, as to the usage which is actually made of the former *by* men of Science, this mechanically-produced light is indeed what befits their night-season with eminence of appropriateness to their working by it;—and just as much as, though not more than, it is

not good for the musing by, as Religion has the wont of doing, by the light of her Stars :—although always, as to the depth of what is two-sided Truth in the matter, no difference at all is in fact between Star-light and artificial, save only in what touches the incomparably farther range of the former.

While, therefore, I require for my own Tree-form a division into compartments that shall specially give larger proportion to the branched half than to the lower main stock ; I perfectly admit that to a mind scientifically cast, the proportion ought justly to be the reverse : signifying lenthened occupation with Rootage, and deferring of the Sexual partition. But all along, from the cotyledons upwards, I uphold a sole *gamous* intention, for that which alone, but sufficiently, may justify my Tree for a natural one. And now let me design it accordingly.

First, as to the cotyledons, I consider that their decisively unfruitful antagonism to one another might indeed be represented in its effect, so far as this pertains to pure Science, in exclusively crystalline fashion : that is, in a method of Leafage which, compared with the proper method, is as-if the mere mineral frostwork of an *Arbor Dianæ*,—the cold prefiguration of the Tree that is perfect : beautiful exceedingly, and yet still, to generalistic conception, incomparably less so than the genuine Fruit-bearer !—On the other hand, also, as to what has the effect of as-if theological passion, of what else can I think than, now as before, of Fire ?—not indeed as affording internalized Heat, which would be alien to the character of the symbol, but as yielding externally a foliage of flames, contrasting with the crystal. Fire and Chemistry together, in this sort of barren union, may still have the ability to lead on to the true kind of Tree-productiveness.

Next, as to the Root-producing trunk, where the *gamous*

implication begins. This, as I imagine, has respect to the inherent combination between the developing effects of the two opposite kinds concerned, arising out of their both being promoted in common by already-sociological motives (p. 149)—or, by the fact of men living amongst men. And while the condition remains purely Astronomic, I have shown how the introspective thought-leafage produced—this being eminently the earlier of development,—appears as those globe-fruits of thought-motion which I count as Metaphysical Light-bestowers :—bestowers of *that* which, ever after its first breaking forth on the mind, is the necessary agent for all turning of mental sap into chlorophyll! On the other hand, again, what are beginning scientific endeavours, I must regard as belonging to that World-effect, counter to Star-effect, which consists in the gradual producing, and continual regulating, of *axis* commenced to the Tree; and which thus is representable in actual plant-fashion, by a growth of the incipient Tree-kind, shrub-like and of yet humbler sort, but uniformly tending, with its in-gathering of necessary Motion to be stocked in the Stem, both to raise up the Stem, and, at the same time, precisely to advance the Leaf-character into the stage where it is ripe for the event of metamorphosis.

And thence, lastly, as to the actual dividing of the Tree-axis, bringing with it this event, and the ostensible Sex-difference hitherto only latent. This means the provision for real Marriage between duly-antagonized portions of the Tree: having regard to the now integrally-separated methods of extraspectional Science and. introspectional Metaphysics or Religion, which, in their several attributes of “speculative” and “practical”, I consider representable as exogenous and endogenous :—although, *after* the inter-union, it must necessarily happen that the signs should become blended, in a manner without example in

nature. That is: I suppose all along in the masculine branch an excess of the outer-productiveness first shown in the production of Roots, which contrasts with the productiveness, properly such, in excess in the feminine branch; and which, even when the characteristics shall have been mingled, by inter-union, shall still retain ever, and ever more finely, the same proper manner of difference.—But as this ultimate stage is altogether in advance of any hitherto-conditioned experience, let me finish my figure in changed style, generalistically, with the adaptation alone natural. That is, by pictorially *planting* it, in pre-imagined perspective: with a ground-line so drawn as to cover in all of the Tree not supposable to be visible at the contemplated station.

To such station, in fact, the earth-line must rise very nearly to the point of the branching:—so nearly, that the branches may very well appear, with the help of their foliage and sub-branching for concealment of their original direction, and the crowding of young herbage round the half-buried fork of their divergence, little different from two separate Trees. The aspect may be painted, then, as follows.

Two noble Stems, side by side with one another. One must have the attributes of the Oak, and the other the attributes of the Palm: save for this, that *both* of them must be crowned with utmost glory of both Flowering and Fruit; and of these even with a mutual assumption, to a certain extent, of opposite characteristics. Namely, that it must always be apparent how with the former what is eminent is the Rose-characteristic of mere flowering for itself; and in the latter only the Apple-blossom pride of making ready for fruit.—All down the Stems shall be specimens of all sorts of plants, with their appropriate issues; and with increasing variation, till at lowest the

one side waves chiefly only its delicate grasses, while the other glows out with full brilliance of cactuses, mingled with the grotesqueness of dragon-trees, shedding acrid and poisonous gums.—And, lying all around shall gleam steadfastly, though mysteriously,—set with regularity of “law”, in true mystic circle,—the primal vegetation of planetary Light-balls: no longer ranged, as of right, in the firmament of speculation, but strangely at Knowledge’s foundation, with their threads of connection with its stock buried under, in earth:—lying bedded upon tenderest mosses:—hedged also, still farther behind, by that circuit of mingled crystal and flames which is the original prophecy of the Tree’s double destiny.

Such, and no better, is the best that I can make of my Igdrasil!—Such, therefore, let the attempted delineation remain, for the occasion, and the moment. That is, simply in waiting till it may need be superseded and effaced.

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And does it seem that the thinking has been little well-spent that has gone to the imaginative effort?—However naturally it may appear so, it cannot be so really, if, as I believe, this is the natural means of *bringing my thinking into order!*

And of so bringing the kind of thought-action which, as shown at the beginning of this chapter, concerns actually the very nucleus of my design with Intellectual Religion! That is, the furnishing out to myself of new creed-position, round the only-retained point of previous Religion, which is the belief in *unum Deum*:—not at all in the manner of old creeds, which I have eschewed, but simply as a weaving into form, to be consonant with thought-changes in general, and with the general requirement of intellect, of

those supernal images of thought which seem naturally and necessarily to attend on the one standing dogma.

Except as produced into Form, no matter of intellect whatever can be said to be believed in. The setting up of shape for it is the only sign of that clearness of perception of it, which is identical with the tangible acceptance implied in the very meaning of belief. And this is true of a specialty with ideas that are religious; in so far as at all these are rightfully open to intellect:—whence, apparently, it has happened that exclusively to these has been ordinarily considered appropriate the express moulding effort, which has had the designation of Symbolism. And naturally so, for the reason of the direct Introspection, which is concerned in all matters of Religion. But none the less is it well to remember how, in reality, if we force ourselves to attend to it, every word that we use is symbolic. If, however, this is well remembered, surely it becomes obvious immediately, how the task of Religious Intellection can indeed be no other than that now attempted, of aiming with set purpose to give to our Symbolizing a direction that is authorized:—or, in other words, to infuse into our Symbolism a right principle of Morphology.

Having then now gone over all of the ground which, by the argument at the end of my last chapter (from p. 306), ought effectually to produce an authorizing by Nature herself of the system I am desiring of Symbolism, let me resume and complete the statement then begun, of what actually now constitutes my only creed-material.

My belief is simply, that while all Mental action is only that of different fashions of Symbolism, of which Symbolism of Deity is permanent and central: all progress in the nature of Mental action, in reflecting what is progress in the action of Nature, tends always towards the



gaining of the Sexual impress on Symbolism itself. That is, as explained, by the Feminine practice of it arriving, distinctively, to the habit of "taking charge of the extreme kinds" of Symbolizing, and "leaving to Science the mean kinds". And, as to the "authorization" I have been seeking for this idea,—while I admit, truly, that there is no effectualness to such end in the questioning of Nature here attempted, in itself:—it has happened to me, on the other hand, to strike into collision with another line of thought, that indeed seems to bring me an amazing confirmation. That is, in the consideration of how actually the World-effect of this sort, as to the strivings of mankind towards Religion, in general, bears on it the identical sign of direction:—with, as now farther appears, a most consonant process of creed-evolution.

When the creed of Christianity was framed,—or rather, naturally produced as effect of mental growth,—Religion, as yet, abhorred the idea of consorting with Science; and therein remained far, also, from power of true consciousness, both of her own limitation, and rightly, of herself! Hence, nothing was yet possible to Thought of that full metaphysical swing, from plain Anthropomorphism to limited Star-imagery, following only upon contact with Science, which I attribute for the Feminine regulation of Thought. Still, the progress made *towards* this appears truly to support the whole plan now suggested.

For Anthropomorphism's being permanent, the very child-likeness of it suffices in explanation: adapted as this makes it to the child-like disposition that is abidingly the true stock-condition of Religion. But then, in what manner could Intellect act upon it?—It did act, at first,—and, as I believe, rightly in so far,—by dividing the image of Deity into *parts*, according to the inevitable effect of intellectual contemplation: and into *parts* that,

by relational necessity of the case, were Three-fold :—whence relational discernment of a kind that was supereminently desirable was prepared for. There was this, however, of coincident intellectual inconsistency. Dividing into parts of an image that was anthropomorphic, ought evidently to disperse the personality of the image ; whereas, contrarily, in Christianity it had effect of precisely intensifying this,—so that, what the “ Father ” became by partition, was expressly Three *persons*. What resulted from the partition, moreover, as knowledge produced by it, could only be imagined to have reference to Deity : that is, as to its being made to appear to us that God Himself, in the gaining of a Son, had, by the conditions of intellect, thereby become first capable of knowing Himself *for* a Father ;—but could have done nothing (except indirectly,) towards helping out our human conception.\* And, to feel this, I contrast what results from the present designed method. Here, when I deviate from Anthropomorphism, with its dazzling obscurity of concrete figuration of Deity, and exchange for this the cold night-vision of philosophy : the Trinity that I recognize has indeed the most unpersonal possible of hypostases, but still which exclusively bear relation to my genuine human need. They are these :—God, seen revealed to us, primarily, in the out-lying universe ;—God, seen revealed, by developed observation, in the Time-effects of universal Progression ;—God, seen ultimately revealed in the manner that only fitly can assort the two other views together : by the taking of our own essential Being, our fact of Self-consciousness, as therein our inevitable exponent of the universe. And each one of this Trinity of aspects, more-

\* Is it conceivably possible that we should ever pray to “ *Our Son* which art in heaven ” ?—That this should not be possible, however, seems validly an argument against the suitableness of the Christian hypothesis.


over, has its two : is exchangeable constantly, for a World of thought-substance to us, or a Star of intellectual illumination !

But, I imagine, there was already in the original Trinity means of actually passing into this one, by the force of the Time-effect involved in the original static embodiment: which necessarily, as soon as it manifested itself, began gradually to elaborate the Triad into a Tree. And this means, in the full sense of the whole that is implied, the assimilating effectually into Christianity of whatever has been true in universal Mythology, itself of Tree-nature. The very Trinity of astronomic sort which I take for consecutive to the Christian Trinity, I imagine to be supplied by a virtual retention of old Chronos and Ouranos, for the all un-idolatrous homage of modern Science. And even as to that "low animal type" seeming needful to the doctrine of Selection, for an estimating upon average of the forces that are at work in creation,—even here seems no other than repetition, after all, of that very abused Tortoise, by which Indian philosophy expressed its idea of statical self-poise obtained for the universe ! So truly does Mythology appear justified in the children of her invention !——But much deeper, of this sort, seems the need I have been acting on of perpetuated Tree-worship : while in this—it occurs to me additionally,—I may farther most significantly claim, even the worship of the Tree as virtually combined with that of the *Serpent*, according to the widest-diffused of the earliest traces of Mythology ! For have I not here been contending,—though purely in pursuit of instinctive ideas, and without the slightest of intention towards this ancient combination,—how Star-method *is* in its action identical with Serpent-method : the mystic virtue of the *coil*, half-way product of revolution and straightness, being actually that by

which planets wield their masses through space, as worms creep by it through earth;—and Tree-method and Coiling-method together (as I shall presently argue) being those which both naturally and mentally *do* give foundation to universal creation!—All these I consider for pertinent signs of that future assimilation into the very substance of Christianity of formative principles in general, which, *when* it has been made, must perfect Christianity's own Tree-form.

But the progress began, as we have seen, already in the hands of an Evangelist! And indeed it appears to me now,—in the kind of consideration here arrived at,—that an endeavoured sympathy *with* the intention of St. John, in his allegory of the Vine, is the true step, as a first step, towards the assimilation of Tree-doctrine now intended.

What in the Christian Trinity touches properly on human interest, is manifestly laid in that duplicity of God-like and Man-like which attaches to its second hypostasis:—showing God, as I consider, under Time-aspect, as the representer of the whole destiny of progressing human nature. Hence the problem of the evolution of this scheme must necessarily turn on the question, of how far the depicting of this destiny of progression by the common Tree-type of development, will actually, or not, deal better with the difficulties involved than the scheme of Christianity has done. Difficulties, I imagine, there must be in the case, of the very nature of self-contradiction, which the *mystery* of the double nature makes acknowledgment of. Hence, not for this reason, in itself, does this scheme seem by any means at fault; but only because with it the intrinsic contradiction falls where least, to modern sense, it can desirably fall. And that is, with an infusion of falseness into the elements of Morality: eminently more fatal than any crushing of mere intellect.



This, however, rests so mainly with the crudeness of Personality, attributed to Christ, in due sequence to the idea of the Personal Trinity, that simply in the abstracting of this, *with* due substitution of the Tree-image, I conceive there may be found true solution of the problem :—a repetition of the doctrine of the Christ that precisely relieves, without in any way losing, its genuine import.

In my idea, any “confounding of the persons” of the Triad, or denial of their separate integral divinity, means only a deficiency of classifying ability in the thought that is dealing with them. But the “mystery” of the God-Man, as such, tends to raise such ability : by its diverting the at-first natural distribution in Space into that thwart state of sequence, where the Time-variations are so multi-form as by degrees to *compel* recognition of the mental operation required to allow for them : and that *is*, an imagining all the number of generations on generations that make up the totality of human beings, represented by the Christ, really in the likeness of successive Leaf-issuings on a Tree of Humanity. And this typical abstraction may indeed be well charged with accounting for the sins of its constituents, without anything of that deep moral injury which lies in this being referred to a *Person* !

The actual, and most terrible “knot of difficulty”, tied up in our position towards God,—incomparably *more* apparent to ripe reason than to the feeble perception of superstition,—I believe to mean always what results from our conflict of Individualism, fraught with self-instincts, with our condition of mere “parts” of Whole Existence : the righting of which contrary forms of our consciousness makes the one constant object of all theology, and the necessary incarnation into practicalness that all true speculation, of such sort, must undergo. A *something* within us, of our individual selfism, *must* hence be de-

voted to frustration! And thus from the first, in our framing of conception of Deity, it has never been admissible to our reason that God, as our Father, can at once be Almighty and All-good. For it is only *this*, over again, that constitutes the perplexity of the Christhood, except as to its moral enhancement! But once let the idea be spiritualized,—so that “Christ” shall mean truly only the effect of the doctrine, as to its power of making all of us true Sons of the Father, precisely through our becoming true brothers of one another, in true human community;—and what really is the “atoning efficacy” of the idea, with indeed all its moral offence obviated, seems preservable as follows. That is, by the Stock of Humanity appearing as the abstract Mediator of religious benefit, and also and specially of religious retribution, which is simply the Medium of transmission in both ways.

St. John, the most spiritual of early believers, had come to see truly, how necessarily “God is a Spirit”:—whence, for Christ also he instinctively strove towards a similar result. But the concrete implications of his Manhood were an inevitable impediment. And correspondently, in the present scheme of symbolism, is there wanting the means of that *lowering* of his image to the full depth of contrast to personality, which really would be the *raising* of his attributes into “divine” ones. They can only be brought to the Tree-level, proper to the representing of moral Time-effects; instead of to the Star-level of true Statical Self-existence, which, in our thinking of pure Deity, means irrespectiveness of Time-effects. —By present understanding, let it always be remembered, “spiritualizing” of ideas has no possible other meaning *than* that of carrying them out of reach of mere concrete allusions. By the kind of sorting-out, however, which now I propose, of such of these as shall permittedly

remain in the mingled Christ-image on these new terms, I conceive that there is a furtherance to morality, which I will endeavour to trace, bearing really towards that always impending division, of typical Sexism, which I assume as the Tree-symbol's final purpose. That is, towards the effects of Christ-doctrine which are characteristically secular or religious: severally concerning our inter-human brotherhood, and our filiation to Deity.

In the first of these chiefly are we concerned with the humanism of the idea: or, with the actual living Man, the concrete side of the Christ, who was necessarily so important in that light to the feeling of first disciples. If the human Jesus be *not* divinely merged, the Tree-image, I contend, renders to him fullest homage in this way:—Since all increase to the stock of human nature in general, proceeds only from what comes to it from the action of the constituent leaf-issues, each and several; the more marked ones of these become certainly what are characterized, specifically, by their uplifting of the *standard* of human character: and thus Jesus, conspicuously amidst other of our benefactors, by especially only acts in which our sympathy as human beings may go with him, has done what was the utmost of good to us in what still is this merely ideal effect, that ever since he existed our idea of human merit has been exalted. But then expressly this means an excluding of sympathy with the Christ; just in proportion to its retention among Christ's members. It is *they* only that are really the brethren; and *he* is the mere Type of Human Brotherhood:—so that, by "Christ growing in us" is merely asserted that condition of sympathy, bound up with community of dependence on Deity, which general instincts of mankind have so notably accepted, by their belief in Christianity, as due *standard*-condition for moral beings.—And manifestly

this agrees with what essentially is Tree-nature: as to *no* true Individuation at all being possessed by the aggregate Tree-form, but only by the particular subordinate forms, which are Leaves. Let any of the preachers of Christianity, therefore, only follow the text of St. John, with a working out of it in fidelity to Tree-principles, and answer to themselves if this development is not rightful, and a legitimate clearing up of the case of morality. I would ask no other test of my reasoning.

My idea is very far off from the "cultus of Humanity," propounded by Positivism, which actually, to my thinking, repeats what is fallacious in Christianity, instead of passing on, developmentally, to a true sequence of what in Christianity was sound. So far from there being anything of self-existence, even typically attached to the Type that I aim at, to which worship may even typically be due, I desire in it merely an expression of the *condition* affecting us in the case. All being-ship here concerned, for legitimate drawing forth of our sympathies, must exclusively be that of the actual fellow-sinners and fellow-strivers with one another, of whom the Ideal only figures the predicament of destination they lie under. And this very predicament means a specialty of isolation, in a religious sense, and of immediate self-importance to the concrete existents, in no degree lessened by their community of condition. Nay, manifestly a specialty of rivalry, inherent to the laying out of the condition. For, every one of the multitudinous Tree-axes that we are—making up by our realism of self-life the fictitious individualism of the Whole,—*may*, in fact, and even *must*, be enhanced to itself into character of independent whole Tree-hood: thus drawn into adaptation to that universal allusion lately spoken of. And here with what fulness of poetry,—as to especially that hard soreness of human



rivalry! One of us, of these linked-together Tree-lets, is an axis so stationed on the common Tree-stock, supplying sap to us all, that it is planted from the first as if "in dry soil". To another it is otherwise the mere overweeningness of well-furnished competitors that is against it: wearing off, or tearing off, its hopefulest of buds:—to which yet, for all that, the blossoms that produce themselves at last, *if* any there be, prove only the stronger and the sweeter!—But the suggestions of such sort are innumerable, and too obvious to need reminding of to any body. What only I need keep to is the "doctrinal" effect, in itself:—the cross of apparent Providential unfairness, which demands, for our being reconciled to it, the principle of Brotherhood.

And now, as to the other, and the actually deeper side, of the same enigma of Providence. What furtherance to Morality is dogmatically to be found in that casting of the self-contradiction of the case where it *must* be cast, on present terms, so as *not* to give the heretofore offence to Morality?—*Where* it must be cast, in this case, is evidently on those instincts of Selfism, of which, in the very nature of things, our consciousness is filled full.

"*We all do fade as a Leaf!*"—And very deep is the patheticalness of it, as well as the poetry of it, that we do so, to our Leaf point-of-view!—Pathetical is it also, with added bitterness of un-poetry, that "our iniquities are like the wind" that, even sooner than is needful, do "take us away!"—But if both of these *are* natural truths, as our world-long experience has shown them to be, how surely it must be well, and be best for us, to admit them, in simplicity, in our schemings, as alone what it is *safe* to us to abide by, for the framing of our principles and our creeds?—And all the more, as I believe,—that is, all the better, and the safer,—because we

are *not* any longer obliged also to admit what has commonly, by Christians, been attributed for meaning to the remainder of the prophet's words, in the much-abused text (Isaiah lxiv. 6).

By heretofore creed-belief, what should reconcile us to our Leaf-destiny,—of successive production, and successive decay, to individuals, with continuity of result to only an abstraction,—has been our supposed sonship to Deity, of such sort as indeed had its sign in our being made by it the sharers in God's immortality. But this vanishes with the Tree-image made solely in place, as now designed, for the filling up of creed-room. What is done for us, is only the producing of such posture to our thought as, on the contrary, makes perfect distinction, in this respect, between God and ourselves:—with, however, this at the same time. Namely, that the present creed-symbol is a rendering into terms, the clearest imaginable, of the religiously-requisite apposition of our consciousness with the Not-Me outside of us, for a Creative Environment from which, *as* Trees, we constantly win our every attainment of life-substance and life-organism; by, however, only action of Struggle, accomplished by us. It is a fixing into systematic admission, therefore, of what actually was foreshown in the grandest of old myths of the Hebrews: of the need that lies on us of *wrestling with God*, for the wringing out from Him of the blessing that in no way can His creatures dispense with. The Christ who is the Medium for our obtaining this blessing, is—*not* the securer of a Leaf-hood to be *un-fading*, which Tree-nature forbids,—but the developed Tree-axis which is our fulcrum to lean back on,\* for our furnishing with right

\* What the "cultus of Humanity" would do for us, on the contrary, as to regulating our attitude, would be expressly to cause us to turn backward on Environment.

attitude in our battling with Divine Circumstance. Nor *without* this mediatorial sense, of the force in Humanity, could we carry on the battle! It is everything to have gained a Tree-stock, which collects into one the whole produce of the particular strivings which we Leaves have successively gained out of atmosphere, in our grappling with the storms of our lives. Yes, and even in our simple imbibing of daily sunshine!—And truly, when “two or three” of us only are thus gathered together, in real Christ-combination, the effect of the stock-axis begins.

How better than thus—how otherwise than thus—could true nature of *heroism* have been realized by us:—realized, I mean, by ourselves, as till now it has been attributed by us as realized by the Christ? For indeed, whatever of real produce of constitution for human nature is obtained in this way, is the sort of gain that in no way directly is of benefit to ourselves: such produce being only stored up for the future condition of our race.—And yet still I have no view to what passes for *self-sacrifice*, in ordinary language:—to call which by such name seems to me a most hurtful misnomer:—what really can alone mean *self-sacrifice* in the case, being changed by present view into merely our voluntary acceptance of God’s law of extinction, as we find it; and retained therefore always in its original implication, as towards Deity. What *heroism*, on the contrary, implies, as displayed towards fellow beings, I consider in reality to require, for real justness of thought, to be accounted of as the highest of human gains. And for this reason: that the very nature of the Life-Struggle engaged in must be understood, in hypothesis, as including just as much the whole gladness, as the whole trial, of human existence. And in fact, it is an eminent part of the advantage of this view of the Christ, that it does give this place to our happier impres-

sions ; and above all, that the Mediation concerned *has*, intrinsically, a specialty of regard to inherited *merits*—inherited *human* merits,—above regard to inherited *penalties*:—the Christ, in this new case, being actually shown the gainer, continually, in his character of representer of human beings !

And now I need again to make reference to that signallest occasion of Human Conflict with Circumstance, which is also a Conflict no more than Inter-human,—and therein correspondent to the duplicity of Christhood,—which I consider for involved in the finishing construction of the Trinity of Religion, by the deifying of its latest hypostasis : giving dueness of importance to that deepest of appurtenances of *Being*-condition, which is the perfecting of Sex. By Conflict of the representers of Sex, one with another, I imagine that the Life-Struggle in general of human beings is essentially kept up and qualified. But no more than this reminder of it is now required. For the present I am only stating in terms my creed-formula ; with the hope of hereafter explaining it in detail.

Let me indulge myself, however, with expressing, in passing, what it has occurred to me to remark to myself, with astonishment, as the effect of my glancing just now at the Bible story of Jacob. Namely, with what clearness of impression I now seem enabled, as if first to any real distinct purpose, to see meaning in that orthodox plan of Religious Development, which assumed through the whole of the Old Testament records a running prophecy of the Christ. Bare criticism has taught me sufficiently in mere words, how, as to Jacob in particular, there is mythically woven in his story a similar feeling, although limited in its degree, with that by which afterwards the man Jesus was glorified. But in entering, as now I believe that I have been doing, into a portion of the general mythicizing

intention, with straight reference to immediate experience in religion, personal and my own, the "prophecy" bespeaks itself to me;—I see how it is only the poetical turn of designation for what is mere "precedent". To take the image I have alluded to—of Jacob wrestling for the blessing to be won by him, with sore hurt to himself, from the embodied Angel of his destiny,—for other than the generalized Israel, claiming of God its peculiarity of favour with Him, which led naturally and historically afterwards to Jesus's assertion of Messiahship, I feel now, convincedly, for the utter barbarism of prosaicalness.—And from this image, besides, there can never be separated that other, which is fellow to it, of the vision that had earlier descended to the stony pillow of the wanderer, and that even in bringing its assurance of Divine comfort, had yet drawn from him the cry of "how dreadful is this place!"—the two in conjunction giving distant effect to the whole story of a wrought constellation of myths!—Nor, if the present idea of Religious Development be true, is there wanting a true visible connection between the awe-inspired consciousness of ancient Israel, *through* Christ-revelation, *with* our actual Religious status:—since Christhood, as now understood, is that which precisely means a rendering personal, and immediate, to each one of us, of the sentiment that in Hebrews was only mythically national:—so esteemed, namely, by the poetical historians who looked back on it.

Yet a deeper effect lies behind, giving general background to the whole of what now has been designed. If the poetic efficacy of Symbolism is increased, as I believe that it is increased immeasurably, by systematization introduced into it, the same sort of command given to it,

as just described, over the past workings of Religion, may well have ability to extend also, in its own fashion, over the parallel, quasi-mythic, constructions of Science. Poetry, in its right sense, means only, and always, our deepest of expression for what is deepest of Truth.

The myth that has favour with Science, is its figment of "Law". And this assuredly is an anthropomorphism, by implication, just as much as any mode of personifying run into by the humbler kind of intellect! What now I have in view to express however is, that this really mythic character has inevitably the nature to conceal itself for such, to the thought that makes use of the figment, till precisely the Tree-idea of Development intervenes, to yield a contrasted embodying method. *With* this appears to spring up, as first given occasion to, the parallel demand, now made by Religion on Science, to what Science itself has already enforced on Religion, of an explicitly owning to its myths, in such character. If it be, however, admitted on its own part by Science, that its symbols *are* as much destitute of externalism to back them as the other kind of myths are, the whole tyranny of the idea of "Law", as to that in it of deadening offence which has ever been felt such by Religion, is dispersed.

If the plan I am pursuing be valid, Symbolic Method of examining Nature, *when* adequately systematized, is as legitimate mental practice, in its own sphere, as that Method of Observation with Verifying Experiments, which is Science's instrument. But an awakened consciousness of this *must* also awaken consciousness of much ulterior metaphysical effect. And especially as to the idea of "Law",—which indeed is the summing-up in one of the general artificialnesses which are regulated by mathematics: convicted for such by their confronting with introspective self-consciousness (pp. 99, 114),—there is

*that* in the force of Tree-analogy which, I contend, makes its actual Anthropomorphism palpable. It may be said, it is true, that a "law" of Growth is as permissible rationally as any other kind of "law", to be accounted for such. But in practice it is assuredly not so. For the very meaning of Tree-nature is, that constantly a new platform arises, making change of the whole postulated basis on which Law-conception founds itself: so that inevitably it becomes natural in the end, when this consequence has sufficiently multiplied itself, that Thought should turn its back on mathematics, and betake itself ownedly to the sense of "spontaneity" lying about it. And the very *modesty* of the elevation of the position—in there being consciously left beneath it all power of farther accuracy to facts,—brings the child-likeness again into thought, which means a felt shame of the original presumption. It *was* child-like, be it granted, to suppose, as was first devised, that the mere "Will" of the Creator did everything in creation; but no less is it child-like, as to Science, to assign the same "everything" to Law. Nay, the two propositions, if we look at them close enough, coalesce:—just because of the ever-shiftingness of the platform of mentalism, as subject to development. Let the conditions of Law, namely, be adjusted by those of nature's actual Tree-caprices, and the capriciousness itself appears eminently for what is the real Law of condition in nature. The argument for Evolutional Metaphysics is completed indeed in true circle, against "vicious" constructions of both sorts that oppose it. Its true serpent course of long windings is indeed, as it were, bitten in, by the reptile's taking fairly its own tail, at the last, into its mouth! (pp. 159, 169-70).

But this brings a new mode of conceiving of very Truth. And a mode which altogether is involved in that religious-

ness of the *naturalness* of Tree-character, which Positivism artificially ignores. I mean, as to the consciousness of *atmosphere*, creatively encompassing all schemed thinking, and giving a just breathing-space to our instincts, which the symbol so notably asserts. *This* allowed for, systematically, there arises, I conceive, such new-ordered conviction of the nature of Truth, as, while indeed casting loose all previous understanding of it, yet moulds a new character for it, incomparably more likely to endure. Namely : that consistent following-out of the doctrine of Evolutional Equilibrium, which admeasures Truth always, from strict human point-of-view, as no other than a matter of "relation",—between our human capacity of apprehension, and that unknown Reality which *does* fold our mentalism round atmospherically.

The "vice" of anthropomorphic construction which the use of this Law-image appears to render chargeable no less to positivistic metaphysics, than to heretofore theology, seems inherently to subsist in that assumption of essential uniformity in Truth, which indeed is as naturally acceptable to prime instinct of Science, as it is to the feeling claiming stand-point with Deity. What is Truth of today, namely, seems necessarily postulated, on both of these plans, for Truth of all times and all places : to the planet Neptune, for instance, just as much as to ourselves. But, surely, when our standard becomes that of Evolution, such conception must vanish. As matter of the Equilibrium just stated, what can only be appropriate must be the thinking of Truth as simply a mental instrument *elaborated* by ourselves, out of the material furnished for it, for our dealing with phenomena;—and, consequently, as that which is *only* what we make it: never actually existent, in fact, until we have made it—all fresh as we go,—in those seekings after Truth, where by illusion



of instinct, we fancy that we have only to *discover* it, as what we call "facts" are discovered. Farther back in the matter, also, this very power of "elaborating" the instrument must be thought of as elaborated itself in us, long before, by circumstance acting on us; circumstance, as well as ourselves, being the matter of development, though at very different rate of progression:—whence is evident how long and how complicated must be the process of the mind's attaining harmony with facts. The influence that comes to us from creative environment, is indeed as those star-gleams that have taken such ages in their reaching us, that the thing they reveal may have ceased to exist:—as the very manner I am tracing of Religious development, at all events, exemplifies.

By the Tree scheme of formation of religious images, this mere relative idea of Truth is so purely in fact rendered necessary, that it shows the successive belief-forms at once *true* and *false*:—*true* only to their own stage of mentalism, and *false* to every other. And certainly it seems to me, that only in this way is the integrity preservable of our idea of Truth, and of our habit of believing in Truth:—by this constantly allowing for relation to mental position, and also for what has been, antecedently, position in mental atmosphere. What in formal Christianity now condemns it, to the need of being considered as extinct, I have here come to refer to its essential root-dogma of Man's Fall, from original perfection to degeneracy,—which is flatly or metaphysically contradicted by the principle of development. If however the tracing have been just, this dogma did fairly represent the only possible apprehension of religion in early ages: because the then state of the Filial relation—the proper source of religion,—was so set to advantage of the Father over the Child, as necessarily led to false view of the character of

the Past (L iv.-i). In proportion as human nature was more near to that of brutes, it *was* actually true that brute-force, as the dominant force, made the man more important than the infant; while as culture advances, bringing mind-force along with it, the tendency is ever towards this, that the Father shall live rather for the sake of the Child, and the Child live the less for the mere sake of the Father. And Religion must give answer to the progress, *even* to the reversing of itself:—as between “true” and “false” there is nothing but a flat opposition.

And even in that lower-than-metaphysical range of Truth, where this flat opposition does not happen, there is still surely happening continually a less heaped-up difference, between mind and the facts of environment. Could geology and astronomy have been true, as they now are understood, already in pre-glacial eras; or, say, when the present solar system was only nebulous?—Would it not be mere folly, again, to speak of moral principles as true, in regard to a condition without any kind at all of living beings?—But, if this be admitted,—*if* this kind of speech be mere folly,—a consequence ensues that meets the whole case of the incompatible Law and Caprice-ideas, for descriptive of creation. For certainly, in proportion as development was primal,—or, as Natural Selection had been little at work,—phenomena *were* lawless, or apparently capricious. We forget, in our now-conditioned view of what is orderly, how many “ill-made” creatures, so to call them,—and how many “ill-made” worlds,—must first have been blotted out of nature! That power of our classifying them now, which the Tree-symbol stands for, only came to us by the sifting away of all these!—But, existing as they must have done, at first, who shall say that the impression they caused did not actually stamp on incipient mentalism that idea of Will-capriciousness

of Deity even yet only partially removed? Wherever organization is at fault, surely the idea is still true!

The Tree-symbol, and that only, gives means to every steadfast form of thought to be true in its place; and also gives it place to be true in, if it only keep to its place. At the imaginable beginning of things, there was *nothing* to which Law-idea is appropriate;—while worlds were creating, *everything* appears to have been so;—while plants were creating, there was *much* so adapted;—while animals, *less*;—and while mentalism, lastly, is developing, *so little*, as to hitherto experience, that Caprice stands again in ascendancy. And the Tree-image signifies it all. Our *growing* world of mind, rolling ever on and on, round and round,—all creepingly as it does make its way, in this fashion, in the process of development,—takes in, one by one, every plan of disposition in its turn. And this is its accommodating to the symbol of the Tree.

## CHAPTER VI.

THE BASIS WHICH SEEMS FURNISHED, IN THE CONSTITUTED  
ANIMAL TYPE OF STRUCTURE, FOR OUR ACTUALLY-  
POSSESSED SENSE OF IDENTITY.

IN what I have now done, of attempting a natural principle of Symbolism, I have indeed struck on matters the most central to my purpose. Nevertheless, it is obvious, the subject remains here incomplete. If, as I assume, the real ground of "the symbolical" in Nature, for religious ends, is restricted to the two provinces described, of Planetary and Vegetal formations; while in these appears so much of generalistic suggestion: it is impossible not to expect a continued suggestiveness, probably even greater, in the ulterior designing of Nature, in the extra-symbolical ground of Animal formation;—while the investigating of this is, besides, the required "negative opposite" to my "positive" foregoing treatment, as to its containing the real cause of the restriction.—To this complement of the subject, involving such importance on its own account, I therefore now turn.

With regard to the restriction at the lower end, the case is indeed simple. Organism, in this primitive sphere, of Thought as of Nature, is, in accordance with the idea just arrived at, accountable merely as unprovided for, by action of regulating Selection. A Symbol of *any* kind

is plainly open to adoption, if there be no selected purpose, or systematized reference, held in view. And while this says enough for the temporary, or "capricious," use of Symbolism; on the other hand lies in contrast, to be pointed to, that anterior-to-realized, though apparently in course to be realized, intention at formative regulation, which, abundantly manifested in Nature, has constantly been seized on by poetry, for answering to occasion in mentalism. Thus,—for sufficing example,—if we need to strike image to ourselves, other than anthropomorphic, of our fragment-in-possession of Life: is it not the veriest instinct of poetry that we speak of it *only* as the "spark" or the "bubble" of existence?—just as also the mortal mass of our material frame-work, when we think of it in our moods of intellectual humiliation, shows barely for the "clod", or mere particle of dust?—And in this way there is furnished us, generally, a most fitting of scales for our degrees of comprehension, generalistically attained or attainable. Of the whole *course* of our Thought-Life, we do indeed possess large means of cognizance: whence naturally we may classify it by the symbol of Treehood;—as, of the more elevated and more apparently-stationary Thought-images controlling us, we have only what limits us to a Solar-systematic ordering-out of them. But as to what we have the power of comprehending, in reflectional wholeness, of the station in the universe of our mere dots of selfisms,—here, is it not bound on us to confess to ourselves, we have utterly nothing to work classifyingly on!

The restriction upon Symbolism rests practically, therefore, alone on the upper end. And here—being involved, as I conceive that in reality it is, in the very deepest of metaphysical problems that in any way we can rightly engage ourselves with,—it will require me to take a wide

ground. It will require me, in summary, to gather into effect the most general imaginable of ideas of creation.

I am tracking out in Nature the Abstract implication, or rather Abstract Efficiency, of Sex. Up to Vegetal formation inclusively, however, Sex is only figuratively present. Hence, when it begins to act *really*, as a formative principle in creation, certainly—it seems necessary to me to imagine,—a Fact has been *born* into the condition of things, which *should* rightly join itself with unprecedented consequences, abstractly appreciable in the light of the connection. But, for such appreciation nothing less can prepare than the utmost simplicity of plan. There is necessity, in fact, to go summarily anew over the ground of evolution, with a subjecting to revision of the very class-meanings of Form-structures, in their ascent from their beginning, precisely for the condensing them on the matter alone regarded.

Out of primæval levelness of things, when divergence into Forms began first to exist, the consequence was still what was nothing more than Form-less, as to present acceptance of the term,—unless the pure Bubble (—hence consecrated by the instinct of Buddhism!—) be allowed for as a real exception :—Waves, Clouds, Sparks, Flames, and Clods, being moulded in what human perception can treat of alone as constructive caprice. And yet, in at all events the two first of these seems the clearest of prophecying, if we look for it, not only of the course to ensue of Formation thereafter, but specifically of the evolution-under-difference which I take for the prophecying of Sex.

*Why* neither Wave nor Cloud has any slightest sign of organism in it, is expressible immediately, in due accordance with the formula of scientific Classification, by saying merely that they are defective, to entireness, of *Axis*

belonging to them. Still, here is my reason for assuming, nevertheless, that they yet show foundation for that *whole* plan of Creation which, from sheer force of its generalism, seems to have stamped itself on our own creative Mind-methods.

Organism is such for nothing else than this, that it provides to the Form it concerns, the power, on the one hand, of maintaining itself with a degree of stability; on the other, the more deep-laid ability of reproducing itself in a Form to succeed it, when stability has ceased for it. These conditions, however, are inevitably, to a shifting degree, antagonistic; so that, while Organism and Life are dependent on their meeting, essential struggle between them is set up, at the same time, by the concurrence. The plan of my now-designed argument, then, is this. While, of the two opposite functions, I conceive that Self-maintenance is characteristically Masculine; and Productiveness, or Race-maintenance, Feminine:—I conceive that the needed primal elements, to lead to the dualistic Sex-formation, really exist in the several Wave-type and Cloud-type of incipient Formation, when blended in the manner of Organism: the which also contain intimate analogy, direct to my ultimate purpose, with the figuratively-sexual Mental habits, which I have symbolized respectively as Tree-method and Coiling-method. And the following is the thread of this conception.

The *Axis* which Waves are deficient in, is shadowed forth in the very matter of their angle of production:—since this, in itself, bears the sign of that setting of Tree-branches, on Tree-stem, which makes of these real Individuals, in relation to the only inferential Individualism of the whole Tree: their over-wrapping of one another, as the Waves did before them. It is *because* the Tree-stock stands upright, and aloof from any fellow stocks, that it

rests an un-realized Individual. And yet, as affording to the real Individuals their means of the over-wrapping combination, the stock actually produces full condition both of maintenance and re-production : for the explaining of which, therefore, the *Cloud*-type comes in question. And in this way. How the Axis from the first was developed, lay always with Movement in the branches, simpler as the Tree was only little developed ;—whence at beginning the sort of Movement concerned must necessarily have been utterly simple, as unconnected with any existence of Axis : and that means, that while axially-supported existence is accompanied, even from the first, with a somewhat of Double Current of Movement ; anteriorly to production of Axis, and as cause of this, really, there could have been only a Single Current : necessarily a Movement in Circle. But,—quite independently of the grand class-effect of revolution, of produced Planetary systems,—there is, already in Cloud-action, an assumable type of what in organisms constantly accompanies Axis, more necessary even than itself to life-condition. And that is, a fixed plan of Circulation.

Cloud-material, it is well known to us, makes incessantly circuit through earth-veins, whence it returns into atmosphere, anew to be suffused as before. But this transit is identifiable, on one hand with the River-systems of earth, which are the means of its fertility to the soil ; and, on the other, with the Circulating process which is needfully the maintainer of the reproductive ability of organisms.

Let the Tree, for a moment, seem sufficient representer of organic condition :—its veined fibres are truly but River-systems repeated, as to *one* of the two currents now presented. Or rather,—let me correct myself,—they *would* bear such character if the Tree were in truth what



the diagrams of Science represent it: without Roots. Tree-action, in proper, is action made in *jets*, which are backed by true fulcrum of Axis:—but the ascending current of these jets receives check on it from circumstance, super-incumbent: in consequence of which, those little deltas of leaves that are as if left behind by the retiring flow, are most equivocally turned into sources, or myriad springs, of the current to return,—of the Tree formed within the Tree, which yet, in beginning from its summit, is thereby reversed into the River. For each little pore of the leaf-deltas is the actual mouth that sucks inwards from atmosphere its organizing-power;—while this, all un-realistic as it is, yet banks itself in, as it figuratively flows, with the solid realities of wood-structure;—until, when the myriad streamlets have united in full, arrives the common flood-stem of what the Tree's "rootless condition" would make properly its state of River-mouth, casting out its whole tide of contents into media that return it, in due course, for Cloud-restoration.

And in this way is immediately touched what I have view to in Mind-currents, of their intrinsic division of nature. For, while Science's efforts, directed to self-maintenance, are essentially *jet*-efforts, restricted with precision to a postulated foundation that axially supports them;—the insensibly-*circling* efforts of self-propagating Religion are solely for the in-gathering of influence diffused,—of an influence that constantly is circumferent, even in bearing itself inwards: having reference continually to a postulated centre that is actually *nothing* but what the windings of the Mind's own circumference makes it:—*nothing*; and yet mentally *everything*!

The formula of Organization, treated as that of Sexual Equilibrium, I thus conceive for no other than dependent,

all along, on the manner of combination of these formative types, with respective predominance of each of them :—the realistic manifestation of Sex, in the highest and finishing kind of formation, meaning of right only the integral presence in each separately-produced form of *both* modes, with distinctive excess : previously to which effect the whole plan of organization was mere barren stock, in regard to its real end. In “combination of types”, however, is evidently signified a principle at work, deeper than either one of them singly ;—as actually *with* super-vention of Sex in created forms, appears involved to Animal nature its own deep peculiarity of leading on to the furnishing of condition for Mind. And such principle, in fact, appears that of *Vibration* : the very deepest, it would seem, of the set movements in Nature.

The efficacy of the uniting together of a system of Circulation with an Axial system, depends entirely, by the now-followed doctrine of Forms, on the natural priority of the former : so that the progress in Formation, which shows rightly the development of Axis as its inclusive indication, must be remembered to imply, at the same time, a fellow progress in the Circulating system, step-by-step in advance of the immediately Axial development. But the means of the uniting of these systems, without impairing of their integral value, rests evidently with the organism’s assimilating of the action of Oscillation, to give effect to them in turn : represented, with obviousness, in the Animal’s central organ of Circulation. The adoption of this ultimate mode of Motion into the plan of organic being, as reflected in the Animal’s pulsating Heart, I argue to be the real connecting link, to ourselves, between Outer Nature, and our own Inner Nature, which Mind has precisely, and solely, the function of interpreting, *when* Mind is realized. For implication of the realizing

of Mind, however,—without which there is nothing of worth in the argument,—the scheme farther requires, as I now have to contend, that the same movement of Vibration shall organically act upon Mind. That is, by an analogous reflection of itself, with a specialty and an integrality correspondent, on a centralized Axial organ: the organ of the Brain.

These three modes-of-motion—alone necessary to begin with, however in the end they yield ramifyings innumerable,—make the ever-requisite metaphysical triad, of which the latest one manifested is yet needfully imaginable for the earliest, under Tree-form of ordering. The Jet-movement, implying Axis, is incapable of duly blending with the Circling or “peristaltic” movement of organic substance, *for* developing animation of the latter, except by the co-essential Vibratory movement: considered as producing itself constantly more and more into the entirety of the organism. But this last is best thought of as the Stock kind of motion. What really gave beginning of organism, we may even refer to what happened to the first “tremblings of æther”, when initially they were caught in enclosure of particles, providing for the final double current of motion,—the internally-impelled one, and the circumstantially-imbibed one,—which follows on the parting-out of science’s modes-of-motion in double track: of Heat and Heat-sequents, to characterize the one; and of mere Sense-perceptible motion, and *its* sequents, to characterize the other. For, as I conceive, the command over Environment which is the prerogative of Organism, and notably effected by developed Brain-power as Mind-power, is effected only as result of a finally Vibrating accommodation of the two vitally-ordered sets of modes-of-motion, represented by Jet-motion and Circling-motion, to the severally internalized and externalized series of the sci-

entifically-ordered modes. The very power of pulsation, seated with ability of circling influence in the Heat-centred organ of Vitalism, is the original trophy of obtained conquest of Environment; but the only filling up of the victorious position is that analogue of the Tree-crisis of Flower-change, which means the parted shares in the work of conquest, borne out as such by the whole force of proceeding development, in the duly branched courses of vital Motion, that act severally, indeed, but still act conjointly, in Brain-system added to Heart-system. And when these do act conjointly, the Sex-difference realized in them becomes manifestly the multiplier of all otherwise difference of the vital modes-of-motion, making up the leaf-issues of the entire stock of motion:—*as* innumerable in the end, as counted few at beginning.

Three points, then, must be taken for included in my formula. Firstly, I assume (inferentially,) that all rectifying of Axis is made duly only when to it also is communicated the Vibrating principle;—Secondly, (as by experience,) that this actually occurs only in coincidence with started Mind-action;—Thirdly, (as again by conclusion of reason,) that the oscillating Mental action thus caused, *as* connected with the innumerable corporeal variations just assigned for coincident with production of Sex, is itself the true cause of the existent condition and stability of Mental nature.—Only by a perfected doctrine of Equilibrium, that *is* thorough to this extent, in being touched with the fine difference of Sex,—and that *is*, for that reason, made so infinitely near to, while so infinitely far from, the closed Equilibrium which is Deadness,—seems interpretable to us actually the Life-function of Thought!—And this clue I am proposing to follow. This subtly-laid contrast, between Life-Equilibrium and Deadness, precisely considered as maintained for such by

the close intermingling in us of material and immaterial conditions wherein Sex is peculiarly concerned, I do indeed conceive instructive to us of the specific constitution of Mind, as to that which is characteristically human in it. I mean as to the Consciousness of Individualism, now to be considered as only respectively held by us, accordingly as we are severally either Masculine or Feminine representers of Humanity.

I will now deal with that proposed "revision of classifying signs", which forms necessarily the material side of the demonstration required of this idea.

The matter of the intermingling of elements concrete and abstract, has indeed been precisely foreshadowed in the Vegetal plan of construction, in that very particular which I have considered to betoken the restriction on Symbolism here concerned, of a kind that systematically is referent to Sex. Namely, that absence of a true Individualism other than foreshadowed, which when it is filled up, with coincidence of overt Sex, makes end to the condition for Symbolism, as now lost in condition of actuality. For, as to the significance of this coincidence, I rest entirely on my principle asserted, that Individualism comes only as the *product* of Individualistic Relations. Already I have argued that it is only the over-wrapping relationism of Parentage that has really been the originator to us of the Mentalism that, as Religious, is distinctively Feminine (I. 479, 497); and now, to complete this view, I am aiming to prove how the deeper relationism of Sex has wrought similarly its Mental reflection through the ordinary working of the relation of Sex, since first it became patently manifested in nature.—But Trees, in their wholeness, have been demonstrated for Sexless-

They are exactly no more than, and hence are with fitness exponent of, the mere phantoms of Individuals that our abstract Idealizings are.

In what manner then, I need inquire, did Nature actually proceed for this second great transition in her structural method, which was to result finally, as I suppose, in that ultimate consequence of Sex which should mean oscillation of Brain-substance, as to the actual, if to us imperceptible, disposition of the entire Brain:—oscillation between actually two sexually-varying such entire dispositions?—Notoriously, the sign of transition lies here, as in the case of the first transition, as much ostensibly with the constituting of proper Axis, as I infer that it has fellow regard to proper Sexhood.

The passing out of Vegetal method into Animal, is the changing of the Tree's Stock-appliance for Individualism—inadequate as that was to any Egoism other than ideal,—into that artfullest, as well as solidest of material appliances, which is the Animal's vertebrated Backbone:—and which is rendered vertebrated, as I have postulated, by precisely its uniting with an answering Heart-system of circulation, acting causatively on it.

At first, however,—as we know, and must glance back to consider,—Nature failed, to great degree, of the idea of Backbone. She began only, as I have hinted for Tree-symbol of the event, by the fallacious or "cotyledon" attempt of mere Articulate and Molluscous formations. And for rationale of her doing so, it suffices for the present aim that we think of her, simply, as therein recurring to her earlier planetary type, though but partially, to try at the taking up of a somewhat of principle that she had dropped, as to Vegetables. What dissatisfied her with Tree-forms, we may imagine, was the multitudinous minuteness of the circumferent Individuals that here were

the only true ones : contrasted as if ridiculously with the gross magnitude of planets, as far-sundered Star-worlds. And this lay with her experimenting, in Tree-plan, at giving *fixity*, at one end, to the Axis of the subject : so manifestly a diminishing to it of its securable amount of latent Motion. Hence for Animals she must naturally both have turned to her original plan of *free* Axis, and yet have done this with an endeavour to combine what in the Tree-type was effectual. Thus,—having already as if trifled with the Star-pattern in unclassifiable structures of the lowest sort,—she began, for Mollusks, with the aim towards a self-centralization of the mass, which should be gained by as if crushing out, in mass, the circumferent individualities which are all-important in the Tree-type, and compelling these instead to become solely, when thus compressed, the mere fulcrum of vital motion to the mass. And, on the other hand,—as this obviously left wanting any more than the very slightest power of Motion-acquisition,—she tried oppositely in Articulates what in fact was true sequent to the Motion-gathering Leaf-forms, in substituted Limb-branches to the Animal trunk ; while in this again failing precisely in the equally-needed matter of internal self-connectedness, in which Mollusks were successful.—Her passing, therefore, at last altogether beyond these cotyledon-attempts, into the proper leaf-effort of Development where Axis is made Backbone,—and where Sex-institution comes rightfully into view,—may still be admitted as virtually uniform.

The abandonment of Tree-*fixity* of Axis has primarily the advantage, for the organism's encounter with environment, that the whole number of Limbs, analogous to leaf-branches, are left capable of action in the struggle ; —while this gain is farther doubled, by the power of accumulating Heat in the organism : in no way provided

for in Trees. But this very condition has effect, in return, of as if planting Rootage internally: in those internalized limbs, so to call them, of central organs, which therein bear out duly their analogy to Roots, by their imbibing of nutritive substance without need being concerned of Light-influence, for its means of assimilation. And this again establishes, with what I take for sufficiency, my assumption of Root-principle for Feminine, in sexual estimation:—seeing that certainly, in the Animal case, I suppose there to attach the full equality of importance to the matter of Heart-Rootage with outward Limb-function, which was only inferential, or pre-figured, in Vegetation-Nay, primarily, it is manifest that in Animals the Feminine province of their organism is entirely predominant:—so that hence is to be noted the main share of the Animal Senses, become specified as such, in exalting to the due degree, as they only have the function of doing, the general value of Limb-agency, for that which is the everything of essential to organisms: the in-storing of outer Motion. Over all of this in-gathered store, the Heart sits at home as Controller and Disposer: not without also drawing in, with each life-sustaining beat, that primal enduring self-movement, which gives natural sanction to *her* ruling ever as Mistress, wherever Sense-power is the regulating Master!—And thus again, let it be observed, I am preparing to assign the “extremes” of the Motion-series, as presented in Animals, to the Feminine function, and the “means” only to the Masculine.

I believe it was Swedenborg who first spoke of the Brain as the “*Flower*” of our frame:—though scarcely with an object like the present!—And similarly is it needful to this scheme to consider this Crown of the vertebrated spine as indeed the quasi-limb, which, precisely for the purpose of Sexualism (representative of entire progress),



buds out into duplicate results : duplicate, though essentially combined. And this tells the whole of my hypothesis, of the inferrible—and consciously *only* inferrible—intimate constitution of Brain-substance. But I have analogy to allege, for explanatory defence of the hypothesis, that regards the whole course of the Nerve-system's evolution, as to its appearing to bear naturally on such ending of it: though it needs to be introduced, as I must suggest, by what seems in itself a defensible inferential beginning.

By this latter I mean an assumption to be made as to Nerves, that everywhere through the animal flesh-substance where ganglions of these present themselves, the cause of their doing so lies—on the one hand, with an influx of outer Motion, which, in being arrested from direct course of circulation through the organism, forms an eddying minor circle for itself;—on the other hand, with the ultimate consequence of this, when once a communication is started for this circlet with the general organic centre, that each ganglion that is permanent remains as if nourished, or kept up, by a double set of influences: the influence of communication with the general organism now meeting, and in a manner contending, with what enters externally. For this evidently would suffice to make each one of these a real Brain, however small a one, in the plan of it. And thence, as I imagine, what I take for the Tree-course of the matter would give also sufficiently the following reason for that magnified case of these miniature ones, which the ganglion of ganglions of the proper Brain is. I believe, namely, that it may generally be stated,—if the terms of modes-of-motion be allowed,—that the collected motion-stores of these several little brains, are, on account of each limb, as well as of the trunk, emptied, as it were, by united nerve-courses,

into the common Spine-reservoir:—the whole class of these named “Sympathetic” (—ranged in ganglionic chain, side by side with the vertebral column, and communicating with this,—) being those which contribute the whole Heart-afforded share of the body’s fund of stored Motion. But, while the Spine thus engrosses the mass of Limb-obtained results,—whether of Limbs that are the internal ones of respiration, or the external ones of locomotion and of hand-movement, assisted with the high tactual ability of extremities;—in the Head that is excepted as to *this* contribution, are opposedly being gathered into Cerebral ganglions the eminently finer knots of nerves, whose structure is the produce of an incomparably closer-handed struggle with environment than even finger-tips are adapted for:—instrumented by the eye-ear-and-taste capabilities having crowded locality in the Head; and which spring from that express multitudinousness of ramified motion-character which it lies with animate beings to produce, in proportion to their heightened vitalism. If accordingly be imagined the effect that must ensue on the uniting of these integrated stores,—by first, the upward shooting of the Spine-contents into a cerebral nerve-bud, of unique disposition and magnitude; and thence by the over-wrapping of this by the seeming-petals of the Sensory formations:—the enormously-enhanced actual result is surely only obviously natural.—And yet only so, as I argue, if it have also been a fertilizing result.—I mean, if it may really be supposed, that these confluent energies have so worked together, as not only to develope between them the real “flower” of the Brain, for ministration of proper self-reflecting Intellect; but of doing this with farther the means of vital oscillation, between states which give separate response to an alternating predominance of the elements of its production:—

a *breathing* oscillation between Sensory and Sympathetic dispositions of cerebration. And as to the accounting of this double result sexually, there is this of close physical reason for it, independently of symbolic analogy. Namely, that of the two separate sources of the composite Brain-action, the one which is Spinal and Sympathetic is physically prevalent, with peculiarity, in the structure of the female frame generally; and answeringly, the Limb-and-Special-Sense effect in the male structure:—besides which it is manifest that in the whole general plan of structure, the former has prevailingly that inward or endogenous turn of function, and the latter that outward or exogenous, which I assume for just signs of the sexes. And this harmonizes, again, with entireness to the mental insignia of the two modes of Intellect concerned, Subjective and Objective, as to the former being the source of Introspection, founded specially on a relatively-passive mental habit; and the latter of the mind's rightly-active kind of action, which is that of Extraspection:—while with specialness it confirms the common instinct of feeling that mentalism's stock-nature is Feminine. For, certainly, the Reflex or Reflectional portion of Brain-substance, *is* that which, in itself, is shut out, or shut in, from all outer communion: thence naturally involving a specific internalism of thought-action.

It is true that, on this plan, each and every *mood* of mind must similarly be thought of as producing with entireness a new temporary frame of mind.—That it should do so, also, is in fact only the requisite correspondent, on my own terms, to what before I have come to, of the need of admitting into theory a “perpetual shiftingness” of mental stand-point: such, however, as is naturally subjected to a leading and sexual class-distinction, of adaptedness of position to either science or

metaphysics (p. 191).—And with this I am led back to the point which I have noted, in this evolutionary survey, of the anterior-to-vegetal structure which the animal structure takes up: the *free* Axis of planets:—this being, as I imagine, repeated actually, though with special peculiarity, in the functional condition of that part of our frame which is the appliance to operations of Mind; in being also the natural “Flower” of the Spinal Axis. I imagine, namely, that in the Brain’s answering, as just said, to an oscillating predominance, as its *leading* oscillation, between two whole sets of the frame’s general activities, Axial and Circulating; it answers subordinately also to multitudinous mental combinations, of which again what are principal ones act as real planetary influences act, in modifying the inclination of its Axis—*here* only a spiritual Axis, not manifested in Backbone, after Tree-fashion; but only as the esteemable effect of Equilibrium, as the Axes of planets are.\* And the working out of this Subjective Astronomy is what I have tried for in my dealing with Star-Symbolism: there treating it from the planetary thought-station;—and accordingly with an unwieldly grotesqueness, (as to the requisite providings for enormous season-changes, to be crowded into daily ones; and, in fact, as *now* needed, into momentary ones :) which, however such when huge masses of gross worlds are concerned, is *not* such when the question is of particles of Brain. In the settling of Planet-Axes, I see what precisely appears as a “prophecy” of the same thing to be done with Human Brains, under the incomparably-multiplied need, attached to our own Subjectivity:—the

\* The very fact of Vibration’s receiving, as here supposed, a distinctive kind of leaning either way, must surely have inevitably the effect of creating a virtual, or spiritual, axis.—And besides, as a collateral reflection, what is actually the derivative meaning of the word “Mind”, is that precisely of an effected inclination.

whole course of the Vegetal scheme being imaginable for intermediately necessary, to provide, through the double set of organs engendered, the needed medium of communion for the Subject with Environment.

That such *should* be the kind of plan in Creation, it is clear, is the inference of necessity attached to my doctrine of Symbolism. If the whole ordering of our Mentalism *be* gained, as I suppose, only as "abstracted" and "essentialized" out of our learnings from Nature, objectively picked up; the ordering of Brain-substance,—functionally or dynamically, though not statically,—*ought* naturally to bear analogy with the class-signs in Creation.—Nor is there the slightest pretension made here to anything *more* than does rest on an "ought"; and an "ought" which has basis, not even in the actually-limited state of Brain-science, as it is possessed by men of science; but specially, owing to the pure personality of my standpoint in this work, on the intellectual conscience of so desultory a mere "picker-up" of science as I know myself to be,—representing here, only, my own "essence" or "abstract" of what I know of Nature.—But perhaps I may refer, without total unseemliness, to one fact of nerve-science that seems rightly in point. I mean, the known junction in one common track of nerves sentient and motor: or, severally "afferent" and "efferent" of motion, to nervous centres. I believe it has not been found hitherto that any difference of quality resides actually in the matter of these tracks;—but, if not, there seems to me a genuine foundation for the very hypothesis I am forming. The primal dualism of mere function thus established, it seems to me, would need only to be imaginarily multiplied into the multiplicity of occasions implied, in the shiftingness of our Brain-affected moods, in order fully to supply these with the kind, and the

only kind, of materialistic correspondence demanded.

Also, in general view, this manner of representing organic progress falls entirely in accordance with that "law" of "two-and-three" regulation which I have taken for the primal form of Sex. The first dual elements of Organism seemed sufficiently laid out in the Axial and Circulating systems; but out of these, nevertheless, the Nerve-system has sprung,—which might equally be accounted a plan of very backbone-to-backbone, or of very muscle-to-muscle, for the frame. With developing of Brain, again, has come,—first, the perfect dualism of Sense-power and Heart-nourished power;—but thence, through uniting of these, the true human capacity of Intellect, having stock-source in ability of Reflection.

And now as to the proper or subjective side of the same argument:—taking the foregoing most attenuated survey for my utmost of material basis. This will only, in fact, be now adding what at this point appears to me for the requisite consequence of the whole ground I have been traversing in this work. I have arrived at what now I see need to account as the true point of junction of the two separate lines of thought, which have occupied me in my First Part, and hitherto in this volume; *with* that which presents itself as the effect of the junction. I have therefore little else to express than, in summary, the manner of the meeting.

Of what recently has been adduced of the nature of a tentative Ontology,—or subjective apprehension of our principle of Individuation, symbolically dealt with,—I may summarize thus, as to its one main result. While the first natural sign or premonition of the approach of Sex-difference, occurred duly in Mentalism at the point

of transition, through the manner of the transition, out of Planetary into Vegetal method of Mentation; the whole course of the latter acting-method has prosecuted the approach, to the extent of what the method provides for: namely, as equally falling short of real Sexhood produced, and of true Individuation effected. And to this I must farther add what has just been collected from the Animal scheme of Nature, as to its indicatory matter of Nerve-and-Brain disposition and development, seen as following up the Vegetal type, with multiplying advantage, through uniting with the primal or Planetary type: giving specialty of duly *Mental* significance to the Flower-change involved, as bringing principle of only virtual or spiritual Axis into the case. The crisis to Nerve-character, namely, which is to it the Leaf-metamorphosis,—of passing out of the simple mode of function only *reflex*, possessed by all Animals in common, into the properly *reflectional*, possessed by Man only,—comes hence to import the following most significant item of analogy: that, as Leaves which have destiny of Flower-change in them, towards Stamen-and-Pistil nature, are even previously preparing for the change; so the quality of initiating Nerve-ganglions, in their blending of “afference” and “efference” of function, should inferentially be similarly liable to a due preparation for the Sexualness of the Brain’s mode of function, which therefore would arrive naturally. And the meaning of this would be, that assimilating of the Feminine or Sympathetic combination of Brain-functions to the lower or more passive kind of Intellect-production, which as Subjective is characteristically Emotive, and thence duly sequential to the “motor” kind of function appropriate to all presented excess of the “efferent” kind of nerves; and *vice versa* of the Sensory or Masculine combination:—whence naturally, at last, in

the ultimate Flower-ganglion, the budding out actually in Pistil-form of the Subjective stock-nature of Psychism, should need, for its ability of Reflectional productiveness, the energetic Stamen-efforts of Sensism to be "afferent" of mental Pollen to it.

For the match to this symbolic deduction, then, I refer first to my continually-claimed doctrine of Psychology, of the intellectualizing efficiency of states of Contrast: these being thought of as to subjective impression made by them upon us. A series of such states, multiplyingly presented in heightening stages, I have pointed to already as leading straight towards a culminating station, where the impressional difference should be, in a true philosophical sense, Objective and Subjective: or, in ordinary terms, between generalized Intellect and Feeling (p. 243).

—But if with this I combine the result of my first volume, as to the Religious effect of our Relations with fellow-beings acting on us Individualistically, considered as due occasions of this impressional Contrast; while I also consider these united together, in our experience of them, by effect of an *animating* Axis, as now described: the full argument I am contemplating is conditioned. Let me try to reproduce it as thus occurring to me.

Manifestly, the demand to be met is that of a spiritual substance to be thought of as recipient of the impressions:—a somewhat to supply ground for the "*Ego*" we attribute to ourselves, such as has been religiously supplied in the idea of the "Soul". But this demand has been actually before me, as I must recall to my readers, and been endeavoured to be met, through the whole of my beginning investigation. I stated from the beginning how my hope as to "Present Religion" was indeed that of finding it to go farther than Christianity in expressly this matter: through showing that, as subject to conditions of develop-



ment, the mere "vital spark" that Christianity revealed to us for the Soul, as if struck from a mere flinty bosom of Deity, may now be understood for an "atom" the rather of incomparable organization (L. 40-1; 517-8): this signifying it simply for a *gained focus-point of habitualized experiences*;—while, as to its developing into precisely Self-experience of its Egoship, or Individuation, I believe to have shown, in the "Scheme" making sequel to my analysis of Christianity, (—the "Scheme of Mental Creation" which before I have alluded to, for the same end,—) how the Relational influences of Religion—not only of Christianity, but of all Religion generally,—may be seen to have acted with such bearing. And I would particularly ask that, to at all events the added tabular compendium of this scheme, reference be here made. In this Part, as I have before said, I had no worked-out view to that idea of Mental Sex which now I am thinking of, as conveying to these atoms—all unrealistic as they are,—a proper life-principle of Equilibrium: thus making them effectively what otherwise I have called them of true "gravitating centres" for spiritual motion:—but still my whole ordering of the table was dualistic, with regard to the Sex-difference found in Intellect and Feeling, considered as creating our Individualism: with this sign of it, that while the influences productive of the former were shown as only acting in detail, the influences that are Emotional were shown acting always in the wholeness of full *being*-implication, whether figuratively or actually such,—figuratively, as to the relational entities of Religion; actually, as to the beings who afford the relations. And this ordering of the two classes does certainly respond to the sorting which I have made of our bodily compartments: since the active or jet-efforts of the Sensory nerve-system may well gain us knowledge in detail; while the passive or

coiling method of our Stock disposition of nerves is the inevitable mode of our acquaintance with *beings*. Our knowledge of large spiritual entityship, or of Deity, can only be *breathed in* by us; while similarly, though in subordinate fashion, our effect from companionship with fellow-beings, making concrete but ever-constant mental atmosphere to us, is continually, as it were, *sucked in* by us at every leaf-pore of our nerve-and-brain substance, and thence coilingly drawn into our Heart-centred framework. Our sense of fellow-beings, made constantly keen *by* their variance of relations to us, circulates through us perpetually, for an ærated mental life-blood.—But, *when* it is thought of as culminating in the integral impression of Deity set in apposition to us, with metaphysical Self-Wholeness that reflects itself on our sense of proper Self: all the minor relations apprehended must inevitably be recognized as leading on to it, by their constantly-afforded fresh items, or “limitations”, in the matter of Self-consciousness, valid to us by intellectualizing contrasts. To a being that should have sprung up in isolation, without integral contrast in fellow beings, it is surely impossible to imagine of Self-consciousness arising. But, with such, all generalized knowledge of them, which had contrast to awaken attention, must have helped out self-knowledge in this way. Brute-nature understood, in so far as it was so, must have shown man to himself as *not* brutish. And, especially, the beings that were nearest to him, as Parents and Offspring and Brethren, must have wrought out the sense of his own possessed correlative relations. But here comes in evident question the element of Sex: affecting universally the beings that mated with him, and by no means alone that requisitely *chief* mate, who was in no way such really antecedently to culture:—the Wife, to the savage, being eminently less mentally important than the

favoured of his brute companions. For,—perhaps the more surely for the mental inattention,—the insensibly and coilingly-felt difference in the Woman's nature from his own must have deepened itself in him: whence afterwards, when culture permitted,—and especially when the Woman herself became rightfully a subject of reciprocal Self-consciousness,—the consciousness of his Sex became deepest of the whole number of his points of Self-cognizance:—since is it not, obviously, the last thing a Man could forget of himself, that he is not a Woman?—But this touches on the finishing of the case, as I would put it. Namely, that on adducible materially-based evidence, there is in him the Woman all along, notwithstanding:—by the very scheme of his frame's composition.

That is:—If the material answerer to Mentalism be Tree-like;—and if real Tree-condition, in being destitute of any proper Individualism, is in its wholeness without Sex;—then, surely, the adding into Tree-condition for Mental beings of an oscillating Sexualness of Mental Focus, *by* the spiritual brain-axis supposed, must virtually be a rendering of brain-status *hermaphrodite*\*—let me call it.—The material correspondent to Mind must have means in it of giving sense to the subject *both* of Manhood and Womanhood:—excepting, as to the actual Sex of the subject, that to a Man it is the former that must ordinarily prevail, and to a Woman the latter.

As to the realizing by concretely-sexed beings of this integral difference of consciousness, surely there is reason for it shown in the oppositeness of Women's stand-point of relationship to that of Men; if our consciousness *be*, as supposed, the fruit of encompassing relations. But

\* The very characteristic which Mr. Darwin has actually found as a sign of the lowest kind of proper beingship, immaterially-and-materially compounded,—and thence naturally supposable for being only in transition from mere vegetalism!

unless there were the ability between them of the mutual understanding of one another, which the strange term just used makes expression of, can we even imagine that “intellectualizing contrasts” of the kind should have anything of effectual in them?—And with this consideration comes the point of the argument specifically significant. Namely, that which appears to suffice for providing to the Soul its intrinsic desiderandum of integration, in that *animating* attribute of it which we account its Identity.

If the comparing himself constantly with fellow-beings has been the agency I suppose for inducing into Man his Self-knowledge, certainly this implies that he has always had the provisional sympathy with the opposed status, in each case of comparison, which therein has involved some temporary and partial deviation, for the occasion, from the status that is ordinary to him. To judge of what is alien in their nature, he has always had need, to some degree, to go out of his own mental frame, and place himself in theirs. And the doing of this, to the extent of his doing it, would in so far cause attention to the qualifying of his self-nature. But let once such deviation be entire and habitual, as a “going out of himself,” and a “returning back to himself”, carried on with perpetuality,—which is the character of the action that the above symbol of Mental Sexhood implies;—and surely there should rise into him, in consequence, a subtle novelty of impression of the very nature of what Identity is. The incessant turning virtually into a different from his ordinary being, once dwelt on reflectively, should teach him how to know himself, surely, for that *same* being, of which otherwise he need never have bethought himself of being:—while, precisely for the awakening of such kind of generalistic reflection, there has always been afforded

the deeply though insensibly-acting force of the Sex-difference in extant beings. And if by its subtlety such experience, or liability, of recurring *un*-sameness, should be long kept impervious to his consciousness, even as painted on his general field of mentalism, and much more as perceptible directly, still this means the very thing that is in question: since what hiddenness and subtleness would be, together, would precisely, as I conceive, bring result of *vitality* to the effect.

Certainly, all cause for our impression of Identity of which we can give any proof with ostensibleness, either to others or ourselves, lies with that miraculous faculty we are possessed of, of Memory: our ability of re-producing, *as* self-associated, past conditions of consciousness. But what here I am dealing with is only the pure instinct. That is, only with what answers to the idea of a Soul: *not* capable of ostensible proof. What Identity stands for is that which gives internally-felt wholeness to the multitudinousness of life-long experiences; which Memory can only testify to in separateness, as it may be, when called on. Of what Soul has done for us, however, in its coming into us, Memory has no means of giving testimony. The sole evidence that is possible is internal: intrinsic to the Selfism in itself, *when* made conscious of itself. But a consciousness of Self that should really have been produced, and really kept alive, as just said, by a contingent apprehension of a Not-Self, bound up within Self, seems lawfully an expounding of the instinct, as to what in it intellect has concern with.

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Thus my whole-designed object completes itself. For while this vitalizing of our principle of Egoism, through

sexualizing it, *if* granted for legitimate, does indeed fill up truly the scheme of Mental Sex which is the end of this aimed plan of Symbolism;—so truly is the full measure here made up of the Creed-articles which the Symbolism has the need to replace: and especially without the injury that has reason to be dreaded. Without belief in a Soul, to give answer to our believing in Deity, it is manifest that the latter remains purposeless. And even in this sexualizing of the Soul, as a thing to be believed in, I am doing nothing in reality of that “materializing” it which would seem to be inevitable, but which fully would destroy the whole consequence that is requisite. So far from it, I am only raising *this*, as a symbol, to the spiritualness of its counterpart. That is, I am making of the Soul just as much a mere spiritual *thought* to us, as I have admitted in Deity:—as to all that is cognizable by us.—And I have done this by the mixing up with it of the very concretest of material realities: the fact of there being Men and Women, as such, in the world! *Except* for the fact of Sex-variance, I am supposing that Self-Consciousness would be wanting!

So, in the beginning of things, it would seem that the very slightest of material variations in the plan of Nature might have cut off altogether the actual moulding of our religious intuitions: since, merely a different “angle of production” given to us would have varied the whole scheme of those personal relations which *are* what they are by the existence of Sex, perhaps also dependent on that “angle”. For, what “Fatherhood” means to us is certainly involved in that relative period in human life at which Parentage, acting through Sexhood, begins: symbolically represented by such “angle”;—and a something of such varying consequence would actually seem inferrible as presented in connection with the known difference of

the Sexes. What our whole Religion is to us, and with it all else of intellectual, may therefore be a contingency of this sort: resting solely, as experience can unfold it, on the peculiar *proportion* which the Filial part of our lives does bear to the Parental, through instrumenting of the Conjugal part!

But this wedding of materialism with immaterialism,—against the grain of all heretofore philosophy,—must especially be judged through its fruits. The subjective demonstration of the idea that is wrapt up in it, namely, as that of other subjective ideas, must show itself by the effect of its working downwards, on relevant concerns. I will therefore now try, as the finishing of my dealing with this subject, to state briefly, in bare indication, the signs that appear those of such effect, in the separate respects that may suffice to be alleged:—leaving always till later what the design of my work comprehends, of entering with proper detail into at all events a part of these consequences.

The most obvious of these signs regards naturally the Sex-condition which attaches to ourselves of to day.

*Why* the idea of the Soul now afforded seems to me a religious one, all abstract as it is, is always that it *personifies* still, with integrity, our Egoship;—*not* leaving this without intimate application to every being of us that has instinct of it, as “pure reason” might leave it;—nor by any means as the principle of sole “combination” for which science can only know it. It allows, *by* its personalness, of each one of us still saying, as our instinct makes us crave to say, that “Our Souls are our own.” That is, it signifies not bare Individualism, but true *Individuality*, possessed by us.—And while this concerns eminently what has constantly, under cul-

tural defect, been the base feeling of Men towards Women, it does so in a manner that in fact touches generally the whole meaning of what now I am taking for real culture.

This idea in no way assumes that to every human being there is necessarily attached a real Soul, and a real Individuality. On the contrary, it supposes that not yet is the possession attained to, by the very highest of human beings, to the degree that is discernibly possible. And this, chiefly, through the heretofore one-sidedness of culture.—Before culture had made way in the world, I acknowledge that Women, much more deeply than Men, *were* destitute of real Souls, though both were so: whence, the “baseness” of the feeling I refer to is not so much that of personal injustice, as of treachery to the real truth in the matter, already dawning for Men. I mean, in the implication that it was their Sex, it itself, that forbade their having Souls. But if it be granted, both that Women are as open to culture as Men, in their own way; and that real Individualism, self-appreciated, is state of culture, precisely in proportion to the niceness of the appreciation, which again coincides with nice difference in apprehension of Sex: then certainly no culture of Men can be perfect, unless in being sexually answered by the culture of Women. That is, in the ability arrived at by Women, of knowing themselves possessed of “their own Souls”,—self-rooted, and not only reflected from Men’s Souls,—coming actually to re-act on the Self-consciousness of Men.—And what practical argument for the culture of Women, even extending into provinces characteristically those of Men, could go farther than this does?

But this is backed, most essentially, by the following consideration, which is eminently *more* practical. If the working out of their own Individuality, to all beings, depends necessarily as it must by present view, to a cer-



tain degree, on each one's undergoing personally of the relational influences that have been creative to the race: while these rest with contingencies of circumstance;—and especially on subjection to that primal one of Sex-union, round which all of the others are grouped, though itself the most contingent of all:—it follows inevitably that *many* of human beings can never have the means of arriving at true sense of themselves; and especially can never gain the finishing quality of Self-consciousness which attends on its vibrating duly with Sex-difference, rendered fine enough. Previously to Marriage entered into between them, neither Men can have rightly the sense of being Men, nor Women of being Women. But, if this be the case, so far is it from being true, as it is wont to be assumed, that for the unmarried of either Sex to enter into culture that is general, or relatively unnatural, is the un-sexing of them; this appears for the only means left to these of really accomplishing their Sexhood, individualistically. That is, by their falling back purely on that inner kind of Sexhood which Nature has made no ways dependent on contingency: on that native *Mental* Sexhood for the realizing of which, to the extent that suffices, each several Man has already the "Woman" provided in him, and each several Woman the "Man".

There could scarcely be real danger of the Sex-difference losing itself in this way. On the contrary, if Women were really to betake themselves thus to the proving of their own Souls to themselves, in the same way that Men have done,—no longer taking it, with all other images, as they have wontedly done, at second-hand from Men-thinkers,—I believe that the following would appear as very sign of the distinctiveness of their effort. Namely, that their habitual idea of the Soul, in representing the culminating *want* in their nature, would as naturally be a

relatively Masculine Symbol, expressive to them of active self-energy, as to Men it has ever appeared Subjective and Feminine. And, if so, I contend that it would sufficiently be proved, how—so far from the duplicity of Mind-in-the-abstract causing a parallel duplicity in-the-concrete, as is apt to be supposed,—it would really in *itself* be the thing to be affected; and to be merged and exalted into rightful distinctness of division. That is, the “hermaphrodite” character of Mentalism, only such at present, would ripen into a proper dividedness of Sexual mental functions, to be thenceafter gradually adapted to the already-established differences of proper Manhood and Womanhood.

Next, as to what appear for the more purely intellectual of the subjective results of the idea.

If our Souls’ Integration be taken in this light, of being sexually realized, at last, in a manner that only just over-passes the Tree-kind of development, bearing constantly towards the consummation; there follows, in the first place, this essential physiological consideration. Namely, that the integrating combination thus given to continuous experiences, while initiatively possible on very low terms, as to the amount of comprehended experiences,—just as wholeness of plants is inferiorly provided for by but very few stages of leaf-issuings;—enhances itself multiplyingly, as that of Trees does, in proportion as these stages are accumulated. The rise in the constitution of Beings, as of Trees, is geometrically proportioned to the number of leaf-stages included.—And what a sign appears in this, I must parenthetically remark, of the circumstantial advantage that works for us, in so far as occurs ever to us such specialty of circumstance as this: of any added average increase to the tether of human life!

But this physiological inference may be taken as a clue, I conceive, that will specially direct us to the understanding of those other-than-normal phenomena of Integration, besetting our rightful experiences, which are manifestly so important a check to our subjective impressions in ordinary.—It has been seen that the force of organic Integration for that which it is, above ordinary combination, rests solely with the “double current” of action which is proper to all organism, mental as well as physical. Hence, excepting as the finishing quality of Self-consciousness attained, betokening our human Integration, does fully re-act through the whole range of our mentalism, disorder in the latter seems inevitable; and precisely in a varying phase, according to the extent and degree, and especially the persistency, of the failure. If general, the degradation to ensue would seem naturally to signify a lowering of mental wholeness into those anterior little-furnished conditions of wholeness, which indeed are exhibited by the lower animals, not yet advanced to Self-consciousness. And that Man does at times retrograde into such, is evident of him, when overthrown for the moment from his rightful mental posture by excitements of inordinate passions! If the lapse, however, be only partial, with a somewhat of persistency, such temporary insanities, with every variety of attendant distortion, should lead naturally to that brokenness of the integrity of Selfism which, because it is such, either becomes, or has tendency to, the frightful reality of Insanity. Short of the real rupture, the deviations out of Selfism into even the lower selfisms of animals may collaterally even strengthen the integrations that are large enough to support them, with the requisite control; as affording, on rude scale, those occasions of contrast of which the sexual is the normal exemplar,—the stages of diversified lapse

being always represented in the general physical frame, by the sinking proportionately out of duly-reflectional into reflex nervous state. But with fracture to the Selfism, the whole Mind falls unsound. And certainly it is known to be in connection with Selfism, disordered to different degrees, that mental unsoundness betrays itself. —But, if this plan be allowed, the classifying of disorders of the Mind seems to range itself with utter simple-ness, set against what is orderly. The one daily departure out of Selfism which is regular being that of sound Sleep, having counterpart only in Death ;—irregular aberrations may class always as of the nature of Dreams : the simpler kind passing into, first, the Delirium of fever, and thence into Insanity.

When Dreaming is no other than pleasant, it is obvious that we are merely in the position of inventive constructors of fiction, in the images that flit before us, except as to any direct sense of being so. But immediately that these images have the semi-wakeful distortion that so often accompanies our revival to proper Selfism, there is habitually presented that sign of delirium which is either loss or confusedness of our Identity.\* And with this comes essentially, as I conceive, what solely in the degree of it

\* For instance, we often—in this state of waking struggle to right our mental faculties,—attribute a real Selfism, antagonistic to our own, to a mere feeling of local pain, as what bodily we might take up in our hands, to contend with :—thus reducing our status, it may be, to the very feeling of the dog, for example, who makes inference of an enemy from nothing else than the obtrusiveness of his own wagging tail.—The whole character of Dreaming in fact shows it as no other than the transition between Sleep and Wakefulness made irregularly obvious to us, when in health this should naturally be momentary: a clear passing, all at once, from no sense of Selfism at all into full sense of it. All healthfulness, in our whole state of being, depends on the habitual recoverableness of this sense, after our habitually losing it. And this explains that most piteous of the concomitants of Insanity, in which the unhappy patient, vainly striving for his own power of self-recognition, instinctively refers himself to the ability of others to supply it for him.

makes any separating line possible between the mere tricksomeness that may even exhilarate us in Dream-fancies, and Insanity's terrifiicalness.

But the same nature attaches even to what, as pure mental disease, I have ventured to account the Insanity of Philosophy (p. 229). On the terms of what is here held a true Philosophy, the Self-regulating ability of an habitual oscillation between Objectiveness and Subjectivity, which procures for us our culminating faculty of Philosophy, is so truly the real fulcrum to all lower mental function, that it seems the fair substitute which justifies, in its repeating them, the old dogmas of Free-Will and Spontaneity (pp. 238-40) : since the concentrated energy implied in such fulcrum is as naturally figurable for Self-energy, "free" of any cognizable regulation on it, as thence it is figurable for "spontaneous". But the "Idealism" which abjures all Objectiveness has nothing of such recognizable fulcrum ; and loses itself accordingly in that maddening bewilderment to the brain of the theorized "mere seeming" of all sensible phenomena : maddening on sole account of the persistently dwelling on it, and not balancing it with those contrary results of experience, which go with a due reference to our Egoism. In philosophic Individualism of mental station, the integrity of the attained feeling, on the contrary, becomes, I conceive, simply this.—Assuredly it is allowed for, to begin with, that nothing can be known by the human being, in a general way, any more than in any partial way, than his organism admits of. That is, no more can he see through his "Soul" than through his eyes, what the structural condition involved does not furnish provision for his seeing. But the effect of this generalized understanding, duly leaned on, can only be of right the converting of the before-esteemed "film of delusion", spread over outer

nature, into what must be contrarily hailed, with the deepest of self-gratulation, as the instrument, so far as it avails, of human comprehension to be extended by it:—the means to us of a faculty *re*-quired becoming actually a faculty *ac*-quired. And this change of view in the matter, I conceive to be truly that giving of Self-Control to Philosophy, which betokens at once proper Will-force abiding in it, and proper Axis produced in its substance. —And may I not also say, that, *for* the Soul's real means of seeing, in right manner of Soul-vision, the very principle I am seeking for, of Symbolism, appears to me as the requisite organ!

But now as to the light to be cast on what stands as our normal condition, from this idea of the abnormal.—The sense of Identical Selfism, on which perfect Individuation depends, certainly is maintained in us solely, as just noted, by our resident ability of Memory: that “miracle” associated with our Consciousness, which like the latter is of quality that is primal and inexplicable in the highest sense of these terms, except as to the ordering of its phenomena. Memory, in this primal sense, is the very tissue of our feeling of Identity. Still, I conceive that by the present mode of classifying and of symbolizing its effects, *as* presented to our Consciousness, the miracle does well adjust itself, in regard to phenomena.

What Memory *is* in this light, namely, has constantly the aspect of original creation, even more than of repetition, of images:—in this manner, therefore, ranging itself closely with the effect following Sleep; and especially of this as *not* following upon Death. I mean, the effect of renewed mental life, after intervening Oblivion: imaginably necessary for the vitalizing of impressions. What happens to us physically in Sleep, as not involving Death, we know to be a lowering of our state into that of

a very low kind of animal integration, below anything of real mental ability, though perfectly retentive of vitality : this being properly as the root-basis of the Tree-system of our mentalism, into which we retreat fully, out of our ordinarily-ramified mental state, *when* Sleep is sound ; and only partially and irregularly in state of Dreams. But if so, both is sound Sleep *Death* as far as Mind is concerned ; and Forgetfulness is the same thing, in relation to Memory. Whatever is forgotten, is no more, and it is subjective delusion in us to think that we can recover : it is extinguished, and must be thought into existence over again. And it must rightly be the same with our whole thinking principle during Sleep. Most truly it must be that “ we die daily”, as to all that gives Soul to us ! The extinction that is only different in Death by its actually being here unamenable to recovery, through basis of vitality retained, is yet every day made to us the most normal and beneficent of our habitual restorers. And what idea of our existence can we imagine more “ miraculous” than this !

If Self-consciousness be two-fold as I suppose, then Memory, its maintainer, must continually pulsate with respective interventions of Oblivion. And Sleep is only this, on a larger scale, in respect to our animal and psychical parts of being. The Soul in us, therefore, which means full integrity of being, is most literally the “ spark”, or more properly the *flame*, that is only kept hovering in us all the day long, and that regularly as we sleep, becomes *nothing*. Every day that we live and that we sleep, the alternation goes on. The Soul flashes in, and flashes out of us, with the dueness of sun-rising and sun-setting !

But there is somewhat more than this.—We all frequently amuse ourselves with the sparks upon tinder, in

watching with what vagaries of out-spreading and contracting they make out a fire-pattern, alternately burning up and subsiding. Let our subtle Mind-material of nerves, then, be thought of as such tinder; with our placing in Circumstance for the due Lamp of Life to us, supplied with the universal Divine oil. When the Flame of our Soul burns in full, the Tree-figure of Psychism must be imagined as complete in fire-foliage; and moreover with sex-varied extremities, in flame-tips that play into one another with answering aspirings and sinkings, scattering scintillations all down. In Sleep, on the contrary, the mere root-leaves alone must remain, beaming gently and lambent on the oil-vessel;—while all intermediate states show merely interrupted psychic tracks, where the sparks run but slightly consecutive, and shine out but fitfully here and there, so long as the oscillation goes on,—though always no longer than this. *With* absence of oscillation, to entirety, as I suppose, arrives always what we know for extinction.

Such mere subject of thought-motion as this, backed only with such tinder-like suggestion of material accompaniment, I take for the real figuring of a "Soul" bearing due apposition to my ideal of Deity:—a pulsating Tree-flame, throbbing ardently within us, set against the Divine Sun, beaming stedfastly above us. It is a symbol of subjective experience, that *in* this apposition represents, as it seems to me, a full winding-up of that effect of Motion's being "moulded by Matter", or, alternatively, (according as we consider it,) of Matter's being "moulded by Motion", to which Science reduces all Forms of existent construction in nature (p. 205). The animal-like pulsation of the Soul, in character of fire, running tree-like along our ramifications of nerves;—and this, in obedience to a gravitating impulse towards a merely phe-



nomenal Cosmical Emblem : drawing forth, in alternation with a different sort of influence, the upward strivings of the Soul ;—the Sun-Star, in itself, having originally sprung, as I have imagined, from only the primal mind-movement of revolution, as permanent as it was slow in its effects, having concentrated on it all possible general-istic thought-motion ever after to ensue :—all this, I would say, is the culminating response, and nothing else than this, to what has been gathered of the effecting of materialistic formation. Leaves danced in the wind, and it has followed in effect, that the Motion they have gathered in has been stored up in organized Stem ;—eyes, ears, and heart, and especially tongue, have vibrated in the inter-communion of living beings ; and from this sort of finer activity has the subtle sort of Motion been imbibed which has hidden itself in quiverings of Nerves, heaped finally in the Motion storehouse of the Brain. Nowhere seems an actual difference to exist between effect of Motion known as Sensible, and of Motion to be considered Psychical, such as really should import a first beginning of Subjectivity, or that actually should betoken a Soul-substance *not* associated with Matter. For surely, as to the condition of the Brain, in regard to its being a treasury of stored Motion, it is not thought of actually by men of science as comprehending in its substance, by its infinitesimal vibrations, however much of Motion these absorb, the whole sum of what is wrapt up in Brain-function :—but surely, rather, as to much the greater portion of its store, as forming the Mind's draft upon Nature,—a holding, by the Mind, of Nature's "promise-to-pay", when required, so much actually of Motion as the organism represents, for having gone to its formation.\* But,

\* For instance, let the question be that of the Brain-ability to predict an Eclipse :—I suppose that what is meant by the "stored Motion" thus im-

if so, the miracle of Subjectivity is everywhere:—everywhere where human Intellect is present. And everywhere in mingled Flame-character and Tinder-character. The Ego's glorious draft upon Nature, so assuredly leant on by Intellect in its solidest of transactions with her, is proved to suffer nothing, all along, from the tenuity of the brain-matter it is graved on.

And this brings to a point the whole view. Nothing imagined could be unstabler than this flickering, and even constantly-expiring, conception of the Soul, as to what our Self-instinct demands in it of attested Perpetuity. It is a Soul that, at all events in Sleep, is annihilated every day. And Nature's "promise-to-pay" expires always along with it, though, by the stamp on it of Tree-law, the renewal of it comes as regularly as the expiring, so long as the Tree-basis remains, in the mere vegetative animalism of our frames. But this Tree-kind of renewal is only virtually and temporarily, and the opposite to absolutely, for Perpetuity. There is no stamped assurance on the draft for renewal when the material of it is no longer held together. The tinder dispersed, the Mind's claim upon Nature is settled; while the Soul figured on it has no longer any figure, but subsides to the oil-vessel: become now the general lap of Divine circumstance.

Is it better then, the question comes, to have means of full trust in the Soul-nature, which has on it this recognizable stamp of Analogy with the whole principle of

plied is in actuality represented as follows: by the amount of sense-perceptible Motion that would naturally be required for the Sun and Moon to undergo, before they could exhibit a sufficient course of phenomena to convict the prevision of futility—or, rational folly. In every case of the mind-action by which the mind governs environment, the state of things signified must certainly involve a constant effort on the part of environment to overthrow the constitution that controls it; and hence I imagine as to every example of such control, that it is properly expressible, in terms of Motion, by the expenditure of outer Motion that would be required for the resistance to be successful.

creation ; or to miss this, through a clinging to Self-instinct ?——But, with the latter, it must be remembered, we need also to cling to the whole mass of world-associated ideas. So at least it appears to me to be necessary. Of all possible Religious views, I can only find these two for pertinent : the belief that carries with it an assertion of Immortality for us, and that which does not. For, once let us assume, that our Perpetuity is secure, and from this comes inevitably that demanded Self-substance of the Soul, which includes in it logically both the Personal Beingship of Deity, and thence truly, either the whole actual scheme of Christianity, or a somewhat that should closely be equivalent to it. Such belief, however, by the whole of the present doctrine of Forms, would entirely be destitute of any stamp of Analogy. There would nothing be found that is demonstrable, on true natural principle, of the harmony that should be of Natural and Revealed :—“ Natural ” as to evidence of Science ; “ Revealed ” as to Subjective vision.

Lastly, then, as to the main thing of subjective weight : the effect of this idea of the Soul, *as* held by pure force of Symbolic Analogy, on our basis of Moral principle.

I by no means wish to hide from myself that this hangs upon balance ; and that such learning of the Time-limitation set on it, has naturally the tendency, so commonly insisted on, of depressing the general energy of the Soul, and therein of acting in so far as a check on Moral culture. I recognize such tendency in it, on the contrary, so strongly, that I conceive the just balance to fall only in favour of this view, when culture has prepared an adequate counteraction, to permit of the influence being surmounted : coinciding, besides, with an afforded disproof of the previously-attached body of doctrines.

What actually does turn the scale, however, in favour of the present view, appears to me supplied by nothing other than its own working out, with a requisite two-sided sufficiency. It is still only a doctrine of Motion in question, rendered only into its subjective version ! I speak, namely, of the heightened Activity in every way conditioned to our faculties, as compared with what the former view promoted.

By our conceiving of the Soul as a developing, instead of an in-planted principle, it arrives for itself, in reflectional consequence to the whole plan of Analogy, at the symbol of the highest kind of organization, moulded to its case. That is, of a mentally-qualified Vertebration : consisting, as explained, in the implication of an Axis that mingles with the concrete or Tree-kind of Axis that mere abstract respect to Relations in Environment, which, existent in the Axis of Planets, Subjectivity has expressly the need of repeating in its own mode of action. When, however, we consider what it is that Vertebration in physics expresses, there is surely said all that is needful of the furthering of mental movements, by due *fulcrum* and *regulator* obtained for such, which the symbol has import of. If by primitive anthropomorphism the Soul appeared a Being to us, taking reflection from Deity ; now, through Star-figuring of Deity, it is rendered into itself an Inner Light-sphere, representing to us authoritatively, through the manner of its enkindling, our standard of Self-Truth and Self-Principle, such as naturally should enable us to deal widely and well with the relations encompassing us, as Moral beings. It is a power of Moral Equipoise, in the resting upon which we may bear us with right dignity, amid the shiftingness and contentiousness of our lives : *through* precisely our poised station towards our Mind-wrought Ideal. And this in-

cludes what is religiously figurable for right attitude in our Struggle with Environment :—the Israel-struggle, in which necessarily our face must be turned to the battle ; and ourselves be not left to the mere Introspection, too constant and direct, which, though encouraged by Christianity, yet has tendency to morally enfeeble us.—Morality is itself an essentially “equilibrated” condition : divided needfully between active and passive states. But in Christianity the libration seems directed so specially to the fostering of Self-instinct, in the matter of our desired Immortality, as to hold down our right functions of the active sort ;—while the present sought scheme, even in its drawing forth of these, does so with the fullest corresponding maintaining of the passive ones. No image of instability could go farther than that which I have attributed to the Soul, as mere subject of Psychic Motion. But hence, on this point, the passiveness of submission that Present Religion enforces must be deepened in proportion :—must be virtually absolute, even in the struggling, which it also enforces, with the Destiny against us. We know, in such wrestling, *Who* it is that must end in being Vanquisher ; but we know at the same time, that not by any servileness of mere crouching before Him, should we gain from Him the blessing He comes laden with.

Also, what the Divine Vanquisher stands for, when its poetry is dispersed by the analysis here dogmatized, is a prosecuted kind of Struggle so specifically of mingled activeness and passiveness, though with characterizing dominance of the latter, as eminently to carry on the Israel-figure. That is, in the Conflict with Circumstance-in-general being shown for reduced, in its subjective aspect, to one of which exclusively the weapons are our Affections, to be assorted by the very sign of old dogmas.

The "limitation" on our Selfism to be contended with, takes form as the familiar Emotional Triad, which—first seen as only dual, as to emotion being leadingly religious or secular, and thence yielding only Conflicts that are either Filio-Parental, or Fraternal,—ripens duly into triplicity by the joining with these of the much deeper-planted Conflict of Sex : thus making up fully the Inner Subjective principles that have rule over us. The Deity that in idealized wholeness was either cold Destiny to the male form of thought, or All-Father, more justly, to the feminine,—when it does subside fitly for inner struggling with,—breaks up into those true minor Deities, the Penates of the hearth, which signify our home-influencing Ideals of true Parentage, true Brotherhood, and true Conjugality. Ideals of these three kinds, laid up in the home sanctuary, may certainly be regarded as real God-commissioned angels, that *have* their rich blessing to be won from them, and that *will*, moreover, yield it alone after struggle ! Yes, and alone when the struggle has been "lawful" : carried on with due poise of moral dignity, rendered such through being regulated in full reference to foundation-sense of Deity :—therein answering still, as I claim, to what originally was figured as our "moral accountableness" to God.

And this inclusive assertion, in fact, gives the finishing cast of the balance :—though for the explaining of it there remains a most pregnant consideration to be added. This is, the enhancement of our whole value of the Present of our lives, which the cutting off of a dwelling on the Future—unduly,—should naturally produce if not thwarted by defect of Self-equipose.—The Tree-figure essentially contains, that the force of integration attached to it lies always with each separate station of leaf-issuings, giving Egoship of the moment : the Egoship which is

general being always but subordinate to that of these stations, and no more than an averaged reflection of them. And similar in so far is the case of the human Individual. But what this would imply of his rightful value of the Present, is bound on additionally, for what is meant by the Moral Control of himself, to a law of Gravitation ever following him, into each momentary dalliance with his life-tenure. So different is this principle of Naturalism from that at which Paul was indignant, where the feeling that "to-morrow we may die", was only thought to be met suitably by the resolution of "to-day let us eat and drink!" By the doctrine of Soul-evolution, the Soul that should cease from due Moral Control would fully have the Avenger behind it. It is a case of full penalty suspended, such as the very implied nature of the Soul must cause to carry force of requisite "obligation". For not simply would it be "dying" that was concerned to the Soul-endowed being;—and not only even "death to the Soul" that had neglected to "save" itself, though now known to its possessor for as frail in its integral character as it has hitherto been counted indestructible;—but there would also be question of living downward into brute-state, with the immense aggravation upon this of what every unrealized possibility implies. And this truly seems to bind up the human Conscience with the otherwise whole governing of the Universe. If this doctrine of Symbolism began, as it did, with an "awe of the starry heavens", still more does it end with that deeper kind of awe,—only needful, to the cultured feeling of to-day, to make up the full feeling of Religion,—the "awe of a Moral Law set within us".\*

And one other thing must be said. When the value of the Present is under Moral Control,—and when therefore

\* I am enabled by the kindness of Dr. J. H. Stirling to give the following

its effect only brings determination to make the very utmost of the allotted modicum of our existence, in especially all best exercise of both intellect and affections,—there should naturally, besides, I conceive, be this also effected: a repetition in religious way of precisely that requisite reversion of general feeling which I have predicated philosophy's undergoing. Namely, of temper of repining at "*the little* possessed by us", into habit of rather taking it for thankworthy that "*so much* are we endowed to be in reach of." All frail as we are, and even most so as to what is the best in us, still I believe that what it is natural we should feel in due moral state, is not, as so often is now felt, "Why did not Omnipotent Deity do better for us?";—but, instead of it, this: "How wondrous and enjoyable is it that we have come to be, and are, such beings as we are! Bursting up, as we do, with our flickerings of Soul-light, only exceptionally, as favoured spots in the wild-forest world of lower existences, how glorious is it yet, any way, and for any short space, to have been granted so to shine and to burn!"

original expression of the grand thought of Kaut here referred to:—made known to myself, as probably to most other general readers of the day, only by its recent quotation in English, first on the part of Mr. Carlyle, and since by Professor Tyndall.

"Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüth mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: *der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir.*"—Kritik der practischen Vernunft. Beschluss: Rosenkrants edition, Theil viii., p. 312.



## CHAPTER VII.

THE EFFECT WHICH SYMBOLIC METHOD INVOLVES, OF  
SEX-CHARACTER INTRODUCED INTO THE DUALISM EVER  
INTRINSIC TO PHILOSOPHY.

It may seem little desirable in the treatment of my subject, that, after the point now arrived at, I should still propose to linger in this division of it, instead of passing on immediately, as would appear natural, to that full consideration of practical consequences to ensue from my newly-moulded Creed-Belief, which however I am reserving :—in contenting myself for the present with the mere leading hints of these which I have just given provisionally. But the deviation that I am proposing, even as such, has a deepness of importance towards the whole purpose of this work, that forbids its omission, for any thing like real justice to that purpose ; however slightly I may be able to deal rightly with the matter it has respect to. And collateral as the effort is, and must be by the nature of it, to my chief object,—in the same way that the out-branching of any topic is so, even when necessary as I believe this is to the very maintenance of the stock-subject,—yet I have to allege of it that regard to it has constantly blended itself with my design in the work. And this, notwithstanding a peculiarity of difficulty involved in it, that the mere stating of its object will make obvious.

I allude to the needed *testing* of my gained idea of Religion which should be afforded by a sequential alteration, legitimately supported, in the existing understanding of the nature of Philosophy—universally recognized to be requisitely akin to Religion. All along through this work, I believe, I have implied the design of it, also incidentally expressed, that its showing of Religion by the intellectualizing effort attempted should actually constitute a developed result, in the true order of development, on the produce of former Metaphysics: a *new* scheme of Ontology, namely, that might stand as true Sexual counterpart to the right principle of Science, instead of the dead opposite to this which heretofore Metaphysics has been. But the full *Doctrine of Sexhood*, which now I have made out as my Religion, renders necessary, as it also renders possible, a direct entering on the question of this development of Philosophy:—while in fact this associates itself, inevitably, with the individualistic experience in the case which itself is also Sexual. And every reader will at once see what actual train of thought this involves with a writer who is a Woman.

It involves, let me own at once, the assertion so apparently unwarrantable, and at all events so apparently unbecoming, to be made on her own part by a Woman, that *her* entering, *as* a Woman, into the matter of Philosophy, means intrinsically the bringing of an element into it which conveys to it a principle of advance on whatever has been possible to it under the handling of Men only.—Will my readers have patience with me, I ask of them, if—without any attempt at what indeed would be so futile, and really impertinent, as apology,—I still argue onward with this result of my own doctrine by the track I have laid out: of always holding fast to exclusively my basis of self-experience? This implies, I ad-

mit, that I make claim for myself to be actually an agent of the stated kind ;—but the whole nature of my subject, and especially the whole character that I have myself been assigning to that nature, has implied this throughout. And indeed it is my surest belief that I can very quickly show how the presumption that here appears for such, is very far in reality from being such. I mean, as to the point that has relation to my own circumstance of Sex.

I refer to the fact, that what I speak of as an “advance” in Philosophy, so appearing to my womanly point-of-view, yet signifies an incomparable reduction of that demand of proper Intellect which till now has been made by it and been answered to by Men. Philosophy ever yet has had its recognized object in the exploring and discussing of “Mind”, as of a somewhat that had entityship attached to it: requiring necessarily the utmost strain of human thought to order forth its conception. But this entityship henceforth being accounted of as abolished, so also is abolished future need of the surpassing mental effort with the mysterious hidden essence. Henceforth remains solely, in the place of it, simple need of the ordering out of Mind-methods : that is, of differing departments of that general mental action, no other than such, into which mental entityship has resolved itself :—to meet which requirement I consider to be precisely adapted that fundamental assorting by Sex-difference which in no way, however, has the means of presenting itself for such to the thought of a Philosophier who is a Man. For, on the other hand I must explain, as an attendant point,—necessary to be stated at the same time, and as it were in the same breath,—that correspondently must be modified the understanding of the very meaning of Sex, in the present application of it to Mind-action :—as the following, I hope, will make clear.

What I imagine mental Sex to be—as to the two general methods that I call on Philosophy to recognize for such, bearing severally on Science and Religion,—is truly capable of being displayed where Men only are in question: since it signifies simply an instituted division in Mind-action, become part of the common character of Mind which is due to it whenever Mind is ripe enough to realize it; and therefore equally as to Women and Men, when the former reach the proper stage of culture. And yet, none the less, it appears to me an inevitable inference, that when Women do, by sufficient culture, become the subjects of the process, the analogously-sexed province of general Mentalism thence attains to a deepened and an eminently better kind of quality, of its own sort, than it ever could have gained in the circumstances of a Man's nature; just as contrarily must happen with what is mentally masculine where the subject of the process is a Man. The Feminineness of the Woman's mind, namely, needs be accounted of as the higher, or characteristic kind of Feminineness; as the Masculineness of the Man's is similarly the best kind of Masculineness. And this subtle distinction, so peculiarly *more* subtle than the ordinary one of Sex, yet in fact only answers to the following most familiar experience: that the leaning of Women's minds is as prevalently set towards Religion, for occupation of intellectual kind, as that of Men is towards Science. It is the real provision, as I believe, towards that power of Sex-influence on *Minds* which I have lately been referring to (p. 417), as the means of truly raising, by truly sexualizing, the inner being of those Women—and I might now say the same of the other Sex,—who have wanted to the same end the truly-normal effect of proper Marriage. And what perfecter effect is imaginable, to fill up to completion Nature's object with Sex! The whole meaning of what

is deepest at the design of Sex-union is the *mutual dependence* created, between opposite members of Sex, by an otherwise-established *in-dependence*, acting even to the very verge of antagonism. And exactly a providing for this effect, to occur spiritually, is the matter I am alleging, for due at all events to the Future of mankind.

My idea is truly that, as the very point of Nature's Unity-of-composition, through material and immaterial respects,—involving everywhere this actual end, of integrated separateness made out for the sake only of an integral ensuing combination,—the perfecting of the Sex-nature of Women in its spiritual department, is the identical thing that must manifest itself as the perfecting of the nature of Philosophy : this being only the term for “a regulated apprehension of Mind.” In other words, that the due sexualizing of Philosophy is at one with the sexualizing of Women's minds.

That which is the now-existing kind of differentiation in Philosophy is indeed to such extent sexual as that manifestly it is dual ; and has been so, through whatever changing modes of dualism, from its earliest existence :—so that the actual denominating of Experientialists and Ontologists forms a legitimate sequence, developmentally, to the previous dividings into Aristotelian and Platonic, and Baconian and Transcendental. But, if sexual, it is still, I contend, only sexual hitherto with such absolute defect as *ought* to be the case while Philosophy rests exclusively with Men, wanting power of the true mental Feminineness. Its Sexhood has been that which manifestly goes no farther as such than what should be in a state of merely spiritual “hermaphroditism.” And the so regarding it is evidently, upon terms of evolution, the very promise of the result I am prophesying :—“herma-

phroditism" being naturally only another word for pre-sexualism.

The purely sex-less condition of Philosophy, which it began with, I imagine to have got through with the requisite hard work of it, which no Woman, in the circumstance of the case, has ever had the means of taking share in. And this "hard", if not *rough* work, I suppose for the phase of Philosophy's green-leafage, in efficiently rooting it in mental soil, with an also-furnished tendency towards a finishing metamorphic result, of which the actual "hermaphrodite" confusion, or incongruousness of self-elements, is the hopeful sign. As to what is however the rightful or truly-sexual kind of Dualism thus pointed to, I arrive at the idea of it as follows.—Always the stock-character of Philosophy I imagine of the nature of a general effort at the interpreting of the universe by the light of native mentalism; while the real "rooting" of its practice in human habit has been owing to the strength given to it, by progressively the adding into it of on the one hand increasing knowledge of outward things, and on the other of a direct turning of consciousness on the self-action of the mind thus engaged. While, however, the gaining of such addition, in effects of Science and of Mental Analysis, has been sought characteristically by Experientialists; Ontologists have the rather resisted it, through peculiarly their insistence on the Divine character of Knowledge and of Mind, forbidding specially all analysis of the latter. And this already marks a relative slightrness in the mentation of the latter, which is of Feminine implication. But the real step towards Sexism appears this: that in the progressive working out of the two methods by extended applications to general topics,—as in Philosophies of the various Arts, and pre-eminently of that of History,—Experientialism

has leaned constantly more and more towards the Static or Scientific dealing with Mind, in the manner of proper Mental Analysis; and Ontology, to the Sequential or Dynamic observation, which, as I believe, rightly culminates in Symbolic Method, as a scientifically-assisted development of Ontology. For this new kind of moulded division,—into Static and Dynamic,—is thus the intermingled assortment of the former two classes, resting only on respective preponderance of elements, which naturally gives Sex-character to them, as henceforth but compartments of one class: the Dynamic, however, being always the retainer of the stock-character of Philosophy. Let then only there be supposed added to this what must follow of the real vitalizing of this difference, when once Women shall take up their own province:—and there is truly effected, as I conceive, what forms in typical imagery the final parting of the typical stock into branches “exogenous and endogenous”: whereof the latter is characterized specifically both by its excess of now-developed pistil-character, and by its thence being continuous of peculiarity, as needed, to the primal stock.

It is true, indeed, that this event of symbolic Sexhood to Philosophy, so requiring to be produced, can at present, through the defectiveness of Women’s culture, be only matter of prophecy. Nothing yet has the means of being existent but a dim and most hesitating presentiment of a state of things that may come to give answer to it.—And accordingly, the mere statement of what is my own prescience about it,—so to call it,—is the whole that I am now intending, as the aim of the remainder of this volume. I am proposing, namely, to show that which to my own stand-point appears actually to bear symptoms of such on-coming event: and chiefly as to the present state of those particular Philosophies alluded

to, where certainly the Mind-aspect diffused over them which applied Philosophy signifies, *ought* of right to display impress of such division in Mind-nature, if it is really in process there. But before touching on this, and in needful preparation for this, must be attempted the much harder task of that requisite defining of the Woman's standpoint, as such, which means a new and an immediate kind of Mental Analysis:—while in the circumstance of my own case this is farther enforced to be nothing at all more than sheerly personal.

I mean, as the referred-to matter of such circumstance, —now affecting and most injuriously limiting my whole power over my subject,—the following: that while necessarily it is the fact, that no other than a Woman can be the holder of the experience that must begin the institution of Mental Sex, in human nature and in Philosophy; yet I know of no other Woman than myself who has entered on the experience. I know well that there has been an abundance of Women, in all cultivated times, who have studied Philosophy to much greater depth than myself; and especially that at this moment there are numbers of them, all around, with whom in this light I should never have the folly to compare myself;—but in none of them, nevertheless, have I found what is the thing now in question. In none of them, namely, have I met with the sign of their revolting, in a manner, from the teaching they have received at the hands of Men, as feeling it intuitively for unsuited to them, in comparison with a teaching felt possible: while precisely it is this which I feel to be called on to acknowledge of myself. They have always, on the contrary, appeared to me only as aspiring to be on common terms with Men-students.\*—And, on the other

\* Most likely from their lying under near influence of Men, as objects of their reverence and affections. It needs for a Woman to be very much indeed



hand, as to the Philosophers who are Men, the very fact that I find in their actual position which has drawn from me the term I have applied to it, only expresses, if it be real, their incapableness of understanding such state of mind: since to those who are "hermaphrodites" \* spiritually, it must necessarily be as forbidden as it must be to hermaphrodites of the physical kind, to conceive of such thing as a needed Feminine counterpart. Nor in saying this am I in any way forgetting that great case of the representative Experientialist of the day speaking recently on this point, which would seem to be the kind of afforded instance of Men's opinion that a Woman above all should forbear from the temerity of resisting: † the fact being that in my actual plan it *should* precisely be the event that the more noble and more manly the Man in question, the less should the Sex-difference be conceivable to him.

To make the requisite self-analysis, however, is a task actually prepared for and begun, in the very work under

isolated from social ties, and even from domestic ones, to be able in reality to think for herself.

\* There is however a confusion in the using of this term, which needs acknowledging;—since I have already applied it, though with qualification, to the full sexual condition of the human mind: namely, as the limitedly Tree-kind of Sex. The "hermaphroditism" which is of Tree-kind means the state that encompasses the crisis of metamorphosis. And therefore if there had been a term to express this, it would have been the better one here to use.

† I scarcely know in what terms I can speak that will be grateful enough, as well as respectful enough, to express my deep sense of what my Sex owes to that most generous treatise of Mr. Mill above referred to:—certainly amongst the noblest, if not the very noblest, of the signs of the present age. And necessarily, for my own purpose, I have not failed to consider with most earnest attention whatever is alleged in it of the proofs of parity in the mental natures of the Sexes; although the above view was altogether antecedent in its own forming by myself. But in fact I believe that I could show that there is really no essential inconsistency here with the opinion of Mr. Mill,—unless in one particular:—since the kind of dividing that I am thinking of pre-supposes a real basis of parity, to found upon. The particular, however, that may perhaps be an exception, is this: that I am here considering Sexualness of Mind not the effect, but a very cause, of the perfecting in human beings of proper Sex.

my hands. This examining into the nature of Religion, namely, is my Philosophy of Religion : with a specialty attached to it besides, that the very character attributed to Religion is asserted for what only is perceptible to personal introspection. "Observation of Religion", I have argued at the beginning of this volume, "is the same thing with Self-observation" (p. 4);—while lately I have been showing how my now-arrived-at principle of Symbolism has specifically accounted to me for my own fact of related experience : namely, of my constantly being forced to give secondary attention to the *manner* of my work, while proceeding with the *matter* of it: this secondary attention being what I have just alluded to as the cause of my now "deviating" topic. And in fact at the very first I have not omitted to intimate, as far as at the time appeared possible, even the entire actual bearing of my design towards the idea of Sex-regulated methods, *now* provided for the first time with needed terms of expression. I said, namely, in one of my earliest paragraphs (I. 4-5), that what I solely had trust in, as a means that was secure of giving value to my work, as to that which I intended it to be, was my resolved determination that in any case the construction of it *should* be a following of my own instinct as to method,—“a faithful delineation of my own mental process,” in an endeavouring “simply to write down my thoughts as I had been accustomed to argue them with myself”:—although it might in this way turn out—as from the first I thought probable,—that the method thus pursued would prove *less* than an ordinary method acceptable to my readers. And this was, in fact, the nearest of an approach that I could then give any utterance to, towards the asserting of a Feminine Method : not then having proved, even to myself, the possibility of a condition for such Method.

The condition has arrived to me, as I am supposing, through precisely the mental exercise of the writing of this work, as far as it has gone : this having been indeed to me, as I believe, a real sexualizing of my own mind.

I will then proceed to what I intend for the peculiar object of this chapter: to show, partly by self-narrative, and partly by recapitulated arguments as reflections on this, *why* I believe that a natural Woman's-method of Philosophy is, at once antagonistic, supplementally, to a Man's method, as a rightfully Scientific method ; and consecutive, developmentally, to the method of un-sexual Ontology. In whatever degree I can show this, it will tend, as I have said, to that real vindicating by *testing* my own Doctrine, which I ought not to shrink from at least trying for.

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Certainly, when I first set myself to the writing of this work, it *was* with such degree of antagonism to all hitherto-afforded treatments of my subject—these being all but exclusively Masculine,—as therein sufficed to give motive to the labour, scarcely otherwise to have been adequately afforded. If I *had* only been attempting, as it has been suggested to me in effect that I was attempting, “to do badly that which Men have done well, or, at all events, have the means of so doing,” I should scarcely have thus far committed myself. And I say this, in self-protest, because I see fully how naturally this reflection on me may arise just as much in every actual reader *not* in sympathy with my stand-point, to rebuke me for the daring, as it did to those first who would have used it to deter me from the task. But my answer is ready,—at least, *now* :—that I have been the reverse of exposing myself, rightfully, to the

charge of such attempted competition : that, on the contrary, I have exactly been attempting what no Man has any power of,—the rendering into words of a Woman's need.

And can I rightfully say,—I must bethink myself,—*how* my Woman's-need has presented itself, as such, distinctively from the general character of a Man's?—I believe that I *can* do this ; though I could not have done so before actually my own dealing with Metaphysics.

I recognize the distinctiveness to have lain, namely, altogether with the engaged demand of those very mental qualities that I have here been elaborating the assortment of for Metaphysical characteristics :—with its always being the case to me of requiring to look on, only, at sufficient distance for true power of perspective, at the merely general effect of Men's mental results ;—with my always being obliged to retain a certain consciousness of my subjective status, in the looking on ;—and with my enforced struggle of endeavour, in all cases, caused by subjective and symbolizing impulse, to deal with my topic no otherwise than in-Whole. These three-fold requirements,—working always together, and in fact meaning one only thing,—I believe, express everything that my intended Sex-difference concerns. This “one only thing” I have hitherto described as the effecting of a Subjective plan, for the classifying of fruits of knowledge, in opposition to an Objective plan ; but let me now call this rather—in more convenient though equivalent terms,—an integral Symbolic Method, opposed to Scientific Method.

Long before I began with this work now on hand, I had cast about in my mind for a rightly-generalized idea of Christianity, such as Men-writers that were known to me did not offer : even including the Men-authors of the New Testament. The latter had been rendered to me insufficient, and merely partial,—as all others were much

more so,—by the historical and psychical weighing of these, which had resulted in the need of that developmental estimation of the Religion, which was the same thing with a regarding it objectively *apart* from the feeling of believing in it. No believers in Christianity can possibly regard it in whole. But the principle of Development, believed in, I felt immediately to bestow the integrating ability:—at least, when subjectively handled. Christianity became, namely, a true product of Theology, accounted of as a great Natural Art:—a true *Form* of thought, to which vitalism belonged on the very terms which I found assigned (by Mr. Spencer) to the definition of physical “Life”: holding a “continuous adjustment” established in it between the “internal relations” that were proper to its organization, and the “external” ones which bound it in adaptedness to the general mental atmosphere environing it.\* And this idea of self-organization to the Form,—while this was held for at once abstracted from, and yet connected with, my self-standpoint,—prepared for me inevitably that now-ordered Tree-image of Christianity’s Historic course, which seems to me its perfected formula. Thus in my first volume I here began

\* See *Thoughts in aid of Faith*, pp. 152-5. After having realized this idea of Theologic Art, I made various attempts towards my present design with regard to Symbolic Method, in papers that I offered to different periodicals, entitled severally *Historical Christianity* (Feb. 1861), *A Woman’s notion of Reasoning* (May 1861), and *The Tree-Similitude* (June 1862): addressed respectively to the *Westminster Review*, the *Cornhill Magazine*, and *Fraser’s Magazine*:—very poor literary efforts, as such, which naturally were each of them in turn rejected; but which nevertheless had all a steadfast purpose towards my present design, having actually furnished me with much of the material now in treatment and to follow. When I bent my whole strength, as I did, to this projected construction of my *Present Religion*, it was this Second Part, as it stands, that I originally intended to begin with, consecutively to those minor attempts, as it would have been natural to my own feeling to do; but reflection convinced me that it would be the more effectual course to detain this, and place first, as I have done, my analytic investigation of Christianity.

with, first, that eliminating process of discarding out of the essential Form all inessential particulars, which fairly brought Christianity into the mere representer of the World-stock of Religion; and, next, with that sifting of my elements for its rectified apprehension which should justly depict to me the character of Christianity. This done, also, I treated, no less, the dogmatic constituents of the general form as themselves likewise integral forms, in subordinate degree: each of them being weighed severally, as related on the one hand to the comprehensive Integration, and on the other to immediate experience. —Nay, I may even rightly say, that so close has been my integrating effort, that it has dominated in my every thought and every sentence. The entire doctrinal image has enforced to itself such peripheral respect, as it were, as has guided me in no less than the turning of every phrase, and every thread of conception;—while only by what this has been, of such rounding out constantly of my circumferent image, have I kept to my true centre of thought.—And if it be also allowed for, as it must, that not only does this signify a real carrying with me everywhere every possible consideration felt bearing on my subject; but occasionally, moreover, a compelled wrestling with occurring rational obstacles, still impeding the clear space that my rounding process needed:—may I not indeed plead that the admitted “cumbersomeness of my style” which I am accustomed to be charged with, has been scarcely preventible?—My feeling has been this: I have all along bent my entireness of ability to break myself a road through a mass of felt difficulties: possessed only by the vaguest and yet surest sort of confidence in the track I had selected.

This determinate, though little definite, mental action,—which, as I believe, is more natural to a Woman’s habit

than a Man's, however cumbersome in its working,—I believe also that I am now rightly authorized to attribute, as I have come to do, for *dynamic*. To say everything, as it were, in every sentence, surely is that implication of *being*-character, and therein of dynamic ontologicalness, which properly answers to the life-requisition of co-ordinated vital functions. Simplest breathing means all this:—pertaining, as breathing does, to whatever of life presence is dynamic, or actual.—And yet, let me pull myself up at this word: and use what is the degree of the inaptitude of it, as I may, for my very means of farther explanation. I should have said, not “*breathing*”, but *blood-circulation*: seeing that the first is no more than the external, or poetical, interpreting of the matter, while here is only question of realistic Analysis. But “*blood-circulation*” is the immediate signifier of that mental *coil-ing*-effort which I have lately been identifying my own subjective method with:—while this again signifies that whole process of lying out for superficial impression, and organically imbibing this inwards, which I submit to be rightfully a true *being*-process:—though always, and specifically, a lower sort in the scale of real intellect, than the Masculine *jetting*-process of Science: based firmly on mental backbone, as all nerve-supported limb-efforts are. For, such actual inferiority of treatment I perfectly recognize to be attached to my own practice, here so evident, of continually just glancing at great topics, *not* with direct view to consider these for themselves, as would naturally be desirable, but only for the sake of a still-latent object, held perpetually for a meditative self-centre.

Besides, the same thing that has forced me to be cumbersome in my style has also compelled me to be vague. It has happened to me continually to have to yield to restrict myself from being definite, even when I had the

power of being so, through the danger of any prominence in the items of my matter interfering with the outline required general. And still more has the nature of my purpose contained vagueness through its actually being solely—as before explained, p. 33,—the matter in itself of Definition: of Definition pervading, with entireness, the whole progress of the matter.—It may be said, perhaps, that at least in such plan there should be followed the due practice of Mathematics, of premising sufficient basis of postulated axioms.—But, I maintain, for myself, that I *have* done the equivalent to this, in vague subjective fashion, in part by my leaning on axiomatic intuitions, but especially by my stand for the true posture of subjectivity. I have postured myself, and I have postulated therein the sufficiency of doing so, on the platform of Existing Experience:—not only as a mere intellectual “*Cogito*”, but still more as an emotional *Sentio*. A perpetual present tense of Experience has underlaid my every kind of discussion. “Being what I am, and feeling what I do feel,” I have argued, “such and such I may esteem natural, developmentally, to have been, and been believed in, aforetime.”—But what sort of demonstration is this, to pretend to have the power of being intelligible, except to a mind posited sympathetically? In the right method of proper Intellect what is universally accepted for right practice is to separate as much as possible all attended-to phenomena from regard to mere personal impression; while this means precisely the ever stooping consciously down to fetch up required matter from the past to bear uniting with immediate experience. It means, in fact, the double chain-work of effort, bearing downwards and securing upwards continually, which only the elastic and “colloidal” mental nature, on the one hand of Women’s minds, and on the other



hand of the concerned topic of Religion, seems naturally adapted to the execution of.

What *does* appear the problem of Philosophy to the holder of such subjective stand-point, I consider to be this :—Nature, lying out around to be studied, is, for outward observation, no more than just a lesson-book for the explaining of her principles, say of Arithmetic or Geometry, of which nevertheless the now-living student possesses only a few pages, far advanced in the book. Whatever these display to him of rules for the understanding of Nature,—by the sole working out of which indeed he has access to any knowledge of her :—makes reference however constantly to those earlier rules which the closed pages deny him the sight of. And thus only is it left to him, of necessity, to re-produce as he may, step by step, the whole matter precedent.

But, this being to be done, the sort of Intellect which is the likelier to succeed in the work is surely rather the creeping and more cautious sort, easily diverted from error, than the higher-cast direct sort: what the former has of dynamic and doubly-acting movement, indeed rendering it here in so far the superior over mechanically-acting Science. Thus, my own studying of Men-writers on Christianity was admittedly, through its being a mere absorbing of gained general impression from them, only a low sort of organic action; but still, as organic in any way, I claim for it that it was *that* which should naturally have furnished me, farther, with the power of working onwards organically: or, of providing to myself, incipiently, a true sequent to Christianity. That is, by the assistance of added parallel impressions, of the same general sort, drawn later from the writings of Men of Science.—For I have tried, in the present volume, to deal proportionately with the latter, for the providing of due

integral apposition of this kind: standing here, as much as heretofore with Religion, in the apartness of standpoint which exclusively conditions the after power that is demanded of uniting the two results. This however seems to justify me—may I not actually believe so?—in alleging for my work the true following nature:—that it has simply been the producing, in a loaded and condensed form, what except for forced effort would have been left to spring up, and would really have sprung up, at slower rate, from the ordinary action of the feeling of mankind about the occurring blending of Science and Religion. In proportion as Science becomes common, it inevitably befalls—on present terms,—that the accustomed form of Religion which Christianity reveals itself for an accompanier and exponent of psychological development; and the very same thing with this, or the recognition of this, is in reality the producing of a new form and new principle of Belief:—while for the rendering of the latter *vital* of its kind, needs only its being gradually and simultaneously wrought out, at all points of it: there being no means in nature of producing organic things bit-by-bit.—Just as much, therefore, as my thought has doubled backwards, for a sympathizing realistically with the human feeling at Christianity's foundation, I assume it to have similarly doubled forwards, in advance of what ordinarily would be mere work of time.

I need not any longer be told of the "bad writing" this has caused, and the "style that makes little to be expected my being read with understanding, or even read at all!"—I admit that it may be so; and yet can only say, as to myself, let it be so. I am experimenting with myself, on an all-important subject; and if no more should read my book, or be likely to do so, than indeed the very few that to my knowledge are already

reading it, still it would be impossible to me to regret writing what has involved, in the very labour of it, that which this work has done,—of a whole world of unknown thought broken in upon by the inlet it has pierced, which to my own station was before wanting.—Besides, what I gain from it is the prescience to perceive how, inevitably hereafter there will come to be written books that will have all the due means of being every way clearer and better than my own, even with similar intention :—since the path that is now so laborious must necessarily become smoothened continually.

For, let me mention another claimed virtue of dynamic sort, in my low Woman's-handling of my subject, which I chiefly have rested self-confidence on. And that is, my *tenaciousness* of whatever in past thought is preservable. I have never dropped my thread of continuity with Christianity, and through that with the whole past of Religion ; but have maintained this at basis by the whole plan of my desired method of Symbolism, in my constantly clinging to the old practice of Anthropomorphism, on which modern thought looks in general so coldly : only systematizing on this, with specific recognition of it. It is this ever-conservative instinct which I believe to bestow naturally both the right and the power in the case of Women, as to subjects of religious character, to bud out, at required seasons, into new mental formations, which are *not* in the same way suggested by Science to Men ;—and of the fruits of which, therefore, the latter may well come in time to need availing themselves, *when* adequately presented. And what this really implies of future Sexual influence, to be exerted mutually between the minds of Men and Women, at work together, has surely in it a point of incalculable promise !

That which renders the theorizing of Women, when they

do theorize,—I mean, on their adapted kind of topics,—more organic, as I believe, than that of Men, seems paradoxically attributable to the very same thing that shows it for so frail as it is. For their theories being nothing except in Whole,—as all intuitionism is, of necessity ;—and yet most heterogeneously and emotionally characterized : it is inevitable that these require for their justifying an intricacy and extent of explanation that patience mostly fails for. And therefore commonly they are condemned on the spot by the other Sex, who are not in the same plane of instinct. But this means that whatever is *original* in a Woman is at present, for the most part, without means of development. It springs forth from her purely in the character of a bubble ; whatever be the latent matter in it that, under adequate filling out, might possibly permit its spreading into a whole dome, or whole firmament, of conception !—which, however, if she is rash enough to give voice to it, and refrain from pursuing it in safe silence, is ordinarily done for. The rude burst of ridicule, or of masterful contempt, that ensues, dissipates the thin film in a moment :\* while the masculine contemner, in seeing the sorry dregs only left, comments shrewdly on the quality of Women's minds !—And how surely this would have happened in my own case, I cannot help reflecting, if at the beginning of the writing of this book I had put forth *my* bubble in the same way (that is, if I had been able to do so, which I was not) : or, in other words, if I had waited to begin writing till I had thought out sufficiently the contents of it for a defining of its theory from the outset. However little may

\* It is true, the ideas so dispersed will renew themselves, and in general with only an added degree of urgency in them ; but if repeatedly thus kept down, they can only result, in place of being developed, in forming that hard crust of the mind which so commonly is the bane of Women, of irrational self-opinionativeness and obstinacy.

be the actual effect from my work, is it possible that it then could have had *any* that is desirable! Supposing, namely, I had begun by saying this:—"What I am proposing to show of the nature of Christianity is, that its Creed-form turns mainly on the idea of Marriage."—Certainly, there would have nothing been called forth but sheer laughter! Or, if not, my own thoughts would so have turned on the endeavouring to avoid it, that my writing would have been much worse than worthless. But in doing as I have done, I claim that at all events I have worked undivertedly. The very thinness of my theory at the first permitted me to carry it lightly, as about me, through the beginning investigation, while the dragging of it heavily after me, which is the besetting liability to theorists, would have ruined the material I was dealing with. If at that time it had even failed me, in being found inadapting to the material, I should scarcely have been thwarted, as to the course I was pursuing: so even unfelt by me was my theory at times:—while, as to the suspended need of an open stating of it, I have now gained the strength on its behalf that enables me to think little, and but slightly, of what indeed is still possible of ridicule to be drawn forth by it.—Let me, however, resume my point. If this kind of obstacle, I would urge, is indeed the present source of such hindrance to the development of Women's thinking, what furtherance to it may not be expected when it shall happen habitually, as it now happens only exceptionally, that the very fact of its being a Woman that propounds thought shall induce in Men-hearers respect:—respect that is not outward and conventional, but that recognized *just* respect which must follow on the admission of a Woman's method being her own: *not* fairly to be judged of by a Man except after the experience about it which is mentally-sexual. That

is, until he shall have felt in it a character that his own mind is defective in.

I mean, that a Woman's apprehension of Religion ought to mate with a Man's holding of Science, in an altogether more true and more fruitful sort of way, than the two kinds of thinking held by one and the same person, of either Sex :—while, *à fortiori*, the advantage may be heightened to perception, as lying with this arrangement, by its imaginably being contrasted with an attempted conjunction of reverse kind ; or, between the Science of a Woman and the Religion of a Man :—inevitable, in likelihood, to be utterly abortive.

And here it seems necessary to draw out the argument of my own doctrine, as to especially a concerned opinion of those noble-minded Men whose real manliness of manly nature, as I regard this, *has* shown itself towards Women. I mean, as to its being acknowledged by these advocates of Women, as a class,—if not directly by Mr. Mill himself,—as well as charged against Women by other Men, that although Religion is notoriously the subject of peculiarity adapted to them, there have actually yet never been Women who have taken lead in developing it, by originating new forms of it. To this let me then answer with the following.—By Tree-doctrine, such is still, however true, not more than the outward appearance of the real case. It is, solely, the phenomenal consequence of Men-thinkers having here, precisely as in Physiology, been ignoring in their classifying judgment the latent but most necessary aid of Rootage, which is the analogue of the Woman's mental function. If Women had not “faithfully held fast” the general stock of the Religion of mankind, as Women and as Roots only can do, very vainly would the Male kind of Religionists have striven at the work they have succeeded in, of formally

organizing it. If Men have made the struggling with the outer atmosphere of Mind which has manifested itself formally, not only in central ripening of Religion's Stem, but likewise and especially in the due spreading out for it of proper Leaf-forms; so Women with their Root-influence have not only met the purpose of the Men-workers at the real heart of the matter, but—as I here have been laboriously contending, p. 338-9,—may truly be said to have given, even counting from their state of mere hiding in the soil, the primal *impulse* of Leaf-production. The tide of thought, namely, that flowing upward has developed the Leaf-forms, must in true metaphysics be accounted as having sprung from the Roots. And to show that this formula has real meaning, let me explain that I refer to in part, though by no means exclusively, that assistance from “believers” towards the constituting of any prophet—urged at p. 356,—which manifestly has in all new religions been afforded most prominently by Women. To Mahomet it was his Kadigah that was the making of him as a prophet; and notably in the early Brotherhood of Christians were there Sisters of whom Paul speaks as ministering to it. But in this latter case, eminently, is the following to be also inferred: that specifically this sisterly combining must have acted even with directness in producing in the mind of Paul the very noblest of the doctrines of Christianity:—the idea that male and female, etc., were at one in Christ. Neither farther is it imaginable, I conceive, that after Paul had once uttered the idea, with whatever force of intention, the Women part of his disciples should have suffered it to die out. They must necessarily, by their very nature, both have seized on it impassionately, and have refused to let it go;—nor can Women that have been Christians ever since, have failed with the same grasp on

it.\* The thought, once expressed, while there were Women in existence, could never more be withdrawn.—And, if Religion be what I suppose it, of a thing wholly involved with the perfecting of Sex-nature, *by* its mainspring being with Women, a real series of such consequences as this must have made up, in truth, its whole progress.—Still, this Root-function is only the foundation. My argument is, that supposing this merely latent kind of effort of Women to have existed solely in the first instance, yet the very nature of development ensures that, in true course of development, the Woman's share in the matter must end in becoming rightfully ostensible,—as by Root-function turning formally into Pistil-function;—while the very meaning of this is that the Male efforts that are of Stamen-sort will have come openly to render homage to their Feminine co-efficients: thence implying that, to some certain extent, Women's impulse of Religion *will* have given its own Form to it, enforcing to itself Men-disciples. And to make this indeed, in its occurring, what the figure needs of real *crisis* to the Woman,—as placing her for the first time on the true basis for the full ripening of her mental nature,—there must serve, I consider, not only the incomparable agency to this end which the securing of the point signifies; but moreover the special heightening now involved of what I am taking for the very circumstance of the case,—here, at all events, made self-evident,—as to the mere touching on the point being typically the same with its securing. Let it once but have happened to any Woman, namely,

\* So, long before Jesus had actually appeared, had the aspiring Mothers in Israel, by their clinging to the imagined hope for each one of them of being Mother of the Messiah, surely strengthened the general faith in the Messiah, which again was the preparing of Jesus' mission: whence, moreover, it opened still farther the very path for religionism to take which at last issued in the formal worship of Mary.



that her ideas about Religion have won over adherence from Men,—even but partially, and as it were accidentally, so that genuinely and with acknowledgment,—and the type of Woman's character, I contend, must of necessity so be affected on the spot, as that never can it go back again into its state now assigned of mere pupilage to Man. Her faculties, as to type, can no other than have burst forth, as into the distinctiveness, so into that which belongs to this, of also the due irrevocableness, of metamorphosis.

And the crisis, by my idea of it, must be no less conclusive, from the first, if less importantly so, for Men. I imagine that, in sequel to it, what *now* the keen intellect of Men is at work on, of the "piling up" of philosophical results, they will find it a compelling advantage to subject, for a counter general result, to the opposite mental power—insensibly-consolidating and symbolically-integrating,—that will then have been established in Women. But the re-casting this must cause in the present plan of Philosophy, must also cast the latter behind into an inappropriateness correspondingly determinate.

In the impossibility, however, of here stating in full what this sexualized distinctiveness is intended for, I will condense the general scheme of it now into a mere table,—including much that I have not otherwise space for.

What I believe to be the difference of a Woman's characteristic action in Philosophizing, from a Man's, is as follows.

*She works in Whole :—*

on instinctively-averaged generalisations, which at first are merely bubble-like hypotheses, only insensibly thickening and enlarging themselves, till they gain means of Definition only at last ;—

*He works in Detail :—*

on an assumed Definition, which he takes for his basis at the outset ;—

with a constant checking of this by immediate experience; and thence a *reversed* general bearing of cogitation, as from Consequences backwards to Causes;—

and accordingly on topics only that are rightfully Introspectional and Emotional;—

acting specially by a reasoning from Analogy, that operates by a series of quasi-identical propositions—which I figure for a *spiral* or *coiling* method;—

and thence tending ever to that integrated embodiment in Symbolism, which peculiarly has the *new* means of Verification which I figure for *sexual*: the power of contrasting and comparing its effects with those of Masculine Method.

directly straight onwards, as from Cause to Effect, with almost total oblivion of his Selfism;—

choosing topics that specifically are Outward and irrespective of Feeling;—

by technically-formed Syllogism, or plan of duly-qualified Inferences:—

standing solely on the intrinsically-furnished proof which lies with the ability of Scientific Prevision.

That which constitutes Symbolic Method—characteristically, as such, adapted to Women,—I might, in fact, define thus:—It is a *systematizing of Analogical Reasoning, by alliance with a correspondingly-systematized practice of Anthropomorphism*. Out of plain Anthropomorphism I have here derived a four-fold plan of imagery, which, in retaining this always at foundation, as the initial necessity of mental action, super-adds to it, on specific arrangement, what perhaps I may designate as severally—*Astromorphism*—*Dendromorphism*—*Chelonormorphism*. And this bestows on the Method, as I imagine, the actual orderliness and consistency which entitle it to stand as such:—a Mental Practice, on its own account, that *may* compare itself with Scientific Practice, as of alternate or equilibrating value with the latter.—This claim, however, is always of such sort, as is intrinsically bound up

with the other side of the matter. I mean, with the Method's natural sequence to the heretofore Method of Ontology.

The librating or sexual relation which I imagine for Symbolic Method with Scientific, is in general provided for, as I have schemed, by this manner of apportioning the spheres of each : that to Science is allotted the mid-departments of all serial investigation, as what are right-fully adapted to detail treatment ; and to Metaphysics only the dim extremes. But this implies that if ordinary Metaphysics, or what acts on lower ranges of objects, is indeed what it is lawful to Science to appreciate slightly, as is granted : yet on higher ground of thought Metaphysics may and must surpass Science.—Let me turn then to show, on this counter-side of my plan, how this mediating arrangement serves actually the end now in question :—that of giving to the alleged sequence, believed to be here maintained with Ontology, a true quality of reality.

I find proof of this in the very circumstance of my gained result, that what is the higher ground where Metaphysics excels, is indeed and exclusively Theology, understood on my own terms :—namely, as being that which embodies for human use the Introspectional and Relational fruits of Knowledge : prevented by their moral and merely personal implication from ever taking other aspect than Symbolic. For it is inevitable of Theologic Symbols, thus accounted of, that on topics subjected to them in the ordinary manner of applied Philosophy, they act always with the proper *integral* effect demanded in Philosophy. I mean, as ever casting on such topics the full and entire light of the concerned state of Mind, ac-

according to that which is the engaged manner of Symbol. In their doing so, however, my present contrast of Religious or Philosophic Method with Scientific is retained as much as ever on the following ground:—that while Science works from Matter up to Mind, deadening even what Mind is when it reaches to operate on Mind; my own plan works always from Mind down to Matter, flooding over the whole field of Matter's cognizance with living consciousness of present Mind. And this surely should mean all, in itself, that in fact is the making good of my relation to Ontology.

But to this I may add the following:—that it is the same with the idea of *Causation*, which indeed is bound up with Theologic thought.—In Scientific Method this is easily dispensed with, and replaced, there sufficiently, by the bare image of “invariable sequence,” assumed for such. But Symbolic Method, as Ontology, and as a developed kind of Ontology, holds unceasingly by the vital conception which is inseparable from Theology. And that is, by the now-substituted idea of Development as the manner of Causation, or Creation; with understood Deity, as Unknown Force, in the hidden background:—of Development, moreover, that has even on it the stamp of Will-determinateness, through its ubiquitous bearing on one point, the point of Sex-realization.—Nay, hence I am striving, by this Method, just as much at exclusively the real *Essence* of things as all genuine Ontologists have ever done. Not, indeed, at the hidden Essence of Deity; but at the Essence of the natural *working* of Deity, in both the out-lying and the inner-mental spheres of Nature.

## CHAPTER VIII.

THE TWO SIDES, SEXUALLY CHARACTERED, WHICH APPEAR  
ALREADY MARKED OUT AS SUCH IN THE RESULTS OF AP-  
PLIED PHILOSOPHY, SHOWN ON THE GENERAL HUMAN ARTS.

I will now turn to the easier, or more properly-feminine side of my Feminine Philosophy. That is to say: in having made the strained effort which I account for a masculine or static effort, as directed towards Objective Introspection, I will consider Philosophy on what rather is its impulsive, and comparatively unconscious side, of acting by application. Namely, on mental effort of another and apparently lower sort than its own, dealing always with what is matter of outward sense; and known, in one or another mode, as of the nature of *Art*.

*Art* I conceive to mean always "a structural creation, devised for the interpreting of outer things to our reflective Self"; while the more of Philosophy is reactionally concerned with *Art*, the more obvious to Self becomes actually the Self-demand in the case, of Self-exigencies being regarded and supplied. And hence the force of that idea of Philosophy which is as of the casting of the integrated nature of Mind on whatever it is applied to.— But this signifies manifestly the excess of Introspection concerned, which I hypothecate for a Feminine characteristic; while, again, I suppose a still greater proportion

imparted to this excess when the application to Art has itself also an integral object, over that which belongs to it when the intention is analytic. And it is this inner distinction which now I have to treat of: as precisely laid open of peculiarity by the sole view I am taking—the Symbolic view of mind-nature.

Where Philosophy indeed culminates in value, as matter of application, is where it addresses the entire subject of human History, or human Progress, infusing order into this by its reflectional operation. But the same kind of effect should belong, and seems actually to belong, to the minor spheres of Progress which “the Arts,” as a body, represent;—and seems even much more ripe in these fractional departments than in the general case.—I will begin therefore, as the work of the present chapter, with these only: endeavouring to show *how* and *where* upon the general “Arts”, of idealistic kind, the Sex-partition appears to me to display itself, as even already made out in what is the existing estimation of Art.

And first let me follow up the matter of my last chapter by an arranging of my conception of Logic:—this being the human Art that, as such, I have symbolized already (p. 144,) for that presider over the *upper* spheres of thought-action—so accountable by my Igdrasil-figure of the life of knowledge,—which Mathematics is of the *lower*, or more purely scientific spheres. Logic in *these*, just as much as Mathematics in *those*, I admit for the true *test* of legitimacy. But then I do so only with this of proviso,—and it is this which is now my express point,—that in Logic is the precise Sexualness in demand, the very need of which furnishes proper contrast to Mathematics’ incapableness of Sex.

And it is indeed patent in the case that by long-made

arrangement Logic has its two sides: known for Inductive and Deductive kinds of reasoning. This alone, however, is very far from—is no more than the mere basis of—what I am seeking as a proper Sexual distinction. This must necessarily form a true integral partition of Logic, as to both sides of it, hence carrying the farther subtleness of its own meaning, *as* made subject to Sex, into the meaning also of those long-adopted terms of “Inductive and Deductive”, for the enabling of them still to be employed. —Let me state then how the idea of this distinction has come to develope itself, in the action of my own thinking.

I have lately mentioned that the effect on me of Mr. Spencer's first treatise on Psychology was that of causing me to see in Theology the great pattern-work of human Art, considered truly as “creation” in the full sense of the word, as intending *giving life* to its object:—*life* that at once was abstracted from, and yet connected with, the source of it—and thus, in fact, phenomenally equivalent to *death*. But this being the very condition of those minor individualities that make up Tree-life,—while, as I have also stated, the Tree-image had then already taken hold of me as the true symbol, universally, of Development-in-conditions;—I set myself at once to a subjective realization of this ideal *life*, or rather of ideal *growth*, of what is Art-material, of every kind. And the perception therein of those constant “two currents” which have here been so dwelt upon, fixed itself from the first in my mind, as attached to the idea. They suggested themselves as represented by the two fundamental facts in our nature, of our alternate and conflicting “*desire for expression*” and “*need of repression*”:\*—the latter painting always the effect to us of our check from environment, assimi-

\* *Thoughts, &c.*, note to p. 198. In relation to this notion I pondered often on a circumstance that occurred to me perpetually, as to the effort of

lated by us in what constitutes our *reasoning* faculty, as opposed to our impulsively-creating mental movements. The creating of Theologic Images,—effectible, as such, by indeed no single human mind, but only by a succession of minds, as Mentalism in the abstract,—appeared to me as always accomplished through, in the first place, an impulsive figuring out of throbbing instincts, and, after, through a coldly-intellectual abstracting of the tested residue of the started figures:—which is a proper Tree process.—But when I brought this same idea into the next layer of study I had to deal with,—that of the world-course of Philosophy (as depicted by Mr. Lewes),—it seemed instantly to take grasp of the whole matter. What before I had counted as a typical *Theology* assumed now the surely-kindred appearance of purely *Theory*. I darted to the idea that “every framing of a theory”—or verbal stating of a mental image,—“*is the setting up of a god to govern the idea*”,\* whatever be the ideation concerned. And this idea, vaguely figurative as it was, seemed fairly to yield a clue that, as now I will describe, interpreted for me all that most specially had need of interpreting in the course of Philosophy. I mean, as to the affording an intrinsic exposition of that which is its leading phenomenon, of the ever falling apart of the ranks of philosophers, with distinction to the one class of being

writing for publication, that *rational exposition* of my subject drove me constantly to an order of statement the reverse of what primarily offered itself, and which in mere conversation would have been followed. It seemed always that the current of thought as to reasoning needed to have an opposite direction given to it to that of any simple or narrational line of thought.

\* *Thoughts, &c.*, note to p. 243. A second time I refer to what at first was a more offshoot of conception!—and let this be received as one of the signs I allude to of a needed *reversed order*, to follow rationally on the steps of the impulsive track. Continually I have found myself thus requiring to take up into the subsequent body of my work, ideas that at first were only adjunctive, or parenthetical.



Deductive, and to the other of being Inductive, in the prevailing manner of their Logic.

A *Theory* set up on any subject, I considered, was intrinsically an assertion of abstract principle with regard to that subject; which again carried with it, as such, that assumption of unlimited efficacy, or universalness of applicability, which the term *theos* of peculiarity expresses. But this abstract assertion, however at the first most limitedly hypothetical, is the same thing that all Logic demands specially, for any power of validity in it, of an assumed *major premiss*, for whatever be the syllogism designed.—What I imagined then to avail as the clue just referred to, is an assorting of universal thought-material into units of such species as that each should have necessarily attached to it, either actually or implied, a *major premiss* of this kind for its dividing into two proper departments: the anterior being the inductive preparation for this *premiss*, the posterior its ensuing application. (*Thoughts*, p. 254.) Such assortment adopted, I considered, left open in all cases the mere easy supposition, that where thought had the general nature of Deductive the central line was found early in the unit, leaving the larger of the compartments for the final one; and the contrary for Inductive thought. And thus the whole *leaning* of Philosophy, in differently-constituted Platonic or Baconian minds, would adequately be represented by the imagined shifting of the mid-division.

Philosophy's unity of composition being thus provided for, it seemed to me simple to figure for it, as Tree-symbolism demanded, that constantly-differentiated bearing towards Emotionalism and hard Intellect which had to end, nevertheless, when Developmentalism arrived, by the coming of the two streams into integral combination. (*Thoughts*, p. 264.) At this time, however, my chief in-

terest lay solely with the development of Theology, with its one *major premiss* of intuitionally-asserted Deity. That is, I came to feel interest in what never before had in the least inspired any, of the purport of Logic. I had been learning, from Feuerbach, that the existence of our intuition of Deity was owing to a pristine and unconscious but pervading operation of human Art ;—I had learned farther, from Mr. Spencer, that in this respect it stood only on common terms with other large intuitional impressions, such as those of Space and Time :—hence I came to think generally as to intuitions that, as I found with the sovereign one of Deity, so with all it was the course to begin primarily with a quality of opaqueness that only afterwards was removable, when reasoning should have adequately dealt with them. I mean, that to original perception, while crudely subjective, the generalization which was arising for the ruling principle, or *major premiss*, of any case being reasoned on, was as if a solid barrier of Theory, shutting out from the reasoner all view of what was hidden behind it, which yet actually had gone to its creation ;—while the working upon this of psychological effort tended always to pierce open the barrier. (*Thoughts*, p. 256.) And with this I wound up what was then my furnished gathering of results.

It was, however, very little after the publication of these *Thoughts* that I was determinately led into the path that ever since I have followed. Early in 1861, namely, my attention was awakened to a discussion that had been common then a year or two past on the subject of the Lecture of the late Mr. Buckle, thus entitled : “ *The influence of Women on the Progress of Knowledge.* ” \* I found that in this Lecture, while Mr. Buckle nobly ac-

\* The Lecture was delivered at the Royal Institution on the 19th March, 1858, and published in *Fraser's Magazine* of the following month.

knowledge, as a man, the amount of benefit which men owed, as to that progress, to the contributions of women, he explained the cause of the benefit by what was generally felt for the disputable assertion, that it lay with the *deductive* peculiarity of women's intellect, as contrasted with the *inductive* character of that of men. And when I compared this opinion with my own gained results, it seemed to me that the whole subject of Logic became open to an arrangement, that in regard to my own purpose was as desirable as it was feasible. To my actual state of thought, namely, it seemed much the more easy as well as pleasanter effort to make Logic in a manner over again, for my own using, than to force myself passively to assimilate the idea of it held ordinarily. I consulted, naturally, Mr. Mill's work on Logic, for points of information I felt needful; whence I gathered, beside what was the Author's own defining of the "Syllogism", the understanding of it held, especially, by Dr. Whewell. And I farther compared both views with what I found in the lucid article on the subject (headed "Organon,") in the *Penny Cyclopædia*. But nothing in either case seemed of right to forbid my new hope, which the lecture of Mr. Buckle had aroused. That is, of proving my self-acquired notion of Logic that which should be, in the end, a distinctively *feminine* mode, altogether compatible with, and even requisite for companion to, the existing authoritative mode—whatever this might finally turn out to be.

The two following are the grounds that are adduced by the Lecturer for his opinion about women:—"First, because they are quicker [in intellect] than men; Secondly, because, being more emotional and enthusiastic, they live in a more ideal world, and therefore prefer a method of inquiry which proceeds from ideas to facts; leaving to men the opposite method of proceeding from facts to

ideas."—But this latter thought is the very same that I had expressed by an increase of proportion to the later or deductive part of reasoning over the dimension of the first part, or of the inductive provision for idealizing. And yet I felt there was a great difference, notwithstanding, between my own desired meaning of these terms and that which Mr. Buckle had in view:—precisely through my including within the province of legitimate emotionalism the whole effect of Theology, which to him was a mere nullity:—for *if* Theology were omitted from the question, I acknowledged to myself that women's intellect, as such, would bear little of comparison with men's. I could only use the terms, namely, of "deductive and inductive" as with respect to their several predominance in the cogitative unit. But I liked better the expression that occurred to me, as to especially the kinds of intellect of men and women, that the former acted rather on the principle of *Inference*, and the latter on the principle of *Deference*:—because of the implication here made of moral quality added. This widening of the subject, however, cast me anew and with fresh force on my latently-held Tree-symbol, as alone fit to take in its entire range.

I adhered to my conception of Natural Creation as still acting, through the means of human intellect; and thus elaborating the concerned ideal forms—or, continually called-forth generalizations,—with always a *vital* kind of agency, as different as possible from the artificialness of proper Logic. And in trying—as I did try,—to figure forth the conception in diagram, what resulted was in fact such as fitted the Tree-symbol,—though causing to me a peculiar revulsion as to my original impression of the "opaqueness" of the intuitional mid-barrier. For, when I produced my initial lines of Induction into the diffused area of a stage of Leaf-issuing, as Tree-sym-

bolism demanded ; and thus imagined the *major premiss* of the case a vast ideal shadowing, projected in advance of mental stand-point,—on which it might consequently react, for new organizing of the latter, in the same way that Leaf-issues produce organized stems, either Endogenous or Exogenous according to the Leaf-quality in question,—what before was “opaque”, as in sign of crude intellect, was now contrarily *hollow*. But this baffled me only a moment when I remembered what so eminently is now taught us by physicists, that real darkness is the darkness of vacuum ; and that, consequently, for representing of light breaking in upon thought the only type is of obtained organization. Hence my conception became fixed that the real strength of manly intellect, inferentially endowed, was as that of the filled stems of exogenous timber, contrasted with the superficialness of endogenous vegetation.—And more than this, I new-moulded my idea of the mental unit, by imagining it as really lowered—or, as admitting of being lowered,—into that of the mere “cells” which are in vegetation the common first-stage of vegetal forms. Just as “cells” make the general tissue of plants, so, I imagined, are instinctive analogies the basis of all thought. To the lowest, indeed, there is no *major premiss* really present, because purely of their minuteness : whence thought, in their case, leaps immediately from conclusion to conclusion,—following solely, as imperative, the common “law” that “like produces like”, saving only as to differences intervening in the circumstance of any novel production ;—while actually this is the occurrence that is perpetual wherever organism is in question : so that no one analogy, developmentally ensuing, can be otherwise than a “varier” of the “sameness” of its principle,—the “law of growth” ever growing as the Tree grows. But whenever the case is large

enough for reasoning to have room, the abstract principle that determined the analogy needs a special displaying : and this means, when the firm thought-fibre becomes present which gives vegetable backbone, or stem.

And if now, with the aid of this completed Tree-principle, I were to write over again the same survey of the course of Philosophy that I offered in the referred-to earlier work of my own, the meaning that I should consequently now give to the "dialectics" it is concerned with would be very much more definite. At that time, indeed, I felt truly the desirableness of regarding the historic progress in-whole, for which the *artistic* or *organic* ability of the work of Mr. Lewes in question (the two terms being equivalent in my idea,) so felicitously prepared the subject ; and hence I began upon my object with what now I describe as the proper Leaf-principle. That is, of asserting all whatever of philosophic efforts to have been of the one nature, of a casting out, by the human mind, of successively "adventurous feelers" of hypothesis ; such as constantly won out of mental environment, by their dealing with it, fresh powers of reflectively rectifying the subjective crudeness that inevitably all thought-effort begins with : as to the needed transpiercing of its primitive opaqueness. But this physiologically-turned idea had at that time no means of completing itself, for the want of the "final purpose" discerned in it towards Sex, which, I contend, has naturally the sole power of really integrating either this or any other of developing conceptions ;—and accordingly I stopped short with no more than the idea of morphological *branching* to the course : into the two streams of Inductive and Deductive Philosophies, which Developmentalism has the glory of now being able, for the first time, to unite. If, however, I were now fully to apply my own type, with its spe-

cially ordered stages of Leaf-character,—*cotyledonous*, *pre-metamorphic*, and *post-metamorphic*,—the meaning of “dialectics”, as the Tree’s mode of self-agency for advance through the three stages, would illustrate itself thus. Dialectics being naturally as the muscular self-effort of the mind,—and hence producing what Mr. Spencer explains, of “struts and ties” to the very structure of the mind,—*must* therein both have helped out the mind’s contest with outer nature for its obtaining proper nutriment of observed facts, and have elaborated inwardly its fund of intuitional constitution. And thus, before Aristotle, brilliant as were the effects of initiated physicism,—exceptionally even prophetic of the final Sexual character to be realized; just as cactus-flowers are as-if perfect flowers, though springing monstrously out of substance that is stem-less,—the class-nature of Philosophy counts only for *cotyledonous*. And this, although always making ready for the subsequent working of the idea most essential to the case, which Xenophanes substantiated: of the true *Unity* of the life-principle concerned. But when Aristotle had been led to invent Logic, for the *organon* that he felt necessary for the mind’s carrying on of its struggle: the fact was that coincidently was existing a fellow-Logic of Plato:—while this also is expounded, as being natural to the case, by Tree-symbolism: as follows. The gymnastics of the mind which dialectics are, being typically occasioned by the encountering in the type of the two necessary currents, of the Leaf-producing agency which has seat in the earth-planted part of the Tree, and of the downward-tending external agency, arising in the Leaf, which propagates itself earthwards: this manifestly involves as provided for the event of two different modes arising of dialectic action, according as either kind of energy preponderated.

And let it not be forgotten, as to Logic that was Platonic, that the mental *soil* which is in question is only what in the higher super-vegetal creative type means the seat of heart-feeling :—accordantly with which, subjective dialectics worked actually on, after Plato's time, until duly they had originated the affective Form of Relationism effectualized by Christianity. The whole epoch of these rival dialectics, at contention with one another, I consider thus as the season of Philosophy's green-leafage, which mainly showed result in firmly planting the general Tree :—such operation being represented by especially the outer triumph of Induction, effected by Bacon, as to driving the then-extant rival mode of Deduction, for its relative crudeness of subjectiveness, into latent or *sub-terra* position. But with the modern outburst of Developmentalism comes the crisis of true Flower-change. And this means, of necessity, that Metaphysics and Metaphysical Logic must now gain the ostensibleness of true kind, which is the turning henceforth of their hitherto Root-character into the new Pistil-character, adapted for real blending with Polleniferous Inductivism.

Still, as I have now come to recognize, the real perfecting of this crisis depends on Women coming in to take up and re-model the department of Subjective Logic : identical in my own view with the regulated plan of Symbolism I have stated :—while the classifying of this as I have done, for a sequential or dynamic mode, and Masculine Logic for a static mode, has been prepared for—as I must appeal to my readers,—by the whole course of demonstration in the first part of this work : showing how Time-effects properly are associated with Religion, as Space-effects with Science ; and thus the former made naturally appropriate to Women.—As to the condition of the latter, on the other hand, being in general what



befits their appropriation of the position, I rest certainly on those qualities which Mr. Buckle has adduced, of their "quickness" and "emotionalness": as combined, however, with my own scheme of their distinctive inclination to Analogy. A Woman's mental quickness, I conceive, means specifically an incessant and even overflowing-prolific kind of mental productiveness, thence charging the mind to unfitness with primal "cells" of analogies: which, precisely, the needed habit of duly questioning, as Men do, has the function of reducing. And to the very last, and the very best, that Women's minds can be ripened into, by the aid even of a Logic rendered suitable to them, their self-made Forms of Thought should hence surely keep the sign of this quick running up.—And yet, by my idea, they are in no way less stable on this account:—since, unlike Mr. Buckle, I am the farthest from here thinking of *only* what is Deductiveness of quality, or of Deference that Women pay to mental images ready-made for them; but I am thinking, in addition, of precisely their ability of creating such at first hand for themselves. What they habitually begin with—as the simple crying out, at every fresh mental object, "it is like this, it is like that,"—*when* controlled, as I am contending for, by a true *principle* of Analogy, I conceive to be really capable of growing into a legitimate counterpart to the Logical Organon of scientific Men:—always being understood, however, that it is acting where in place, within the adapted or emotional domain.

And now let me carry forward this plan into the subject that is my proper one, of the ideal Arts.

It is obviously first necessary to show how my own postulate about Art affords really that proper Unity to

the subject, which admits of the proposed scheme being applied to it:—my recognizing in Theology, namely, that which yields with sufficingness the common type of Art. With this let me then begin.

Under this view it is implied, as I have stated, that human Art is considered always as at the same time a mere part, though the highest part, of what is Nature's general Art in creation. And this furnishes at once, as I consider, a true ground for the classifying of the whole series of Arts, in sub-division to the integral conception of Art:—namely, accordingly as they are treatable the more advisedly in the light of *human* Art, or of *natural*: or, in other words, as of specialty they are *conscious* or *unconscious* Arts. By taking Theology, however, as typical in the case, I assert, for myself, the desirableness of abiding by the *natural* estimation. The following, then, is the idea of Art-development, and of the classifying principle resultant, which, in connection with the foregoing, does indeed so approve itself to me as—according to my own circular mode of thinking,—to form the proper argument of its requisite demonstration; and precisely *for* the integrality I find in it.

The true quality of self-consistency and naturalness is provided, as I consider, to my own view, by this which I would give as my general explanation about Art that is human or idealistic. Namely, that its action is entirely by created *Symbols*, however variously ordered. I conceive that the passing into this form of the related “primal cells” of the mind which I have described, is only rightly the consequence of a beginning selfism established there, with the alleged need of a manifested expression; since this turn henceforth given to the simple finding of analogies in outer nature, does obviously respond to the final human demand now produced into our beinghood,

which is that of the mind's holding within itself, contained in its own structure, what may be to it the master-key to the structure of outer nature.—For such master-key certainly *is* Symbol, when selfism and intellect *are* made commensurately concurrent!—By creation of Symbol, I conceive, the mind fixed itself then, and for ever, into the position of a commanding harmony with environment, which gives character universally to present Intellect: notwithstanding—or, as rather I should say, on precisely account of—its pervading subjection to Sex-division. The whole substance of Art, therefore, needs be shown, for such view, in a state of bare tendency to this end: thus helping it ever forwards, by the very law of developmental causation;—while I consider this answered to, effectually, by the Sex-nature which I have also been attributing to Logic. I suppose, namely, that the rule of the two currents concerned—impulsive self-expression, and the re-actionary check upon this from environment, more or less undergone in proportion to the repressed hastiness of the action: making up, by their struggle, the full purport of Logic, of both kinds,—may be stated as this. The greater the amount of such corrective the impulsive effort can assimilate, without losing its impulsive nature, the more perfect is in every case the Art; but it is lowered as such, nevertheless, the very instant its impulsiveness is over-balanced and mastered. Nor actually do I miss what there should be accordantly in the real facts of the Art-progress:—as now I will explain.—In Theologic Symbolization, what I take for its typical or stock character lies in this, that while indeed the circumstantial repression on it which is that of intellectual rectification is at its minimum, yet it assimilates to the full, or may do so, without anything of loss to its Symbolic character, what is the rectification

really proper to it, of the subjective or moral kind of dialectics ;—while in the subsequent Arts of the whole series, doubly-furnished as such, there is a continuing progress towards the contrary effect, of Symbolic nature merged into an aspect that conceals this, through preponderance of proper Logical effect. And Theology also shows on itself the real manner of this progress. Primarily, the only outward sort of check that its impulsiveness is subjected to is what affects the outer moulding of its Symbols ; and this causes the unconsciousness that it begins with, and which is rightful to it always in its purely subjective mode. But this condition, and the unconsciousness of it, dissolve the very instant fellow-beings come in question : bringing with them, as they must, the occasion of controversy. *Now* begins, of necessity, the need of the proper Logical conflict for the two currents of expression and repression which transcends the instrumentation of mere Symbolism ; and Theology henceforth must incarnate itself in Language. And this is identical with produced consciousness of itself :—peculiarly, as I urge, through the integrally-opposed methods of employed Logic. For always, by my theory, it is only by the fact of two sexual variations-in-consciousness being produced, that consciousness itself is produced.—Here, then, is the entire clue to the point under concern. Wherever Symbolism-proper, or of the primitive sort, remains permanently triumphant in Art, through preserved character of subjectiveness, this is accountable for of Stock-nature and Feminine. Wherever contrarily it is Language-character and Logic that prevail, Art is Stamen-like and Masculine.

Between Theology at the one end of the Art-series, and Language at the other end,—*that* standing in single stock ; *this* divided, as to the philosophy of it, in sex-depart-

ments,—I thus suppose a mid-sphere where the inclining to either extreme mode of self-expression suffices, as such, for the needed classifying of its component modes of Art. Language from the first stands as rival to pure Symbolism: its own facile handy Symbols of *Words*—split and polished by their undergone logical testing,—being alternative in availableness with the proper kind of Symbols which remain integral; and which address always, correspondently, our entire body of feeling, whichever be the special sense they have the nature to take hold of by their appeal. And apparently the special sense that is appealed to helps out, by what is the quality of its specialty, the double course that is demanded: as thus:—Theology, in its progress towards verbal communicativeness, allies itself naturally, *in* mid-course, with Arts that address severally our eye-sense and our ear-sense;—but the former, as I conceive, is the course that is analogous, of the two, to the final painting by Words; and the latter that which lingers in the Symbolic character: while there is another mode of permanent Art which indeed fully keeps the latter to the last, by its essentially addressing, up to present times, as Theology did originally, the whole mass of sense-appreciation at once:—that of Drama. And hence that which I require of a proper class-idea, for now the duly “polarizing” of my notion of Art, is really answered entirely by the common way of judging of Art which describes it as respectively *dramatic* or *realistic*:—Music, for instance, falling the rather into the former mode, and Painting into the latter.—But here becomes necessary what indeed is an extended kind of “polarization”, regarding the entire subject. To show, namely, why this classing suffices farther, as to that which is the point most essential, of the marking of progressive consciousness-of-Art, I must turn, for the moment, to a

view of the whole course in reverse. I mean, to one that shall take Language, in place of Theology, as the afforder of its type.

If Language be considered separately, as a stock-Art for itself, the whole history of its career into its present state of consciousness of its own Art-character, surely *does* bear out thus the above plan, *when* studied developmentally. What is the Logic of Language we know as Grammar, and before Grammar was invented, truly Language was as destitute of self-reflection in it *as* also is sex-character in any "stock" only latent, and defective in ostensibleness. Why Grammar *was* invented, however, was manifestly—as just said of the bringing of Logic into Theology,—through the regard paid in speech, *not* primarily bethought of, to its effect on a listener. That is, through a marked increase of the "imitative" element in Language, implying attention to the act of self-expression, as superadded to the "interjectional", or crudely-impulsive element. Nor, in fact, did the amount of self-attention to speech actually reach the required point of needing Grammar's invention, till precisely—as Prof. Max Müller has shown,—common intercourse with fellow-beings grew towards intercourse between fellow-nations. And, to support the taking of this actually as a developmental *cause*,—explaining thus the constant ripening of speech into a communicative, in the place of but an impulsive, Art,—the same Professor has notably farther shown, that the power of infusing Grammar into Language, drawn from need of mastering alien modes of Language, *has* immeasurably enhanced itself, as the theory needs, in proportion as these alien modes respect widely-parted epochs of speech-development.

The same course then, and no other,—only with a differ-

ente,—I attribute to every other Art:—requiring, however, the understanding, at the outset, that each other Art only exists, indeed, as specifically a protest against Language, as to its sufficiency for what it claims to be, of a medium for human self-expression. Precisely that interjectional element that Grammar tends constantly to extinguish, the Arts that are the “fine Arts” have taken upon them to cultivate and triumphantly establish. Thus all of them, in a manner, are at issue with Language; just as naturally they are all ministrant to Theology:—excepting only Poetry, the superfine of the Arts, of which the exquisiteness of the triumph is just this, to have mastered very Language into Symbolism’s slave. The clipt “phonetic” instruments of *Words*, when they are forced, as they *are* forced, by the self-energy of thought, to express indicatively to a listener even what full mythological and dramatic Symbols convey of impulsive import,—just as otherwise they adapt themselves to ratiocinative arguing,—give to Language the Poetic force of Art which is Language’s most perfect of attainments.—And every fellow-Art of the whole class shows a varying somewhat of the same history.

What Painting was primarily was merely Picture-language, employed needfully as a means of narration that was even long anterior to Hieroglyphics. And between them lay the notable struggle for the framing forth of the wondrous *Alphabet*, which has carried itself, as it has, by consecutive borrowings of one nation from another, often of character the most opposite, in one track:—the struggle meaning, how far in each letter should the nature of full symbol be preserved, as seems earliest to have been the preferred case; or should suffer the phonetic truncation which *now* seems to have settled itself universally for the best kind of process.—In the modern Picture-

language of Painting, however, this contrary effect follows, that while the two practices are open, of the literal or realistic kind of Art, and the symbolic, the latter stands notoriously—though by no means uncontestably,—as high Art. There are those, it is true, who of the “Two Paths” pursued alternatively by painters, would gladly exclude the esteemed upper-path from legitimacy : but, none the less, both continue to be trodden, and to be admitted lawful. And may it not be taken for the real reason of their being so, that the Language that Painting is, when used for narration, is in fact but a one-sided mode of Language : one in which *verbs* take the lead in importance, just as statical or still-life Painting resembles Language that rests upon *nouns*?—Verbs *are* representable only in Symbol;—and what emotional feeling is, which addicts itself to Symbols, does again, through its objects being relations more than things, affect principally verbs,—or, what is virtually equivalent, adjectives.

Before need came, however, of the Picture-writing of History, to primitive human beings,—or, while the emotions to be presented were so far from yet expressible by verbs, or by adjectives, that they rested in need barely of interjections,—Art, other than Theologic, was entirely engrossed in the one form of Dramatic Art : that which constituted from the first, and has done all along, a true secular parallel to Theology, beginning with utter absence of help from Language, and meaning only gesticulation, either of fighting-kind or dancing-kind, with ear-stimulation of pre-music, and ending with inclusion most decisive of Language. A true Drama is still, by no means so much a course of events represented, as it is, in reality, an embodied interjection, emotionally thrown out;—the most different imaginable from a logical expo-



sition. But originally it was nothing but a bodying forth of what was merest as well as rudest kind of impulse.—Music, also, is continuously of this kind. The vocal Music of Opera is narrative in part, through its alliance made with Words ; but the truest kind of Music is that where it speaks for itself,—and always interjectionally, as an organon independent of syllogisms.

The opposite leanings, again, are markedly displayed by those other two Arts which have common material—so differently acted on!—in stone: Architecture and Sculpture. The latter approaches Poetry for its power of assimilating, and, at the same time over-mastering, the imitative realism of its function; but the former is like Music, interjectional throughout,\* and dramatic to the very basis of its intention.

Thus, in each and every Art do I conclude that the “Two Paths” which Mr. Ruskin has attributed to Paint-

\* Let me here repeat a striking historical anecdote, that was in fact present to my mind when, a few pages ago, I spoke of the “bubble”-images of Women’s minds as perhaps capable of spreading out into a whole “dome” of conception. Sir J. E. Tennant relates in his account of Ceylon (I. 481), that, according to the *Mahawanso*, when the Singhalese prince Dutugaimunu was desiring to build his stupendous Ruwanwélé dagoba, “he consulted a mason as to the most suitable form, who, ‘filling a golden dish with water, and taking some in the palm of his hand, caused a bubble in the form of a coral bead to rise on the surface; and he replied to the king, In this form will I construct it.’”—If, however, we connect mentally this bubble-notion of Architecture, with the really-primæval stage which was that of the mere improving on natural caves, we gain farther an illustration that is thus thorough, as to the whole course of subjectivity in operation. Namely, showing mental energy as at first dealing only with environment as it happened to be, with merely so much of a voluntary hollowing out, in addition, of due breathing-space and vision-space for the mind, from the encompassing solid, as should yield to it, beneath its ideals, a somewhat of retained power of self-movement:—“solidity”, to the mind, meaning always its “enduring” or habitual experience. To this, however, in proportion as self-energy increased, has succeeded—first, selected places for excavation;—and next, that beginning regard paid to exterior, as well as interior, which marks the dawn of objective intention, and which the bubble-form expresses:—this leading the way to what modern

ing, in condemning one of them, are essentially presented in a manner that does indeed mark out opposite classes in the Arts, but that does so in only supporting the true lawfulness of both: namely, as showing that the *dramatic* line of Art and the *realistic* line are really blended in the nature of every Art, though with varying preponderance, just as much as in every mode of Language are the intersectional and imitative modes of speech blended, according to the specialty of disposition in the people that is concerned:—this specialty being dependent, as I conceive, on the respectively subjective or social characteristics of the people.—And here occurs the point that leads on immediately to what I am thinking of as proper sexual “crisis” in Art-progress.

The judgment I have been passing on the averaged characters of the various Arts may well appear questionable to other persons. But, if so,—and I expect it,—this will only help my principal object; which is that of showing that the ever-capable variance of the respective leanings of Art, towards symbolism or realism, is controllable farther, and most especially so, by the personal variance of disposition, of the same kind, that attaches to the worker in any Art. For, this idea being admitted,

modes show, of yet solely the power of heaping detail upon this, either in the still-impulsive Gothic mode, or the deliberately-intellectual Grecian mode. This modern stage is what it is, eminently, through its working *from* detail parts—of stones or bricks,—*towards* the general form; while in excavating the entire form is primal. And here is met the full contrast I am designing between Symbolism and Scientific method:—even that which at first appears in it as an incongruousness of image—in turning the figure of *growth* into that of Art which is mechanical,—vanishing on consideration: since both endogenous and molluscan kinds of structure are as an excavating effort, while exogenous and vertebrate kinds have principal reference to exterior. What there I call a *coiling* process, I need here only think of as a process of mental *boring*. Crudely-subjective thought gains a chamber and a passage for itself by pressing back environment with its own body;—and the shape of itself, thus externally impressed, is the meaning of its habit of Anthropomorphism!

the inference that I am pursuing is at once gained, that with Women's entering fairly into the field of Art, as competitors with Men in the function of bestowing character on Art, their excess of impulsive and introspectional habit must act as precisely national character has acted in the parting out of specially two large classes of modes of Speech: namely, in giving true Sex-character to the division that obtains ordinarily and practically in the understanding about Language, *as* divided into varying modes of Speech. That which has given Grammar, or Logic, to Language, has been only the extended socialness of mankind which has grown into communion between nations: adding logical improvements and logical consciousness to Grammar, only in proportion to the widening of this communion. But this means a *national stamp* set on Language altogether in accordance with what is now taken for a *sexual stamp* set on Mind, the sign also of produced consciousness.—And, in actual illustration of this theory, I have the signal event to refer to which *has* happened, though only recently, to the study of Language; precisely as attending on a carrying of “comparative grammar” into a domain of alien tongues altogether uncomprehended before:—the unfolding to linguists of the old and sacred language of India. At the discovery of Sanscrit, there was actually such new meaning infused into the study as was parallel to nothing less than, according to Professor Müller's expression, what was afforded to Geography by the discovery of America. And the very reason of this, as I understand him, was the obtaining of a stage of linguism so far back in the Art's progress, and so essentially diverse in conditions from existing stages, as to have duly given basis, for the first time, to an evolutionary or *derivative* assortment of such stages: laid out, as of primal importance, in a plan of

*families* of languages.—This assortment established, however, immediately is involved the “crisis” that distinctively touches Women’s minds as concerned in it. That is: a state of Art comes in view which implies that *when* the assortment shall be established, it shall include in it an assorted line specially fit for Women’s minds to adopt, *when* these are ready for it :—the two things being what I take for coincident by the nature of the case. And this plan of metamorphic crisis I imagine applicable to universal modes of Art, potentially if not actually, and necessary for the real simplifying—with whatever semblance of the contrary effect,—of the new mass of complication which occurs at this point to be dealt with by the several “Logic” of each Art.

And a *derivative* mode of “Grammar”, fit to attach itself to every kind of moulded Art,—joined with an attending implication of what goes with the dividing into *families*,—is again only the same with what I am thinking of as a Subjective mode of Logic : or, with the exercise of Symbolic Method.—Also, as to Theology, which stands as my own type of Art, it has indeed been my experience, in my Womanly way of handling it, that the *derivative* practice on it which I have followed, as concerned with generated and generating Symbols, is truly the bestowing on the Art a grasp on my own interest and my own consciousness that it had nothing of while remaining in its first state, of barely static treatment.—If Theology *first* began to be a conscious Art, as I imagine it did, through effect of Logic begun at all to be made to bear on it ; and *then*, of a Logic *merely* statical :—I imagine that when this becomes responded to fairly by a *derivative*, or natural Woman’s kind of arguing on it, its consciousness, as it were, is heightened into being made conscious of being conscious. That is, it becomes

able to compare itself, as Sexual, with what it was before when without Sex.

As to the fact, however,—or rather, as to its being a fact,—that the mental nature of Women has in general this kind of leaning, I grant, and am exclusively supposing, that proof of it lies only, as in circle, with the entire view I am propounding. I attempt to prove it, namely, alone by *Dendromorphism*.

That is : I claim only to be right thus far, that the past course of Women's developing functions, as limited within merely pre-sexual conditions, bears promise, analogically, of their coming, after the crisis of sex-change, to take on them peculiarly and ostensibly the *dramatic* side of the practice of Art, interpretable by symbolic or derivative Logic.—Antecedently to the crisis, I only claim to repeat generally what I have said of their past dealing with Theology : namely, that it has hitherto been indeed mainly latent, just as Root-function is so, in the developing course of Endogenous plant-life ; and yet, like this also, with the effectiveness that has constantly been tending towards a final characterization in Pistil-function.

Thus, I consider that it suffices to this view merely to point, as I did in that previous case, to the continually-helping action supplied by Women : needing here, as to the case of Art in general, to show duly nothing more than an ever-present dramatic element in it.—I recognize this for displayed, then, in that whole character of their wonted self-expression which does now, and as I infer must from the first have done, address itself the rather to feeling that is general, than to any that might be touched by that which concerns principally Art-methods, of the particular stirring and delectation of any particu-

lar sense. Laws of colour, and of form, and of sound, must ever as to Women have been altogether in subordination to the need of giving out the inward life in them which of necessity is integral, and needs the whole being to express it. And this must always have rendered gesture rather than language what it is natural to them to express themselves by ; while the whole practice of society has varyingly assisted the same result. Even at present, when the effect of social restraint laid upon them is so much lessened as it is, they still much more express themselves by general movements, and turn of countenance, than by speech. Let therefore only this effect be borne in mind, and applied with due proportion to the whole course of the whole matter, and the due case seems made out : since, on the one hand, what is known for "expression" in Art is intrinsically of dramatic nature ; and, on the other hand, Women ever have been capable of displaying this, or, it may be, of creating it where it was absent, in the part they have ever played with regard to Art. They have, at all events, helped Men as their models, or their copiers, or performers. But the sitter needs to "act" what the modeller would represent ; and the performer, if not the copier, who *has* helped, has also really dramatized her work. And, as I contend, this has really been Art-effort on her own part, of truly creative sort, and eminently of vivifying sort, even while totally absorbed, as to social recognition, in the Man's part. A simple melody sung with genuine feeling, coming warm from the heart of a merest peasant girl, may well have often planted it in human memory, and thence *first* given enduring life to it, when without such unheeded assistance it would never have established its Art-character.—But, let this and similar agencies be admitted, and it is certainly not impossible, but, on the contrary, is

analogically all but necessary to happen, that under culture they must arrive to originate for themselves, *when* a line of Art adapted to their habit shall once openly be allowed of for such, on the part of existing Artists.

When Art was totally without aid from Women,—I mean, such as Women *actively* afforded, from the exercise of their own subjective impulses; and by no means only such as they produced for Men, by being stimulating objects of Men's instincts:—it was rudely limited to its cotyledonous stage, as of mere dendromorphic unisexism. But this implies, as before urged, that Women's beginning to take share in it, carries prophecy in itself, dendromorphically, of Art's nature thence approaching its true crisis,—to bring naturally its own highest of conditions.

Nor in any way does this signify what to common feeling is so unlikely as that henceforth might be expected to arise, on occasion, such phenomenon in Art as that of a Woman-Shakspeare, a Woman-Beethoven, a Woman-Raffael or Michel-Angelo. The hypothesis even expressly lies the other way, forbidding this:—since whatever these Art-magnates have been, has by Tree-rule precisely been owing to what this makes their status of “hermaphroditism”, which Sexism has the function of abolishing and superseding. Of Shakspeare especially,—to take this for what peculiarly it is here, through the Art concerned, of the rightly typical case to be judged by,—the illustriousness of the rank held is well admitted to have proceeded from his having blended as he has, in the effect of his works, the characteristics of both sexes. And that means, as I would express it, the womanliness of keen feeling impassionately poured forth; and the manliness acting rather by restraint upon this, through regard had pervadingly to an outward mental posture,

referred to a spectator looking on. Dramatic feeling without the latter, or some degree of the latter, can never become ripened to Dramatic Art. A Woman-dramatist, however, with a realized Art-condition of Sex, must inevitably only intensify the impulsiveness of the rendering; as the Male dramatist of the future must oppositely intensify the reflective effect. And this indeed must prevent as much for Men as for Women the arising of a repeated Shakspeare :—which, however, is the farthest from preventing, both for Men and for Women, the possibility of an Art-character's being attainable, and even already attained, actually greater than Shakspeare's.

Such being then my desired ordering of the subject, in what way may I suppose it to have been brought thus to bear on my own object : that of proving—or rather, of submitting proof,—that the sexualizing of Philosophy is prepared for, in the matter of application to the various kinds of Art, by the existing state of these?—I have now to draw out this believed bearing, by uniting on it the considerations I have glanced over. And in fact, as I perceive, the so doing is the indispensable step towards proceeding into the matter yet remaining to be dealt with, and, as I have said, of really culminating importance : that of Philosophy's application to general History.

I do indeed consider, as to what is immediate to this chapter, that no more than the showing, as I believe to have done, that “two sides” are found present in the general practice of the Arts, such as naturally are associated with the proper Sexhood of Artists, is intrinsically to have shown, at the same time, that the Philosophy of the Arts must be analogously two-sided : having its feminine or derivative side,—of which the actual state-



ment makes a tentative specimen,—needed rightfully to supplement what is the ordinary method of Philosophy, here adjudged for analytic and masculine.—But I thoroughly recognize that this view, and the availableness of it, depend always in the main on the deeper consideration involved,—and that is so by the very meaning of Philosophy,—of a principle being concerned, as attached to the proffered mode, which may be equal to the transition referred to : having a power in it, namely, of applying not solely, any longer, to particular forms of Art, such as answer to the degree of Culture in particular persons, but to that matter of Art in the abstract which, as such, is connected with Culture taken also in the abstract,—as affecting, if not entire human nature, yet those large amassed bodies of human beings, with which History concerns itself, as being Nations. And the more closely I approach to this idea of transition, the more do I distinguish indeed what actual degree of difference must needfully attach to the mental action !—To study History by “ derivative grammar”, I say to myself, cannot possibly be done with the rules of a grammar merely statical.—That is, the very “ laws” that are to be admitted those of Culture, *when* accounted of as Human Progress in general, must necessarily be re-modelled, even as “ laws of Progress.”

Let me venture to say then of the effort of this chapter, that it *has* been directed to the obtaining of such changed regulation :—not a difficult effort as it stands, because already in what has been aimed at before, I have precisely made out for the one Art of Theology what now I would extend only to Art universal. And does not this vindicate it, on my own part, for the real *testing* of my scheme that I have meant it for !—The re-modelling of philosophic regulation has been begun, as I conceive, in nothing

more than my attempt here, as constantly, to substitute a formula that is organic in the place of that statical arrangement which *may* indeed suffice for analytic intention, but which cannot, as I imagine, be sufficient when the large scale of History is concerned : here being needful that peculiar uniformity, under magnified and multiplied modes of difference, which nothing can admeasure and sustain save only metaphysic *substance* afforded. I have worked, therefore, towards the figure that seemed rightly adapted to this end, by the process that, in my own devised technical terms, I may describe as the following. Having first astromorphically *polarized* what I take for the extreme modes of Art, Theology and Language, I have next dendromorphically so assorted the entire series of Arts, as at the same time to *sexualize* the two opposites, and give to them,—by the very virtue of the hypothesis,—and in a measure to all the rest, the required quality of self-consciousness. That is: I have figured of the desired general stock of Art, that, in beginning with being barely symbolic, or Theologic, it has yet constantly been putting forth, in Tree-fashion, side-efforts of two sorts : the one of them maintained by a process of Logic that is root-planting and heart-felt ; the other by a process that is intellectualizing and verbal :—which has finally resulted in proper Language's so approving itself for masculine in its Art-character, as thence to cast back on Theology, for the first time to belong to it, the self-light of its own feminineness :—the lingual sex being interpretable by the very point of its advance,\* on the prime state of Art.—Nor does the subjective formula, although merely such,—being expressly held in view, according to my own method, as no more,—yet fail to

\* And owing to this state of advance, does not Language in fact contain in itself a very epitome of the Arts here ranged as below it (—so ranged, as

contain in itself, nevertheless, that degree of regard to historic facts which the now using of it requires. I mean, as to the circumstance, in especial, of the development, or sexualizing, of Language.—But here I must explain with more definiteness.

I am alluding to the point that where actually Language has succeeded, or effected that best for itself which the sign of “masculineness” here expresses,—as implying its appropriateness, specifically, for the ends of manly reasoning and science,—still appears from this survey to have been among precisely the same nations, if accounted as a class, of whom otherwise I have been finding, as to Theology, the similar need of such figuring, through their power of affording requisite oppositeness to the accounted “feminineness” of the religious class of nations:—the Aryan mode of Speech being that signified in the former case, the Semitic mode of Religion being intended in the latter case,—here betokening the emotional and symbolic style of thought which I suppose proper to Women, and which also is displayed, as I believe, though in less manifest than theologic fashion, in the Semitic plan of verbalism. And, this *cross* relation granted, as between the two Arts, the *direct* relation, farther, between the peoples in each case and the Arts, which should justify this kind of class-naming,—now daily indeed becoming more and more common, as in place of mere local designing, by the terms of geographical distribution,—appears rightly supported to reason. In precisely this inference, however, lies the whole of what now I

the strata of geology are, with implication as to *recentness* which their history might the farthest from verify—)? Just as Religion has used all for its own ministers of expression; so Language bears stamped on it the effect of an analogous combining. As *spoken*, it has ministry from Music and the Drama; as *written*, that of Painting; and as matter of verbal polish, and of logical composition, it has surely not less the aid both of Sculpture and Architecture.

have in view. Let it only be admitted, namely, that the separate matters in question, of Aryan supereminence in Language, and Semitic supereminence in Religion, *are* at once related *cross-wise* to one another in philosophic aspect, and *directly* related, each of them, to the mental status of the massed beings that subtend the Art-developments; and the full idea of national Sex, with the principle wrapt up in this, has all that is needed both of actual confirmation in History, and of means for the new-ordering of the understanding of Progress. Namely, thus: by the recognizing for principle, that the large class-combining of Art-results—here supposed, in the case of Religion, to have been the natural cause of its developing, by successive new infusions into the stock of Semiticism of the stamina of Aryan intellectualness; as well as also scientifically ascertained, in the case of Language, to have there had effect in the same way:—is ever—or rather has been, in the beginning,—the general mode of all parallel development, of abstract sort. World-results, of rightly permanent nature, may naturally be attributed, always, in the early state of things, to the same kind of diffusive combining:—which yet may also naturally be inferred to have the power and the habit of condensing itself.—Before finishing with this idea, however, I must turn to the side that is philosophic.

*This* concerns that real nature of the Arts, *when* judged under a general view of Art, which of specialty dendromorphism has in it the capability of asserting. The true problem of Philosophy with Art is assuredly to regulate our conception of Art's position in respect to human Culture; and as such, its real question must be this: is it instrument, or consequence?—And here springs the difference I am thinking of.—Under statical reasoning, it is surely what is natural, and here what is amply suffi-

cient, to consider of the Arts, and of Art, that they *follow* on the improving of human beings. It is Culture that makes the Arts. But once let us take the large view of the case, which is that, not of personal, but of human, or at least national, improving, and immediately becomes true; with a much deeper kind of truth, what it is natural to dendromorphism to pronounce :—that *not* Culture makes the Arts, by any means so much as the Arts create Culture. And the importance of the changed formula becomes immense, when we carry it to its consequences ! It signifies *the ever-constant ability in what is abstract, of causatively preceding what is progress in the concrete* !—I mean, as to mentally-ordered forms.—And immediate experience may be called on, to give testimony as to this. Pre-eminently as to Language, we know that its framed symbols of mere abstract imaginings, just as much for scientific and materialistic ends as for guiding of subjective cogitation, are exclusively the means of any effectual employing of those images :—so that any newly-coined word, for the expressing of any newly-rising thought, even in technical fashion, is the only bringing of that thought into action ; while exercise of thought, universally, is the only agency for the extending of thought-action. And although the same thing is indeed not yet granted of Theologic forms—it being the sum of the present object to *give* to these forms the very character ;—yet in Arts that are otherwise emotional, it is perfectly acknowledged by cultivated common sense, that the exercise of Art-faculty does similarly heighten, and even produce, the emotive nature belonging to us.\*—

\* Doubtless, it was a religious state of primary feeling that invented Gothic Churches, and a domestic one that gave plan to common Houses ;—but who will doubt, either, that the having of Gothic Churches to worship in, and the having of domestic Homes to abide in, has done more than the equal of the same thing in reactionary effect on ourselves !

Let the idea however be once accepted for universal,—or, which is the same thing, metaphysical,—and, I contend, there is requisite “substance” for that new apprehension of general History, embracing the entire meaning of Culture *both* as abstract and personal, both as intellectual and emotive, which dendromorphism, here ultimately applied, must ultimately establish:—nay, must establish with proper absoluteness, so far as to its own terms. I mean, it must yield, if it succeed, that real testimony of History to theory, which, for theory that is derivative in its import, is necessarily what alone is conclusive.

As to the mental character and mental Sexhood of Nations,—to return to these,—my theory, thus made general, *by* the force of dendromorphism, involves this. In the first place, it assuredly upholds that the very finding in the respective Art-forms of the accounted male and female among Nations what are assumable as philosophic landmarks, does indicate, on the one hand, as to peoples that are Aryan, a possessed accuracy of intellect native to them, with native sociableness of disposition, such as *might* have given rise to their attained excellence in Speech; and, on the other hand, of Semitics, a native vagueness of thought, and secludedness of habit, that might naturally have lent itself to Theology. And from this it follows simply in the former case, that the downward-flowing efficacy of Culture may have constantly tended, out of masculine Nations to produce masculine, or thoroughly-developed, Men. But then, with Semitics the case is thus different, that what in Nations is the symbolized Womanliness realistically concerned Men: more and more with exclusiveness in proportion to the earliness of the stage of civilization;—and hence indeed there is signified, in the national effect needed ultimately to fall upon Women, a diversion of current that, as such, answers truly

to the figure's hypothesis of the demanded *latency* of female functions at the outset (—see my previous argument p. 456—): in accordance with which, *when* the principle becomes absolute, to suppose forms of Art actually originated by Women, even in Theology, and *à fortiori* as to Language, makes a very contradiction in terms,—if such excess of Semiticalness as must then have been unmitigatedly produced, could indeed be imagined as produced!—And what it did befit *Men* to give birth to, in the early days of Semitic life, under all its simple pastoral conditions, and imaged notions of divine things, *may* well be the matter, through their exercising on which *Women's* proper capacity may ripen! It *may* well be imagined, that in the two parent stocks of human beings having primarily wrought out moulded national forms, of Speech and of Religion, for human beings to come after continuously to speak by and believe by,—continuously, but not other than improvingly,—the true consequence of the exercise, of each sort, *should* be severally assimilated with preference *by* respectively male and female individuals. —Nor all at once. The originally world-diffused effect of developing human functions, thus showing themselves sex-parted, may with naturalness have condensed itself only gradually: as on a scheme that may be roughly stated thus. On the one side, as prior to the national sexual condition, it must be inferred of the collected bodies of human beings, universally, that, precisely in being thence only sexless, or at the utmost pre-sexual, they had nothing yet capable of creating what might be real World-effects, of such order as Present Speech and Christianity are, *for* the usage of descendants: while this sexless or pre-sexual state remains actually instanced in the perpetuated early character of human beings that in general marks the out-lying “Turanian” human family. But

on the other or descending side, the power of collective uniting with such world-extensive kind of result, may have narrowed, as to at all events our own Aryan stock, within the sole precincts of its own branches, these also becoming differently-sexed: so that the mingling of mental fruits thus internally produced,—say, of Celtic kind, as feminine, and of Teutonic kind, as masculine,—may afford the entire requisite condition.—If, however, this may be, why not farther the full course I am supposing? It is in no way forbidden, as it seems to me, to hypothesize on a prosecuted narrowing which may end, even already in the present stage of civilization, with the needed agency alone of individuals. That is, with its being possible henceforth, as to all widest and best of human ends, that these only need depend, for condition, on the mental combining of particular Men and Women:—merely parted, as these are, *by* the absoluteness of Sex.

With the help then of this speculative outline, taking it as thus being indeed duly furnished, I will come to my concluding and conclusive department of needful questioning:—that of History no longer specially Religious, and thence rather to be accounted of, while general, as Secular: where yet the sign of my theory of Religion, *if* true, ought imperatively to be in some degree yielded. Certainly, I can seek but the merest hint of support to my idea, that a Woman's mode of Philosophy, by application of Tree-imagery, *has* here a true ground for itself: the tracing out of which may thence give to the philosophizing of History, also, its own proper two-sidedness. But the afforded hint is essential. Without it, my speculation is hitherto short of grasp on what yet it is stretching towards.



## CHAPTER IX.

THE REQUISITE NEW SIDE WHICH APPEARS FURNISHED  
BY THE PRESENT SCHEME OF INVESTIGATED RELIGION  
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF GENERAL HISTORY.

If that which is Secular History were indeed *not* reducible to the relation which I demand for it with Religious History, certainly I should be checked in the point where of all others it is fatal, intrinsically, to a principle of Development to be found wanting. But no less, let me also say, should I be fatally baffled in those which are my personal results, considered as already having been attained in this work. For in fact not only has my continual purpose, as always claimed, lain with the obtaining of confirmation out of History, but I have expressly, in the early part of this volume, drawn out that which is the needed basis to the now-proposed finishing endeavour;—while, in turning to this, moreover, I find in the very moulding of it, besides its already dendromorphic intention, that peculiarity of response to the constant nature of Ontology which I am recognizing to be called for in my own desired aspect of Philosophy.—I mean, as to the assumption which is proper to ontological Philosophy, in application to History, of the entire sequence of world-events being referrible, by indispensable postulate, to the anthropomorphical symbol of *Providential Design*.—I

will begin, therefore, with submitting my argument to this effect, as thus previously entered on, or prepared for.

I refer to having expressed the conviction, already as to the matter of Comte's ordering of the sciences, that the truest way of regarding Sociology was the taking it as pervading really the entire course of lower sciences that preceded it, in the character of "the constant *aim* of men's thought-work" (p. 150) : admitting fully by this, that in this way the regulation of Society *may* actually comprise view to what, one sphere excepted, is the everything that has need of being regulated in human affairs. For the very assigning of an *aim* of this kind—in itself giving the Unity to the whole subject which all symbolism naturally has need of and answers to ; and which also here respects, of a specialty, those acting human *motives* in the effecters of progressive Sociology which directly bear subjective relation to our consciousness :—is surely but that adding of organic life and quasi-*soul* to the subject, of which Comte's own dead series appears destitute, which in fact is theologic aspect maintained, though with the advantage of gained consciousness in regard to it—consciousness as to the symbolism's being employed. With only a fuller shade of the same subjective colouring, the "intention" here ascribed to human beings, in the mass, as to what I *have* called a bare "series of experimentings" for the working out of a true principle of Society, I might equally have ascribed to sole Deity : just by inclusively referring to *God*, through the expressive power of anthropomorphism, that very effect of Sociology's felt comprehensiveness which, in our own case, in the position of Deity, must inferribly have prompted such agency. And this indeed would imply that penetrating Divine Eye-cast into History, straight glancing end-to-end through it, which "Design of Providence" means : as to, at all events,

its prime import;—although truly, as to the coincident implication with that of Foresight (—and all sight shown as Divine *must* be *Fore-sight*,—) which is rather that of *Provi-dence*, the diffusion here involved must on my own terms be specifically guarded from what common theology, on the contrary, of specialty encourages. It is not sufferable to spread, namely, into that sphere of level out-lying circumstance, touching only single beings at a time, where I recognize that analytic method only is of right applicable; and where the grand image of Historic Providence, in its full and proper sense, I admit to be manifestly out of place. Here indeed my theology is of a kind *not* the common kind.

Unless for such particularized pathway of Divine Energy, laid out for the passing of Rational Eyesight along it,\* all idea of Design would be manifestly without pertinence. Design everywhere, would be nowhere. —But then, the concentrating thus of organic results on one track—first on many tracks, and then on one,—needs again, I am supposing, to give way to that mental bisecting which is the action of all Reason that is human, and not such as was of old assigned to Deity. And this I have allowed for precisely in that “one sphere excepted” which I have not suffered totally to be abandoned to un-religious analysis. I have not been able really, in following out my personal subjectivity, to do as not Comte only, but *all* Men-philosophers of scientific sort have done, in compelling Religion into oneness with Secularity:—and this at once has given *branching* to my figure,—has supplemented Anthropomorphism with Dendromorphism. The idea of Divine Foresight is therefore left its own track, and

\* And moreover the very *causer* of the mental faculty of vision:—since, on present hypothesis, the very organising of circumstance into tracks, has itself been the exclusive conditioning of our rational ability of taking cognisance of them. And this must never be lost sight of, as the preserver of this view from its otherwise always liable sense of *fallacy*.

real force, on the subjective side of the started Tree-figure, which abuts on the personal human consciousness;—though indeed the objective view of History, however ministrant to the idea, is itself *without* Deity present.

Thus in imagining, as I do, that my now-occupied station, for the object before me, is set at the subjective branch-tip, the very effort of symbolization I am proposing I consider *is*, precisely, but the casting of mental consciousness over the whole field of Historic matter (p. 460) *with* that effect of Design which I recognize for indispensable to Philosophy. I have to hold present, most specifically, the remembrance of my isolated subjectivity. That is: in looking back to my solely-introspectional line of vision, for the now-intended view of progressing Sociology, I have strictly to remember that the true objective course of this, after once its dividing into branches, has lain rightly with the branch *not* my own:—*there* only being preserved the true aim of Sociology, while my own has distinctively gained a new aim,—a *new* one, as to actual ostensibleness: having previously only hidden itself, as all products that are feminine ones have the nature of doing. And this again brings the equivocalness and duplicity which is inherent to introspectional survey! The real aim of the subjective branch of mind-action I am asserting for none other, and nothing less, than the perfecting of Individualistic Religion:—that is, as I shall burden my present sketch with attesting, the perfecting of our human Individualism by the means of Religion. But, for the secular view now intended, I must rightly drop all for the moment but the element still attached to the Religious branch, of its tangible connection with Sociology:—while this also I have characterized in my dealing with Comtism: between which and the present point, the whole course of my thinking which has been

traced in the intermediate pages of this volume, has indeed only deepened my belief of having rightfully appointed it. I have said, namely, that the course of human progress that is religiously estimated must have *end*, teleologically, in the sole matter of culture that respects Sex-division, and the ordering of "the Family" (p. 61). —So prepared, therefore, my object is direct, however obscure,—and however it may be involved, as it must be, with difficulty I had no thought of before approaching it! —I have only to do, let me repeat, with such peculiar kind of matter in History, sifted in thought from the mass, as indicates ostensibly a pursued line of *coincidence* between Development that is Secular, and such as is Religious :—the very power of discerning this being what I have view to for precisely the distinctiveness of my own mode of Philosophy.

There is, in truth, such peculiarity and such intense-ness of subjectivity in the assumption I make stand on, for this finishing application of Symbolic method, that *one* point alone is really needful of being farther made out—in addition to the one other that I consider to have been already made out,—to signify the pursued contact with History which the application presupposes. One crisis to give general stock-aim to the Sociologic Tree,—another, to give angle of divergence to the Religious part of this aim, and therein to make ostensible what before was only hidden under that which was a disguiser of it,—*if* both crises *are* verified,—are enough to show adequately the entire bearing of the formula : since the lower one marks the original transition for the Tree out of its stage of seed-leaving into that of the true leafage which *does* give real stem to it ; and the central one marks the principal and characterizing change, which in subjective

reality means the bestowing on subjectivity of the very station whence the crisis can be realized,—*not* realizable otherwise, or *before* there was a branch-tip to make stand on. But this centralizing crisis is itself indeed asserted as realized—or rather, as in course of being realized,—in the very matter whose discussing forms the whole substance of this work: which is throughout but a virtual argument put forth, to show of the crisis that it is actually under present operation,—that it lies all around us, enwrapping our own selves in the very circumstance of it!—That is, saving for the somewhat of overpassing it, which is necessary to make condition for discerning it.—And truly I may say of my own experience, in the stumbling to give terms to this argument, that it *has* borne the character thus implied, of an encountering, and finding myself entangled in, the precise juncture of commingling with Secularity which the crisis of metamorphosis represents:—such as entirely would have baffled me in my own object, if the strength of my held clue, of Religious continuity, had been subjectively less than it has been!—having this indeed for a leading one of its consequences, that the historic course now sought for, which is dependent on the character of the crisis, has shifted itself to me in the very act of my writing.\*

In my first merely vague apprehension of the believed pending crisis,—taking it as exclusively applying to properly-personal Religion, and therefore *only* concerned with that entire abrogation of Supernaturalism which, as

\* Or rather, in that of printing:—since it was not till this last stage of re-consideration, given to my prepared matter for publication, that the full meaning broke upon me of what I was actually offering for the interpretation of Religious Forms: causing me a needed re-moulding of design on the spot. To meet this sudden need, I added where it occurred the lengthened note which stands at pp. 320-3; and what I have now before me to do, is the carrying out into necessary sequel of the deepened view then originated.

I consider, is the bringing of Religion, for the first time, into conscious intelligibleness, in a general as well as individualistic sense,—I supposed that it would be sufficient simply to point to that external moulding of Religion which from the earliest regulation of Society has had share in the effecting of this, but which now, if Supernaturalism is abandoned, must entirely fall away, and give room to whatever may take its place. I supposed, namely, that what is dendromorphic Philosophy of History must be simply the Philosophy of Ecclesiasticism : showing how from the first Ecclesiastical institutions have had a requisite average bearing on the two connected mental results which together make my personal concern : the ripening into required Sexhood of both the mind-nature of Women and the intrinsic character of Religion :—as to which the true point of metamorphosis would be answered to sufficiently by the sole passing of this external agency into that which has effect only individually, in the manner of dogmatically-wrought principle. And this is indeed still the real end I am looking to, the true bearing of everything upon which I aim to wind up my scheme with showing proved in it. But the deepening I have gained of my conviction about the crisis, meanwhile, has materialized this to a definiteness that forbids its being so easily accounted for :—so that, for my very means of now reaching the same end, I am compelled into a track of considerations that at first sight appear as hurtful to my subject as little relevant to it.—I will however try to expose it with no more of discussing than its deep nature makes necessary.

And to prepare for this I will bring under the terms of my formula the matter of historic eventuation which, indeed, by this estimate of its characterizing crisis, retains *only* the lower part of the Sociologic Tree, such as

depends on the primary needful contact with History, for that which bears actually the applying to History.—Nor is the case in fact here greatly different from that questioned in my last chapter: whence I have carried forward into this both the principle and the historic reference which, as just hinted, I believe to be here also what suffices of such kind, through precisely the limitation on the symbol's application thus enforced. And this seems to me what may instantly be made evident.

By treating Sociological Progress as that which is rightly under a principle that is common to it with Culture having relation to Art, specifically of the refined or æsthetic kind,—although itself of specially practical and concrete nature,—I submit that I do gain, in fact, the fundamental condition for my symbol, which thence brings into the case the peculiar end of its application: which is, the required force of dendromorphic analogy in regard to showing *cause* of the Progress, self-inherent in it. For to this end does actually suffice the mere attributing to the Tree, for its general leafage,—always classifiable under the three stages of leaf-character which the two crises concerned make transition for,—of those “experimentings” with Sociology just spoken of, whose successive heightening in character, with raised ability of thence organizing the mental stem that supports them, is obviously referrible to the kind of causation which belongs naturally to leaf-agency, in the same way that has appeared true as to æsthetic Art. That is: first, by the accounting of these “experimentings” as specifically but specimens of an Art that may be nominated Political, or the Art of Government; and next, by the recognizing in terms that the real *sap* of the matter, which is the source of the heightened character, is the same assimilating of right Logic into the process involved which



in the case of fine Art was found similarly necessary ;—and truly with a comprehended indication of moreover the same special mode of due contact with History :—thus showing to the full what is needful. For, as the introduction of Logic into æsthetic Art first really made Art of it,—or, made real leafage out of that which was cotyledonous ;—while this very introduction seems to have rested with the *two* proposed methods of Logic, brought in junction with one another by the historic circumstance of the intercommuning of opposed Aryans and Semitics : so it is immediate to infer, of the Logic of Sociology, that this also, being analogously in demand, was analogously afforded.

We are used to hear it said, in the speaking of all kinds of generalistic influences which affect human beings in masses, but which are little understood, that these come to us in the fashion of *waves*. We hear spoken of, as sweeping widely over the surface of Society, *tides* of different kinds of passion and moods of temper :—now, a tide of war-impulse : now, a tide of credulity ; now, one of headlong presumptuousness, casting off every band of control ; now, another of mere abject servility :—just as similarly philosophic physicists find tides among diseases and storms. And from this kind of fitful inundation must there be imagined to follow, heaped up in different corners of Society, as if piles of intellectual alluvium, as yet rudely, without smoothening into shape.—Such accordingly, whether of wave-kind, or of soil-kind,—since *any* matter will be figuratively here in place, if only needfully inorganic ; and matching fitly, besides, with the special bearing held in view,—I imagine to have been that which was the Sociologic pre-leafage, persistently so remaining as long as native habits alone, amongst peoples, supplied these with requisite

forms of Government: without yet any means of that comparing and checking of indigenously-formed plans of self-government, with those stamped by local habits of an opposite kind, which precisely was furnished when nationalized Aryans came to mingle amid nationalized Semitics. Just as in the case of national Speech and Religion, I imagine that this integral meeting—where Nations, *as Nations*, had contending and competing together,—wrought *fibre* for the first time into the substance of the rising principle of Government, and gave stem and true leafage to it: as to at all events the one family of these peoples which alone, it is true, bore the share in the communing that was active. And here is notably responded to the actual nature of the difference that was ever to be teleologically present, and increasingly so, between Aryan and Semitic ideas of Government. For, if the Aryan peoples did, as I suppose, first intelligently comprehend what true Government means, such as themselves had the instinct of demanding, by contrasting with their need what Semitic attempts at Government displayed to them: this “masculine” effort of their own shows to have led them on rightly into the path of the final method of Government, having certainly right masculine *fibre* in it, which Republicanism is. And the Semitics, in having been wanting in this effort, may thence naturally have remained short to the last in this appropriate result:—here now ventured to be pronounced for such, with dogmatic *à priori* turn of thought, because precisely of its proper sexualness! By my whole framing of conception, it is the end that was teleologically in demand, that the Aryans, *by* their maleness of constitution,—working under circumstance of agricultural habits, which, as philosophic historians have demonstrated, led them on into a rightful providing themselves with manly

civic institutions,—*should* gradually pass forwards into the fully realized perception about Government, that its only logical basis of principle is that which Republicanism means, of asserted natural Fraternity, or levelness of condition, among the universal constituents of mankind;—while the real feminineness and real feebleness in this sense, which however is but strength in the opposite sense, which belongs to the Semitic fashion of mere Despotism,—maintained oppositely by the circumstance of rude pastoral conditions, with peculiar liability to the need of war,—is rightfully and *also* logically approvable for founded on the natural principle of Paternity, which, *when* requisitely moulded by the crisis coming finally, must also have its recognized place, even in Political regulation. But this means, the giving fairly into the handling of *Women* of what primarily, when Semitic Despotism was in force, was in the handling of such un-sexed and un-masculine *Men*, as that rather were they a somewhat, while half-Woman, half-*Brute*.—And the progress towards this effectual crisis—which I am about to argue for as *being* such,—my symbol has still the most apt of expressions for: since the work of gaining *fibre* to its stem, incidental to the whole stage of pre-metamorphic green-leafage, is physiologically associated, not only with the heightening of the successive leaf-shoots being engendered, but also and mainly, in relation to this stage, with the bestowing of proper Rootage on the Tree: which in the *having been* afforded, and *only* in this, will have power of giving place in the end to the realizing, for one half of the leaf-shoots, of their demanded Pistil-function. And thus the important understanding is made good, for the referred-to part of History, that the assimilating by Aryans of Semitic plans of Patriarch-hood and Kingship was not alone negative in the teleological good

it conveyed :—was not only the means of metaphysically striking contrast for the clearing of their own springing ideas :—but was farther of the positive and the ever-increasing service to them which is of this double sort. Namely, that on the one hand, the wrestling of the two principles together, in their being each of them naturally valid in its place, wrought for a rightful distributing of them into that which did now become, for the time, their several right place : by the requisite casting downwards of the ruder kind of Sociologic substance, half-womanish, which the alien mode of Semiticism afforded, into the internalized basis of Social principle, where the firmness and the tenaciousness, and the forcefulness attached to Despotism, *when* in place, are the real desiderandum ; —and, on the other hand, that the very action of the wrestling to this end of the two methods of Logic that are concerned, was what morally, just as much as physiologically, ought to have acted as required, in continually rendering, at the same time, less and less rude progressively the Tree's proper issues, which are the Leaf-shoots,—thence naturally tending forward to the character finally to belong to them, when the furnishing of Rootage being over, the vital force that had gone to this is set free for the new agency that is called for.

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What is then the point of peculiarly critical import, which may answer rightly to the wide extent of the demands which are thus made on it?—What is actually the immediate sense of Sociological development, which justifies the considering of the now-existing epoch of this for the precise analogue of that determinative era, in universal development, which the setting-in of Sex-change represents?—and which, in having been here subjectively

appointed, for the symbolic ordering of Historic facts, must, according to its appointing, cast over these the now sought-after track of exclusive teleological importance?—It is the weighing of the answer to this question which I have now to make effort for: although indeed the act of judgment that it requires could not actually have presented itself as requisite, without the “intense subjectivity”, just asserted, being involved, which itself means the judgment’s determination.

I have just said, that to myself, while abandoning the outward form of Christianity, the precise sequence of events which has appeared to carry on sociologically the peculiar matter of human progress which Christianity has relation to, is the general course of Ecclesiastical institutions:—to which, let me add, I consider that in a view really general must be joined, in anterior stage, Religious Forms of every sort that evolutionally made way for Christian Churchhood.—And, as a quite opposite effect to this, I now gain the perception, from the very terms just symbolically collected, that to the “masculine” point of view which I assign for the only rightly Sociological one, the parallel consequence to what has been my own of the same degree, in abandonment of Christianity, should be this: the casting off, even absolutely, of the now worn-out world-idea of *human* Sovereignty under claim of *Divine* right, which is the meaning of Semitic Despotism; and thus the retaining, with true rational adequacy, of the idea of Social Brotherhood, for the reigning symbol of political idealism;—while, on the other hand, I preserve for the ideal which is “feminine” of the Sociologic sort, that of the ordering of human beings under the form of “the Family,” where peculiarly it is a mode of Despotism, of the form that is *Parental*,—though not solely, as heretofore, *Paternal*,—which is contended for as,

if not actually of Divine sort, yet of sort that is essentially implicated with Divine images.—But then, beyond this, I have recognized, in the very manner of my own abandonment of Christianity, what at once is the retaining, in my belief, of that part of Ecclesiasticism which is provable for really central to the whole of it, in a philosophic or teleologic sense ; and the transforming of this, again, into the purest ground of what is Natural authority :—in my finding, namely, that what is intrinsically the required moulding of “the Family,” the duly-sanctioned bond of Marriage, sociologically provided for, *has* ever had its own social maintaining, in consecutive track, through the evolutionary phases of the dogmatic form of Christianity.

It was a very little matter, in the opinion of the world-secular, and perhaps also in the opinion of the ecclesiastical world, subsisting at the time, when the civil contract of Marriage was made first, by ostensible agreement,—and by agreement specifically between the two kinds of social worlds,—an admitted *Sacrament* of Christianity ! Nevertheless, if my conclusions be just, it was *here* that was laid root to the crisis, now occurring, which, in the actual manner of its occurring, means the knotting up in one of the entire group of results, on whose destined inclusion in it I have constantly been speculating.

The principal one of these results—believed by myself to have been gained personally by me, in the very act of withdrawing myself from belief in supernatural Christianity ; and the result which also specially I am adducing in this section of my work as the *testing* of my Religion that survives :—I may recapitulate as this. It is the finding that in the nature of my own mind, where specifically it appears that of a Woman, there is a leaning to the assimilation of symbolic aspects of Religion, such as

heretofore Semitic mentalism has produced, which thence seems to bear claiming for the very kind of distinctiveness that carries a real promise of what is the whole effect I contend for, of Women henceforth taking the part of Semitics in World-history. I imagine, in fact, *a special method of Intellect* being now specially furnished to Women, by the "providential ordaining" of Nature, for the very occasion now demanding it :—or, rather, (as my own principle requires the re-moulding of the phrase,) *a special method* created less, in reality, *for* the occasion, than precisely *by* the occasion. And I imagine, besides, that what my own sexualized action of Philosophy is revealing to myself through its being such, is the express point of the importance in an historic light, as well as in a religiously-dogmatic light, of the one matter of Sociologic institution which assuredly *does* bear the heaviest of all social institutions on Women's welfare :—on Women's welfare, not only in the meaning of this which is ordinary or secular, such as heretofore has been principally held in view ; but the welfare that I wish specially now to think of as intrinsically religious.

I mean that by the very import of the alleged crisis Women are supposable to have arrived, for the first time in human history, to the possession of a true *Conscience* about Marriage :—just as the effect of their now having the power first produced in them of intellectually perceiving what I will call the Divine purport of Marriage, revealed to them by the traced working of symbolic "Providence" through History. While Women, as heretofore, have been short of the power of realizing, for themselves, abstract principles having reference to their own station, it has simply been natural that their ideas about Marriage, and the Duty that attends on this, have been blindly accepted from Men ; while the Religion

which has had the same source has in consequence caused the Duty of the case altogether to turn on subserviency to the sole objects of Men. And it is this which I believe must in the end be the condemning of Christianity : the turning-point to the balancing scale, weighing against it where at present is its strong-hold of maintenance :—since, however Women's general feeling may still cling, as it does, to the terms of the proper doctrine of the Bible, it *must* tell against this to their now-arriving stage of self-consciousness, that the Creator's primal fiat respecting Woman is there written for what it stands in the book of Genesis: that "her desire" is made over to her Husband, so as that, as such, "he shall have rule over her." It is true, this decree is a penal one, represented by the Men-writers of the Bible as the consequence only of the Woman having been "first in the transgression", which thwarted the original purpose of Creation : while Christianity is considered to have brought what suffices of indemnity from the sentence;—and according to my own idea, now to be shown, of what here forms historic verity, no Woman can more deeply pay regard to the benefit, and esteem Christianity for the affording of it, than I desire to do. But this historic and natural benefit out of Christianity is the farthest from upholding its actual claim of supernaturalism;—while the decree that is made subsequent to "the Fall" is indeed but the appropriate sequent to what also the Bible makes statement of as the very cause of the Woman's actual creation : the need, recognized by Deity, that the *Man* might be endowed with "an help meet for him."—This idea, of *Man* only having been, from the very first, of importance in the design of the Creator, matched truly with the idea—which again was then matched by the real circumstance of the case,—that the average status of Women was then such as really



called for no attributing of real *soul* to them : needful always to be implied in any imagining of apposition with Deity. But what I argue is, that *now*, when Woman's nature is become both intellectual and spiritual, her perception into past History has the right to have effect given it, *also* in dogmatic mode, just as *Men's* first perception had effect. And this perception, such as I have gained it for myself, is precisely, that "the soul" which was then wanting in actuality to average Woman, was yet demonstrably present with her teleologically:—that, from the first, the Creator must be figured, in due accordance with a philosophized History, as having intended the reversing of His first plan, by promoting the Woman's nature, when the fruits of Time should bring season for it, into equality of condition with the Man's, as to at all events the point where the interest of the two Sexes is common. To believe otherwise,—to think that anything which is *less* than this can possibly be the destiny for Women, which ought henceforth to be "read into" human History by the mode of thought which is adequately religious,—it seems to me now, after the views of "Divine Purpose" that appear to have been opened to me, would be only that which I should have reason to blush for:—only that which should bring burning indignation, felt against although for myself. The very effect on me, namely, which has been kindled by the tracing of these views,—being that which, in coming to me as it does with the force of entire "Providence" behind it, I can necessarily only refer to my whole Sex in common with me,—is what thence has the aspect to me of amounting, in itself, to that changing of the very basis of the first "sentence", painted as such by the Bible course of thought, which Christianity, though it led to it, was short even of the aim of producing. To the Woman's feeling within me what these views

seem to express is a warned reversal of Divine arrangement about the position of the two Sexes in Marriage, which is as thoroughly authoritative and judicial as the first plan had to Men's feeling the appearance of being. A new fiat seems pronounced. A new word of God seems to have gone forth, addressed specially to Women, which tells them in full terms that the old law, framed originally, is abolished:—that old law of mere conjugal "obedience", which was in place indeed as long as Marriage was a mere animal relation, with the only end of causing men, just as brutes, merely to "fructify and multiply"; but which now it is as false as it is gross so to estimate. The Maker now seems to say in the hearts of Women, that for the future with *them* also He will deal directly: delivering to them by His own voice the charter of the old claim on them henceforth closed. — And yet, far from this only being as if a new boon to them,—a new prerogative bestowed on them,—it is therein made precisely, by the heart-language of the charter, but the charging on them specially for henceforth a most grievous as well as noble responsibility. Namely, of the new kind which must weigh more on the Woman as Mother *than* as Wife.

When the idea first broke upon me, in definite form, that the framing of the Marriage-Bond for human beings, considered as the work of successive ages, is the practical index to the meaning of universal Religious Forms, my argument with myself, under the shock of surprize, was of this kind:—"Why not?—why should it *not* have been constantly the most important of all things to mankind, that they should act well and wisely with regard to the prime function of all those that belong to them: the function which is that of ushering ever new Life into the world, and thus of literally becoming themselves, in

a secondary sense, the *creators* of their race?—Does Religion indeed stand as what serves, by its influence on human beings, to separate these from mere brutes?—In what more, then, can it do this, than in regulating, morally, what is the manner of their exercising this function, so as to exchange the mere pursuit of what is animal necessity, alone therein followed out by brutes, into the occasion in reality of the most absolutely humanizing of all possible mouldings of circumstance: that constituting of the ideal barrier of ‘Family’, within whose circuit alone, of all spheres of human life, the real ‘altruism’ of living out of oneself, by knowing of that which is truly dearer than self, has at least any habitual condition?—Within this closely-drawn frame of condition lies the *only* kind of feeling which is intense, while not of the destructive sort: needing, in fact, before reason was ripe, the sort of magical control which Superstition, as the early mode of Religion, was the appropriate agency for.—But then, *where* the feeling is intense, and most needful of control, is so different with the two sexes, as that truly this agency of Religion fits more the case of Women than of Men. The intenseness of feeling towards Offspring, namely, is pre-eminently the Mother’s; and it is *she*, therefore, who is equally concerned with pre-eminence in the regulating by Religion of the state of Marriage. It is *she* whom Nature forces, just in proportion as reason comes to have voice in her, to look forward in Marriage, as to what is its special circumstance, to the Children to be born of her:—who *must* say to herself, if in any way a true Woman,—‘What kind of these am I preparing to give birth to? Is it all one to me, indeed, whether my Children, now about to be conditioned, are actually rightly, or not, so conditioned:—whether they are made likely to be such as may be of full human endowments, fitted ade-

quately with human power to struggle bravely in the life-battle before them, or to be such as can probably only be crushed there? Shall I indeed run the risk, where religious regulation might defend me from it, of for want of this being dragged blindfold into the chance, if no more, of the commission of the cruellest possible of sins! that of bringing into the world helpless beings that have no right to be there: piteous infants that will have nothing to love me for, fated only to the suffering of an early dying out again, which they must seem only to reproach me for not saving them from, by having hindered beforehand! Or, still worse, shall I be the possible agent, for the same want of foresight, of giving existence to such as, even in realizing their just prospect of life, are predestined to do this in only unworthiness of it: half-vitalized beings, so unfurnished with provision for moral strength, as that all but inevitably they must have life-long to strive hopelessly with native tendencies growing rankly in them, such as can only make them what is hateful to themselves!—For, thoughts such as these are no longer what even Women must turn away from. It is the one fearful consequence of advanced Science which Women *must* heed, if true to themselves, that the Children whom they long for may not simply be regarded, any more, for those mere ‘gifts of God’ that old Religion has so expressively painted them. They must henceforth be thought of as evoked voluntarily into being, by the determinate and determinable *will* of those of us who are parents:—their ‘creators’ in that secondary but most true sense, which is that of providing to them their furnished *manner* of being. They are consequently, and must ever more and more be as our reason gains ground, our occasions of such tremendous responsibility, as that well may

the Woman's nature, of peculiarity, need the utmost of Religion's help for its fortifying to meet them.

"Surely, in this,"—I have continued my self-arguing,—  
 "surely, in a newly-attained conviction about Sin such as this is,—touching a feeling the most common to Women, though now stirred into such immediateness of emphasis,—the very import of a new 'Word of God,' come at first-hand to Women, is genuinely borne out, even expressly on Christianity's own terms. The Religion of Evolution which brings this, addresses, just as much as Christianity, specially the interests that are future; and of these above all such as are spiritual:—only that it is the souls of our Offspring here mainly brought in question, instead of actually our own souls, though bound on to these by our now-revealed power over these. With power given, must come, spiritually, foreseen penalty made awaiting the abuse of it; while here is shown, as threatened to transgression, a true moral hell of self-reproach, *not* spiritually escapable by transgressors;—and yet naturally softened, all the time, in the very manner of Christianity's own succour, by the 'atoning' consideration for Conscience, that what is personal in such Sin is, after all, ever chargeable mainly on in fact the whole *Race* of us:—our parents, gone before us, having stood to us as we to our children; and thence, all of us in common being joined really together, as in common liability to the frailty, so in one common inheritance of its retributive effects. The effects, indeed, of what must thus be the accounted primal mode of Sin,—as to that state of entire *un*-regulation, in regard to Marriage, which *was* that of the first ages of human history: when, as we know, Woman *was*, as the Bible-theory exhibits her, so degraded, inferentially, from what otherwise would have seemed right as her condition from the very first, as to appear fit, thence,

for what she was allotted to, of nothing more than the sensual service of Man,—still do weigh, undoubtedly, on the whole Race of us : making it 'natural' to us always, more or less, to do a somewhat of renewed wrong to our prerogative of creators, severally entered on. The whole matter of Marriage, before 'Christ' came among us, and descended into the moral depths of it, for the first time bringing import of heaven into the ideal of it, was such as Woman now cannot think of without a horror almost turned against Providence. How should Children then who were produced by such—by a practice of Sex-union thus rendered, through the fostered self-indulgence made attached to it, lower even than that of brutes,—not have continued to carry on an effect of the degradation, legitimately so esteemable, which thence makes Christianity's advent, with its exalting of the ideal of Marriage, the true sign of 'Grace come amongst Men',—which, to help us in our holding confidence in Providence, may farther be allowed of in our thought as moreover predestined from the first?—The effect of this interpreting of the Bible-scheme shows God truly as much interesting Himself *for* Women, as a Woman's own constructed scheme of things, if it had been possible to her to have produced this, for a checking of the exclusive Man's-view, need have shown Him doing. However horrible it is now to refer directly to God the mode of the early treatment of Women, in remembering what this actually was,—in truly multiplying to them the incurred 'sorrow' of Marriage beyond what even Men who were then capable of reflection saw for requisite, even under the existing demand of human increase :—however frightfully *more* against present moral sense this reference now appears than even as to what else are the alleged consequences of the 'Fall:' yet with only the present simple assumption being made,—

as passing from idea of *God* into that of merely symbolized *Providence*,—the whole effect becomes changed into such as really answers to a tone now given to the supposed ‘sentence’ on Woman, as capable of being anthropomorphized into *compassion* Divinely felt for her, with implied wrath now turned chiefly on the Man, as the actual implication is the reverse. I am assuming, namely, of this parable of Genesis, that it is really but a locally-framed theory, to account to human thought of the period for the manner of the existing conduct of Sex-union : felt already for, in its nature and effects, of that primeness of importance to human beings, which could only be thus signified by the Divine figures adopted. And this makes of the parable, truly, but the Philosophizing of History in the matter by early thought, which, as such, is purely instructive to ourselves.

“The idea of continuous human development, teleologically bearing always to the one point of realization of true Sex, which seems rightly to under-lie this historic plan, also answers in direct view only more thoroughly to a conditioned Woman’s scheme :—just as, now, the feminine symbol of ‘Nature,’ rather than ‘God,’ comes leadingly into appropriateness. The farther back, or lower down, we here plunge for theoretic basis to a general view of Sex-condition, manifestly, the relative value of the female side of it to the male side ever increases. The characteristically-female one of life-functions, namely, as that of reproduction, ever dominates more and more over that other of its two general functions, which is the masculine one of self-maintenance : till in the vegetal state of things, it is virtually the *only* one present. ‘Male and Female’, as to plants, have no other signification at all than as requisite factors in re-production. Let then this be the assumed point to reason upwards from, with directed

view to the Woman's actual position, and the nature of the entire progress so exposes itself, for that in which Man cannot actually raise himself without also being Nature's instrument for *her* raising, as that indeed the whole Bible-painted course of her rising in condition appears truly as laid out in benevolence towards her. For, the function of re-production is in a manner vegetal to the highest stage of its subsisting :—or, in other words, *passive* in the mode of it :—whence, undeniably, there is the ordinarily-estimable inferiority in her state, chiefly physical, which *only* a peculiarity of mental furnishing, springing up to atone for it, can have ability when realized to cancel. The case appears as if, when the transition out of plants into animals was proceeding, the physically-stronger ones of the latter, merely as being such, had thrust upon the weaker ones the heavier share in the passive work of the plant-function, merely as seeking for themselves the evolutionally-higher kind of work that was *active* : their own lighter share being also farther thus lightened by the new voluntariness come into it. But, if so, the whole passage from this point—from Sex-union of the lowest animal sort to the ennobling Marriage-practice which is truly such,—is constantly expressible by the mere in-coming to the female side also of the same kind of amelioration of voluntariness, to the degree compatible with the instituted mode of Sex-division. That is, by the new Will-power of the sort concerned being engendered in the Woman, whose quality may be actually of the kind needed, not personal, but in fact purely intellectual, which *is* that now in question, of a new sense of Divine Duty arisen in her : a conditioned Conscience in regard to Marriage attained by her. Nor does there seem wanting, even in the ordained common course of Nature's working, express provision for her



arriving at this 'Will-power': in the very fact which would seem necessarily to be in occurrence every actual fresh time that a new being is produced,—having as such, I infer, that antecedent equal 'chance' of being destined Man or Woman, which should apparently carry with it a virtual need in the plan of Sex-division of a continual re-instituting of the very terms of it:—seeing that Daughters as well as Sons do continuously draw nature from their Fathers, joined with that which they owe to Mothers; whence a lessening of the primæval inequality of the division, by means of the mental quality which Daughters *may* draw from Fathers, seems a very part of the evolutional system of inheritance. But, at all events, I find a direct 'Providence' towards the point, in the entire agency of evolving Religious Forms: nourishing constantly in the Woman, by a mental force that bears specially on her posture in circumstance, the precise mode of as if active-passivity of mind-action which Religious Duty is known for. These persistent ideal images, I am conceiving, sprang from the very first only out of those moulded relations, which human beings are only subject to, at all, through their inheriting from brutes the common circumstance of Sex. *Without* what is Conjugal relation, affective sentiment in any mode now known to us would have been wanting; and, in consequence, any mode of Religion also;—whereas, under its actual existence, Women truly have that furnished advantage, of thence deriving their mental nature as Daughters from the symbolic 'Father in Heaven', which the very passiveness of their mental habit, enforced on them by their position as to Sex, makes indeed greater than what Men have, as being Sons. They are forced, by their very fact of Sex, to be more in harmony with 'general Nature' and 'general Providence', as such, through their

emotiveness, coincident with Sex-circumstance, than Men have the means of being. They are closer to the heart of Nature as to what Parentage is intended for. And where Religious Form has completed itself,—namely, in that Trinity of Christianity where ‘the Father’ stands not alone for the whole image in demand : in that symbolled uniting of the *three* meeting relations, which however Fatherhood includes, of Husband-Wife-Offspring, whereof none has admitted precedence over another (p. 320):—the true type of Sex-union seems actually held forth to mankind, with a real promise of what it has to be, and is to be, when the Woman’s willed consent in it *shall* be raised to be on equal terms with the Man’s. All along, Religious Forms, as I believe, have teleologically been idealizing to the world what the affections of Family have power to develope into, *by* the giving of a Mother’s Conscience to the Woman, duly weighted to respond to the different, and less religious kind of Conscience of the Man;—while moreover in the same Forms, by their very nature, has lain also the constant means of their own promise now being ripe for its own realizing.”

To what, then, does all this lead?—In this hinted-at train of self-argument, let it be remembered, I am adducing what I assume as the state of feeling, or conviction, now become due to the general body of Women, through the actual character of “revealed” Science :—in what manner then, I have to explain, do I suppose that hence follows that especial Sociological consequence which I am believing to point the present as time of “crisis”? Namely, of peculiarly-demanded strength and deepened influx of principle, in the Social ordination of Marriage.—To express this drawn consequence—to show barely what I mean by it,—needs truly nothing less than now similarly to suggest what is actu-

ally an entire farther line of thought, and quite different train of argument: one no longer held as if only with myself, but as precisely towards the kind of mental posture, the opposite of my own, which I am theorizing the required existence of. That is, as supposed directed to such male Sociologists as, resting equally with myself on the sole basis of Evolutionism, yet do this with a characterizing bias of only Secularism.

By the above I am assuredly contending, that the present state of Women's instincts, supported by the general course of the evolving principle about Sex amid mankind, is indeed of the special kind which should authorize the result I am predicating, of their henceforth taking the part of Semitic-nations, for the framing of regulation for Society. Not for properly-sociological objects;—since these I regard specially as parted off by the very fact of the occurring "crisis", into the ground that is properly only masculine, and only subject to unreligious restriction;—but for solely that promoting of the true character of "the Family" which, in my own view, is the proper ground of sole Religion. What "the Family" is, however, is sociologically contingent on the one matter of ordained Law of Marriage. Here expressly, and here solely, is it therefore that I find the point of contact with Secularity that I am engaged with;—while the sole "line of coincidence" between the opposite interests which I now have in view to refer to, is hence that in which I consider that the framing of this Law, on a true footing, has been prepared for: only possible when the *one* party of the *two* concerned which is really the one principally concerned, shall have adequate share in the framing of it. Just that state of immediate impulse which I have been endeavouring to represent, is, I argue, the true sign of the condition for this produced: since the

Woman's ardently-awakened instincts are rightly, I contend, the promise of *her* being, in the matter of the regulating of Marriage-law, much more naturally efficient, as acting for herself, than have been, up till now, the agents that I grant have been in service for her. I mean, the Ecclesiastical class of Men.

"Has it not been so,"—let me imagine myself, then, now appealing to opponents of the kind described:—"has it not been the case in actual fact, that where at all you have really given heed, in your orderings of Society, to the one point that to *us* is the only one of really sovereign importance, it has been through alone the instigation of Ecclesiastics? That which truly you have attended to, and which is manifestly in true need of attention, for anything of just organizing of Society, has been hitherto the sole guiding of its moral status existent: or, of that relating to its actually living members:—namely, as to the needful distribution of those differing spheres of employment, and of recompenses and penalties due to these, which the various kinds of persons concerned have need to be advisedly appointed under, for the best drawing forth and ensuring of general good. But this is surely of no ultimate avail—of none other than the very shallowest of avail even at present,—excepting as borne out by such deeper providing as must regard the very bringing into existence of those needed as new members of the Social state. And yet to this main thing you have scarcely, *from* your own point of view, turned in any way your attention. You have left it, as now appears, in fact over-much in the hands of those Ecclesiastical *Men*, whom, from the very mode of their own Religionism-of-Marriage, *you*, as Sociologists, ought already to have socially condemned, as for a principle now socially over-passed: that of the multiplying of the

mere numbers of state-members, while peculiarly it is this which brings on you the mass of your actual difficulties ; and while the thing really called for is now expressly the means of restricting these. Namely, their limiting to such only as admit of being endowed with bettered natures : to such only as may be duly provided with conditions both physical and circumstantial, and moreover educational, for growing into the character which Society has the right to demand of them. Surely here the true agency required for your own ends—and indeed that which you have almost owned your own powerlessness to obtain on present terms,—is necessarily that of using, and legislatively meeting, the express instincts on Women's side which are involved in the very nature of the case, and yet are not such as Men can do justice to in representing :—the instincts which a Religion truly natural, if once this be permitted to have sway in legislation, must allow for as now ripened into real power of active prosecuting of themselves, in due balance to the social instincts with you uppermost : showing in Women truly as much the adapted nature to enforce the moral growth of mankind in the manner of generative and hereditary sequence, as in Men lies the opposite or static power of duly organizing the preserved result.

“ It is true, there is here implied what must amount to a constant struggle of principle, pervading the whole plan of legislation :—just as indeed, by the very admitting of a separate ‘ Man's view of Marriage,’ and ‘ Woman's view,’ there is implied the same conflict much more urgently present within the sphere of the actual conduct of Marriage. It may be, in truth, that what is involved as to the latter may be such, as that, for the moment,—or, as long as the keen trial of the crucial change remains in force,—a new current of domestic

bitterness may set in, that may even utterly sweep away what at present is the experienced form of home-happiness!—Conscience cannot spring up newly *without* struggle in formed habits of life-conduct;—nor Religious Conscience, specially, without, as heretofore, some rending, most particularly, of domestic ties!—In this case, however, I am inferring, with the most confident insistence, that the effect to follow after the crisis, is to be thence a real clearing, and an actual re-vitalizing, of the whole practical condition of Marriage: precisely *by* the incoming into the sense of the abiding Duty concerned in it, of that express equilibrating difference which, as softened into sexual by the Woman's gaining rightly her own side in it, I imagine must give finally the true harmony that is due to the condition.—And thence only in the same way with legislation, I conceive what is a proportionate effect. Instead of that which is the actual dualism of politics, I conceive a real parting of the State-principle, which, in adjudging always the main field of social topics to the working generally of the sole principle of Republicanism (such virtually, though not necessarily as to form), should yet recognize such true sphere for the counter-principle, or rule-of-Family, as that in it the Woman's office should become duly, and peculiarly, both in place and of required weight. I entirely acquiesce on my own part with the common idea, that the ground of Family is her sole naturally-fitted ground;—but all the more I contend she must thence have prevailing voice in what is legislative controlling of that ground: the allotted sphere of this being also suffered to include, beyond that which is immediate to the concerned point, of the right ordering of 'the Family', all that actually in state-affairs bears the esteeming of as falling under the same standard of principle, by in some way having rela-

tion to the point\* :—while, in fact, how few are the actual state-affairs that have *not* in them a somewhat of this relation!—But a Woman's mode of Conservatism, thus influenced to its political action, could be only, I repeat, what should aim at the conserving of only the true quality of human virtue.

“And I am the farthest from here desiring what, in fact, is *more* strongly opposed to my own ground of thinking than actually to a Masculine Sociology, of a direct kind of control to be planned, set over the exercise of Marriage. This appears to me truly the most positively barbarous of any mode of imaginable legislation. The lawful guidance of what is natural feeling *can* be naturally only that of Religion; while the utmost that the State can do for it must be surely the preventing of Religion's hindering in its function. And thus I seem to come indeed to desire precisely of the State, that in the ordering of what is Contract-of-Marriage, it should simply take up with the same kind of merely negative understanding that in fact Ecclesiasticism did begin with,—though most injuriously so from the want of direct concert with the State. I mean, with the legislative assumption of an abidingly-existent *veto*, laid in general on Sex-union, saving only as *removed* in conformity with State-ends:†—thus assimilating the merely civil side of Marriage-Contract, for these ends, with what actually the full meaning of all Marriage is, in its character of Re-

\* Such as, eminently, regulations that are sanitary; and those touching on all vices of character, like intemperance and, above all, cruelty. Whatever of overt offence brings out such into need of State notice, ought surely to be dealt with, as in regard to the very conscience of the nation, in the mode only of despotic determination with which heads of family have to act as to infants.

† In the same way that the State does assume in regard to food, that the right to it may be denied in any person not working for it.

ligious Sacrament. Namely, inasmuch as the introducing of new members into the State, more numerous than should hence be made likely to ensue, would indeed disturb the existing plan of State-arrangement: both as to its formed adjustment of supply to demand, in provision for immediate need of subsistence that is physical; and as to means for that accumulating of wealth which gives character to 'property';—while, moreover, as a result the most specifically desirable, the very fact of a civil Contract thus being made, with such limiting of its object to Social ends, would afford means for the State also assuming by it, and thenceforth acting practically on the assumption, that all issue of such unions are requirable of the parents for rightly qualified in respect of early nurture, as well mentally as bodily. A Contract that should carry with it all this, would surely, without in any way interfering where it would be tyranny to interfere, and as to especially those deep personal inclinations which alone naturally have any right to be the suggesters of Marriage, yet perfectly meet what is morally the true end of Sociology, of not suffering what is personal in the indulging of such, to interfere with what of such is the general right of State-members. It would be the 'caring for the State', of the true kind that static feeling needs to call for!—But then, here is only included what is the clear monogamic understanding, that with one Woman only at a time, such being also duly contracted with, is union at all suffered by the State;—the demand therefore being yet left unanswered to, which indeed is only naturally individual, and not answerable-to by State-principle, of contracted-for fidelity to the one person. I mean, not answerable by State-means, save as these are under recognized express guidance of Religion: of Religion, so accounted-of as common



to the body of members of the State, as thence to be of right an admitted State-Religion. Under a Religion that is Natural, and as much so by the Woman's as the Man's standard; and that also should be backed by a full understanding of being supported,\* in main points, by the whole weight of State-energy: I believe assuredly, that the latter, where it now fails, might gain the real seconding that would prove effectual. Let only the Social power do its own part,—in earnest, and with full purpose of succeeding,—in putting end to the Social crime of any un-contracting union being engaged in : and the thorough opening thus implied to the personal right of always-possible Divorce—the which right human frailty indeed makes practically undeniable,—would yet obtain the true safeguard, against the immense danger involved otherwise, of the only kind that is naturally in place. The power of true Religion, here acting in its full character and proper sphere, by the demand of a moral Contract going beyond the other,—to be added, optionally to the sole parties concerned, to the merely Secular one always indispensable,—would, I urge, act abundantly with more force as a check on the admitted practice of Divorce, than at all events do actually the now mingled mass of motives brought to bear on the accepted rule of Marriage-principle,—truly *more* of the merely Sociologic kind, touching ordinary prudential considerations, *than* such as have character from Religion. The very sorting of the departments of principle, would, I imagine, give occasion for the true impulse of monogamic fidelity to exert itself: *as* guided by the rightly-personal sense of Duty,

\* The support possible to be given to personal principle by the supposed kind of State-Religion, must be indeed what would place all demand of Divorce on the very footing of present heresy, or dissent. That is, what should render such demand only tolerated:—only suffered as on the terms of mere "indulgence", which carry the distinct brand of disapproval.

independent of Ecclesiastical intervention, which however would carry what is Religious intervention, as control on immoral license of self-guidance, *within* those very bounds where at present Religion actually ceases from that exercise of itself which is practically of the kind chiefly in demand:—to enter upon Marriage being, in this view, solely to enter upon the state where Religion becomes primal and imperative.—It is true, indeed, that such deepened restriction appears, at first sight, to render an easy withdrawing from the sphere of Contract only likely to be the oftener availed of.—But this, I rejoin, is defended from specially by the very meaning I am attributing to Religion,—such as truly its whole ritual to come may be thought of as henceforth only centering upon! This meaning is precisely the effect, wrapt up in the restriction, *not* by any means of crushing out natural feeling, even as much as an over-economic prudence would do this, and does over-often now do this: but of rather cherishing the feeling onwards into the spiritual extension where true Conjugal Fidelity may find naturally its maintenance, much more deeply than is yet possible, even outside of what originally gives birth to it. Assuredly, in the present state of things,—where, above all, the great matter of the initiating of human Life, notwithstanding its being covered by an admitted Sacrament, is left mainly for its regulating to be an affair of mere economy, *if* even that,—the leading source of desired rupture of Marriage is the encouraged mercenariness and frivolity that are now constantly-ruling motives to the engagement. And to meet this, the truest remedy *must* be, to raise the natural Sex-feeling that is implied, into that character of Religion which of all others is identified with stableness.”

So different—as thus is shown,—is the effect of *this*

manner of the abandonment of Christianity, from what has ordinarily been hitherto the result of Unbelief!—And just from there here being involved nothing more than the simple “ordering into departments” of what are granted common principles, having rule in human nature!—Instead of casting loose the signal human institution of Marriage, which, thus far, the work of ages has been spent on,—while I thoroughly recognize that this is the impending evil to be dreaded, in all stirring of the foundations of Religion,—my very clinging to Nature now teaches me to hold on specifically *by* this, for only the farther strengthening of adhesion to it!—This teaching is, in truth, what precisely convinces me that the very institution of human Contract which has thus *grown* into human habit of practice, and there shows as specifically *artificial*, is yet absolutely *natural*:—my Religion being truly, as it is, a conscious “Doctrine of Forms.”

In what I have now been arguing towards this point, —trying to sort the entire group of considerations concerned into the two inwoven lines I have given terms to, —I believe to have shown evidence that suffices, both of the actual convergence of all on this one point of mental Form, the raised Ideal of what the Contract has the need to be framed into ; and of the critical importance, both in Social and Religious view, of the concentration’s being realized as a point of true belief : or, of the evidence becoming personally appreciated :—which is the step to its hereafter being acted on. And I am still but preparing to draw into the same congeries that needful Historic thread, over the very tracing of which I have in fact no command, till precisely the formed station of convergence shall give me means for it. I have yet therefore to add to my present effort, of attempted “weighing” of the

signs of existent "crisis", what may truly have effect of a knotting-up of the different strands of considerations. I feel that I need yet, as it were, to give *form* to the required belief in the point of *form*.

And that means, indeed, I need still to try and show to my readers what in myself is this peculiar appreciation ;—while in reality, what does afford this to me, I see well, has depended on solely the engaged thought-work of this whole volume. I can only appeal backwards to what I have just now been calling my own "personal results";—while the only character of these that even in myself I feel actually to have realized, is such course of subtle inference—such insensibly-led current of convictions—as, though carrying me, I believe, lawfully to the present point, has still rather only hitherwards insinuated itself, by instinctively-winding coils of meditation, than directly so borne in any manner that would make it easy to communicate.—Is not this however, always, that very process of "growing", the applicability of the character of which to mental effort it is my very object to present proof of?

I will then, still, before trying for the yet-wanting Historic line, attempt expressly that full "winding-up" of my own scheme, which also I have just alluded to as my present aim ; and which truly is my own only means of really binding in one the "signs of crisis" in question. My Historic thread, I have farther said, and I must beg of my readers to hold in mind, needs be "burdened" with no less than the enormous task, of "attesting" of the whole work of Religion, how indeed this has been, in main end, the sole "perfecting of our human Individualism." I have to prepare for its drawing out, therefore, by exhibiting my own proof as to the point of Marriage-Contract being actually, as such, and all humanly con-

ventional as it is, yet the true *formal* means of Nature's agency to the great end.

It is the mystery of Integration that lies everywhere at basis!—It is indeed this true miracle of Nature, that all faithful exploring of her only more and more manifests as pervading the entire realm of her display of herself!

The whole purpose of Evolution, when mentally centralized, is that of its enabling us to see, of the body of general influences diffused in the Universe, that continually they deposit themselves, variously, on organized set Forms, counter-adapted to receive them :—that is, on an Igdrasil Tree-plan of evolving Forms. Only the same thing with this, then, have also my own results, here obtained, done with those which are pure mental Integrations, reflectionally given Form to but in repetition of outer Forms.—Planets, once having been consolidated into Integers, laid stage, as we know, for Living things ; —but so much more than thus was Nature's next mode, of Plants, farther Integered, that even there she made way, as I believe, for such finally-perfected Integration—so needful to be adjudged “absolute” as such,—as isolates out of Nature what we know as the conscious solitariness of human Self-hood.

All progress whatever in Mind-development, it is the postulated practice of my plan to estimate alone on Ideals. Namely, on these as dendromorphically accounted of, for wrought out to the collective stock of human beings, by anterior layers of these only furnishing them to successors:—the Ideal Forms, therefore, giving back to the race with rich increase, that burning “sap” of immediate personal experience, newly elaborated, which was originally poured into them ; and which, in the case of the

most general of the Ideals, reckoned as primary and universal,—and produced into such alone by the amount of ages that their creating had taken up,—are thence rendered to ourselves mental landmarks of Star-kind, which, as historically only witnessed to in their producing, are also only visible as such by means of History : being therein of right properly of Religious or celestial kind. —When, accordingly, I conceive, as I do,—and *because* of my set clinging to Nature, in reverse of the set habit of Supernaturalism,—that the abstract notion of Sex, for its found absoluteness of favour with Nature, is indeed due, at the present stage of thought, to the full rank of Metaphysic, and full “assumption” into the character of Religious : I am necessarily thus attributing to the notion, *not* the old kind of apotheosis indeed which was mythologic, but the astronomic effect of now directing an entire aspect of things, in the same way (though not as fully) as the idea of Time gives us posture for History, and that of Space for static Science. I imagine, namely, that when idea of Sex is, on occasion, made “regnant” over thought, the impression from it must rightly work downwards on Mind with the real concentrating force that must act on it with true creative result. Not directly, however ; but precisely by the medium of those minor Ideals which, by their nature, lie in contact with the region of human practice :—the Ideals of the various fashions of Art. In this sphere, Sex of persons, as I have reasoned, is expressly made out into mental—or, at least, is now tending to that end,—through that which I symbol for the sexualizing of Art. I have no thought, namely, of Women entering on any path of Art saving as by its proving itself, through Women’s efforts made tentatively on it, really adapted in itself to Sex-division ; and this eminently, as I have just implied, as to Art that

is Political. Unless, namely, Government that is of the State *does* turn actually on things where Despotism or rule-of-Family occurs rightfully, I suppose always, let me say clearly, that Women never will compete naturally with Men ;—and the same, in less measure, must apply to all other kinds of spheres that are physically not forbidden them. The very effort of this dividing-out of *practice*, in regard to Art-forms of all sorts, I imagine, divides Culture analogously, always bearing on the personality that it affects. But in that which I may call the Art of Marriage,—or, in other words, that artificial laying down of conditions for Marriage, which is the same with the setting up of its Ideal,—the effect attached I consider so signal, as to first the bestowing of Social status on Women, and thence as to the personally-exalting of their very nature, as appears to me no less than the real sealing to them henceforth of a new mode of distinctive life :—such as may, for the future, balance rightfully with that of Men, in giving also to these their own means, not yet gained, of the very perfecting of their own actual Individuality.

What is Ego-ship, or principle of Individuality, to every human being, I account truly in itself but a Mental Form, or Metaphysic Fact, of the same kind with all other such images, highly-strained : and *so* strained, by only their ages-long course of becoming realized. The real integrating, or isolating, of the human Ego, I conceive to have been prosecuting itself, *by* Nature's process of imparted Sexhood, through all others of our realized thought-abstractions, always influencing our moods of general thought :—this being feasibly expressed by the supposed need of a mental matching and blending, in symbolic Marriage, of the whole integral moods of Religion and Science, *for* each separate human being ; though in oppo-

site proportion for the two Sexes of these,—providing for their *own* mental marrying. Hence, therefore, does indeed the whole course of the Ego's growth in us, simply answer, as I scheme, to the producing of the human frame, doubly-sexed, evolutionally out of primary inorganic masses, that actually only *began* to evolve sex-wise when the Star-type had fairly passed into Tree-type, and that hence only improved and condensed into our own type, by precisely the Sex-state becoming perfected into mental.—Such turn to the case does a full Sex-teleology present!—But then here springs the argument of dendromorphism, with precisely the effect I contend for in regard to the human artifice of Marriage-law. This itself, I contend, is the very matter of a produced mediate stage which by analogy is made necessary, as between the mere planetaryism of what is primary Integration of masses, occurring in the aggregation of brute-integers of beings, and the truly-human combining which has accompaniment of human consciousness. That is, Marriage-law in itself is the intermediate Tree-form of Integration, very far from being personal, which however is in Nature's plan the only step to the perfect kind of Integration, which is that of Persons. And here singularly have I been helped to my result by solely what are external Religious dogmas!

In my questioning of physiology in these pages, two points of side-concern have struck me with their pertinence to my own object. On the one hand, I have noticed how aptly has the course of physiologists, in passing from the old and not-accurate mode of their science to their present mode, run parallel with the similar transition believed occurring in the morphology of Religion, as to that which in nature is the actual basis to all organic formation: the prime type of the constituted Tree. And



on the other hand I have noted how peculiarly, *by* the present fineness of their method, physiologists have brought out into view the nice difficulty which is now arisen as to plants, of assigning character to the actual Wholeness of these : through the fact, that what here stand as Integers are so different as to this from mere planets, —so made up of parts only piled on one another, just as human generations are also piled to make the mass of the general *race* of men,—that a true Individualism must necessarily be classifyingly denied them. And so at present is it also the pending difficulty in theology to find similarly a true integralness where here called for : as affecting the proper personalness of Deity, such as primarily it was dogmatized for in the crude fashion of Anthropomorphism : *not* then matched, as now desired, by an interchangeable aspect of Astromorphism, which, being admitted, now enables it to give way, under effort of intelligence, to a transitionally-effected Dendromorphism, thence necessarily obliterating the first personalness of the Divine symbol in itself, though always tending, like the impersonalism of Tree-hood, to make stage for what is proper Personality where due : in the human Ego. The Christian symbol of Triplicity, namely, painting Fatherhood and Sonship and Conjugality as bound up in the static absoluteness of metaphysics pure and simple, required necessarily an ignoring of all growth, or effect of sequence of conditions ; and yet, all strangely as it has seemed, the very import of the Filial image in itself, as standing for the general body of men, has effected in its analysing that dispersing of the first setting of the conception which coincidently has given to it the actual Tree-form, as in relation to that image, now made chief, instead of secondary. That is, the tri-unity of relations is now moulded as the proper Family is, by force of the

integration of Marriage, *not* previously conceivable, as applied to Deity. Nor beyond this is it conceivable, any more, that an abstract Ideal, as such, should pass on, so as again to have a personal implication.—In the outer world, however, (—or, the completed *lower* range of evolution,—) I am supposing that what is mere Tree-integration does work forward into the human or perfect kind of such, by indeed as if a multiplying of the two first kinds together. I have seemed to find, namely, that for the proper Animate type, Nature has so mingled, in Planet-like state of centralized self-balance, what in Trees are the sexual determinations of constitution,—now empowered to be distributed into two distinct forms of personal Wholeness,—as, by the “hermaphrodite” junction so formed, to give to beings of both Sexes real basis of Individualism : in supplying to them means of that physically-answered system of impressed contrasts, which is at last the human Tree-stock of brain-and-nerve, vibrating to the human sense with the phenomenon of Self-Identity. And certainly of these potently-effective contrasts I imagine always that what rank of the emotive class, primarily in question as to Family, are signallest in their importance : so as to give to the bond of Family, which holds the ties of circumstance together that draw forth all the affections of Family, the strongest actual instrumentation for impression on the Individual. Whatever be the looseness of the frame of Marriage, as truly “mere form.”—making of the Family that mere phantasm of “magic circle” that it commonly is pictured for,—yet the artifice of it suffices, just as Tree-form suffices, to give play to especially the two *sets* of affective ties that, as such, act in vitalizing human sentiency. And once more do physiology and dogmatism here combine for exposition. In the Tree, one sole case of triplicity—or, of Leaf-issuing,

with Stem and Rootage brought to match,—fills primarily the full type of the Tree ;—just as also in the Family one case of relational trinity, of Father-Mother-Child, answers fully to what in dogmatism is given as the true import of Family. But no less is the type really enriched, and of right only properly perfected, in both cases, by that piling-up of subordinate Tree-unities, which in the human case produces Brotherhood into the Family, not possible at all as to Deity. Only, however, in so far as the extent of the repetition in no way transgresses what is inherently the character of the type : represented, as to Family, by the devised formula of Marriage :—any stretching of conditions in this way being the injury that above all needs providing against. And this amounts to the entire moral consequence now aimed at : which is that of demanding as to Marriage, that no instance of renewed Parentage be considered as permitted by it, save as with renewal of the full primary Sacramental understanding :—consent of Conscience in both parents, obtained mutually. Thus only should truly the birth of every separate human being be made of the right consequence in a religious sense that each separate Ego has the right to be made of !——But this manner of the enriching of the type, by that new tie of Brotherhood thus sprung up, and laid athwart the first class, and the only *proper* class, of ties of Family, explains as to Marriage—first, why it is called for as the needed outer Form, able elastically and even-organically to include all the new and even-adverse complexities now produced ;—and secondly, how, being present, such outward restriction compels requisitely inwards, *for* the object now in question, the sum of dynamic energies comprised, as precisely laid out in the two *sets* of the domestic relations. As to therefore the culminating point in the matter, of promoted Indi-

viduation to the human being in two kinds, by means of Mental Sex being duly furnished, I conceive as follows. By the very law of impressed contrasts, I suppose primarily that the moulding force of domestic ties must be always chief as to opposite Sexes: that the relations, namely, of Father, Son, Brother, must bear as principally on Women, as those of Mother, Daughter, Sister, must bear principally on Men; while above all it is the Wife that must give his real manhood to the Man, and the Husband that must give her real womanhood to the Woman. Going beyond this, however, it is the effect of my whole view of Religion as a feminine mood of mind, and of Science as masculine, to imagine (as just hinted), that the Daughters of the symbolled "Father of spirits" are, similarly, as prevailingly influenced in their very "souls" by this merely reflective relation, as Sons are esteemably by the mental implication of Nature, or "the general Mother." But to this let there be added, conclusively, what is meant by two *sets* of relations,—so as that the Conjugal set of these be considered as most effective on Women, and the Fraternal set on Men,—and the whole import of a symbolled mental marrying of the two moods, in the common psychic life of all beings, though with difference of proportion as to Sex, seems to answer to the proper nature of Mind as to all that already is recognized of it, as much truly as to that now desired to be added to the recognition. Mind, in this light, appears simply the ultimate one of Nature's Integrations, or closed spheres of limitations, which follows always on the plan of precedent ones, only in enhancing *by* condensing, and by multiplying-and-dividing, its comprised sources, or organs, of contrasting-limitations.—Nature, at first, only began with encrusting solid Worlds, in huge masses. But in her very next step, when she plainly

dealt with Sex, the outer Form that was required needed already the small compass, and the elastic quality, that should specially hold together, without integrally destroying, the duplex system begun upon. And when from Trees she passed finally on to the small Living Worlds of ourselves, nerved and sexed for our possession of Minds, she did so, I conceive, with determinate prophecy of, and fore-insistence on, our providing for ourselves only a similar integument, only intensifiedly adapted,—social on *our* part, as preparatory to *her* giving us, on her own part, what is ultimately spiritual. I conceive, namely, that while our purely abstract phantasm of Egoship is such, only as limiting or covering in, and also holding together, the two systems of conflicting agitations that are now inferred, *with* the Form of reflective Unity : so Nature made it her demand of mankind, that in their course of agitations of life-conduct, making up historic progress, they should similarly centralize their efforts, however in the first instance unconsciously so, on the obtaining of a true practice of Marriage, as a safe frame to all exercise of Self-life.—To have passed on to the latter *without* such acquired practice, I believe would have been only the same, in Nature's plan, as to have passed on from mere Planets to Human beings *without* the intermediate of Vegetation.

And thus truly the intervention of Religious Forms, as the needful Leaf-agency to the Mind of bringing consciousness, finally, into the functions of the life of Family, —being our culture in the true *Art of domestic living*, only therein making *us* religious beings,—seems requisitely borne out in that *causative* character of Art in general which I claim for such. No less than of framed Verbal terms,—let me repeat from myself (p. 493),—do I believe of Religious symbols, that they have served as

Nature's means for our gaining of intellectual strength - to deal with the living circumstance they embody. And in the case of the latter, this means the whole practice of the affections. I believe that we can as certainly *love better*, as notably we can only *reason at all*, by such constituted images.—And how otherwise should there actually be shown our affections as the subject of Developmental progression,—*not* as implanted by the Divine hand all at once, but as constantly themselves in act of growing?—Instead even of its being rightful to say of them, that “they grow with our growth”, as first appears simply the case, I believe that we must needfully only say, that “it is *their* growth that only makes *our* growth.”

And here I touch indeed, in this summing of my own scheme, the point over again of enforced stoppage to its argument,—made such, on its own terms, by the reached need of division in the ground of it ; while it also brings me anew, and here centrally, into the fellow-ground of my antagonism towards especially Comtism, which specifically denies such occasion :—on account of which I must needfully assume that I have now effected with sufficiency my object in regard to the stage, of knotting together my own proofs of it, in my different strands of principle. Even to finish this very aim, at definition of combined principle, the concurring evidence of History needs as much being regarded, in fact, for the very proving of a state of crisis as existent, as the state needs assuming for the means of making survey of History.

The very notion of crisis, such as that I am expressing, is only possible on terms of growth : while, as actually, I complain, the Sociology of Comte has no principle of such sort that is adequate ;—and again it seems involved in the case, that no actual Sociologist at all, in his not

being a Woman, *can* at first hand apprehend such conception. The manner in which Comte treats the *nidus* of Family,—being that of the “Sociologic unit”, in common, for the whole State’s composition being wrought out by,—is the taking it, I urge, on the footing of a primæval institution, ready-formed by a Creator, on the very plan of supernaturalism;—whereas specially I demand that it be taken instead as rather the moral “seed” of Society’s whole Tree-course: what was not even possible on the lower ranges of social life, concerned with social Rootage, but only after Sex-terms produced, *by* precisely intervention of due crisis:—meaning by this, needful consciousness of Sex-duty, arisen in Women.—All male Sociologists must naturally indeed feel, for themselves, that as conduct of Family has till now been continuously improving through human history, the same course needs only still to be that which Society must simply follow.—But, I answer, the very nature of the case here forbids it. The very fact of Women’s Conscience being once touched, makes what previously was borne with now intolerable. Evil contemplated is at once a newly-created species of evil;—and the remedy for it must be as new and as sudden. That is, critical.

I will then enter on the necessary last effort:—as necessary for myself, as in itself. But only by my own determined method. I have nothing of any questioning to make, let it be understood, of what are the mere details of the subject, of the instituting of Domestic life:—which, in my own idea of Art, would be the opposite to distinctive of a Woman’s rightful position in Philosophy. I have need only to regard those integral and symbolic “mental landmarks” which Religious station, as such, renders visible.—Also, whatever has yet passed itself in History as domestic Marriage, has so mainly but con-

cerned the Man's side in it,—just as similarly has there the entire form of Religion chiefly ministered only to this,—that I must necessarily repudiate all concern with it, as in relation to my point of *real* Marriage. It is only by the recurring to Nations, and large national influences,—having, as such, the true power now supposed of concentrating themselves downwards,—that I find anything of historic precedent really adapted to the term. Nor this, save indeed with such actually-disfigured attributes as render the antecedents as revoltingly discordant to the true idea, as also were the foreshadowings of whole Religion to what now is the developed sense of this. The landmarks of these precursors of real Marriage are necessarily far other than celestial ones!—What *could* be the nature of them, evolutionally, when the present sacred form of Domestic Morality, the fruit solely of true Religion and true Marriage-law, was as yet only struggling to emerge from what expressly we now think of as the only proper *Im*-morality?

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In assuming, as I do, that all past Sociologic evolution is, on my own side, to be teleologically referred to the ripening of Sexhood and Individualism,—being on the other side always referrible to the right ordering of Society :—I certainly perceive as the primal Integrations of social beings, those large masses of these, circumstantially determined, which, from specialties made gradually attached to them, we know of as Nations : these specialties being leadingly their acquired forms of Religion and Language. I conceive them as so occupying the first character of formation, which needfully, towards the due Tree-integration of Family, is that solely of in



a manner social Planets,\* as that actually the whole clue to the development thus ending, is such as in the outer world also has meant, typically, the passing forward and condensing of Planet-masses into Tree-masses. That is, as internally providing to the former the sex-varied organism which is proper to the latter.—And such Planet-spheres of social masses I suppose indeed naturally assorted in two kinds, even beforehand; as having themselves at first sprung into coherence, from amid the minor hordes diffused generally on the earth-abode.

Mere influences of outer circumstance, deposited on such coherent social masses, I imagine are indeed as geologic strata, representing far-separated states in regard to Time. But then, in order to the passing of such process into the kind of developed action which is Tree-like, or incipiently so, I conceive that there was means duly furnished, in already that working of Culture which in my notion is intrinsically of Tree-nature. I suppose, namely, of beginning Nations, that they developed into sexual—or representatively, into Aryan and Semitic national types,—through purely the matter of that mingling and competing together—over and above, and more deeply effective than, the contending in only gross warfare,—which was rather a proper traffic of moral natures, enriching diversely each sort: a real bartering with one another of their experiences, home-made to each, by the medium always rightly-interchangeable of their severally-moulded forms of common Art. That is, chiefly, by the

\* A few pages back (p. 536) I used the idea of planet-state with an apparent difference from that here implied, for what I called “aggregations of brute-integers” of beings. But in fact I meant there also what amounts to the idea of “Nations”: since these surely, taken as only circumstantially induced, are but such very kind of combinations as show the human beings concerned, for their want of any exercised control in the case, but in the state of proper brutes.

form of Words which goes with reasoning, on the part of Aryans ; and by the form of symbolled feelings, or continuous Religiousness, which goes with feminine affectiveness in Semitics. In regard to this moral traffic I have noted as an effect due to it, that with Aryans became produced the ideal of Social Government that appears rightly to be permanent of such kind, as the due mould of Republicanism, which, in terms of Family, is the same with the plan of Brotherhood : always secondary as to Family ;—while Semitics rested constantly in the Paternal plan, primary in the case of Family. And this immediately involves what I may now easily state as the Tree-like, or *branched* condition of Sociologic progress, which is my present entire basis :—as opposed to the uniformity which is the postulate of all Positivism.

In Comte's scheme of Sociology it seems to be assumed as the true end of progression in State-science that the State itself should be at one with the Family :—which forbids totally that idea of dynamic concentration which I am holding by. For myself, therefore, I accept simply the view which indeed the whole range of early History confirms, that it was actually the constant symptom of barbarism, even anterior to any beginning of real culture, that the two *were* found existent as one. All that progress in State-nature has ever meant, I see as actually comprised in the dividing of the two : though, as dividing of sex-kind always means, with a constantly preserved somewhat of sameness ;—and, as to the latter, I find that the very rank just assigned to what is Brotherhood, in relation to Paternal Headship-of-Family, is what perfectly symbolizes the fact. That is :—I see always that the State, at its best, *may* resemble the Family to this vague and rather-gross extent : that the mass of State-members, existing at any time, may relate to the existing

Government in the case, in the manner of one single multitudinous leaf-issuing of State-progeny, the offspring of a common birth of Time-effects: while the Government, in itself, might part the shares of Parentage in the case, by the Civil power ranking always as masculine, and the Ecclesiastic power duly as feminine.\* And Brotherhood, when judged in this static sense, would truly mean a Brotherhood much more rigidly perfect as such, than what actually in the Family stands as such,—carrying rightly the effect of Time-sequence most stringently stamped on it; and thence making the Elder-brother as following close on the similitude of the Father, to younger offspring. If then I consider of the former or artificial fraternal scheme, that as such it befits present culture; while no less the real concentrating progress of the idea of Family is that which goes on towards respects that are exclusively individual, for its *proper* course of progress: I seem in this apparent complication of results to obtain rather what is organic simplicity: as not really mixing, and injuring by confounding together, what are rightfully issues that stand best, and most helpfully so, apart.

In this manner, but only so, I conceive that the real pertinence of Marriage becomes evident: as made necessary by solely the two systems of relations, which in case of individuals need a recognized true Formula of combination:—a true binding in one of two integral and perpetual agitations, systemed out for endurance, in what yet is demanded of as only an effectual, though oscillating, equilibrium! All this of real effect in the state of

\* By the view of Comte it would seem indeed the enforced plan to take as "Father" to the State the entire body of its extant Government; leaving only as "Mother" to it the idea of the materially-conditioned "Country." But this is exactly, as I urge, that injustice to the idea of Sex which ignores the metamorphic crisis arrived. It fits only the initial character of Sex-hood, where only the rootage of human culture was in question..

Family, only securable by convention in the sense of Marriage, I believe may have really followed, as effect of dynamic centering of natural forces, *if* only the prime States of human aggregating *were* that which surely History has testified to their being ; with only farther being proved, as a thing existent, what myself I am proposing as so finding. And that is, a real kind of premonitory institution of Marriage, symbolically lying hidden in the obscurities of the early history of Religion.

To seek this mere hint of monition, is then solely what I now embolden myself to attempt.—I mean, to point, openly to my readers, to what has struck my own thought, in the meditating of my scheme, as an actual historic testimony, bringing to it the real force of corroboration.

I have stated it for my theory in regard to mental progress, that all "World-effects" of this have only arrived to mankind as the fruit of mingled influences of Aryan and Semitic kinds, *so* mingled as to admit thinking of by the symbol of effected Marriage (pp. 494-5);—while, of all such engendered World-effects, it has been a guiding idea of the present work to show eminently how Christianity, as the World-exemplar of a stock-created Religion, has visibly sprung out of such mingling, taking place at the local period of its origin between Hebrewism and Hellenism. — But this crisis to Religion, of the birth of Christianity, was not the same with what now is believed due, for its not yet including, what now needs to be included, of Secular and Political respects. And this lack to it is indeed also, I consider, the very point that now farther concerns me, as precisely betokening, in regard to Marriage, the matter of this being yet *only* abstract, or symbolical, for mankind : *in* being as yet between Nations only, instead of between Persons (p. 493).

If then I now use this gained assumption—as the force of my conviction of it now leads me to do,—for my true fulcrum in this backward-stretching quest, I believe that the really pertinent signs of antecedence to the event in question, of symbolic Marriage, *are* actually traceable as such, in precisely what appears as the National construction of the two peoples concerned,—regarded always, besides, as in this only serving as representers of formed peoples in general, of the same standing in History.—And this, without at all the going deeper than that surface of general History, beyond which, I need to say, I have indeed, on my own part, no power of going.

All *States* of Nations, it seems evident, have constantly only been such by a real blending in their constitution, of Ecclesiasticism, or Priest-ism,—now identified with Semiticism,—and the mode of Policy that is Secular. This at once, however, bears the import of a union that intrinsically is *sacramental*. For what else does the term of “Sacrament” stand for, in regard equally of Heathen and Christian use of it, than precisely such blending of referred-to sanctions of any entered-on engagements?—It means always, I assume, *a somewhat that binds in concert together the agents in some common occupation or destined object that is secular, by a common owning of obligation that is religious*.—This admitted, then, my proposition is the following, Among Hebrews and Grecians, representatively, there appears rightly in their several mouldings of State-hood, the several points as to each, sexually varied, which evolutionally *ought* to have been there, on present terms, teleologically to have led on as now supposed, through the ground of Christianity, and its presented notion of Marriage-Sacrament, to the very kind of conception on the subject which now here I have laboured out.—The most obviously this indeed appears

as to Hebrews : as ought naturally to be the case, where the kind of precedent to Christianity concerned is that which always, in religious view, is the more important of the two sorts of the parentage implied ;—but no less truly, and with especial instructiveness, does the related effect seem shown also on what stands as the *mule* side.

But again I must proceed by selection. If Grecians, or rather Grecian-Alexandrians, stand for Aryan peoples generally,—as Hebrews stand for general Semitics,—I am now, among Grecians, really thinking of exclusively Athenians. I am conceiving, of peculiarly this one miniature Nation, of the concentratedly-civilized people of Athens, that they do indeed display in their own State-constitution that very indication of true National Individuality, which the Marriage-bond, of right, may mystically answer to :—here, on the male side, as oppositely, on the female side, the small people of the Israelites were similarly individualized.—— With my view then always bounded, in the main, by a regard solely to these two limited historic circlets, I will begin first on what concerns me with the former of them.

Here, however, I must at once show how there is met by my own scheme, in general terms, what is here involved of a notorious anomaly, in respect of my concerned subject. By this anomaly I mean, the exceptional degree of honour which, in relation to their early standing in History, was rendered by Athenians to Women : repeated also, in later times, in the practice both of Romans and of Gothics, fellow in importance among Aryan tribes. And, in fact, in a research that were realistic, I believe that the individualistic practice of Marriage, which always indicates the civil status of Women, would need showing as having gained a legal strength of definition attached to it, amongst Romans in especial, and quite inde-

pendently of Christianity, which serves still for the fair model of what secular institution can thus effect.—And yet oppositely it is in ordinary recognized, it being also special to my own purpose for myself to do so, that wherever, as the rule, the Ecclesiastical or Priestly influence prevails, the Woman's side in social life has the more favour ;—while, on the other hand, the actual form of the maintained government of these peoples, and eminently of the Athenians, was still that in which the Priestly kind of power, although adequately present, was as specially made subordinate to the Secular, as essentially it was of spirit that was republican.—This perplexity of conditions then I meet with what seems to me its natural solving, in precisely the doubly-ordered formula only adapted to answer to it: that which duly, as just shown, admits principle of Brotherhood (or Republicanism) as required part of the proper status of Family, in the full ripening of which only Women's state can also finally be rectified with sufficiency ; but which holds this only secondary to what in Family is the principle that characterizes. And the mental habit of (representatively) Athenians, as that of secular intellectualness, I consider *ought* only, as such, to have helped into development the one principle of mere levelness of relationship which indeed does include naturally Women with Men as possessors of a co-heritage of privileges. I imagine, namely,—with a believed adequacy of evidence,—that whatever in the Athenians, and notably in Athenian poets, had the mark of ripe culture as to feeling about Women, much more signified their being accepted as Sisters, in the manner that was befitting to republicans, than their being taken in what is actually, when rightly regarded, the light which is theirs characteristically : that of Wives and destined Mothers ;—while, in the latter aspect, they were

held in scarcely better moral rank than among Orientals themselves : there being utterly also wanting, on the other hand, that mediæval kind of homage, engendered by Christianity, which substituted for the first sinking them into slaves, the raising of them factitiously into angels. The Athenian mode of homage seems, in fact, to have been a real antedating of that genuine fraternal respect on the part of Men towards Women, which, ~~when~~ based on due sexual respect paid also to them in their chief character of Wifehood, forms the noblest of any enhancement that is possible to the whole plan of what is constituted relationism;—in defect of which basis, however,—as in the then state of things it could only be, as actually, unprovided with such,—it stood necessarily in the same rank of mere precocity of culture which also was that of their first outburst of Science : a mere prophecy of what finally should come to have the means of being realized.—And I take it for a very sign of this abortive precocity, that what followed on Women's nature from this Grecian mode of honour, seems mainly but to have tended to un-sex them : in reverse of what happened in either of the two cases just referred to. Namely, under severally the sensual passionateness of Orientals, or the enforced chivalry of Mediæval Europeans, and among these rather of Celtic than Teutonic Aryans :—both which kinds of estimation had the effect of tending always to separate them in character distinctively from Men. It was the *idealism* of Greece, as seems evident, much more than the thing really wanting, of a duly-furnished *relational conscience*, that procured them the complacency they were here treated with : which thence naturally remained barren of its proper end.

And this attributed feeling was shown eminently, as was natural, in the rank of Grecian goddesses, placed



ideally by the side of their male deities:—the fact of which placing of them is a point that is of the uttermost significance, when we come to make contrast with the religion of Semitics. To this latter, its entire character, as far as this was pure, made the imagining of any goddesses the matter only of abhorring repudiation :—female deityship being naturally only sufferable under Polytheism, which, although it had sway perhaps generally at one stage of progression, flourished only of right amongst Aryans, and chiefly of these, amongst Grecians. This effect of specific difference involved, seems indeed to afford clue to the whole meaning of this stage of the progression.—I mean, as to the proceeding by Aryan nations from the honouring of Women merely as Sisters, into the honouring them as Wives, and thence rightfully as Women.

With goddesses to be worshipped came necessarily priestesses for the ministrants of their worship. And with whatever debasing consequence this was fraught, in regard to the special matter I am contemplating, yet I cannot but infer, by the very force of my own systematized conviction, that such mingling as even this was, of religious implication in sexhood with general temple-service, had a real however distant effect as to the producing in the male nature of what should finally be a true moral posture towards Women. Such tendency must at any rate have lain with it thus far : that there was, at all events, a decided innovation made on savagery, in the bare fact of Women's gaining, in this way, admission on any terms within the range of religious rites. In pure savagery, as we know, they were utterly excluded from all such :—as, at the same time, what made Wives of them, in place of Marriage-contract, was alone rule of purchase, if not of brute force.

But if in general what was religious or priestly institu-

tion at Athens had this for an apparent part of its result, it seems inevitable to recognize something eminently more pointed of the same kind—something expressly directed to the very point,—in that notorious ceremonial of “*mysteries*” which, as it were, circled-in the whole statehood of Athens :—to which therefore it is actually that I am now referring in my intention, for the real fact to which attaches the symbolic attribution of my scheme : that of a proper State Marriage-bond ; or, formal uniting of Priestly Government with Civic. These specialized observances of State-Polytheism were, as such, if I understand right, truly common to *all* governments that in that age became rightly established as State-forms of this sort ;—but undoubtedly they were conspicuous in such character, and precisely characteristic, in foremost Athens,—in Athens, foremost in all extant civilization. I take them, accordingly, as the very kind of heathen *Sacrament* I have been speculating for, as the evolutionary antecedent of the true kind :—in itself indeed always utterly false, in relation to the true, for *this*, which is by much more important that any matter of direct backwardness in progress, that it was then solely addressed to the one-sided Man’s position :—it being not only in the Bible view of things, but in every other view of antiquity, that the Woman, in proper person, had *no* side of any account in the matter.

When I attribute to Priests (and thence generally to Ecclesiastics,) the taking virtually of the Woman’s part in State-matters, I am not forgetting the immense mass of mere trickery and hollowness that contaminated whatever good they effected ;—any more than I omit otherwise to allow for the gross evils that co-existed with Civil Governing, that, in claiming to be Family-like or Paternal, was only tyrannously despotic. But the secret cere-

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monies now referred to, just as having the very object which I believe I cannot fail to be justified in assigning to them, must inevitably have acted genuinely towards that object: for the very reason of their intention *being* that which the word "sacrament" implies, of directly *practical*. Priest and State in conjunction made by them, as I believe, the demand of every candidate for state-membership—with the sole condition of male sex,—that there should be with him an admitted understanding, as of the will of the State, that the terms of birth into the State were *not* those only of personal gratification, and especially not of merely that of sense. It was only by what was painfullest of preparation, signifying instantly called forth self-control, that the initiate was suffered entrance on the main circumstance concerned: the mystic spectacle, whose object, as appears, was no other than indeed the providing in him of an Ideal of Marriage, symbolically figured out in whatever of Divine images the subject had locally become framed into. That is, by some symbolized union, either of Isis with Osiris, or of Demeter with Dionysus, or between any other possible deities representing the opposite principles of Sex.\* And hence must practically have been involved, in at all events the intention of the initiation, the very essence of whatever still the true contract of Marriage needs to bear upon:—wanting only, towards this, the transfer-

\* I am aware how largely the purport of such "mysteries" turned in fact upon the dramatizing of the movements of heavenly bodies. It seems to me, however, what really is inconceivable of the latter; that they should actually have thus attracted to themselves so much interest as this use of them implies, *except* for their possessing, as so manifestly they do, the power farther to symbolize, by their own phenomena, the events of human destiny,—bound also to an incessant alternation of setting in Death, and rising brightly into Life. And this immediately involved that centering of attention in the case on the great matter of Life-production, wrapt up within the import of Marriage, which thence naturally may have caused the practice of its mystic hiding in this fashion from exoteric participation.

ring of the included point, of afforded "birth into the State," to the true matter, individualistic and realistic, of the natural entrance into Life, of the candidate for State-membership—hence necessarily of the generation only in prospect. There is manifested the very kind of State-conscience which I have been urging as the needed background, always necessary as such to the full working of what is Religion in the case, *as* acting with individuals ; and which therefore I desire to have embodied in the very sense of Marriage-contract :—the implied condition, namely, that no fruit should be suffered (willingly) to proceed from the contracted union, *not* capable both of the very ordeal of self-control that was thus symbolized for, and of includedly entertaining the Ideal as to Marriage also here figured :—an Ideal always, let it be observed, much more having reference to the obligations, than to the immediate pleasures, of Marriage. It is, in fact, the very utmost that any *Woman* can desire of the secular State, that her own highest feeling of this sort, towards intended offspring, should be answered in this manner by a renewed spirit of Eleusinian imposed-rites.

By this national form of sacrament, therefore, I imagine the sort of product out of Priestcraft which was actually the only thing, and the precise thing, which could have served the required end :—Nature's *own* demanded end, to which thence she gave requisite success, to the degree then possible,—notwithstanding the local grossness concerned, from which naturally some of the greatest of concerned citizens revolted. Neither Socrates nor Plato, of whom it is recorded that they regarded these ceremonies with contempt, had the means of seeing in them what alone comes at present into view, under the sole aspect of "derivative" observation : by which they are seen with traced thread of "design" in them,—running through

them, and even connecting them, if I am not misleading myself, with those grander, and really world-enlarged mysteries, which Christianity has provided ; and which also (without anything, as I believe, of derogation to Christianity,) I imagine set forth, in these "latter days", only still to embody to us what Providence means finally as to Marriage.—This, however, is a view only rightfully furnished, when the connection forwards into this ripened result is evolutionally supported by a deepened connection made out backwards : such as indeed, if a true one, must even yield a right meaning, and defence as of apparent moral necessity, to even that actual grossness which was so justly the offence of philosophers. I mean, by a giving to these ceremonies of the aspect of inevitably taking up, and of condemningly-supplanting, antecedents to themselves of incomparably baser quality of grossness: belonging developmentally to the very times of opening History, touching men's close emergence from sheer brutism.

That is, to the times when the idea of "the State" was in reality no more than pre-existent: just as also was Religion only Pre-religion, and "Marriage-for-individuals" a thing not begun to be pre-figured, but absolutely without meaning :—when indeed was accordantly the only notion of "Family" such as totally was engrossed by "the Tribe", standing in place of "the State"; and the attendant practice towards Women was that just referred to,—of their absolutely being shut out from any kind of participating in religious acts, so accounted ; while as Wives, even if at all they were individually appropriated, they were left unprotected in any way from the brute power of their possessors. Even in this scarcely-human fashion of society, it needs be noted, there appears still to have existed, as called forth by the begin-

ning status of "Family", that kind of rudimentary regulation, on the otherwise only-unmitigated sensism of semi-brutes, which, with whatever hideous mockery of true Religion it presented itself, seems to have had in it, nevertheless, the very object, as a starting Conscience-of-Family, of filling already the true function ever after to remain abiding in the idea of Marriage: that of acting *as* precisely a defined *veto* on unbridled sensuality, *through* appeal to an admitted voice of Religion. And if indeed we may believe, as I suppose, that such rites of barbarians, of mere ordained fetishism, were yet actually associated, evolutionally, with the later agency of regulation which comparatively was so refined as was that of the Dionysian symbolization: there seems truly thus afforded, I contend, the relative palliation as to both attempted modes, and especially as to the later one, which lies generally with improving institutions for such ends. Namely, in the exhibiting of the later mode, as a devised check on the moral evil at the time recognized, in the proper light of besides a raised *protest*, on the part of the human nature of the time, against that which had been suffered previously to serve as such, with also what was its temporary justification.

And to fill up the immense space which this signifies in evolution, between Athenians and bare savages, there lay, we must remember, the entire field of intervening civilization which stands as that of Egypt:—that immeasurably-extended course of human progress, which at once gave the Grecian "mysteries" that were drawn from it their prestige of enormous antiquity, and imparted to them otherwise, as by contact, the commensurate coarseness which it thence propagated in continuity. The giant stock of progressing culture here furnished—which actually gave birth both to Grecianism and Hebrewism,—

is indeed, evolutionally, the explainer of the whole basis, or lower life, of Religion's development. In that which was the purer part of it, so really Tree-like was its nature, that it all but gave sign, of *draconian* kind, of antedating Christianity itself : although forced, by its contaminating base elements, to withdraw itself, as it did, into serving as no more than the needful nourisher of better stocks to grow out of it.—Egypt itself,—may it not probably be surmised ?—must have been, like Christianity, some fruit of primæval world-marriage between races, endowing it with its stupendous historic rank.

What Egypt did for the world-growth of the beginning stock of Religion, appears indeed what in my own terms I must express thus. It must apparently have combined, in its Priest-status, the two separate abilities, equally needful in that stage, of overcoming severally each one of the *two* kinds of cotyledonous fetishism which I figure to have existed as seed-leaves to the entire Tree :—these being, on the one hand, the fetishism of Death-worship, inherent characteristically to Semitic races ; on the other, that of the sensual mode of Life-worship, besetting ever the opposite family of nations, which was, nevertheless, still naturally bound up with the finally grandest of intellectual images,—the metaphysical bodying forth of the pure Abstraction of Life, considered as objectively manifested to human thought. The very grossness of the pertinents to this idea may actually, at the first, have given dignity of self-conscious abasement, voluntarily undergone, to the bewildered philosophy encountering it ;—however, later, the advanced mode of morality and the purified metaphysic of Grecians might be forced into abhorrence of it.—And yet Grecians themselves, as I contend, so far failed of such Ideal about Life-production as alone *could* make possible true morality in concern

with it, *by* that dealing-upon-principle with sexualism which their own principle of Fraternity was not equal to, as that actually, by the testimony of history, they fell short in their own practice of what are the moral obligations of life-of-Family, of what Egypt as their religious parent set example of.—How then was it with the other line of Egypt's progeny,—with the Hebrews, who, as I conceive, did take up specially the sexual mode of imagery, with the "Family-plan" of government, *not* impeded by republican tendencies?

I have stated it as my clue to the symbolic reading of History, that the plan of "Family" only actually coincided with State-government in what was but the early barbaric dawn of civilization; while the function of reducing it, concentrately, to the sphere alone rightful to it, I have assorted as that in general of Semitics. That is, by their precisely having converted, in their course of national life, the State-form of the barbaric Tribe, into a form that is specifically religious:—seeing that among people of this class there was by no means existent that formed balance between priestly and regal powers which I account "national marriage"; and which, as such, I suppose giving to the state of Athens its republican perfectness: here, contrarily, the sole governing authority being the despot who in himself alone totally engrossed whatever of either sort might be present. But then of Hebrews, in peculiarity, I imagine that they so exercised this world-function, as indeed to have been Semitics of the Semitics:—answering rightly in this to what was their admitted rank in Religion. I imagine that they so fully, from the first, plunged into the adapted religious course, that as to civil regulation they were *simpler* in their own Tribe-scheme than even savages themselves. —And it is here that is again concerned, on the Semitic



side, what I have alluded to before, of the significant impossibility of female deities remaining, where inherently it was only Monotheism that was in place:—this being the cause, in my view, of what was finally the full advantage in regard to feeling about Women, which the æsthetic kind of honour, paid to them precociously by Grecians, had not in it to any extent to promote.

I am referring to what in the later state of the Hebrews became ostensible, of the entire Family of the people, as a State-body, being forced into the *feminine* side in the kind of Marriage-union that *was* indeed signified in their State-form : as to which, not any secular despot, such as common Semitics were governed by, but sole Deity itself was formulated on the *male* side. For this femininizing of the State—however politically defective, in cutting off any ability of admitted head to the State of rightly human kind,—was the real raising of the notion of Female Sexhood, for Men's minds, into the abstractness on its own account, which was really the true plan of deification such as might render a true permanent effect :—herein exactly opposed, as before hinted, to that framing of particular goddesses by Grecians, which, though helpful in a lower sense to the case of Women, by an idealizing of them as in-concrete, did nothing however that was effectual towards an ideal as to Sex-character in the pure abstract, or in entirety. That is, in relation to the general thought of the age. In the mating personally of an Isis with an Osiris, there was necessarily what drew around it mere grossness of imagery, the farthest possible from promotive of a true feeling about Sex. But in the Hebrew ideal, where it was only what was the type of the Nation that was bound conjugally over to Jehovah, the utmost that of such sort was made involved in the employed symbolism, was that dwelt on so often by He-

brew prophets, of the incurred danger to the Nation of its thence conjugally polluting itself in any leaning to false deities, as the patrons of baser-constituted Nations. And for their right so to assume, of themselves and of the Gentiles that were of concern to them, the very doctrine I am pursuing, of teleologic import here being present towards only the raising of a true Conjugal Ideal, seems precisely to bring the very interpreting of the case that, after all, really vindicates the assumption,—as being actually what was due to the rightly-conscious purity, comparatively, of the Hebrew people in this respect. I mean, in regard actually to what thus becomes evident, that the same tendency which was in Hebrews to Monotheism, was symbolically a true advancing to Monogamy:—a real progress, however gradual as such, into that which is the only basis to any rightfully-moral principle of conjugality.—And this entirely is supported by the fact of what is here, in the case of Hebrews, the equivalent that I have view to of what in Athens stood as symbol of Marriage-contract: or, initiating ceremonial of permitted birth-condition:—there also, as I am inferring, implying special *protest* raised morally, as from a consciously-higher stage, against environing State-practices of the same kind.

Just in proportion to the simplicity of their State-form, does what Abraham covenanted for, as in settlement for his people's binding to Jehovah, seem to have been that which, in contrast to the mysticism of Athens, went even barbarously direct to its purpose:—making it even practically impossible to any born son of Israel, partaking in the contract, to evade the terms of it.\* There was the

\* I draw the above inference as to the import of the covenant, from a comparing of its terms, as in *Gen.* xvii. 10, with that principle of general priestly ordination which appears manifestly such in, for instance, *Lev.* xiii. 24. And

earnestness of determination implied, which, while showing truly the coarseness of *this* kind, which of the other kind it was free from, explains naturally the whole impetus of religious development which the people became possessed of. For to ourselves, the barbaric standing rite of the Hebrews—referred necessarily by poet-prophets, in their historic generalizing backwards, to a formal instituting by the people's head,—can possibly only appear in the light of what afterwards came out of it, of rightly spiritual import, by the time that the proper advent was become due of what alone was the proper "spouse of the Lord", in a fully-Christianized Israel. We can only now see it in relation to what then Paul made of it, and supplanted it by, when the conviction had sprung into him, that for the real sign of adoption to God's Family—as by that "putting on of Christ" which every Man and every Woman also might attain to,—there needed only the same law of bidden purity, which also the "law of ordinance" itself signified,—though with the "literalness" of a too-brutal morality for cultured times,—to be henceforth, more effectually, only impressed on the tables of every heart. There was only in the case, it seems manifest, the change needing to be effected, and at last rightly effected, from the rude framing of a corporealized ideal of what was needful, into the adapted making out of an idealization of what was present of corporeality:—a making recognizedly "holy" of what only in its mere "literalness" was the contrary. I mean, that from the first rude intention of the Nation's ordi-

whether the rite in question were originated, or not, by Abraham, or by Moses, on their own tribe's account—which is always possible, on an understanding that, like this, makes the invention of it so possible to be multifarious: or, originated by many peoples independently:—is of no concern to my purpose: this only demanding what is notorious of it, that it belonged to the Hebrews characteristically

nance, to Paul's spiritualizing of it, there was purely signified the one thing that form-of-Marriage, as to any Religion in it, still signifies :—*a symbolic repudiation* of whatever, of the kind implied, lies outside of the standing barrier which Marriage constitutes.—And perhaps the very rudeness of the first form, in itself, may have been necessarily the only means, in its own time, of the success with which its principle was then established.

The required sealing at birth of every added son of Abraham with the original stamp of the Family-covenant of the people,—before he had power either to give or withhold consent,—was indeed but the same with that now-sought condition of Marriage, which should likewise, by its recurring regard to each particularized case of produced offspring, *so* regulate conditions as precisely *not* to abandon any child given birth to, to what now, as much as ever, may symbolically be thought of as the service of "false gods,"—the ruling passions of the lower part of humanity.—But moreover there was also contained, in the requirements of such legitimation into the Family of the Nation, the immediate action in-detail towards the individualizing of the reference, which was in reality co-incident with its spiritualizing. That is, an involved effect, from the first, on the private unions which as yet had *no* regulating of proper Marriage: giving already the needed turn of arrived importance to the Woman, which caused first the true distinction of the Wife to be made good,\* by this signifying but a right accordance carried out with the framed demand of the State (limiting unions thence principally within solely the proper range of the Tribe-Family):—since, in order that the

\* This appears exemplified pertinently in the mythic story of Hagar: who was divinely commanded to be banished by Abraham, in rebuke of that which was her presumptuous desire of setting her own son, being the son of a bond-woman, on level terms with the son of the true Wife.

State duly might be furnished with lawful children, it was inevitable that private persons should, similarly, make condition of legitimacy. This also marks clearly, in the spirit of State-government, that real change now induced which is this: cessation for it of the mere seeking of "multiplication" of its progeny; and the obtaining, instead, of the much better recognition, which is that of the real preferableness of a select few of state-members, such as are morally self-restrained, over whole hordes of licentious hangers-on.

The Israelites, it is true, vain-gloriously aspired for themselves, that their seed should notwithstanding be surely multiplied, even in numbers as of "the sands of the sea." Nor, if we allow for the after-change that had effect on them, was the aspiring left short of its fulfilment. That is, as brought about by the "Spirit" coming actually to have rule, in the very place of what at first was mere "Law."—And indeed, for sufficing *cause* to the whole effected progression thus befalling them,—itself planted in their very method of nationality,—I imagine that enough is always present in no more than, on one side, the very narrowness, as well as rudeness, of the mental status attached to the early people, as if commensurately with their alone-realized state-dimensions. I imagine that the "select quality" in the Hebrew nature, which indeed gained for the body of Israel its symbolic destiny of "chosen spouse of Jehovah", was truly as to intellect an express slowness of development, as such expressly contrasting with Athenian precocity, and precisely *not* in this way *antedating* the true need of the time; although, in another and the demanded sort of way, it was specifically furnished with the effective, though *un*-ideal, moral instinct, which in the matter concerned was, in fact, a truly deeper-than-intellectual mode of intellec-

tion. In other words, the Hebrew intellect from the beginning seems to have had in it the true *womanishness*, equally such in its narrowness and its freedom from sensuous images, which thence gave to it the world-function now in question :—of precisely elaborating for mankind the abstract sense of Conjugalitv on true terms, at once faithful to the case, and yet answering to the truest need of refinement. I mean, such as duly should have respect to the utter solemnness of what attaches to Conjugalitv, as the idea of “produced Life”; and also duly be respondent to the immediately-involved conditions for this, as to the problem of their true moral directing.

By my own scheme, however, I am guided to a more strictly inherent, and more properly a root-kind of cause, to this developing whole effect :—this being what I account of as residing in those describably-cotyledonous pre-efforts of true Religion which made basis for all efforts that should follow : enforcing from the first, by their own actual division in two sorts, the two-sidedness found present in the historic manifestings of the latter. I mean, what pertains generally, though also severally, to the two parted modes of fetishism of pre-Religion, which, even when formally subdued in the after-course of evolution, must have yet still pervaded, with their intrinsic character-in-several, the opposite workings of the religions Hebrew and Grecian. For, the kind of fetishism that on present terms prevailed with Hebrews, must necessarily, *in* prevailing, have killed out from them any inclining to idealism, of lighter sort than itself was congenial to. Being that which I suppose, it was indeed what we still, even in ourselves, and our own actual living consciousness of today, bear continual witness to, *as* sprung from a still-abiding source. We all of us know the sign of it, now imagined such, in that haunting dumb feeling, coming

over every one of us occasionally, in our intervals of cessation from thought positive, which is the sense of our ever-pending liability to Death. From this bound-up condition of our existence, as it is impossible to us ever to escape, so is it likewise impossible to us, now as much as ever to human beings, not to shrink. And why, therefore, should we be backward to own, of this abidingly-attached human fear, that, even as ourselves still partake in it, it is indeed but at one with that early-expressed feeling, all-imbuing the first character of Religion, as that of real Nature, which Religion in its first feebleness so frankly and so strikingly made utterance of:—the feeling which, to at least after-times, suggested the signal name of a produced “*panic terror!*”<sup>\*</sup>—out of which, moreover, it is still what I am scheming, to suppose always derived whatever in Religion is Religion’s best! Namely, that spirit of genuine “*reverence,*” made such by the commuting power of our higher feelings, which keeps always Religion rightly true, and rightly limited, to that sole child-like mode of temper that mixes always with confidingness the true *awe* of the proper feeling.—It was then solely this common pervading fear,—*being* thus taken for the common stimulus to Religion, in all its forms,—which I have now present in my thoughts as its “*root-cause.*” It was solely this unreasoning, but, no less, most reasonable common fear of human beings, which I consider to have been that really combated, in the case of Athenians,—as in the

<sup>\*</sup> In Mr. Sibree’s translation of Hegel’s *Philosophy of History*, I find the following most impressive explanation of this phrase of “*panic terror,*” as the common one for a “*groundless fright.*”——“The position of curious surmise, of attentive eagerness to catch the meaning of Nature, is indicated to us in the comprehensive idea of *Pan*. To the Greeks *Pan* did not represent the *objective* Whole, but that indefinite neutral ground which involves the element of the *subjective*; he embodies that thrill which pervades us in the silence of the forests.”—(p. 244.)

manner only appropriate to the warm and worldly-genial kind of nature of this people,—in that which I have referred to, as being their peculiar national practice: in the manner, namely, of a setting up against the Death-terror the full glory of Life's own proper mystery.—As to Egyptians, on the other hand, who supplied to Athenians their parent-method of such sort, I consider that they were here of peculiarity surpassed by the latter:—just as the nature of Egyptians, and the whole character of their religion, seems thoroughly as if saturated with, of specialty, even a fascinated self-delight in Death-gloom: making it that which was instinctive in them, even expressly to rush forwards into the depths of it.—But with Hebrews, I imagine this, of true difference from both. Even in that which, with them, was the possibly much ruder way of dealing with the feeling than that of either, I conceive that there was still what was so much more true to the case, and so much more instinctively just, as thence necessarily took hold of human nature, for destined perpetuity. I conceive, namely, that Hebrew action in the matter was *that*, so duly wrought on, and wrought out of, the common awe, that in even its cherishing this actually, for the time, into what indeed was a mere barbarous excess of its predominance, it yet led the feeling onwards, none the less, into the real course of its ultimate development.

This implies, I need to state,—or, at least, partly implies—a granting of the suggestion made by criticism, that Jehovah of the Hebrews was actually in the beginning but coincident with the Moloch of preceding Canaanites. That is, my own idea imports, that at first the Hebrew Deity fully shared in the fetish-character of a Death-symbol, which the Canaanites, like other persisting savages of the Semitic race, preserved in the same



light, *without* emerging, as Hebrews did, from the Moloch-stage of deification, to the very end of their appearing in History. And this idea supplies reason, I find, for what certainly is a sequent in consistency with it, that the religion of the Hebrews was so cruel as it was, even throughout: a religion so peculiarly one of *sacrifice*. The Hebrews showed evidently, I mean, that they had none of the moral horror towards *this* kind of fetish-rite, which they did indeed exhibit to the utmost against the opposite presentation of the same kind of thing: *no* horror of the fetish-service where the rites were those of cruelty; though a *right* horror of the other fetish-service which was extant, and which the Grecians found native to them, where the rites were of sensuality. Nor did their imbuing notion of demanded cruelty in "sacrifice" cease to cling to them even to the last; since Christianity only had power over it, to supersede it, in so far as lay only with a reversing of the original form of the notion. That is, by showing Deity itself here converted, for the proving of the new quality of Divine beneficence, into the *sacrificer* still thought of as necessary: the Being who now offered up His *own* Son, changed from Him who before claimed it of Abraham, that the latter should make of Isaac the required victim.

It seems to me, truly, that when I allow for this deeply-implanted instinct of religious fear, while attending to the early history of the stock of Israel, their exceptional religious course, by its local fitness to its surroundings and antecedents, is only enhanced in its seen value to the present power of esteeming of it, as now arisen into teleologic range of view.—The circumstances now in question, which as such require weighing for our judging of the mental posture of the right founder of the house of Abraham, who must surely be thought of as being

Moses, appear to me these. Transplanted, as Moses was, into the alien religious atmosphere of Egypt, and there expressly made "learned in all the wisdom" of that people\*, he has the need to be accredited also with the full spirit of the exclusiveness of his people: which, however, is but the same with the *negation* of addictedness to any kind of corporealizing familiarity with the thought of Deity:—he being farther to be remembered as fixed in set purpose, and believed mission, for the redeeming of his enslaved brethren, and the right making of a true Nation of them, perhaps rivalling or surpassing the Egyptians. The one problem with him therefore from the first must have been the finding of that necessary substratum in the case, to the conditioning of a Nation,—as in sequence with his own Semitic Tribe-ideal,—which should adequately be in place of, though on higher ground than, the mystic *Totem*, or accounted symbol of Family, which indispensably was such to mere savages. "The definer of the Tribe of Israel"—I imagine him as reasoning,—“must be that which essentially shall enforce *more* of the very effect which with Egyptians is the true merit in their mode of ritual; while it shall also demolish the whole offence which that ritual is encrusted with. What this does for the ennobling and the purifying of its priests, *by* their initiating in the deep secrets of Nature, and vowed life of restricted harmony with those; *I* will do for the entire family of Abraham, by no more than their native awe of their father's God: the God with whom he primarily covenanted for the ritual purity of his family. *My* people shall be a whole nation of priests.

\* *Acts* vii. 22. For my present teleologic purpose, it is indeed better, as seems of right for such object, to look back to the course of Moses by this later interpreting, than by its original Hebrew stating. In thus reading it by the eyes of Christian Stephen, we have the advantage of indeed holding firmly by a safe actual middle-station of dogmatic thought.

Nor shall they be this with any kind of the base pretence at imparted knowledge of Deity which these Egyptians dare to hide their real insight under. What they bind themselves to live by, as vowed priests, shall solely be accepted by them as the demand of the Unknown Unapproachable One. They shall thoroughly turn their backs on the accursed idol-worship of Egypt; and in its place shall have *nothing* but the pure awe of Him, who is too terrible to be even named by any name, that should carry in it any signifying of any image to mere sense. The sole Life-producer whom Hebrews shall worship, shall be dared to be asked nothing about Himself; but shall only be acknowledged by them to *be*."

To give this interpretation to the sublimest of the passages of the Old Testament,—which still carries its real shudder of awe into present readers of it; and forces them, in effect, even precisely in proportion to their own cultured intellectualness, to "put their hands before their face, and draw their shoes from off their feet,"—is, I conceive, the very farthest from really damping the intense "flame" of its inspiration, *by* its bringing within the reach of chronologic probability. Let it be granted, if it must, that when Moses, in his perplexity for outer signs to his people, had recourse, as is apparent, to natural lightnings and thunderings, both in the "bush" and also afterwards on Sinai, for their insisted-on evidence of Divine presence, he did so in the direct practice of duplicity: still, the refined mode of priestcraft this implies,\* affording a naturally-turned diversion of the existing gross instinct of idolatry into a course specially open to moral adjuncts; seems indeed the very *tact* in the directing of the religious sense in mankind, which it is a

\* "And they [the select elders of the people] saw the God of Israel: and there was under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone, and as it were the body of heaven in his clearness."—*Exod.* xxiv. 10.

matter of only honour to the female nature to call but "naturally woman-like." If Moses went up "into the midst of the cloud," behind which was that sight of the glory of the Lord, which was "like devouring fire on the top of the mount" in the eyes of the people; what he brought thence in testimony of that Presence was none other than this: the two tables of stone, on which was inscribed Moral Law for them. Nothing grander can be imagined, and also nothing of possibility more appropriate, than this manifesting of true Spiritual Negation!—This purely *moral* kind of "testimony" of the living Presence of the God of Israel among the tribe, it is true, was appointed to have made for its keeping, nevertheless, an "ark" that should indeed be ceremonially appurtenanced, with all gew-gaw of mere outward formality heaped lavishly about it: as a somewhat that would not hurt by the being tampered with. But the vital "testimony," in itself, was shut up there as jealously as whatever else, otherwise, priests had the practice of at that time making mystery of. The pure "tables of the law," esoterically closed out from common view; and hidden afterwards, besides, with mocked clouds of blinding incense, behind the veil of the temple-sanctuary,—to be thought of in utter dread, as always there bearing witness to the One whom to see was to die,—were the only "idols" that were really suffered to this people!—the only "symbols" that their leader would entrust them with!—And why not so, when a very stick, or very pebble, was what primarily might serve as a true Fetish?

That inspired case of spiritual evasion which the designation of "Jehovah," applied to the hidden Power in Nature, thus stands for, is in this light indeed totally different from—while, as a beginning speculation about Deity, it is intrinsically, as I imagine, much safer than—

the revealing of that principle of Self-Existence, purely and absolutely such, which the "reason" of later intellect has assumed its revealing. It has nothing really implying in it that Spiritual Beinghood, or unconditioned Egoism of the Universe, which orthodox metaphysics has referred to it. It is rather, as I conceive, the putting forth of a sole verb—the one verb of philosophic grammar,—as of right the only possible expresser of what only here has the right to be expressed.—A Semitic verb, in which accordingly is but the phantom of an implied nominative held suspended!—the Divine assertion of an "I AM THAT I AM," in which, however, is so the pronoun suppressed, as that rightly is the actual mere phenomenalness of the Universe, *as* revealed to us, and *not* any real absoluteness of it, at all sought to be represented:—only that which is mere Motion and E-motion, rightly figurable by the mere *verb*, being presumed to be included in the "name." The added pronoun of our English needs inevitably, it seems to me, to be felt by us as, still, but a mere void excuse for the Noun which the real case is unprovided with:—only as *that* which holds the solemn space that it encloses most truly "behind the veil" to us.\*

Such spiritualized version of the Totem-principle of barbarians, I imagine formed rightly the *catastrophe* of a true basis procured to what might finally be a rightly-natural Religion:—effected also, *as catastrophe*, in the

\* In this interpretation of the Hebrew phrase, I am in fact supposing what is exactly a reversal of balanced import with that expressed, in also a clear outburst of infantine inspiration, by the poet Goethe: in his crying out to himself, as he tells us he did, at the age of eight years, "*Ich bin ein Ich.*" Here, the whole force of the dictum is that borne by the pronoun in itself.—There is another phrase, however, most familiar to ourselves, where the very force of the sacred "name" seems even given with equivalence, though in the modern literalness that dispenses with any symbolism, and therefore uses but the pronoun of neuter gender:—"Whatever is, is right" (or, *Divine*).—If the three phrases be united mentally in successive layers, there seems truly to be embodied in right formula the entire progress of main religious conception.

very manner of a uniting of race-influences, within the mind of a "selected" individual, that afterwards took place with Christianity (see I. 298-9): *here*, as a parting of the general stock of true Religion from its brutish beginning of "seed-leafism"; just as *there* was made a parting out finally of Religion as thence to stand by itself, for only *one* of the tested elements of mind-action.—For, this negativeness of spirituality now affixed to the idea of Deity, was, in being such, the very "substance" on which rightly might be laid that mere doctrine of "relations",—or, of produce of the emotional part of us,—which had the function, as I contend, of finally assorting into right provinces our whole dominion of knowledge: the *inner* one of which concerns expressly, and exclusively, what follows as effect of our emotive "relativeness", in producing finally on ourselves that very quality of a needfully-limited Individuality, which, however, *could* be gained to us only by its first picturing on the imaged surface of Deity.

The imagined Life-principle which by Moses was thus purely bodied forth but in Words, was indeed, obviously,—as in consequence of the motive power of the latent feeling concerned,—most naturally adapted to the mode of limitation that is emotive. God, namely, being once recognized as to be known only by the intellect for "WHAT IS" and "EVER IS" (the latter also being expressed in the mystic naming of the Hebrew's God): the problem of working out an availing *noun* to the predicate—availing, as to the felt demand in the case,—concerned necessarily only the imparting to Him of emotive attributes: kept however free from any immediate correlation with human feeling. This idea of Jehovah, I mean to say, was in no degree that of even Abraham's God, except as "Abraham" stood for the whole body of

his people :—whence, the symbolized Father of the symbolized Nation had no involved hindrance to the full abstractness finally to be requisite, such as *words only* have the function of expressing (for a rightly-revealed *Logos* to human reason). In this special Hebrew case, therefore, the progress to this end—that of the furnishing of a reasoned *noun* to the whole *verb*-painted action of the universe ; and such *noun* as is itself but constructed out of ideas of merely signal *relations* :—the progress to this end, I would say, bears contained in it indeed that effect of causation, working downwards, which peculiarly at this stage meant expressly the first raising into mental importance of Women ; though also, in the same fact, having a tendency that in advance of this has betokened itself patently to the world's consciousness. That is, as to the two things being together involved in the one point of symbolic demand, that the Nation who was Deity's "chosen spouse" should be thence femininely conditioned for the abstract rank. In this nothing-but-merely-figurative demand, it appears to me, the whole character of first-Jewish and then-Christian Morality, with the uniqueness that belonged to it, is solely but most entirely made explicable ; and, much more, made permanently what the world is still in need of.

The merely-feminine Morality of the Bible, I consider, touches *only* that relation in ourselves towards Deity, which in practical interpreting means *chiefly* our position as to circumstances of Family. But, this admitted, how simple seems the following as the real course of Hebrew thought !—The sole witness to Living Godhead in Nature was received as the verbal Law, engraved on stones that were laid up in the hidden heart of the Nation's sanctuary. By only her obedience to this did the Nation fill her part in the spousal union with Jehovah, which, as in

real Marriage-contract, she had bound herself purely to carry out, as with Him only. Her only "righteousness" as a Nation was then necessarily but thus limited in its terms: that as Jehovah, for Himself, was, by his proved faithfulness to Israel to the rejection of all possible other States,—so reiteratedly insisted on by the prophets,—the One Husband that alone made her his One Wife: her due faithfulness of the same sort in return was the only virtue He could need in her. What was *law* to her to the last, even when Law was exchanged for Gospel, was the trust only in her first ordinance of settlement: that which, in resting first on the "faith" of Abraham, condensed afterwards into the sole "faith," individually entertained on the part of every member of Israel, in the proved "Father of Jesus Christ." The "law of God", which was a "converting of the soul", by the very "love of it", was never that which had other centre than Deity:—any more than in habitual family-life the Woman's "duty" is else centred than round her own ideal of that specialized sphere of life.—But, in this feminineness of the Moral sense that is Religious, what conflict had it naturally to undergo, in the effecting of its progress of condensation, with the realism of the existing mode of apprehension!—There was not only here to be encountered, as is notable, that struggle which was brought into the abstract case, by the vivid personalness of that presented "Son of Man", for the typical child of "God and of Israel", who thus held from the first double station to idealism: the signs of which struggle give intense realness to the whole body of the New Testament;—but even more, as now seems, was there constantly, although latently, being contended with, that harder of existing obstacles to be overcome, for the symbol's power of rightly prosecuting itself, which lay in the existing feel-



ing of contempt of that very character of sex which the female symbol of "Israel" was enforced under ; and which only *was* duly overcome,—or, rather, set on foot to be overcome,—when the rival Gentile effect was brought in junction.

If, as I suppose, the very One-ness of the State of Israel in its own eyes, was indeed the *cause*, and not the effect, of also the One-ness of Jehovah among the Gods of general States : *He* being the only true God, because *she* was the only true Wife, of State-kind :—this gained consequence of Monotheism, following always from comparison with Gentiles, *must* have settled for the Hebrews the principle of Monogamy once for all, without power of its ever after being unsettled. The thing still to be observed, however,—as always the preserved sign of unculture, at this stage,—is that here is no penalty imagined, or imaginable, for infringement of the true character of such union, save alone on the female side : the view naturally most acceptable to male thought, tending always to give it fixture there, as showing Marriage in a coercive light only towards Women. And this consequently must have acted with precisely the peculiarity, of (in the end) producing *only* for *Women* what is characteristically the due Conjugal Conscience, which in Paul-ine or "evangelic" morality is therefore found as so adverse, as it is, to a natural secular moral instinct : as urging duty, not on grounds of reason, but only of vowed faithfulness.—But with what eminent addition of benefit in the case,—as helpful to the monogamic native tendency of Hebrews,—must have fallen-in that supposed Persian conception, as acquired in the people's time of "captivity", which appears as the immortal allegory of Eden ! Here, plainly, what is the typical perfectness of human state, and of human happiness, is shown, as to its true stamp of de-

sign, in the placing by the Creator of precisely One Man and One Woman, side by side with one another, under the common Tree of Life. With this golden ideal once formed, and once practically adopted by the human heart, not the power of the "devil-serpent" itself—as being actually the embodied sin of sensuality, the natural tempter to infraction of true Marriage,—could certainly ever lead to re-produce for mankind any back-stage of the form of union. Ever after, a deliberate Polygamy,—and much more, any mere tribe-state of Marriage,—was cut off from mankind as impossible.

Once however Christianity having been realized,—as the great *plexus* of united courses of moral progress it is now taken for,—the abjuration of these lower forms was expressly sealed: "sealed", in repeated "legal" terms of created dogma, after the actual fashion of the original symbolic contract made by Hebrewism with Deity. For the "new covenant" with the God of Israel,—which so widened out the bounds of Jehovah's family as to admit including in it, in terms, the whole of mankind,—so also required of every child of this new Israel to be thence indeed morally "born again", (as thus newly initiated into state of spousehood with God *by* the spirit of moral purity,) as that truly, in the thought of Paul, to go back from it to the first ordinance, of mere outward ceremonial, would be needfully to make "Christ" of no avail; and himself, with the Gentile converts he had begotten, those who had laboured only in vain. This was manifestly the real cry that went forth, from the very heart of those who lived in the event, at the moment of the first issuing of the new covenant. Not even baptism itself,—however signifying, as is manifest, but the very quality of the moral purity that was in question,—was admitted by the great innovating Apostle for any other than a tempter to

mistake in the matter. The one point which he endeavoured to hold clear,—notwithstanding the double current he was at issue with, of exclusive Hebrewism, and mere abstract thought-progress (I. 301-4),—was, that the new body of the Lord's saints took, as such, the full character which had before been only National: comprising "legally" the condition, that to be "born" into this body meant towards *God* the insuring of His full favour of "selection", and towards *self* the implied vow of surrender to God's service, which was always that of repudiation of *other* service. And such development of the first contract—while indeed, to his own local stage of doctrine, it was such real breaking down of the extant wall of separation between Israelites and Gentiles, as forbade in itself any renewing of the old ground,—made the same thing only intrinsically more impossible, and impossible as well to Gentiles *as* to Hebrews, by that very turn to a new mode of Morality, which itself, as I argue, is only *newly-exclusive*, though now on what are actually rightful terms. I mean, as forcing need of human merit towards God to have always, in its being such, the implication of an *abstract representer*:—namely, the "Christ" who, in this sense, stands for only the symbolic form of Religious Duty: in-half, spiritually spousal, as by integration; in-half, simply filial, as expressing what, in common to all children of Deity, is yet personal to them individually.

Thus, in regard to my point of the *one Sacrament* of Religion, am I not actually borne out at this epoch as to here there being seen, in very process, that matter of transition which I have claimed, as only figurable indeed by change made from Planet-form into Tree-form?—What before was only grossly-constructed Nationalism, now inventively re-created itself into that which was the basis of the destined *Church*. That is, into the considered

spiritually-combined body, meant for totally apart from what are national limits, which yet carried on its own spiritual objects by a plan of truly-organized government, befitting specially concerned ends affecting Nations. And,—just as change that is organic is impossible to be made at once, without anomalous monstrosities intervening,—the condition that befel “the Church”, when it forced itself actually, as by inherent instinct of hereditary Semiticism, to be still that which Paul had forbidden, of a virtual Nation with a human Priest for virtual head of it, seems rightly indeed but the consequence of the true progress prevailing. The Pope’s temporarily-obtained sovereignty over the Church, while offering the sociologic anachronism of a barbaric patriarchate restored, seems however just in this but the case of an adhering crust of the old kind of State-formation, which as such but protected serviceably the then-forming one :—by which latter indeed I mean the plan of those mouldings-in—several of Church and State, which in every Nation’s government have need to co-operate, on the terms of sociological Sex. From the very first, I imagine that Priest-power and King-power have both served as needed checks on one another, for restraining of abuses, and also acted as mutual means on one another’s true development: whence no other State-condition seems made possible as a perfect one, than such as shall constantly maintain both, in harmonious force. And consequently whatever followed at Christianity’s birth, from the infused secularism there which the letting-in of the Gentiles to Jewish State-hood had the effect of, must certainly, I conceive, so have implied the inner conflict set on foot of the two dominating principles, as could only have end, by the very nature of it, in creating that Tree-mode of self-conscious institution which I am contemplating as the centered State-form of

Marriage, rightly limited to the defining of proper "Family." That is, by the organic spreading out of social habits and forms of life under influence of the combined principles, in such way as by Tree-law must necessarily follow in the assortment of the Tree-type:—by my own postulate, the same with type of Family.

The mingled substance of Christian dogmatism—mingled specially as sense of Brotherhood, drawn from Grecianism, with the always stock-mode of principle, in *itself* that of Family,—circumstantially had to encounter, and act upon, the fresh soil of the native character of Europeans, who were already laid out under (principally) Teutonic and Celtic divisions: the former *ready* to assimilate, and re-organize, what should naturally be masculine and fraternal; the latter *ready* to make the most of what was feminine and parental, in the new organizing-conceptions. While therefore the proper Statehood of Nations throve chiefly with the former, as by means of the great Protestant and Republican re-action against Popedom; I suppose that, intrinsically, with the mental status that is of specialty Religious, as being Catholic and Celtic and Woman-like, thought was working in this way. Namely, in the manner that should truly reduce the sense of "divine right", first incongruously applied to civil Monarchy, to the personal feeling of divinely-imposed duty, and divinely-imposed privilege, which indeed properly has its secular manifesting in the sole form of Self-government which *is* that of morally-framed Marriage-law. The "divine right" of true Marriage, I conceive, is only that of giving children to God on State-covenanted-for terms which mean *all*, in real essence, both that Grecian initiation and that of Hebrews foreshadowed:—children, whose *real* birth, for this reason, should be made in future, a *new* kind of birth: *so* promised for—

or, the rather, *so* solemnly intended for—by the proposed parents, as to be on the pattern of the true type of filiation to Deity, that the real character of the Christ, as to this, may be fulfilled in them.—In the same way that, to possess a rectified type of National-being and State-government, is to bring all influences of National life to bear rightly on the *male* feeling in us, of fellow-brotherhood with one another : in first the social sense, which thence passes into the immediate and rightly-personal sense ;—I conceive that to have arrived at a similar ripened type of what is the import of life under Domestic ties, is to have begotten in human nature the true feeling which needs assorting as *female* : as to first, also, the abstract sense of this, which means generally Religion ; but thence, farther, as real ultimate effect, as to Women's specially-obtained Conscience in respect to it. To have realized the true Gentile-ism in Christianity of Christ's common representing of all mankind, is virtually to annul, to religious thought, the true secular benefit of the limitation into Nations ; but precisely therein becomes enhanced in its virtue the religious limitation of Family. —With regard therefore to the Romish Church, while I consider that, in outer sort, it was in service to development chiefly as demolishing the old Semitic incongruity of Priest-and-Sovereign-united, by the very monstrousness of its applying to a concrete "Father of the Church": thence rightfully giving cause to the whole struggle for the true principle's Reformation ;—I conceive that it helped otherwise, *more* effectually, the true inner-rooted progress of culture, by coincidently demolishing the other yet-remaining primal obstacle, which was the incongruousness of a *male* human being representing a rightly-*female* conception : a *Pope* standing for that Church which as such was in dogma the *Wife* of Christ.

And this end it accomplished, I imagine, by its continuously really substituting both for "Christ" and for "Pope" in human thought, the idea of "Christ's-Mother":—who was in reality the main rectifier of the true type of Domestic-state. From the merely limited office of but taking up anew the gross station of the devised "Pope", as merely Mother to the Church just as he had been Father to it, the ideal Mary was cut off by the very terms and entire plan of the Christian Trinity: whence indeed the whole matter of Mariolatry, as here planted, is of right but a mere episode in the dogmatic course of Christianity. Mary, in being one only among Women,—*without* power of that mystical doubling of nature, which as to Jesus counteracted *his* being also only one among Men,—was therein only empowered to be one, though the chief one, among a whole community of worshipped Saints: every one an "intercessor" with Deity, and needing separate religious homage to him, or her. And this manifestly was no more than a renewing of that effect of old Polytheism, which should gain finally for Women, as I am supposing, *not* domestic assortment of position, but in fact rather only the mere status that is due to them politically, and thence subordinately, as by means of their mere Sistership with Men. But the *root*-image of female function that was really such, was still involved, and still passing on, towards crisis of its own requisite ripening, by that which was always this binding condition: that the initial type of domesticity should have in it, of equalized abstractness, its *three* requisite elements. Mary, having now become rendered, in the habit of common feeling, as truly a new Eve, for the typifying of Woman's state of Wifely-Motherhood,—thus excluding once more, with due absoluteness, the possibleness in the type of Marriage of any imagined *second* Wife:—the "Holy

Family" concerned was guarded firmly within the terms which thence resulted, of Father-Deity, Divinely-unpolluted Mother, and Divinely-perfect Man, Son of Deity, —this latter as much the only-begotten, *as* the Mother was the only-espoused: such being rightly the static formula of Filiation only fitting the prevailing "now" that pertains to Deity; although always admitting naturally that resolving into the full series of begettings which an interpreting of the symbol literally involves the seeing there. And accordingly, here I find also the simple reading of the case of the law of Marriage. By the time that the inclusive symbol had *so* worked on human thought as to have gained practically a creative result, that formula which, as humanly concerned, has view *always* to a contained series of begettings, did timidly present itself in the bosom of Christian doctrine, *as* imposing, for the first time, the proper aspect on Marriage of that of a Church-Sacrament, expressly for individual Christians. And the whole religiousness of the first symbol may rightly, as I imagine, here at present fully embody itself.

This *trifling* innovation of Ecclesiasticism, as which ordinarily it appears only to be taken, stands in History without anything of specific proclamation.\* The effect of it was only slowly absorbed into human feeling and human habits.—But for this very reason it seems to me what *should* have been the occurrence having in it the kind of import I suppose: that of a resident ability to give focus henceforth to the whole mass of Ecclesiasticism, in also being the means to hedge in with right re-

\* According to Haydn's *Dictionary of Dates*, the celebration of Marriage in churches, as a Sacrament, was first ordained by Pope Innocent III., at the close of the 12th century (about A.D. 1199).

This work mentions also that marriage-ceremonies were ascribed among the Greeks to the introduction of Cecrops, about 1554 B.C.



verence the provided character of Family. In the effecting of this concentrating condensement, there had need to be sifted out of the standing Christian conception that stamp of local error, and local barbarism, belonging to the time even of the dogma's Christian origin—to ourselves, at this moment, eighteen centuries behind-hand in development,—which assumed, on the mere strength of male instinct, the Divine order-in-permanence of the Woman's inferiority to the Man: from which always, in Marriage-state, she should need to see in *him* that she took for Husband, that very kind of appointed *Head* as which the Divine Christ was received by Church-members. This assumption, which is still held by in our Protestant version of the Romish institute, has manifestly in it, nevertheless, that incongruousness of peculiar Papistry, just noticed,—of a special mingling in confusion things concrete with abstract,\*—which even positively ensures, as I consider, its coming duly to its end, in due season of intellectual advance. But, in the mean time, the very progress to this end, with the work of “sifting” which is herein comprehended, I believe has been really acting, in due gradualness, through especially that agency of Ecclesiasticism on particular life of Christian persons, which precisely has been framed *sacramentally*. By the action of the working Sacraments of the Church, it assuredly *has* happened precisely, that the power in Christian dogmas, whatever it may have been, has come home to the living sphere of human practice. And if, then, it be true, as I suppose, that the one Sacrament of Marriage

\* It might indeed be said of the Male character in general, that this dominates over the feeling of Women:—as oppositely it may be said that the idea of Feminineness is dominant over Men. And this would be actually the librating kind of influence towards which I am looking forward as final.

really includes in it the centered virtue of all, it is surely in this also that the true raising of human conduct in Marriage—which is the one thing now in question,—has been constantly maintained in procedure.

The Marriage-Sacrament is the includer of, in the first place, *Ordination*, both for the Man and the Woman. What is it but the very lifting up of both into that truest and very highest of priestly offices, which is that of being Vicars of God, even in his attribute of Creator:—yes, and also, of Redeemer and Sanctifier!—It is eminently, next, the includer of the whole meaning, the initiatory meaning, of *Baptism*, whether as referrible to adults or to infants: always indicating, in either way, a vowed design of sexual purity, whether to be practiced on in person, or to be enforced upon offspring.—It includes, farther, *Confirmation*, as to the offspring, so vowed for, taking up their proper share in the vow.—It includes mutual *Confession*, and mutual *Penance* to be often willingly undergone, with attendant need also of mutual *Absolution*.—It includes truly *Extreme Unction*, as to the life-long intended tether of its binding contract.—Nay, it even includes finally, and as it were comprehensively, the full widely-varied import which Church-History has shown attached to the signal Sacrament of the *Eucharist*:—partly, as the mystic “sacrifice” of the “mass”; dramatically symboling, by its very intention, the whole *action* of Christian dogmatism;—partly, as the more rational commemorative rite, which is the paschal “supper” of the primal Hebrews. In the first sense, the whole meaning of the fought-over idea, whether of orthodox “transubstantiation”, or of semi-heretic mere “consubstantiation”, in the sacred elements of the ritual, seems truly but in sequence to the imagined need in the reigning image of the Church’s Spousehood, of proving “Hus-

band" and "Wife" in the case really made "of one flesh", according to the Hebrew notion of the fact of Sex. The swallowing naturally of the sanctified "bread and wine"; as Christ's substance, ought inevitably to bring the female nature of the human disciple *into* sameness of nature with *His* nature : whence the change, referred to *Him* as a constantly renewed incarnation to corporeality, made the act of Divine Marrying also in a state of ever needfully repeated substantiation.—And no less, in the second sense of "commemoration", does the effect really involve, with deeper force, even the immediate moral practice of Marriage, as represented in the rite ; with moreover the true rectifying suggestion also present, that needs finally, as now argued, work out of the habitual sense given to Marriage, the precise injury now done here to Women. For, if indeed, by the abiding dogmatic image, the Husband who now takes up Christ's place is therefore ranked as rightful *Head* to the Woman ; this is only however in regard to that human side of the Christ-nature, where truly the obtained Headship was the effect only of the pure merit of self-surrender. And this, by 'express intention, as referring to the literally undergone suffering of that glorified human being who, by the witness of true History, sealed the originating of Church-doctrine with his own blood : the nucleus to the general myth which has carried livingness of human interest all along ! Even still, at the present day, namely, the Husband in common Marriage has it in consequence demanded of him, that his own lower nature, just as Christ's, should be sacrificed in the act of Marriage to his higher : which means obviously that all "sin of self-indulgence" should be subdued, which as such wars inevitably against the required sacredness of the engaged-in covenant :—the covenant, as I contend, that *can* be a sacred one,

only as also a mutual one, between those who are concerned in it.

By the proper means of these severally-expressive symbols, battled over as to their rightly-pertaining import through the controversies of the Church from its beginning, I conceive that there has really been proceeding that finding by the human mind of the naturally-fitting character of "the Family", which indeed has only now—under present crisis—gained a ripened and fully-tested distinctiveness for itself. These ardently-fought controversies, in following after previous symbolic struggles which were National, I conceive to have been the natural and sole means of enabling human thought even to apprehend, in the barest fashion, what the Family *may* organically rise into, as a truly *higher* mode of social integration than the Nation, provided for within the sphere of every Nation. What at first was the vague principle of Nationalism, has, I imagine, by the very action of this kind of mental battling, through historic ages, settled rightly on those circumstanced organic centres, making up the main substance of every State, where of specialty has been basis for that settling: the constituting of which narrowed integration, in this deepened kind of type, is thus solely as the effect of the meeting of the two currents of principle, Domestic and National. Every member of Family is therein also a member of the State;—but when once that entire body of principle which has heretofore been symbolically applied to Deity, shall have settled down rightly on the ground of proper *homely* Morality, I scheme that the two institutions together—each, by very contrast, helping rightly the other,—will distinctively work out for mankind that *new* stage of progress which is now due,—both in regard to what still remains National, or Secular; and to that specially-

inner sphere, which in being always Religious, is likewise Individualistic.

But in what way—it must still be considered,—is this latter great result, here believed in, to be expected to gain testimony from History?—The constituting of the refined State-hood of Family, as thus traced, seems indeed to have had, all along, its palpable steps left discoverable;—but is the same even imaginable—we need to ask ourselves,—of that ultimate effect on pure consciousness, which is indeed only naturally metaphysic?

Only, it seems to me, in one way, is this testimony to be looked for. And that is, in the mode of a mere negative inference, to be furnished by History, the nature of which it will suffice to explain by the slightest kind of indication.

I mean, by a general comparison made, of the broadest possible sort, between the human status existing under the foregoing-treated course of progression, as evolved gradually out of this, and the general out-lying status of alien peoples:—these latter, on my own terms, having specially been *not* “providentially” included in what makes the *proper* stock of human progress.—And in fact, as may be remembered, I anticipated the arriving need of this comparison, for any power of completion of my scheme, from my first laying out of this, as regarding such main line of progression (I. 57). The one stock which I assumed as my subject, “Hebrew-Grecian-Mahometan-Teutonic”, I did so assume because in it I considered to be contained the religion of the whole civilized earth, with the solely-needful exclusion of whatever otherwise had gone to the one rival stock of Buddhism: making then the observation, now in question, that the very matter of the inferiority of the latter, *when* contrasted with

the one that has been successful, might guide us of peculiarity to the actual cause of the success.—The comparison, however, has besides been preparing itself constantly for the showing, through the whole matter just gone through, of the stating of the proper “aim” of my own scheme:—since, what *is* the deriving of a teleological view of Religion, save precisely that of gaining the very kernel of its purport?

*Why* the outer stock of Buddhism has relatively been a failure in human History, I recognize, as it is common to do, to lie solely with its defect as to Monotheism: this being necessarily the consolidating element of Religion, alone capable of endowing it with the kind of working efficacy I attribute to it. Unripened into Monotheism, no kind of religious formula set forth can possibly have in it the agency—on, first, the abiding human relations; and on, thence, the real making of the individual human being, as such,—which is the object of my own scheming. And thus, in *wanting* the full power of this ripening, it seems evident to me that Religion, in the nature of it, *can* only have become, as it proves to have become,—either frittered, on the one hand, into the fragmentariness which has been shown in the Polytheism of Brahmanism, —or, on the other hand, dispersed into the shadowiness which has been that of proper Buddhism: as the culminating stage in the case, which is thus the true one giving parallel to Christianity. For, by this view, the very attaining to the sense of real Monotheism is by no means the mere effect of native instinct in the human mind, but, much more, the consummating of a decisive stage in mental progress: the “*credo in unum Deum*” being indeed only the centralized product of the wide elaboration of the entire dependent creed (p. 18).—What precisely is therefore the sole problem now in question, is that of the

real cause—or rather, the actual mode—of the Indian stock's having been short in the centralizing ability.

The stock that has succeeded I hypothesize to have done so by exclusively its comprehending in itself the two opposite demanded characters, circumstantially provided, and “providentially” blended, of the Aryan and Semitic forms of mentalism, brought nationally into mutual encounter.—And here let me say a word which becomes necessary, as in parenthesis to my subject, on the somewhat of contradiction to my view which appears in the including, as attached to this stock, of the alien product of Mahomedanism. I do indeed consider this outer branch but, in fact, a mere result of what, in the interest of the main course of dogmatic progress, I can see only as a special point of arrest, and of even degradation, in development. It seems to me to bear character of, precisely, a rigid perpetuation of Semiticism, with its own patriarchal mode of government, and its own permitted status of Polygamy, carried on beyond rightly any power of needed rectifying by admitted Aryan influences, even as brought under contact with these, when it happened to it to be so,—this being, however, circumstantially on little favourable terms. In its adoption by the Persians, namely, it met Aryanism of a too antiquated cast ;—while there where in chief its own doctrine was promulgated, was among mere Turanians, alone capable of developing its worst side. In such soil could no ripening proceed of that Idealism which alone is real culture. No Trinity had any means to unfold itself ;—and, in consequence, both were Women left outside of consideration, and the self-character of individual Men was such as fitted : a mere isolated and case-hardened individualism, essentially inorganic and unimprovable.

As to the Indian stock, however,—to return to this,—

I find the root of difference from our own so deep-seated, that I must count it even abortive throughout :—notwithstanding its actual depth of existence, and the also-actual magnificence of its original resources !—And the “*why*” of this, moreover, I see as if placed from the first in the very matter of its having a truly contrary excess, to that which was the excess in Mahomedanism. That is, an excess, now, of intellectual Aryanism, needing feminine admixture enough rightly to religionize it. As what it was, originally,—or, rather, as first we discern it,—in the pure principle of the Vedas, it was manifestly too delicate and too intangible for its own time. As what next it became, in the subtle doctrine of the Brahmans, it spread out into an entanglement of theology,—contemptuous even of the æstheticism that was the abiding inspiration of the Grecians,—barely hideous and revolting to human sense, in the whole manner of its embodiment. And, as in culminating Buddhism, it finished thence naturally, with a form of sheer Negation-of-Religion :—endeavouring indeed to enshrine, as in place of sound Religion, a form of nothing more than of abstract Morality ; but in this, as of consequence, I conceive, really failing at foundation. A Morality on such terms, by my own principle, could be only what is intrinsically unpersonal ; and, on that very account, baseless. It could be only a Morality *without form* ; which must therefore be similarly *void of good*, to human nature.

If it indeed had so happened, in pre-historic circumstance, that there had been a uniting effected bodily between the two giants of primal culture, the Indian and the Egyptian,—the abstracting and the sensualizing first-stages to Religion,—an effect may be imagined well to have followed, that should really have combined into one, thus early, the whole virtue of Religious Formalism !



—And yet it may be, such event is *not* actually imaginable. In being only *pre-Semitic* and *pre-Aryan* in their natures, the two formative existences may have really been *pre-sexual* also, and incapable of uniting.

But, in actual fact, while symbolism-of-Egypt has gained means of historically leaving fruit of itself,—rightfully to ripen, and again to inter-fructify,—the keener intellectualism of India has remained a mere celibate in world-history (—except as to the baser kind of union, with Turanian formations, not necessary in present view to be accounted of).—And with what practical consequence?—To answer this, in as far as the question *is* capable of answer, must be also, I urge, the very point I have now in demand. That is, there must necessarily be adduced the express quality of Individualism which, on an average, has shown itself present in the race of Indian Buddhists.

To get at this matter, then, I imagine that the course is solely this. We must farther bethink ourselves of the entire mass of lower circumstance than human, which continuously from the first has produced in the Hindoo people their resident constitutional nature :—they being thought of, moreover, as representers of the whole number of Asiatics, lying west of Semitic races :—nay, besides, for this occasion, of the whole general mass of lower races *than* Semitic, in whatever region planted. I mean, for the duly taking into account, with regard to Indians, of that effect on them of crude physical “Nature”, or material environment, which *all* national constitutions of early times had to go through the ordeal of making terms with. It is always as to this the required understanding, that for the kind of human nature in the case to have obtained rightly the due *mastery* over Nature, which we must account it the human birthright to possess,

is also the right proving of the special class of human beings concerned the teleologically—"elect" of such. With Indians, however,—and with these as standing rightly for all others than our own combined race-stock,—it *has* been shown certainly with sufficiency, by the vague testimony of general History, that Nature herself, instead of the human beings, has comparatively gained the balance on her own side :—in most evident reverse to that which has happened with our own stock.—And, more than this, it seems evident farther, I contend, that the manner of the failing of Indian Buddhists, *as* precisely religionists of their own kind, has truly answered fully, by defect, to what here I have argued for, as the intrinsically right nature of Religion. What gives to the human being, in any case, true power of command over Nature, is undoubtedly his possessing, in full measure, the thorough Personality, and thorough Individualism, which is the same thing with a perfected Selfism :—this being needfully true, also, of as much every one, as of every other, of the integrated components of races. And the sign of this belonging to our own stock, I have found in the ability of Christianity, as our central Religious Form, to mould duly out of the primal dread of Nature—furnished everywhere, but *more* in other climes than in ours, with proper Death-bringing and terror-causing agencies,—the beneficent antagonist it has proved itself: so proved itself, by exalting into Idealism those special Relations affecting us, whose function is that of developing for Mankind what is Personal Individuality.—For the races that have been Buddhists, however, the signs lie entirely as those short of this character. The required balance between organic and inorganic conditions, having with them, as appears, been perpetually *un*-adjusted to the degree needful, the native terror of conscious life has also

been left never overcome:—Religion was in infancy arrested at the point of that still-remaining gross Superstition, which it had in the hands of the Brahman priesthood; and even when sought to be amended by the great Moral Reformer, who of prophets was the one eminently such, gave way nevertheless under his grasp. It was not capable, on the trial, of being other than sheerly negatived.—One thing, but that only, the Buddhist practiser gained the power of, in himself. Undefended, as he was, by Religious forms, with which to do battle against Nature, he was yet so far strengthened in moral selfhood, as to be enabled to acknowledge boldly to himself the crushing Tyrant he found in her. He was enabled, with self-gratulating magnanimity, to cast himself voluntarily before her, and let her grinding chariot go over him!—For, what other than this is actually the known fruit of proper Buddhism? A mere Abstract Morality, unpointed by Religious Forms, it has given that for its end which is equally without point for human progress. It has ended, as was natural, in the idealizing of only a state of *Nirvana*!

This, however, is still something. It is still something in world-history, to have exemplified what this signifies. That is, the native grandeur of a moral principle, self-contained, that *can* thus enable the human mind, from its high post, duly to look down upon Circumstance, with conscious dignity of felt *scorn* for it:—conscious victory in being vanquished.—A somewhat of such spirit is that which it is well to us to have known of as realized, and still capable of being realized, within the heart of our species:—it is that, as to which there are fearful emergencies, oft arising to the happiest of us, that make precious our perception so gained of it, and our feeling of having it always in access to us, for sharp

medicine of remedy!—But then, in ordinary, we need food, and not poison. We need strengthening and vitalizing. And it is *this* with which, therefore, the Religion that has “providentially” succeeded, has supplied us.—Even as to its own point, of abstract Virtue, and abstract Truth, the Religion of Hindooism is still but a mere warning, by its very want of vitality. The Buddhist, as such, has no more than mental feebleness in possession, and mental suicide in the background. He stands to us abrupted and unfinished in his Manhood, on exactly the ground of his wanting that influence of Family which true Religion only brings with it; by which also is alone real strength to be had, both to conduct life and enjoy life. Instead of leading to desired annihilation, what the true Religion means has only an effect the direct contrary. It tends to make life only that which is too endearing, and too beautiful, to be likely to be even easily enough parted with!\*

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Such as these, then, are the *momenta* of History, which, it seems to me, are requisitely drawn forth by my own method of seeking for them :—by the mode, namely, of

\* In the drawing up of these latter points of result from my own principle, I wish expressly to make acknowledgment that I have had before my mind the well-known “Lectures” of the late Rev. F. D. Maurice, on *The Religions of the World and their relations to Christianity*. It occurred to me to read this work about ten years ago, while freshly under the impression of my own already-formed hypothesis, and while sketching out the plan of this work; and I hoped at the time, and ever since, that when I should come to the pre-

Philosophy, which expressly takes start from my own point of view, as of a Woman.—They are obviously, I may surely say of them, quite different from what proper

sent point, in my final elaboration of material, I might add a particular comparison with the ruling idea of those "Lectures". May I be permitted to say boldly, that the peculiar force of this justly-popular exhibition of Mr. Maurice's views only heightened my belief that my own were the more adequate—the more intrinsically-demanded? Where he cast such genuine light, as I recognized that he did, on the philosophy of Religion, I still felt that my ideas went deeper.—And in what sense I say this, let me explain, as I may, by no more than this one succinct sentence of quotation. The Rev. Lecturer says, at p. 130 of the 1st Edition (1847),—"This is the report which history gives of these religions.....Dare you talk of all this as merely an illustration of the working of the religious principle in men?"

I find indeed that space fails me to enter fully into the answer I have in thought made to this challenge. But I will still try to condense here its general import.—What I gather to be the gist of Mr. Maurice's exposition is this. While all attempted religions of mankind, save only Christianity, have failed in the character intuitively-demanded of a "revelation", as a making known of true Deity for a Divine *Person*, acting purely upon Nature by spontaneous Divine *Will*: they all prove to us, accordingly, the utter difference between humanly-exerted impulse towards religion, and the needed sort of proper religion, which comes only as imparted by the Divine Being. The Mahometan religion has adhered firmly all along to the Jewish faith in the *living* Sovereignty of God, ruling in presence amongst nations; and in so far has been a witness to the truth. The Hindoo has borne opposite testimony as to the force of proper Intellect, whether as abiding in Deity or in *man*, as to the special priestly caste among men. The Buddhist has enlarged on the same matter, by making the Divine nature of Intelligence what, potentially, is universal: thus tending to the same thing with negation of it. The Zoroastrian shows more practically, and less speculatively, the ideal of Moral Light: set, in Dualism, against Moral Darkness, and in hatred towards all physical symbols,—which latter were, again, to the Egyptian the essential matter of religious reverence. But in every case, and in every other case, the striving was only partial; and, as such, was inadequate to the occasion of religion: nor, as the Author draws his inference, was it possible for human striving, of itself, to be other than continually inadequate. He says specially of Hindooism,—“I ask nothing more as evidence that there is that in man which demands a revelation—that there is not that in him which makes the revelation” (p. 55).—I meet this, then, as follows. I grant that in none of these historical cases was there, indeed, possessed by the human nature concerned the ability of attaining what is offered as the actual fruit of “revelation”; while I entirely acquiesce that this centres in a conviction of Personality;—but I add-on the condition, transforming indeed

Sociology educes, setting out on its own masculine track; and yet, none the less, I contend, they are rightfully, and most cogently, such as lawful Sociologic results are in need of, to be proved lawfully responsive to themselves. For, while the latter must mean always, as I admit, the shown signs only, in human progress, of a developing principle of Society:—what else must go with this, in true

to the whole notion, that this realised Personality is, of right, not attributable to the Divine Beinghood, which to me is of right but symbolical, but needful to be known by us as only affecting the human Self. And I argue that the arriving at this result, in precisely what is actually its held character of a now-realized "revelation", is, in real truth, but an added specimen to all other past examples, of the "miraculous" effect of "integration",—here specially of the kind following on historic junction of opposed habits of speculation. And it is, manifestly, only the full principle of Development, made out, that permits of this mode of explanation: requiring necessarily, as it does, the conviction about human "personality", that, like every other human attribute, it has *not* been from the first in possession, nor even from the first of what counts for the obtained sphere of historic knowledge; although to ourselves it does actually so notably stand as a formed "intuition". I concede entirely, that *without* this conviction,—or, so long as it is considered of "personality", as it is, in the mode of Mr. Maurice, by indeed the general class of philosophers, that it is what has ever been a constant part of human nature, only needing to be, as wanted, *un-enfolded*:—while thus merely thought of, I concede, that for its actual "revealing" to self-consciousness, a real miracle, such as heretofore has been contemplated, could only have been that which should suffice.

And may I venture to surmise, of this argument, that it may even reach to apply to what by Hegel himself seems made the base-principle to his own showing of the Philosophy of History?—I own fully that I am without ground, on my own part, really to justify the offering of this remark; since I have only on which to rest it short glimpses into his work on this subject (by means of the translation I have referred to), made recently with confined view to the express matter of this chapter. But it seems to me, in fact, what is open to almost instant perception, that any applying of "reason" to historic investigation, pre-assumed as "divine" or not-subject in itself to evolution (on common ground with all other of intuitional capacity in us), is really wanting in such supplement to Hegel's own doctrine of development, as alone has the means of its making good. A "reason" strictly human, as fruit of the very course of eventuation which it here is employed to explore, and give account of, is surely that whose function may solely be of right testified, to itself, as *not* that which is at fault in its own basis.

counterpart, than the kind of afforded evidence that is here claimed as such? That is, the proof, duly furnished, of a progressive Individuality, and a deepening Personality, ever coming to the proper beings who are the constitutors of Society.

With this offering, therefore, of my own effort to this end, I now fully complete the designed object of this division of my work, comprised in the present volume. I said, at the beginning of this, that the only mode of my showing, with any truth of *ex*-pression, what had come to be my *im*-pression about Religion, must needfully be that of as if a word-*painting* of it: expressly, as of the landscape-sort, ranging under the effect of it, both by outline and colour, my field of universal thought-subjects, grouped rightfully into due masses to receive this,—under, namely, a right regard to “perspective”. And, at least to my own personal feeling,—let me be suffered to say,—I *have*, in the whole plan of this volume, closely followed on the trace of the analogy: so as *now*, as I believe, to have worked out that very point of present station, ruling vision into the whole outlying “distance” of my subject, which, by law of “perspective”, is the condition that makes painting alone true. My teleology here tracked,—and, while now led on finally through the proper line of History which is of Human progress, having previously been led similarly through the ranges both of Tree-history and Star-history, with constantly my one purpose held in view,—*has* given to my own feeling, I cannot less than now state, a retrospect of clear purpose of the highest sort reigning everywhere.—My Religion, in being that of Development, has been possible to show only as delineated under motion: only as effect of sequence in conditions;—but in now looking back to its moving course,

as from a gained position seeming stationary, I feel truly as if thence a common livingness of reality had been portrayed. And chiefly, as I said at first, by effect of produced "atmosphere."—Positivism, as I judge it, has *no* sense of atmosphere. It paints itself always as the little natural and un-religious view of Nature which is wanting both in air, and thence in sunnshine.—And so also of all Science does it seem to me, as to even its very best and purest modes, that it fails in the same way; neither being able, nor indeed so pretending, to render into analysis what could only escape in the endeavour: mental air and mental sunshine being known to it as, in spite of their being as real as any other of known facts, yet what touch only on our integral experience.—But in my own assorted method, which by intention has the full aim of being integral, I claim that they are both of them fully indicated as present. Even in casting back my subject of Religion to that opening of it which I have figured as astronomic, my thought-picture, I urge of it, has indeed the true hold on the living Past of things, which does rightly unite foreground with distance for the betokening of a true subject;—since those which I have here chosen as *momenta*, or first glimmering indications of Religion's dawn, do actually, as in rule of perspective, so widen out duly to thought the suggestion of the dim world lying under them, as makes space for the whole mighty implication. And still in this faintly-hinted world, the very light now made clear as to foreground, has also, as I believe, really fallen back reflectionally even into those air-depths of mere mist. From the very first of Creation being made ideal, and Nature's own mode of thought and of pre-vision being accounted of, the idea of Sex has been found traceable, looming forwards into our spectacle of her whole scheme of things. And where



later my *momenta* have been clearer ones, as thence spreading physiologically into the ground of what are life-infused forms, only the more have they seemed fit for the reflecting of the very day-light of Religion's meaning. Of the whole, therefore, I have come thus to feel, that it shows indeed a world of such sort as is possible to be indeed lived in and breathed in.

But the consequence from this, which yet lies before me to be considered, and is eminently of a deeper kind of importance, is also here prepared for, to be dealt with on its own terms, with what seems to me an equally true footing. Having now done with the present aspect of my subject, which in being merely intellectual I have called its bare night-aspect: I find indeed in my held clue of "*design* throughout Nature", here my guide for Religion seen in sequence, the basis of immediate sort that is now called for in a true static position. That is, for such finishing of my thought-picture as requires solely the mode of handling fit for foreground.—This must totally be different from that which was in chief concerned with distance. What are "rules of perspective" must now yield, in their direction of my subject, to what is the express contrary,—to what is the properly-individualized expression of my gained principle: which, in fact, can be pertinent and genuine only as the *less* it is restricted by formal rules of direction. My theory, *as* theory, needs so virtually now to lose itself, as in foreground it should do, in dispersion of regulation, as that naturally, in accordance with my own symbol, the stock-idea, raised hitherto, should now bear its broken leafage—mere fluttering passing incidents of reflection: which yet, for that reason, are the true substance that the mind must daily live on. And for such organic matter of future painting, my traced point of Providential Design is surely a sup-

plier of true basis. The mere night-idea of Deity which is that of Abstract Being,—which even under the twilight view of History is only that of Progressing Forms of Being-fractions,—now turns, for its proper daylight presenting, into the form of religious guide to us which immediately is thus close in its direction :—

Our belief in God, as the hidden essence of all Being and all Life,—while being always, as at basis, only that which is our afforder of divine strengthening against the mental tyranny, else too great for us, of the mental image of Death,—is now moulded into in fact what is likewise a very leaning on what is provably Nature's own strongest point. Our Religion for the future, namely, is cast under the immediate condition, that alone by such following of Nature's impulse of selection—alone by our taking of Religious help where *she* chooses, in regard to that special life-of-Family to which ordained Sex has given rise,—may we indeed *obtain* rightly what alone we may also *ask* rightly, of Religion : the bringing us to a right thought, and a right feeling, about Death.

END OF VOL. II.

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